Hitler and His Generals—1942
1. No record of such a conversation has been found and it seems extremely doubtful that one took place on the date and in the manner described by Hitler. The only meetings between Hitler and Coulondre immediately before the outbreak of the war were on August 25 and 26, 1939. See Robert Coulondre, De Staline à Hitler (Paris: Hachette, 1950), pp. 287-292.
2. This is a reference to a speech by Lord Halifax in Atlanta, Ga., on Apr. 23, 1941; see Royal Institute of International Affairs, Bulletin of International News, vol. XVIII (1941), pp. 607-608.
3. General Vogl was Chairman of the German Armistice Commission in Wiesbaden.
4. In telegram No. 1468 of May 14 Abctz reported that Darlan had suggested that the German supply material for Libya be brought to the French army arsenal at Toulon and from there be shipped to the arsenal at Bizerte.
5. In French in the original.
6. For Benoist-Méchin’s role at the Hitler-Darlan meeting, see Jean-Louis Aujol, Le Procès Benoist-Méchin: Compte rendu, sténographique avec un Avant-propos et une lettre d’inculpé à son défenseur, pp. 149 fl.
Hitler and His Generals—1942
1. Transcript number unknown—Fragment No. 8—A partially burned shorthand record, the transcription of which was only possible with gaps.
2. Aksai sector.
3. The year before, during the siege of Sevastopol’, the Russians had attempted two landings in the Crimea, which were thought to be relief efforts: on December 29, 1941, at Kerch and Feodosiia, where the Kerch Peninsula was lost until May 1942, and on January 5, 1942, at Evpatoriia, where the attacking Russian forces were thrown back into the sea after a three-day fight. Later, especially during this Stalingrad winter, no Russian landings occurred.—Source: Tippelskirch, pp. 276 ff.
4. Probably in the western Caucasus.
5. First Panzer Army.
6. Meaning the First Panzer Army again.
7. Already at the end of 1941, Professor von Mende from the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories had created commissions with Turkestani and Caucasian emigrants and had given orders to search for Turkestanis and Caucasians in the prisoner-of-war camps—of whom the great majority, however, had already been “specially treated as Asians” by the SD Einsatzcommandos. Under the code name “Bergmann units,” Captain Prof. Oberländer formed units with the people who had been collected; these units were supposed to support the German forces in their home territories during the following campaign. In the spring of 1942, the Armed Forces High Command finally give permission to set up regular legions of Turkestanis, North Caucasians, Armenians, Azerbaijanis, Georgians and Volga Tatars, after military command posts had already started doing so on their own. Like all the other “Eastern troops,” these units were under German commanders; however, they were also interspersed from the position of company commander down with noncommissioned officers of the concerned nationalities. These minorities from the Eastern areas always had the support of the Ministry for the East, as the ministry wished to weaken the dangerous numerical superiority of the Russian military areas. Initially, however, all attempts to use people from the Eastern nations met with stiff opposition from Hitler. But due to the developments of the war, eventually more and more of these units were set up within the Wehrmacht as well as the Waffen SS. Altogether, approximately 100,000 Caucasians were armed by 1945, of which 48,700 were in the legions and field battalions, 21,500 in building and supply units, 25,000 in German units and 7,000 in the Waffen SS and Luftwaffe.—Source: Thornwald: Wen sie…, passim; as well as the material collected by Thornwald, which was stored in the IfZ (particularly the Caucasian Committee report of March 26, 1945); NOKW-1604 and further numerous Nbg. [Nuremberg?] documents.
8. Cannot be identified. Colonel von Pannwitz could possibly be meant here.
9. The Armed Forces report was prepared by the Press and Propaganda Department of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, and was regularly checked by Hitler before being released for publication.
10. The 5th SS Panzer Division Viking (until the summer of 1942 a panzer grenadier division) was the first SS unit with European volunteers. In November 1940 the division was established—under Steiner, who would later be SS Obergruppenführer—out of the Germania regiment of the SS Support Division and troops from other sources. Up to half of its members were Dutch, Danish, Norwegian and Flemish. From June 1941 on, the division was deployed in the southern part of the Eastern front.—Source: Order of Battle, p. 389; Hausser, pp. 41 and 46.
