April 23, 1942, at dinner
[From Hitler’s Table Talk, edited by H. R. Trevor-Roper (New York: Enigma Books, 2008).]
My opinion of the Duce—The man who best understood the Bolshevik menace—The fate awaiting Europe—The Duce’s difficulties with the Italian aristocracy—In praise of Edda Mussolini.
It will give me very great pleasure to see the Duce again and to discuss with him all the military and political problems of the day. I hold the Duce in the highest esteem, because I regard him as an incomparable statesman. On the ruins of a ravished Italy he has succeeded in building a new State which is a rallying point for the whole of his people. The struggles of the Fascists bear a close resemblance to our own struggles Did they not have, for example, six thousand six hundred dead at Verona?
The Duce is one of the people who appreciated the full measure of the Bolshevik menace, and for this reason he has sent to our Eastern front divisions of real military merit. He told me himself that he had no illusions as to the fate of Europe if the motorized hordes of the Russian armies were allowed to sweep unchecked over the Continent, and he is quite convinced that, but for my intervention, the hour of decline was approaching for Western Europe.
It is always painful to me, when I meet the Duce in Italy, to see him relegated to the rear rank whenever any of the Court entourage are about. The joy is always taken out of the reception he arranges for me by the fact that I am compelled to submit to contact with the arrogant idlers of the aristocracy. On one occasion these morons tried to ruin my pleasure at the spectacle of a dance given by the most lovely young maids from the Florence Academy, by criticizing the dancing in most contemptuous terms. I rounded on them with such fury, however, that I was left to enjoy the rest of the program in peace!
It was certainly no pleasure to me to find myself continually in the company of the Court hangers-on, particularly as I could not forget all the difficulties which the king’s entourage had put in the Duce’s way from the very beginning. And now they think they are being tremendously cunning in flirting with Britain.
Nothing, to my mind, is more typical of the ineptitude of these aristocratic loafers than the fact that not once did the Crown Princess of Italy succeed in offering me a hot and decently cooked meal! When a German hostess offers me hospitality she makes it a point of honor, however humble she may be, not only to give me an excellent meal but also to see that it is decently hot. These degenerates of the Italian aristocracy give proof of their futility in even the most elementary things in life. What a pleasure it was, in contrast, to talk to an intelligent and charming woman like Edda Mussolini! A woman of this kind shows the stuff she is made of by volunteering to be a nurse with the divisions serving on the Eastern front—and that is just what she is doing at the present moment.
[From Santi Corvaja, Hitler and Mussolini: The Secret Meetings 1934-1944.]
On the morning of April 28, 1942, Mussolini’s special train arrived at Puch, near Salzburg. The Duce and his staff, Ciano, Cavallero, and diplomat Mario Luciolli were to have accommodations in one of the wings of Klessheim Castle, the former residence of the Prince Archbishop of Salzburg and now refurbished as a luxurious hunting lodge for the Führer’s most illustrious guests. Ciano was convinced that the Germans were using art treasures stolen in France to decorate the castle.
Hitler was six paces in front of the rest of the German welcoming party waiting on the platform. Mussolini stepped off the train, quite curious to discover the reasons for such an urgent meeting. Right after the effusive greetings, the groups left for the castle, where the first discussions began at once. Hitler and Mussolini were alone at first, while Ribbentrop and Ciano, and Cavallero and Keitel, met separately. Military matters were on top of the agenda with three major issues on the table: the Italian contribution in Russia, operations in Cirenaica, and the Malta operation. On the first issue, after attempting to keep the Italian effort as low as possible with the CSIR at 60,000 men, Cavallero in the end had to accept Mussolini’s position to increase the number of divisions for political reasons. But as a final, desperate argument, Cavallero had insisted that there was hardly any transportation, which made the problem of supplies all the more acute.
This final attempt to stall the operation was immediately broken down in the conference next door between Hitler and Mussolini. Hitler at first began by praising the German soldier during the awful winter just passed on the Russian front. He also congratulated himself for his own strategic and tactical intuitions and was asking the Duce about the Italian divisions the OKW could count on in view of the renewed offensive on the Russian front. Hitler also talked about the courage displayed by the Romanians and the Hungarians who had committed 27 and 12 divisions, respectively. Mussolini answered that, as he had repeatedly promised, the brave CSIR would grow during the coming summer to a total of 227,000 men.
There would be several crack Italian divisions in the new army corps that would bear the name “Armir”: three Alpine divisions, the Tridentina, Julia, and Cunense, those very troops, Mussolini pointed out, that the Führer admired. To these would be added three infantry divisions of the Second Army Corps: Ravenna, Cosseria, and Sforzesca, plus the reserve division Vicenza. The CSIR of General Messe with its divisions, Pasubio, Torino, and Celere, which included the Bersaglieri and Savoia cavalry, would stay in place as the Thirty-fifth Army Corps. Finally, the Black Shirt Legion was to be formed out of four groups: Leonessa, Valle Scrivia, Tagliamento, and Montello. Even after requisitioning everything available, the Italian army still came short of vehicles. The Führer immediately replied that the German logistical services would make up the difference. The fate of tens of thousands of men was quickly decided, and by August 10, as planned, they would be deployed in the bloody Russian tragedy according to the plans Adolf Hitler had prepared.
The Malta problem dominated the discussions because it was closely tied to the question of Egypt. Cavallero, with General Gandin at his side, as well as military attaché to Berlin General Marras, repeated his point of view that the operation should take place as soon as possible. The Italian chief of staff sent a message to Keitel prior to the meeting in which he stated: “We must make some sacrifices to eliminate this threat. Combined with possible enemy actions in 1942 and, more realistically, in 1943, its continued presence could seriously damage Axis operations. While it is obvious that the heavy bombardment of the naval and air bases on the island has given positive results, these must be exploited before the enemy has a chance to recover or before sudden changes on the ground could alter the balance of the forces facing us.”
Cavallero’s analysis was correct. During the month of March alone, Axis bombers pounded Malta with ten times more bomb tonnage than the city of Coventry, destroyed in 1940. Churchill was aware of the threat looming over the island. In his diary he wrote: “Malta was up for grabs.” Cavallero, sensing a favorable reaction from his listeners, spent some time detailing “Esigenza C.3,” the operational plan that would lead to the occupation of Malta. The plan had been written by General Gandin, with Admiral Girosi and air force General Cappa. German and even Japanese technicians specialized in island landings had also participated in its elaboration.