11. A transcription error occurred here. There was no Army Group South at that time, as Manstein’s Army Group Don was not renamed “South” until February 14, 1943. This part had been corrected in the text; originally it said, “to the south.” The stenographers probably corrected it erroneously.
12. Allusion to the supposedly belated intervention (claimed by Hitler and also pursued in legal action) of a German panzer division during a Russian attack on the Romanian Third Army on November 19-20, 1942.
13. Hitler’s fear of losing a great deal of materiel during a retreat was not without merit. Aside from the fact that materiel always gets lost in retreats that are not planned far in advance; this danger was considerably increased due to motorization. Tanks and motorized vehicles that could not be driven had to be abandoned in great numbers, as they often could not be transported back. These vehicles were especially hard to replace, however, as this type of production was affected by the German war economy bottleneck. Bad weather—for example, periods of mud—considerably increased the losses. On top of that, propaganda exaggeration of German armaments had relaxed the troops’ attitude toward materiel losses, which had initially been quite careful. Aside from such considerations, Hitler was also in principle opposed to backward movements—especially since he succeeded, through a draconian order, in stopping the German front from continuing its retreat from Moscow during the Russian winter of 1941-42, and probably prevented a collapse of even greater proportions. He applied this experience equally and increasingly to all situations, all seasons, and all theaters of war. In reality, however, the constantly changing assumptions and the refusal to allow any retreat—and the resulting repeated encirclement of entire armies—led to heavy losses of both men and materiel during the course of the war, not to mention the effect on morale.
14. The 16th Motorized Division supported the deep northern flank of the 1st Panzer Division in the Kalmyk steppe at Elista in the northern Caucasus.—Source: Manstein, p. 358.
15. The thrust of Army Group Hoth (Fourth Panzer Army and the remains of the Romanian Fourth Army) in the direction of Stalingrad. On November 24, Hitler forbade the Sixth Army from breaking out of Stalingrad, which it was already prepared to do. The following day, Field Marshal von Manstein was taken away from Leningrad and moved to the south, together with his Army Headquarters. There, the Fourth Panzer Army, the Sixth Army (which was encircled at Stalingrad), and the remains of the Romanian Third and Fourth Armies were assembled together in the newly created “Army Group Don” and placed under his command. While the General Staff was arguing with Hitler for permission for the Sixth Army to break out, Manstein put together an attack group in the area of both sides of Kotel’nikovo, 150 km south of Stalingrad, under the command of General Hoth. This group consisted—in addition to the mostly useless remains of the Romanian VII and VI Army Corps—initially only of the LVII Panzer Corps with the 6th Panzer Division brought in from France, and also the 23rd Panzer Division, which had slowly been moving there from the Caucasus since December 1. Later, the 17th Panzer Division was also added. Originally, Hoth’s forces east of the Don and Hollidt’s forces west of the river were supposed to lead the relief attack. The beginning of the attack was delayed, however, because of the weather—rain and a few degrees above freezing—because of the slow arrival of the 23rd [Panzer], and because of the uncertainty about the 17th Panzer Division. Because of the situation in Stalingrad, Hoth decided to line up on December 12. At the same time, according to Manstein’s plan, General Hollidt was supposed to attack in a generally eastward direction from the small Chir bridgehead at Verkhne-Chirskii, turning the Russians away and holding up some of their forces. The Sixth Army was to line up for an attack at its southern front in order to establish a connection with the Army Group Hoth, once this group had approached within 30 kilometers—to the outer defense ring—since the stores of fuel available in the Pocket wouldn’t allow the tanks to operate extensively. By establishing the “corridor,” the Sixth Army was supposed to receive reinforcements and supplies, allowing the ring around Stalingrad to be completely destroyed under double pressure from inside and outside. Stalingrad and the Volga position would still remain under German control. For all practical purposes, however—as Manstein and the Army General Staff acknowledged—breaking out in the direction of the relief army would have involved a direct pursuit of the Russians, and with that the abandonment of Stalingrad. Hitler would basically have to accept that, just as he had done in other cases.—Source: Tippelskirch, pp. 314ff.; Manstein, pp. 353f. and 359ff.; Schröter, pp. 98ff.