Kesselring spoke right after Cavallero, confirming his support for the C.3 plan (renamed “Hercules” after its approval). Keitel, still uncertain about Hitler’s final decisions, answered that he would not be able “to immediately provide the required naval landing crafts and paratroop units.” Only the Führer could unlock the situation. Kesselring repeated to Hitler: “Malta has been neutralized by my bombers, but until it is occupied by the Italians we will be unable to stop the British air force. Our plan is now complete and has the approval of both Italians and Germans. We need your final approval.” Hitler, always sensitive to requests coming from his admirers, approved Hercules on condition that it be synchronized with Rommel. A final compromise was then reached: in May, Rommel would be given the green light in Cirenaica. Once certain Axis objectives had been reached, such as the taking of Tobruk, Hercules would begin in mid-July, after the full moon on the thirteenth. The units that would be part of Hercules were the Italian fleet under the command of Admirals Iachino, Tur, and Barone. The air force would deploy 1,506 aircraft, 666 of which would be German. General Vecchiarelli, the supreme commander, would have under him Generals Sogno and Cesare Rossi, as well as German Generals Student and Ramcke, who specialized in paratrooper and other types of airborne units. Right after the Klesseheim meeting, all units intended for the Malta operation began their transfer to Sicily. The operational plan required that it begin immediately, to be ready at day X plus 20. Naval and air attacks on the island were progressively increased.
But Hercules was destined to never see the light of day, and Malta was spared complete destruction, thanks to Rommel. On June 29, Rommel occupied Tobruk and took 35,000 British prisoners, including seven generals. He was convinced that the British Eighth Army was practically destroyed, since it had lost over seventy-five percent of its strength. Cavallero was well aware of the professional weaknesses of the Afrika Korps commander and, on the evening of the great victory in Tobruk, quickly submitted the following letter addressed to Hitler, for Mussolini’s signature:
Führer: in the naval and air offensive just completed, the enemy has endured a major defeat. The same can be said for operations in Marmarica that are about to reach a positive conclusion.
It is my opinion and certainly also yours, Führer, that we must consolidate the current results as quickly as possible. At the center of our strategic picture, there is Malta, which we have previously settled. I wish to tell you that preparations for the Malta operation are very advanced. It becomes more urgent than ever before. To make the most of the results we have achieved in the Marmarica and to prepare for future requirements, we must be able to channel our supplies in complete security. The occupation of Malta, besides solving the transportation problems in the Mediterranean, would give us full use of our air forces, now stationed and committed to the Mediterranean theater as long as Malta is controlled by the enemy. The freeing of the air force, along with the other advantages stemming from the occupation of Malta (for instance, the problem of fuel), would allow us to regain freedom of movement, a crucially important factor to achieve victory. The problem of fuel for the Italian Air Force must be examined in relation to the Malta operation, and discussions on the issue are taking place within the Italian high command. The occupation of Malta will create opportunities in this area that we will best examine once the operation is completed.
I have every reason to believe, Führer, that in spite of the considerable difficulties that I can imagine, your personal intervention will also ensure a favorable solution, since it is of vital importance for our position in the Mediterranean and its future developments. Mussolini.
The naval and air battle Mussolini was referring to was known as the “mid-June” operation and was in fact the swan song of the Italian navy. Two months later, as historian Aldo Fraccaroli pointed out, during the mid-August operation, in the middle of another and larger effort by the enemy to occupy Malta, the Italian battleships were unable to sail because of lack of fuel. Many people claimed to have led the Italian forces during the victorious battle of mid-June, Mussolini among them.
Italian forces had been successfully engaged, as evidenced by a rare British admission at the time: “Only two ships of the eastern convoy reached Malta, while the western convoy had to turn back to Alexandria after losing a destroyer, three cruisers, a support ship, and three merchant men.” This battle saw the one and only sinking of a British warship by an Italian torpedo plane. The destroyer Bedouin, after being heavily shelled by Italian destroyers, was sunk by a torpedo fired by an S.79 plane. During the “mid-August” battle, Axis success was even greater in spite of the absence of large caliber guns; the Allies lost an aircraft carrier, two cruisers, a destroyer, and nine merchant ships, while another aircraft carrier, two cruisers, and seven more ships were heavily damaged.
The letter from Mussolini and Cavallero was sent to Berlin on the evening of the Axis victory at Tobruk, and was preceded by a message from Rommel requesting permission to continue his advance to the Nile and the Pyramids, following in the steps of Napoleon. Hitler examined the entire matter for two days, and on June 23 he answered Mussolini with one of the most crucial documents of the entire war.
Duce, at this time, when militarily historic events are in the offing, I would like to explain my thoughts to you as concisely as possible regarding a decision that may have decisive impact on the course of the war. Destiny, Duce, has given us an opening that will never again become available in the same theater of operations. The fastest and most totalitarian exploitation of this advantage is our best military opportunity at this time. Up to this moment, I have always ordered our forces to pursue a defeated enemy in retreat for the longest possible time as our troop strength would allow. The British Eighth army is virtually destroyed.
At Tobruk, with its practically intact harbor and piers, you have, Duce, an auxiliary base that is all the more important in that the British themselves have built a railroad line all the way to Egypt. If we fail to pursue the remains of this British army now with the utmost effort of each soldier, we will follow a fate identical to that of the British when they lost their advantage very close to Tripoli because they diverted troops into Greece. Only this capital mistake of the British high command made our effort in reconquering Cirenaica a success.
If our forces do not march forward to the extreme limit, into the heart of Egypt, we will be faced with new, long-range American bombers able to reach Italy. At the same time, British and American forces can link together from all sides. In a short time, the situation would turn against us. But the continued pursuit of the enemy will provoke its disintegration. This time, Egypt can, under certain conditions, be taken from England. The consequences of such an event will have repercussions all over the world. Our own offensive, helped by the occupation of Sebastopol, will determine the fall of the entire eastern structure of the British Empire.
If I, Duce, can give you, in this historic moment which will not be repeated, my most heartfelt advice, it would be this: order the continuation of operations to seek the complete destruction of British forces to the very limits of what your high command and Marshal Rommel think is militarily possible with their existing troops. The goddess of fortune in battle comes to commanders only once, and he who fails to seize the opportunity at such a moment will never be given a second chance. The fact that the British, contrary to every rule of the art of war, decided to interrupt their advance on Tripoli and divert their units to another battlefield was enough to save us . . . Please, Duce, accept this request only as the advice of a friend, who has considered for many years that his fate is tied to your own and is acting in consequence. In faithful comradeship, Adolf Hitler.
Mussolini read and reread the letter. Between the lines, it ironically tried to be provocative. But in substance, it was an out-and-out order. Unsure how to react, the Duce summoned Cavallero for advice. The Italian
commander arrived at the Palazzo Venezia with Kesselring. They both remained unmoved by Hitler’s prose and begged Mussolini not to make any decision before they both had a chance to inspect the front in Cirenaica. The next day they flew to Africa.
Concerning this event, Carlo Cavallero, son of the Italian military leader, wrote:
At a meeting in Derna, on June 25, 1942, Kesselring and my father attempted to convince Rommel that because of the long distance separating them from their objectives, an advance under such conditions would not allow the Axis to fully take advantage of its success. In fact, Rommel would face a refreshed enemy, close to his bases, with a reduced and ragged Axis army that would be dangerously low in supplies.