16. This reference is again to the Army Group Hoth attack.
17. At that time, Manstein often transmitted such situation assessments in short intervals via the teletypewriter, in order to emphatically state his opinion to Führer Headquarters. One such assessment, regarding the situation three days before, on December 9, 1942, was published by Manstein in his Verlorenen Siegen, pp. 651ff. He also described the circumstances of the reinforcement for the relief attack on Stalingrad in detail in the following text. The importance of this problem justifies the inclusion of Manstein’s statement also, as a comparison:
The second question was the reinforcement of the relief forces. Reinforcement of the Fourth Panzer Army was essential after it became obvious that of the seven divisions originally promised for a relief attack by Army Detachment Hollidt, at most the XXXXVIII Panzer Corps with two divisions would be available for this purpose. It didn’t require a long discussion to determine that with only two divisions (the 6th and 23rd Panzer Divisions) it would not reach Stalingrad.
There were two possibilities for reinforcement. The Army Group High Command requested again and again that Army Group A send the III Panzer Corps with its two panzer divisions, which would be out of place in the mountains anyway. This request was always refused …
The second possibility for a timely reinforcement of the Fourth Panzer Army for its thrust toward Stalingrad consisted of the Army High Command bringing in new forces. The 17th Panzer Division, and behind it the newly established 306th Infantry Division, were approaching Army Group Don. The former could have just managed to line up against Stalingrad, because of the delay suffered by the LVII Panzer Corps at Kotelnikovo. But the Army High Command gave the order to unload the division as a reserve behind the army group’s left wing, as it feared—not without good reason—that a crisis would develop in the case of a full-scale enemy attack, which seemed imminent. However, one could not have both things at the same time: success for the 4th Panzer Division and security from a crisis on the left wing of the army group—which the 17th Panzer Division, if it joined in, would not be able to control anyway. We preferred the success of the Fourth Panzer Army, while Hitler opted for the false security that he hoped to achieve by holding back the 17th Panzer Division. As a result, the division—when Hitler finally released it, after the arrival of the 306th Division, which was following it, joined the Fourth Panzer Army too late for the first part of the relief attack. Perhaps the decisive opportunity was lost there because of this! …
It was a race to see whether the relief troops—the Fourth Panzer Army— would succeed in holding out their hand to the Sixth Army east of the Don before the enemy forced the break-up of the relief operation. If they were successful in overrunning our weak front at the Chir or the left wing of the army group (Army Detachment Hollidt) or the right wing of Army Group B, it would open up the opportunity to cut off all the rear connections of Army Group Don and Army Group A at Rostov.
Launching and sustaining an attack operation east of the Don in the direction of Stalingrad—with the danger described above posing more and more of a threat—must have meant taking a risk that we had rarely dared to take before. I don’t think Hitler recognized the real significance of the risk at that time. Otherwise, he probably would have taken more drastic steps, at least for a reinforcement of the Fourth Panzer Army, in order to bring rapid relief for the Sixth Army. Instead, everything he did, as General Zeitzler himself says, ‘was always to throw a monkey-wrench in our plans.’ For example, when he held the 17th Panzer Division back for decisive action in the wrong place, or released the 16th Motorized Division far too late, as was already mentioned earlier. Hitler constantly claimed that the General Staff—meaning the generals—could only ‘calculate’ and not risk. There is probably no better proof against this claim than the risk which the High Command of Army Group Don took when it ordered the thrust of the Fourth Panzer Army on Stalingrad, and when it held out until the very last possible moment in a situation which could have meant the destruction of the entire German southern wing …
While east of the Don the LVII Panzer Corps, which was intended for the relief attempt, was completing its assembly around Kotelnikovo, the enemy had been attacking our front at the lower Chir, west of the Don, with heavy forces since December 10. It became obvious that the XXXXVIII Panzer Corps would not be freed from this front to move out of the Chir-Don Bridgehead and work together with the LVII Panzer Corps.