Kesselring pointed to the difficulty of effectively supporting the Axis ground forces with the few planes he had, hundreds of kilometers from their bases. The enemy would have the advantage of being very close to his own bases. He concluded by stating: “I am very skeptical of a deep advance. If I am given the order, I shall obey, but the end result of the battle in this case is very much in doubt.”
Rommel told Mussolini’s two envoys that it was now too late to alter the battle plans. He said he had already given the green light to the units to take Marsa Matruh. However, he continued, given the very persuasive points he had heard, he would consider each of his movements nothing more than a series of “jumps” forward; he was not willing to become engaged in a “deep operation.” Rommel only spoke this way to get rid of the emissaries sent by Rome to upset his plans. Rommel also knew that the Führer was definitely on his side, so much so that from Berlin, he had been forewarned that the OKW was preparing an underhanded slap at the Duce.
On the evening of June 25, with typical Nazi arrogance, Keitel phoned the Italian high command to inform them: “The German high command cannot furnish the minimum fuel requirements which have been requested for the Malta operation.” Without even waiting for the return of Cavallero and Kesselring, Mussolini, with this piece of information, cabled Rommel that he had a free hand to move forward. The Duce was now beginning to dream of the Nile and the Pyramids. The shelving of the Hercules plan was a German decision and must rest with Marshal Rommel himself. In this entire matter, Mussolini only played a cameo role but perhaps he already saw himself on a white horse, making his own triumphant entrance into Cairo.
General von Rintelen, German military attaché in Rome, confirmed that at the Salzburg conference, Cavallero had termed the occupation of Malta a prerequisite to any successful campaign in Africa, but the Führer, after Operation Merkur over Crete, had become skeptical about paratroop landings into enemy camps that were well protected and well armed. For Hitler the supply of bridgeheads was the most difficult of all military operations. For this reason, he concluded that it was preferable to let the British stay in Malta so that the Axis could inflict even greater damage to the merchant shipping tonnage of the enemy engaged in supplying the island. Based on this analysis, confirmed by the recent victories in Africa and the Mediterranean, Hitler approved Rommel’s plan. The Field Marshal, well aware of Hitler’s views, had told him, before resuming his march toward El Alamein, that in taking Tobruk he had seized enough vehicles and fuel to reach the Nile at the enemy’s expense.
The field marshal’s enthusiasm effectively convinced Mussolini, who went to North Africa on June 29 and remained there until July 20, waiting in vain to make his own triumphant entry into Alexandria. This was to be one of most humiliating episodes in Mussolini’s life. Rommel virtually ignored the Duce’s presence in Cirenaica even though he had been invited more than once to report in person to the man who was nominally his direct commander in the Mediterranean. Cavallero, even though he cut a rather understated presence, consoled himself with his promotion to marshal of Italy.
Vittorio Mussolini was at Derna at the time and wrote about the Duce’s trip: “I reached Berta on July 1 and went straight to the small villa where my father was staying. He was in a sitting room. I hugged him affectionately and he smiled without interrupting his work. I asked him how he felt, because I saw him push his belt below his waistline and assume his usual slumped position, resting deep into the back of the chair. ‘Not too well, but maybe it’s the change of climate. If Professor Castellani were here, he’d say that I have amoebae. He specializes in diagnosing the amoebae bacteria in anyone who has visited Africa.’ At that time, Mussolini would answer questions about his health this way: ‘My ulcers are the convoys that leave Italy and never reach Libya.’
“He was in a bad mood,” wrote Vittorio, “because he had to cancel his flight to Tobruk due to the weather. I asked about his impressions of the prisoners: “Impressive looking soldiers, tall and strong, almost all of them Australians and New Zealanders, with a few British and South African units. I also saw a lot of Hindus, blacks—a few thousand in all. The commander of the camp told me he had to separate the colored troops at the request of the whites. And then we are the ones accused of being racists.’
“Something was bothering him, and in harsh tones he asked me: ‘Why is it that our command is located in positions so far removed from the front line? There are some 600 kilometers separating the fighting from the first commanding general. It’s good to be cautious, but I think they are exaggerating . . . ‘The advance came faster than they could move the command post.’ I replied, in attempting to justify the situation. ‘You’re probably right, but the troops want to see the faces of their generals, and that’s why I admire Rommel, who is always extremely active up on the front lines. He may be stubborn, rude, and gross, but he’s always among the soldiers and they appreciate it.’
“Of the situation on the front, Mussolini said: ‘Rommel has assured me that we will soon be in sight of the Nile. You know how much I hate silly optimism, but this time I want to believe it. Cavallero also thinks we’re not doing so badly even though we’re losing precious time due to transportation problems. Rommel is insisting on taking advantage as much as possible of the initial success even if it means reaching Alexandria with only one panzer. Kesselring and Bastico, the Italian supreme commander in Libya, are much more cautious; they feel we must consolidate our positions in the El Alamein depression.’
The next day the Duce received at his villa headquarters not Rommel, who was still avoiding him, but Minister Plenipotentiary Serafino Mazzolini, who was to become civilian high commissioner of Egypt once the Axis forces had taken Alexandria. This was a premature appointment, as events were to show. Mussolini justified this move ahead of time: “The Germans will be full of Teutonic pride when they reach the Pyramids, like Napoleon. The presence of the Duce in the area will serve to demonstrate that on these shores we are the ones in command.” Then Mussolini said: “I didn’t come here to be confined to this little house and wait. Rommel doesn’t show up. He has the good excuse of being engaged in battle on the front. I told Cavallero that I would like to go over there, but he doesn’t recommend it because of the rapidly changing lines. I don’t like to receive second hand information. And when there is no one around me, it means things are not going so well.”
Mussolini’s analysis of the situation at the front was far from wrong. To go and seek out Rommel would have been a humiliating gesture for him as the “Duce.” Fortunately, Cavallero was able to avoid this with a plausible excuse. Mussolini was killing time by traveling around and handing out decorations and harvesting wheat with the Italian colonists at Barce and Borgo Baracca. He finally visited the bombed-out town of Tobruk. On July 16, he held a military conference in his quarters with Cavallero, Kesselring, and Bastico. Cavallero made a pessimistic assessment: at El Alamein the attacks by Australian and New Zealand infantry had made better progress than expected. Afrika Korps tanks were now reduced to about thirty, as many as the Italian divisions Ariete and Littorio.
The breakthrough that would begin on October 23 with the offensive of General Montgomery’s Eighth Army was not far away. After meeting with the generals, Mussolini said to his son: “I have decided to go back to Italy as soon as possible, possibly tomorrow.” The crisis of the Axis had begun.
After Mussolini accepted Hitler’s veto to attack Malta, Cavallero, on July 7, transformed the Hercules plan into the C4 plan—the occupation of Tunisia. General Messe wrote about this change: “The cancellation of the occupation of Malta was one of the major mistakes of the war. The materiel and supplies which had been put together at great cost for the operation and were ready at the beginning of July were immediately assigned to other tasks. The excellent paratroop division was thrown into El Alamein and used as an infantry division. The German paratroopers of General Ramcke had the same fate.”
At the end of April 1942, during the Klessheim conference these dramatic events were still to come. The atmosphere of the meetings in the Berchtesgaden area was almost idyllic, so much so that Hitler invited the Italians to come and have tea at his residence at the Berghof. Mario Luciolli, aghast at the news that fresh Italian divisions were to go to the Russian front, was part of that group.
“We ran into snow as our cars took the mountain road toward Hitler’s residence. The German general who had just returned from the Russian front and was sitting next to me suddenly became angry and cursed the snow. It took him a few minutes to calm down, and then he said: ‘You know, when you have seen too much of something . . . ‘ He was obviously thinking about the eastern front. That ride awakened some poetic memories in my case . . . As we had tea, I noticed that the ‘Satan’ [Hitler] who was responsible for the bloodiest battles in history, was playing host with the simple courtesy of an Austrian petit bourgeois . . . ”
Ciano, worried by the excessively friendly atmosphere, became suspicious: “The cordiality of the Germans is always in reverse proportion to their good fortune . . . On the second day, April 30, after lunch, we had said all there was to say—on Great Britain, the United States, Russia, France—Hitler spoke uninterruptedly for one hour and forty minutes. There was not as single topic he did not touch upon: war and peace, religion and philosophy, art and history. Mussolini kept looking at his wristwatch, I was lost in my own thoughts, and only Cavallero, who is a model of servility, pretended to listen in rapture and nodded repeatedly. The Germans were much less able to withstand this than we were. Poor people: they had to listen to this every day, and I’m sure there wasn’t a word or gesture they didn’t know by heart. General Jodl, after a brave fight to stay awake, fell asleep on the couch. General Keitel was groggy, but he was sitting much too close to Hitler to let himself go as he would have wished.”
Cavallero, servile as he needed to be to get ahead, was privately celebrating his success after having obtained from the loquacious gentleman his approval for the operation against Malta. This was worth the small sacrifice of being the Führer’s audience for more than an hour. Had Cavallero known that Hitler’s promises had no value perhaps he would not have been so compliant. Mussolini was very happy to leave Klessheim, probably because he could see the problems besetting the Führer. He summed up the two days of meetings this way: “The German war machine is still extremely powerful, but it has suffered wear and tear. Now it will make another gigantic effort . . . ”
Mussolini left the following note: “Magnificent valor displayed by the Germans in Russia. But strategic difficulties are growing in the east for the Führer. We spoke with him about defensive actions: “We will need only a few forces to defend this front in prepared positions. The mass will be turned toward the west. Perhaps Great Britain will finally become convinced that it cannot win and will ask to negotiate.’ These are the Führer’s thoughts. For the rest, a stepping up of the submarine war, and containment on other fronts. Some hope about Turkey.”
Mussolini further confided to his son Vittorio: “The Führer is fully convinced of victory and is counting on Anglo-American resistance in the face of Stalin, a useful but dangerous ally who keeps on demanding the opening of a second front. As far as we are concerned, soon we will begin our action in Libya, and immediately after that, we will snatch Malta away from the British. The Germans will start their offensive for Leningrad and Sebastopol in June with huge troop and artillery concentrations. The very difficult winter crisis seems to be over now, and the German high command is confident in the success of the coming operations.”
On May 1, a joint communiqué was issued: “The Duce and the Führer met in Salzburg on April 29 and 30. The conversations were held in the spirit of close friendship and brotherhood-in-arms of the two peoples and the two leaders. The result has been a complete agreement regarding the situation created by the victories of the powers of the Tripartite Pact and the future course of the war by both nations. Once again, on this occasion the iron-clad decision by Italy and Germany and their allies was reaffirmed to insure the final victory with all the power of their arms.”
At the Rome cabinet meeting of May 2, Mussolini gave his version of the “two days in Salzburg” as Bottai noted: “Very long talks, on a single day up to twelve straight hours. There was a polite mention by the Duce about the Führer’s loquacity and his fluent oratorical style. The main issue was the Russian campaign where the Germans were experiencing a collapse similar to that of Napoleon. According to Hitler, Russia is the only worthy foe we have been facing. Bolshevism did, in fact, create something serious: an army that can qualitatively compete with that of Germany.”
After meeting four times in 1940 and three times in 1941, the Salzburg summit would be the only one in 1942 and marked the end of a certain sense of balance in the relationship between Hitler and Mussolini. The Führer and the Duce would meet one year later on April 7, 1943, once again at Salzburg. This meeting preceded the events of July 25 that were to overthrow Fascism. But before its unstoppable decline, the Axis was to live through the victorious summer of 1942.
Meeting in Finland, June 4, 1942
[Considered to be the only secret recording of Hitler’s voice in one-on-one, conversation thanks to the device used by Finnish intelligence, this document is interesting because of its context following the failure of Barbarossa to take Moscow and the start of the fateful second year of the war in Russia with the drive south to Stalingrad and the Caucasus. See Gerhard L. Weinberg, A World At Arms (New York: Cambridge, 2005-2010); Robert M. Citino, Death of the Wehrmacht. The German Campaigns of 1942 (Lawrence: Kansas, 2007). Baron Carl Gustav Mannerheim (1867-1951), Finnish military leader and president of Finland from 1944 to 1946.]
Recorded secretly by Finnish intelligence on the railroad dining car where the meeting took place.
Hitler: ...a very serious danger, perhaps the most serious one—its whole extent we can only now judge. We did not ourselves understand—just how strong this state [the USSR] was armed.
Mannerheim: No, we hadn’t thought of this.
Hitler: No, I too, no.
Mannerheim: During the Winter War—during the Winter War we had not even thought of this. Of course...
Hitler: (Interrupting) Yes.
Mannerheim: But so, how they—in reality—and now there is no doubt all they had—what they had in their stocks!
Hitler: Absolutely, This is—they had the most immense armaments that, uh, people could imagine. Well—if somebody had told me that a country—with... (Hitler is interrupted by the sound of a door opening and closing.) If somebody had told me a nation could start with 35,000 tanks, then I’d have said: “You are crazy!”
Mannerheim: Thirty-five?
Hitler: Thirty-five thousand tanks.
Another Voice in Background: Thirty-five thousand! Yes!