Thus, the lining up of the LVII Panzer Corps became even more urgent. After the corps had completed its discharge and assembly around Kotelnikovo—in heavy fights against strong hostile forces, which tried to break up the final linking—and had destroyed the enemy to a great extent, the corps started off for the attack in the direction of Stalingrad on December 12. Its flanks covered the Romanian VII Army Corps to the east along the Volga and the Romanian VI Army Corps to the west up to the Don. It seemed as if the attack came as a surprise to the enemy—at least he probably didn’t expect it so early. At first the corps made quite good progress, but the enemy quickly brought up forces from the Stalingrad area. He didn’t restrict himself to defense at all, but constantly tried to counterattack and retake the territory that had been won by our two armored divisions, or he tried to encircle parts of them with his tanks, which outnumbered ours by far. The LVII Panzer Corps succeeded again and again in destroying strong groups of enemy forces. In the course of this unpredictable battle, a key decision was not made until December 17— when the 17th Panzer Division east of the Don was finally able to join in the operation. Under constant urging from the Army Group High Command, the Army High Command had finally released the division from its unloading area behind the left wing of the army group. However, the division had quite a long march to the Don Bridge at Potemkinskaya and across, before it could attack east of the Don.”—Source: Manstein, pp. 357ff.
18. Army Group Hoth.
19. The reference is to the front at the Don, which had been taken by the Italians.
20. It was these two weak “last reserves.” The leader of the Schulte brigade, mentioned frequently in the following text, could not be identified. The Führer Escort Battalion was a fully motorized Army battalion. It consisted of selected officers, non-commissioned officers and troops, and it was reinforced by tanks, assault guns, anti-tank guns and light anti-aircraft. Generally they were assigned to protect the Führer Headquarters, but in particularly critical situations, such as in this case, they were also often temporarily sent to the front.
21. Regarding the Italian divisions on the Eastern front. The Italian divisions were named in part after provinces (for example: Piemonte, Calabria, Sicilia, Puglie), in part named after towns (for example: Roma, Napoli, Como, Cremona, Pavia, Siena, Verona), and sometimes they also had other names like Re, Regina, Cacciatori degli Alpi, Lupi di Toscana, etc. So the names were not synonymous with their places of origin.
22. During the reorganization of the Italian infantry divisions from three to two infantry regiments in 1938-39, plans called for each division to be assigned two militia battalions in case of mobilization. The reference here is to the so-called Black Shirt battalions, 132 in all at the end, which had been formed by members of the “Fascist Militia,” a party organization. This extension of the army divisions was actually carried out at the beginning of the war, but it did not prove effective in the least. The four militia divisions 3 Gennaio, 23 Marzo, 28 Ottobre, and Giovani Fascisti were set up from the spare Black Shirt battalions and all of them were stationed in Africa. The two divisions mentioned first were destroyed during an English attack in December 1940. Both divisions—“March 3” is a mistake it must be “March 23”—were later reestablished and were transferred together with the Italian 8th Army to the Ukraine. A fifth militia division was the Armored Militia Division “M,” which was set up in the spring of 1943 in Italy and which was trained by SS staff and received German materiel. Hitler and Himmler wanted it to be a special Lifeguard unit for Fascism and particularly for Mussolini, but it was not used.—Source: Martin, p. 70; Rintelen, p. 55.
Hitler and His Generals—1943
1. Meaning before the start of the actual situation conference, because initially only Hitler, General Zeitzler and Lieutenant Colonel Engel were present.
2. The question was whether or not the Donets area—whose wealth of coal, in Hitler’s opinion, would be of decisive importance for either the German or Soviet war effort—could be held. On January 18, Zeitzler had suggested to Hitler for the first time the possibility of evacuating the area, as there was the danger of a huge gap developing in the front between Voronezh and Voroschilovgrad after the collapse of the Hungarian Second Army, and Army Group Don was thus threatened with encirclement. In a long-distance call with Zeitzler the following day, Manstein identified timely relief from the direction of Khar’kov as a prerequisite for holding onto the Donets area. If forces for this purpose could not be freed up in time from the Armed Forces High Command theaters, from Army Groups North and Center or through new call ups at home, or if the railway systems did not permit such a rapid assembly of forces, the district could not be held, and the attempt to remain anyway—isolated on the lower Don and on the Donets—would be an operational mistake. In a teletype message to the Army High Command the day before this conference, Manstein had expressed his opinion once more: the timely defeat of the enemy northeast of Khar’kov, before the beginning of the muddy period, or—if, as unfortunately might be assumed, the forces were insufficient for that—the abandonment of at least the eastern part of the Donets region.—Source: Manstein, pp. 430ff.
3. The SS Panzer Corps’ divisions assembled in Khar’kov to push into the rear of the enemy forces advancing on the German Donets] front. So far, however, only the General Command, the 2nd SS Panzer Division Das Reich, and parts of the First SS Panzer Division Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler had arrived. The rapid advance of the Soviets and the threat it posed to the assembly area, however, frustrated the planned concentrated counterattack by the corps.—Source: Manstein, p. 435; Hausser, p. 82.
4. The 13th Panzer Division belonged in principle to the First Panzer Army, whose withdrawal to Rostov, in order to strengthen the threatened Army Group Don, was finally agreed to by Hitler on January 24. But the 50th Infantry Division—which was also under the command of the First Panzer Army—could no longer make the connection as a result of this hesitation, and had to join the unit of the Seventeenth Army that was withdrawing to the Kuban. After much vacillation, Hitler then decided that the 13th Panzer Division should go with Army Group A back to the isolated Kuban bridgehead, which Hitler considered particularly important due to the Crimea’s influence on the attitude of Turkey.—Source: Manstein, p. 429.
5. The following discussion applies to the suggestion to pull the front back in the southern sector, thus abandoning the Donets area. Hitler had strongly emphasized the need to significantly increase German armament production, because he realized—to a certain extent—that from the beginning of 1943, American armament production would accelerate dramatically. Because the production increase seemed possible in the long term only with the help of the Donets area, extensive production programs had been planned for the region; these programs would disappear if the area were evacuated. But one has to bear in mind that the discussion refers to plans only, because in reality—and this was also indicated in a memorandum by Speer written at this time, possibly as a result of this meeting— successful economic use of the Donets area had not been achieved thus far, because the destruction was too extensive and repairs were therefore very difficult. Only in the coal mining sector were some successes achieved; however, after the ore mining and steel production did not materialize, a grotesque situation arose that—because of the great distances—the locomotives transporting the coal away were using almost as much coal as they were pulling.
6. Meaning per battalion sector.
7. In the context of this discussion about the clearance of the Don River’s mouth and the eastern Donets basin to the Mius River—requested by Manstein in order to reinforce the west wing of Army Group Don, which was continually threatened by encirclement—Hitler refers here to the previous disagreements concerning the withdrawal of Army Group A from the Caucasus after the collapse of the southern sector of the Eastern Front. The First Panzer Army and the Seventeenth Army constituted Army Group A; the former retreated past Rostov and reinforced the defense of the Fourth Panzer Army and Army Detachment Hollidt, while the latter withdrew to the Kuban bridgehead. Although Hitler claims here to have saved Army Group v. Kleist, that is not quite in accordance with the facts, as it required several requests—and took literally until the last minute—to obtain permission from him to withdraw from the Caucasus. Thus, the last incomplete sentence is particularly unclear.—Source: Manstein, pp. 379ff.; Tippelskirch, pp. 320ff.
8. The Reich Division (Second SS Panzer Division) was an SS support division, formed in 1939 from the SS support troops after the end of the Polish campaign. After the Western campaign, the division received the sobriquet Reich, and later Das Reich. The division fought under Küchler in France, was among the first German units to invade Belgrade a year later, and was deployed until March 1942 in Russia with Army Group Center. After being refitted in France, the unit was transferred again to the East and in March 1943 took part in the battles in the Ukraine (Khar’kov), after June 1944 on the invasion front, and in Hungary in 1945.—Source: Hausser, passim; Order of Battle, p. 337.
9. The following discussion refers to the Russian report that Field Marshal Paulus and other generals, including v. Seydlitz and Schmidt, were captured in the southern pocket of Stalingrad.
10. General Giraud—who had already been in German captivity during World War I, and escaped from a field hospital—on May 19, 1940, drove into the headquarters of the Ninth Army, which he had taken over, without knowing that it was already occupied by German troops. He was captured by German officers and imprisoned. Later, through his successful escape from the Königstein fortress, he added considerably to the strain of the Berlin-Vichy relations.—Source: Aron, p. 513 and others; Abetz, p. 235; Munzinger Archive.