Hitler: We have destroyed—right now—more than 34,000 tanks. If someone had told me this, I’d have said: “You!” If you are one of my generals had stated that any nation has 35,000 tanks I’d have said: “You, my good sir, you see everything twice or ten times. You are crazy; you see ghosts.” This I would have deemed possible. I told you earlier we found factories, one of them at Kramatorskaja, for example, Two years ago there were just a couple hundred [tanks]. We didn’t know anything. Today, there is a tank plant, where—during the first shift a little more than 30,000, and ’round the clock a little more than 60,000, workers would have labored—a single tank plant! A gigantic factory! Masses of workers who certainly, lived like animals and...
Another Voice in Background: (Interrupting) In the Donets area?
Hitler: In the Donets area. (Background noises from the rattling of cups and plates over the exchange.)
Mannerheim: Well, if you keep in mind they had almost 20 years, almost 25 years of—freedom to arm themselves...
Hitler: (Interrupting quietly) It was unbelievable.
Mannerheim: And everything—everything spent on armament.
Hitler: Only on armament.
Mannerheim: Only on armament!
Hitler: (Sighs) Only—well, it is—as I told your president [Ryte] before—I had no idea of it. If I had an idea—then I would have been even more difficult for me, but I would have taken the decision [to invade] anyhow, because—there was no other possibility. It was—certain, already in the winter of ’39/ ’40, that the war had to begin. I had only this nightmare—but there is even more! Because a war on two fronts—would have been impossible—that would have broken us. Today, we see more clearly— than we saw at that time—it would have broken us. And my whole—I originally wanted to—already in the fall of ’39 I wanted to conduct the campaign in the west—on the continuously bad weather we experienced hindered us.
Our whole armament—you know, was—is a pure good weather armament. It is very capable, very good, but it is unfortunately just a good-weather armament. We have seen this in the war. Our weapons naturally were made for the west, and we all thought, and this was true ’till that time, uh, it was the opinion from the earliest times: you cannot wage war in winter. And we too, have, the German tanks, they weren’t tested, for example, to prepare them for winter war. Instead we conducted trials to prove it was impossible to wage war in winter. That is a different starting point [than the Soviet’s]. In the fall of 1939 we always faced the question. I desperately wanted to attack, and I firmly believed we could finish France in six weeks.
However, we faced the question of whether we could move at all—it was raining continuously. And I know the French area myself very well and I too could not ignore the opinions, of many of my generals that, we— probably—would not have had the élan, that our tank arm would not have been, effective, that our air force could not been effective from our air-fields because of the rain.
I know northern France myself. You know, I served in the Great War for four years. And—so the delay happened. If I had in ’39 eliminated France, then world history would have changed. But I had to wait ‘till 1940, and unfortunately it wasn’t possible before May. Only on the 10th of May was the first nice day—and on the 10th of May I immediately attacked. I gave the order to attack on the 10th on the 8th. And—then we had to, conduct this huge transfer of our divisions from the west to the east.
First the occupation of—then we had the task in Norway—at the same time we faced—I can frankly say it today—a grave misfortune, namely the—weakness of, Italy. Because of—first, the situation in North Africa, then, second, because of the situation in Albania and Greece—a very big misfortune. We had to help. This meant for us, with one small stoke, first—the splitting of our air force, splitting our tank force, while at the same time we were preparing, the, tank arm in the east. We had to hand over—with one stroke, two divisions, two whole divisions and a third was then added—and we had to replace continuous, very severe, losses there. It was—bloody fighting in the desert.
This all naturally was inevitable, you see. I had a conversation with Molotov [Soviet Minister] at that time, and it was absolutely certain that Molotov departed with the decision to begin a war, and I dismissed the decision to begin a war, and I dismissed him with the decision to— impossible, to forestall him. There was—this was the only—because the demands that man brought up were clearly aimed to rule, Europe in the end. (Practically whispering here.) Then I have him—not publicly... (fades out).
Already in the fall of 1940 we continuously faced the question, uh: shall we, consider a break up [in relations with the USSR]? At that time, I advised the Finnish government, to—negotiate and, to gain time and, to act dilatory in this matter—because I always feared—that Russia suddenly would attack Romania in the late fall—and occupy the petroleum wells, and we would have not been ready in the late fall of 1940. If Russia indeed had taken Romanian petroleum wells, than Germany would have been lost. It would have required—just 60 Russian divisions to handle that matter.
In Romania we had of course—at that time—no major units. The Romanian government had turned to us only recently—and what we did have there was laughable. They only had to occupy the petroleum wells. Of course, with our weapons I could not start a, war in September or October. That was out of the question. Naturally, the transfer to the east wasn’t that far advanced yet. Of course, the units first had to reconsolidate in the west. First the armaments had to be taken care of because we too had— yes, we also had losses in our campaign in the west. It would have been impossible to attack—before the spring of 1941. And if the Russians at that time—in the fall of 1940—had occupied Romania—taken the petroleum wells, then we would have been, helpless in 1941.
Another Voice in Background: Without petroleum...
Hitler: (Interrupting) We had huge German production: however, the demands of the air force, our Panzer divisions—they are really huge. It is level of consumption that surpasses the imagination. And without the addition of four to five million tons of Romanian petroleum, we could not have fought the war—and would have had to let it be—and that was my big worry. Therefore I aspired to, bridge the period of negotiations ’till we would be strong enough to, counter those extortive demands [from Moscow] because—those demands were simply naked extortion’s. They were extortion’s. The Russians knew we were tied up in the west. They could really extort everything from us. Only when Molotov visited— then—I told him frankly that the demands, their numerous demands, weren’t acceptable to us. With that the negotiations came to an abrupt end that same morning.
There were four topics. The one topic that, involved Finland was, the, freedom to protect themselves from the Finnish threat, he said. [I said] You do not want to tell me Finland threatens you! But he said: “In Finland it is—they who take action against the, friends, of the Soviet Union. They would [take action] against [our] society, against us—they would continuously, persecute us and, a great power cannot be threatened by a minor country.”
I said: “Your, existence isn’t threatened by Finland! That is, you don’t mean to tell me...”
Mannerheim: (Interrupting) Laughable!
Hitler: “...that your existence is threatened by Finland?” Well [he said] there was a moral—threat being made against a great power, and what Finland was doing, that was a moral—a threat to their moral existence. Then I told him we would not accept a further war in the Baltic area as passive spectators. In reply he asked me how we viewed our position in, Romania. You know, we had given them a guarantee. [He wanted to know] if that guarantee was directed against Russia as well? And that time I told him: “I don’t think it is directed at you, because I don’t think you have the intention of attacking Romania. You have always stated that Bessarabia is yours, but that you have—never stated that you want to attack Romania!”
“Yes,” he told me, but he wanted to know more precisely if this guarantee... (A door opens and the recording ends.)
September 5, 1942
I helped pull down Serrano Suñer—Personality of Alphonso XIII—The race of Princes—The process of selectivity in reverse—The train of the Archduke Otto—The art of cultivating idols—Serrano Suñer and the Latin Union.
Epp has just submitted a paper on the colonial problem to me. I must say, no colonies which we may obtain elsewhere in the world will compare with those which we hold in the East.
Serrano Suñer, had he been given the chance, would gradually have engineered the annihilation of the Falange and the restoration of the monarchy. His disgrace has certainly been accelerated by my recent declaration that he was an absolute swine!
Alphonso XIII was certainly a man, yet he, too, brought ruin on himself. Why, I wonder, did he not keep Primo de Rivera? I can understand most things, but I shall never understand why, when once one has seized power, one does not hold it with all one’s might!
Princes constitute a race unique in the world for the depth of their stupidity; they are the classic example of the laws of selectivity working in reverse. If the Habsburgs were to return to Hungary, they are so stupid that their presence would immediately give rise to a crisis without parallel. There are circumstances in which an attitude of passivity is absolutely untenable. With each generation, the Princes of Europe become a little more degenerate. In Bavaria this process developed into tragedy, for they eventually became insane. When all is said and done, the whole of the European royal families are descended from the old Frankish nobility, which was founded by Charlemagne and has since withered away through inbreeding. The Austrian Princes had a better chance of survival, for they were allowed to seek their wives amongst commoners.
I cannot but admire the patience of the people who tolerate such fripperies! The practice of kneeling to Royalty had at least this advantage, that it prevented the subjects from contemplating the idiot faces of their rulers!
Efforts for improving the breed of cattle never cease, but in the case of the aristocracy, the reverse obtains. The Hohenzollerns are no exception to the rule; they all have their little idiosyncrasies—not excluding our dear little A. W [Prince August Wilhelm, son of Kaiser Wilhelm II and member of the NSDAP]. There should be a law prohibiting Princes from having any intercourse with anyone, except chauffeurs and grooms!
If the crown of Brazil were offered to the Spanish Pretender, he would accept it unhesitatingly. He would become king of Sweden with the same enthusiasm! He doesn’t care a damn what the country is, as long as he is king of it! Are people like that of any real value? To browse through the archives of these families is an edifying experience; the Wittelsbachs wanted to exchange Salzach for Belgium, but the whole thing fell through thanks to a disagreement over sixty-eight acres of land, and thanks, also, to a certain degree, to the intervention of Frederick the Great, who did not wish to see the influence of the Habsburgs spread westwards. The negotiations were conducted by the Minister Kreittmeyer, which is why our friend Hanfstaengl insisted on the destruction of Kreittmeyer’s statue in Munich. I myself was opposed to it. The men of those days did not possess the national sense, as we understand it today. Ludwig I of Bavaria was the first monarch who thought in terms of the whole German Reich. For the others, dynastic interests were predominant.
The journey of Otto, the son of Zita, to Budapest reads like a novel. His suite consisted of a Hungarian nobleman—and a trumpeter, perched on the engine, who from time to time all but burst his lungs with his trumpetings! Horthy did not even deign to receive him. The whole buffoonery had been organized by Zita; its repulse was the work of Madame Horthy. I leave you to imagine for yourselves the dénouement of this grandiose undertaking! The only person whose head it entered to welcome the heroes was the brother of Franz Lehar. In Vienna, Otto would just about have been fitted to become a maître d’hôtel. If the Habsburgs had had an ounce of character they would have defended their heritage or died; as it was, they docilely surrendered their rights—and then tried to recover them by force!
Humanity cannot exist without an idol. The Americans, for instance, need to put their President on a pedestal—for as long as he remains President. The monarchies have shown themselves singularly adept at setting up this particular type of idol, and there is no doubt that the whole performance has a measure of common sense in it. It succeeds splendidly, provided always that it is backed by force and power. The Church, for example, possesses nothing but the outer trappings; its troops consist of inoffensive archers, nice fellows with broken arrows! One has only to see them marching in the Corpus Christi procession to understand why the revolutionaries of 1918 left them in peace!
When Franco appears in public, he is always surrounded by his Moorish Guard. He has assimilated all the mannerisms of Royalty, and when the king returns, he will be the ideal stirrup holder!
I am quite sure that Serrano Suñer was goaded on by the clergy. His plan was to found a Latin Union of France, Italy and Spain, and then to range it at Britain’s side—the whole to have the blessing of the Archbishop of Canterbury—and a little spicing of Communism for good measure!
I think one of the best things we ever did was to permit a Spanish Legion to fight at our side. On the first opportunity I shall decorate Muñoz Grandes with the Iron Cross with Oak Leaves and Diamonds. It will pay dividends. Soldiers, whoever they may be, are always enthusiastic about a courageous commander. When the time comes for the Legion to return to Spain, we must reequip it on a regal scale, give it a heap of booty and a handful of Russian Generals as trophies. Then they will have a triumphal entry into Madrid, and their prestige will be unassailable. Taking it all round, the Spanish press is the best in the world!
*****
Hitler and His Generals
Military Conferences
[In September 1942 Hitler instructed stenographers to record the military situation conferences, at which the detailed orders for future operations were issued. Hitler at this time took over command of Army Group A because of disagreements with some of his generals. By then the Russian army had almost cut off the Stalingrad area as a prelude to the capture of the city and the encirclement of the entire Sixth Army commanded by von Paulus. From: Helmut Heiber and David Glantz Eds., Hitler and His Generals. Military Conferences 1942-1945 (New York: Enigma Books, 2003)]
[A few hours before the beginning of this conference, Army Group Hoth began operation “Wintergewitter”—relief for Stalingrad—from both sides of Kotel’nikovo, in the southern sector of the Eastern front. Otherwise, the situation in the East has changed very little, except that the Russians are now attacking the German salient of Rzhev from the south as well, between Rzhev and Gzhatsk.]
Beginning: 12:45 p.m.
East
THE FÜHRER: Has something disastrous happened?
ZEITZLER: No, my Führer. Manstein has reached the sector2 and controls one bridge. The only attacks are against the Italians. This one regiment, which had been alerted during the night, appeared at the command post at 10 a.m. That was good, because the Italians had already thrown in all their reserve battalions.
THE FÜHRER: I have more sleepless nights because of the action here than because of the South. We don’t know what is happening.
BUHLE: They are unreliable.
ZEITZLER: Something has to be done as quickly as possible, just like yesterday evening. If the Russians had taken advantage of it, it could have turned into a catastrophe last night. The army group didn’t want to send in the regiment until early morning. So we got it at exactly 10. In the Seventeenth Army area, there wasn’t a lot going on. Agent reports are surfacing again regarding a landing in the Crimea3—they wanted to have really bad weather with snowstorms, etc.
THE FÜHRER: That is very likely. Is our Navy able to make use of such weather as well?
JODL: You cannot land there.
THE FÜHRER: The Russians do it; they can get through. We would not land in snowstorms and the like. I admit that. But I believe the Russians would do it.
KRANCKE: If it is not too bad. If there is frost and everything is icy, then it is bad. But if there is only snow and it is around freezing, then it will work.
THE FÜHRER: That works fine. That is like with fog—they land while there is fog.
ZEITZLER: Here4 there were stronger attacks by battalions. For the first time, we have received from here reports of deaths caused by exhaustion— 14 cases within 6 days. I asked them to give me the detailed documents on what this bend looks like, in case we have to decide to eliminate it. If we take it away, in my opinion, we could save most of a division. There is a huge number of battalions in there, because they are holding it pretty tightly. However, we cannot attack down here within the next few weeks, and as to supplies, we can always get in the same situation again, so that we will have just as hard a time as we are having right now.
THE FÜHRER: It depends on whether or not they get something final over there—and, secondly, they should build a final position.
ZEITZLER: If the weather was good and we drew this back, we would have a division. I worry a lot about the armored army5 down there; we need to bring some additional forces in there. We could get these here free for a while. The other thing is that the mountain regiment can’t be there before the 20th, and the Luftwaffe even later, so we don’t have much available right now.
THE FÜHRER: I’m only afraid that if we draw back now, all the materiel will be lost. Then we won’t have anything.
ZEITZLER: No, it will have to be well prepared, of course.
THE FÜHRER: The enemy will probably follow further, if they don’t have a position here.
ZEITZLER: It is a huge waste of forces, if one looks at the whole battalion. It’s awful.
JODL: All they have in there are mountain guns. Once they brought up one anti-aircraft battery and one heavy battery.
THE FÜHRER: We’ll have to see what they have.
ZEITZLER: I think that in the winter the same situation could happen here again.
THE FÜHRER: It is not very nice here in the south.6 They have to build a position.
ZEITZLER: They definitely have to work on it.
THE FÜHRER: Then we can always take it back again. What I wanted to say about this Georgian battalion or company7: I really don’t know, to tell the truth; the Georgians are people who are not Muslims. So one cannot call them a Turkish battalion. The Georgians don’t belong to the Turkish peoples. The Georgians are a Caucasian tribe that has nothing to do with the Turkish peoples. I regard only the Muslims as safe. All the others I consider unsafe. That can happen to us anywhere, so we have to be incredibly cautious. For the time being, I regard building up battalions of these pure Caucasian nations as quite risky, whereas I don’t see a danger in building up a unit consisting of only Muslims. They will always charge.
ZEITZLER: I have sent various questions down, in order to gather some experience. The Baltitz8 asked a Russian general, who was quite open, about the Georgians. He answered, “We don’t have any advantage or disadvantage because of the Georgians, but neither do you.”
THE FÜHRER: I believe that. They only think of making themselves available to all sides. Secondly, they are, according to what we hear, quite unreliable to all sides. However, I can imagine that because Stalin himself is a Georgian, quite a lot of people are attracted to the Communists. They had a kind of autonomy. The real Turkish people are Muslims. The Georgians are not a Turkish people, rather a typical Caucasian tribe, probably even with some Nordic blood in them. Despite all explanations— either from Rosenberg or from the military side—I don’t trust the Armenians, either. I consider the Armenian units to be just as unreliable and dangerous. The only ones I consider to be reliable are the pure Muslims, which means the real Turkish nations. Whether or not they are all militarily useful is a different question, which I can’t assess. (Presentation of the Armed Forces report.9)
ZEITZLER: He is getting a bit livelier down here near the First Panzer Army. He pushes forward a bit—on this front relatively little. But here there are bridge constructions in progress at seven locations, as if he has something special planned there. I already reported yesterday that the bunker and a company were destroyed here.
THE FÜHRER: Where is this position being built?
ZEITZLER: Here, my Führer. This position will save us some people. This position hardly saves us anything, actually; not a lot will be coming out of it. But this position saves people because of the mountains—according to my feeling, the entire 13th Panzer Division or the SS Viking [Panzer Grenadier Division],10 depending on which of them we want to draw out. Strangely enough, during the night a request from the army and the army group arrived. They are worried because of this thing up here, and they want to pull this in, in order to draw out the 13th Panzer Division and the Viking [Division], and to pull them in a more mobile way to Army Group South.11 I think we have to come to this decision. It is a pity to give it up, but we can take it again. We will save an entire division if they prepare this. Up here there was a surprise, insofar as it was reported in writing that they had entered up to this point. I looked into that matter. It seems that it developed from the impression that the attack up there was not successful and had to retreat. The reasons are as follows: an armored group attacked here with an infantry regiment, and proceeded quite well. A Russian armored attack came from up there against the rear or the flank, so quite a few tanks were lost—18 were destroyed initially, and this morning another 16. Altogether 5 infantry [rifle] divisions, 6 cavalry brigades and 2 tank brigades are in opposition. It seems as if he drew everything together that was here—which I reported several days ago—and that there is an army of riders here that he is putting together. That is the bulk of it. He is relatively strong here. During the night, the order went out to hold this position to the very last man, and that it is forbidden to take a single step backward.
THE FÜHRER: Tell me one more thing. Where are the tanks that were eaten up by mice back then?12
ZEITZLER: They were up there with the 22nd Panzer Division. May I now give the order for these preparations?
THE FÜHRER: The decisive thing is that we take this road.
ZEITZLER: The roadblock doesn’t do much, since there is a side road here. If we really block this army road, he can use this side road here. But including Schikola, so we have the whole thing.
THE FÜHRER: We have to remain over there, so that we have the road. That is an unpleasant thing.
ZEITZLER: We won’t be able to do it. That frees up the only reserves. I have double-checked, and the mountain regiment won’t arrive here before the 20th.
THE FÜHRER: Whether or not they will finish the thing by the 20th is also a question. If they don’t build themselves in, they will retreat here.
ZEITZLER: I think, though, that it is naturally quite strong.
THE FÜHRER: Whenever they retreat, I always fear that they will leave the materiel behind.13 Then we have troops but no materiel—leaving aside the issue of morale, because we can’t do anything with it then.
ZEITZLER: The preparation has to be divided up over several days; then we will get it back, because there is a position here with not much in it. The 16th Motorized Division has made quite a nice thrust—150 were taken prisoner and they went back with these.14
THE FÜHRER: They didn’t conduct mobile warfare down there; they left the tanks behind and didn’t do anything—position warfare.
ZEITZLER: We could have moved the flanks much further forward.Relatively little on this front. I have settled this thing with the retreat order.It will now be diluted a bit. He wanted to give the order to retreat. (Presentation.)
Thrust on Stalingrad
The situation here15 has developed like this: this morning Field Marshal Manstein phoned me. He holds the bridge at this village. A little bit of pressure is already beginning against the 23rd Panzer Division. That is probably because of the troops that were brought in. The resistance here was not terribly strong. During the course of the day today, though, there was some quite heavy fighting. He took Rychkovskii. That is unfortunate because of the bridge. That was the connection we wanted to make over to this place. The attack has also spread out further to here, while on the whole, it has relaxed. We listened in on a radio message from the 8th Cavalry Corps and heard that they want to shift into defense posture. Up here it is still unclear what he is actually doing. One could regard it as a reaction to our radio operation, since it was especially high during the days before we lined up for the attack. But one could also see it as him wanting to do something. Attacks against the Sixth Army were mainly in this area here. Field Marshal Manstein called today about the coming of this attack,16 and he put it down on paper as reiteration and sent it. (Presentation.17)
THE FÜHRER: He has 80 kilometers as the crow flies.
ZEITZLER: He sent it as a written document. Perhaps you could read it. The 16th (likely referring to the 6th Panzer Division); is not up for discussion. If we pull the 16th out, the entire Romanian front will collapse, and we’ll never get it right again. Maybe he thinks that because there is a gap, the panzer army can send something in there. Otherwise, I’m surprised that he actually came up with this suggestion.
THE FÜHRER: We’ll have to wait and see what he has in the way of forces. After all, he has two strong divisions. One of them has 95, the other 138 tanks.
ZEITZLER: Of course, there is a risk, if two divisions are drawn out.
THE FÜHRER: I admit that—without doubt. However, he has Luftwaffe units there as well, and something has to come out here. When is the next infantry division coming?
ZEITZLER: It will be a long time—8 days—before we have them. We had hoped that the 11th Panzer Division would be able to go in there. That would be tolerable. If it can’t go there, the two armored divisions18 will be left behind. This 23rd [Panzer Division] is getting bitten into from the flank and will have to do it. The only one left is the 6th (Panzer]. It’s particularly difficult when the counterattacks come and the connection is supposed to be maintained. If we take away the 17th [Panzer] from up there, then a risk is created there, too. But the attack of two panzer divisions can wait, and it is possible that we will be forced after 2 days to pull in the 17th [Panzer], and then maybe a day will have been lost.
THE FÜHRER: He wanted to put the 17th [Panzer Division] in here.
ZEITZLER: He wanted to pull this one in here and take this one over here.
THE FÜHRER: Actually, the 17th [Panzer Division] is of no value.
ZEITZLER: If any of them is, then it’s the 11th [Panzer Division].
THE FÜHRER: It has only 45 tanks.
ZEITZLER: So far it had 49. Only a few have broken down. It has one detachment located up here, and we could add a regiment of the 306th [Infantry Division] as a temporary measure.
THE FÜHRER: When did the 11th [Panzer] lose so many tanks? It used to have 70 or 80 tanks up there.
ZEITZLER: As far as I know, it came down with 49 tanks.
THE FÜHRER: There are breakdowns again.
ZEITZLER: Of course, there are always short breakdowns, which last for a day. In such weather the number increases again the next day.
HEUSINGER: The 11th Panzer Division once had 57 down here.
THE FÜHRER: They left up there with 73 or 75.
ZEITZLER: I will check it again. I don’t know the number by heart. From my experience, in this kind of weather one generally has to count on 10 to 20 missing tanks.
THE FÜHRER: I want to hear the rest of the situation first. I will come back to this matter at the end.
Don front
ZEITZLER: On the whole, nothing else is going on here. With the Italians, it turned out yesterday that they had been in it after all, and dug a hole of 1,200 meters. Afterwards they marched here during the night, arrived at 10 a.m. and are now able to join in if something happens. The situation seems to be more or less under control. If attacks start here during the morning, it will be a good thing that the regiment is located here. He attacked again; yesterday he sought some contact here, and this morning here. Here he entered a bit. In reaction to this, the army group acted quickly and independently. They deployed a regiment of the 385th Infantry Division and gave the 385th the command in this small sector so that the “Cosseria” is free. I think this is right. There were only small thrusts there. He made a small advance west of Svoboda, came in a bit and left again. At the moment, one gets the impression that he is not really done here yet. It is also possible that this is only a holding action somehow. But with the Italians, one never knows what will come out of it. He can make a small tactical attack and be successful after all.
THE FÜHRER: Here they’ve been driven back everywhere?
ZEITZLER: Only at this spot. A regiment of the 385th [Infantry] Division is deployed here, and the 385th Division took over command.
THE FÜHRER: But there is a steep escarpment.
ZEITZLER: Yes, actually it was safe from tanks. He is not reported to have appeared with tanks.
THE FÜHRER: If we had had 14 days, these units would have been there. I wanted to give these tanks to the Italians. Actually, it is really a loss of 14 days. But on the other hand, to put three more German divisions in here, you know—until the railway functioned better, it would have been difficult to feed this.
ZEITZLER: The supply situation is already starting to get a bit tense. We already had a difficult supply situation back then. Now we have troop transports there. We actually have to juggle with the Quartermaster General every evening, whether to put those trains in there.
THE FÜHRER: Has this branch been completed?
ZEITZLER: The railway is done.
THE FÜHRER: Completely done?
ZEITZLER: Yes.
THE FÜHRER: Over the whole way?
ZEITZLER: Yes, it is already in use. It has some minor defects. It has not been completely graveled. Everything will be pressed out that can possibly be pressed out. I have set up supply trains instead of some troop transports. They will join this rail transport.
THE FÜHRER: If one looks at all the danger points, this front19 is still the greatest danger. It is our weakest ally, and there is nothing behind it in places. The Schulte brigade is arriving now, and then our escort battalion.20 The Schulte brigade will be pressed in somehow, in order to hold there, at least. That is a small block. But if they evade infantry attacks without tanks in a territory where they are quite good because of their colossal artillery power, then I have to be pessimistic. How is the “Cosseria,” actually?
ZEITZLER: As far as I know, 6 battalions.
JODL: A normal division, which has just arrived today. It has not been in action yet.
THE FÜHRER: And the Cuneense?
JODL: That is the Alpine [mountain troops] division.
HEUSINGER: There are three Alpine divisions.
THE FÜHRER: They will be better. [—] And the Celere?
JODL:Celere, Torino, and Pasubio21 are the old ones. The March 23 division is the Fascists.
ZEITZLER: There is one January 3 division and one March 23 division.
JODL: Those are the Fascist divisions.22
THE FÜHRER: Have they been taken out, or are they in there at the front?
JODL: They have them as reserves, and here they put the reserve battalion into action.
ZEITZLER: The 27th Panzer Division is not quite complete either. It’s not doing a whole lot. It looks better on the map than it does in reality.
THE FÜHRER: I’ve been thinking about something. Here there is nothing more. If he starts here, then there’s nothing left.
ZEITZLER: At most, we could put only a regiment of the 306th [Infantry] Division down there. That is the only way out of it. The army group suggested that they pull this one regiment group down to here. Then there would be something here tomorrow, and here we would have to pull in this regiment to here.