11. On January 26, the Soviets had attacked the pocket at Stalingrad—which was stretched the furthest in the north-south direction—in the middle, and finally divided it in two. After January 27 at 2 a.m., there was no further connection between the main pocket and the troops of the XI Army Corps under General of Infantry Strecker, which were pushed together around the tractor factory in the north of Stalingrad. On February 2 at 11 a.m., the Russians lined up for the final attack on the tractor factory, after the main pocket had surrendered two days before. Three hours later a German reconnaissance aircraft reported: “No further combat action in Stalingrad.”—Source: Schroter, pp. 196 and 231ff.
12. Arthur Schmidt; born October 25, 1895; studied architecture at Karlsruhe Technical College; 1914 war volunteer, 26th Infantry Regiment; activated and taken into the Reichswehr; 1937 Lieutenant Colonel and Ia [Operations officer], VI Army Corps; 1939 Ia, Fifth Army (after November Eighteenth Army); 1940 Colonel and Chief of the General Staff, V Army Corps; June 1942 Major General and Chief of the General Staff, Sixth Army; and January 17, 1943 Lieutenant General. Contrary to Hitler’s fears, Schmidt did not cooperate with the Soviets and also did not join the National Committee later. He returned to Germany in 1955 from Soviet imprisonment.—Source: DNB of Jan. 14, 1943; Order of Battle, p. 620; Das deutsche Heer, p. 118; Rangliste 1944-45, p. 24; Manstein, p. 365; Keilig 211/297.
13. Hitler’s Luftwaffe Adjutant v. Below had received this letter from a relative who had been a general staff officer in a unit in Stalingrad.
14. Friedrich Paulus; born September 23, 1890; 1911 Second Lieutenant; during World War I mostly in adjutancy and general staff; 1918 Captain, Reichswehr; 1931 Major in RWM; 1933 Lieutenant Colonel; 1934 Commander, Motor Transport Detachment, Wünsdorf; 1935 Colonel and Chief of General Staff, Armored Troops Command; 1939 Major General and Chief of Staff, Fourth Army Group (later Sixth Army); 1940 Lieutenant General and 1st Senior Quartermaster in the Army General Staff; January 1942, General of Panzer Troops and Commander-in-Chief, Sixth Army; November 30, 1942 Colonel General; and January 30, 1943 Field Marshal. On the following day capitulated in Stalingrad. Paulus declared after the execution of the July assassins that he had joined the National Committee to Liberate Germany. He was released in November 1953 from Soviet captivity and took up residence in Dresden, where he died on February 1, 1957.—Source: Army High Command staff files (Nbg. Dok. NOKW-141); Munzinger Archive.
15. Walter v. Seydlitz-Kurzbach; born August 22, 1888; 1910 Second Lieutenant; 1930 Major and Adjutant to the Chief of the Army Weapons Office; 1936 Colonel and Commander, 22nd Artillery Regiment; Major General; 1940 Commander, 12th Infantry Division; 1941 Lieutenant General; spring 1942 Commander, Special Corps Demiansk; May 1942 Commanding General, LI Army Corps; and June 1942, General of Artillery. In Soviet captivity, Seydlitz became president of the German Officers’ Association and vice president of the National Committee to Liberate Germany, but he refused after the dissolution of the committee to take a position in the German Soviet zone. In October 1955 he was released from captivity.—Source: Munzinger Archive; Seemen; Order of Battle, p. 626; Das deutsche Heer, p. 479; Keilig 211/317.
16. Hans Hube; born October 29, 1890; 1910 Second Lieutenant, 26th Infantry Regiment; lost an arm during World War I; Reichswehr; 1936 Colonel and Commander of an infantry school; October 1939 Commander, 3rd Infantry Regiment; 1940 Major General and Commander, 16th Panzer Division; 1942 General of Panzer Troops and Commanding General, XIV Panzer Corps; summer 1943 in Sicily as commander of Group Hube; and after November 1943 Commander-in-Chief, First Panzer Army in the East. On April 21, 1944, after being promoted to Colonel General and being awarded the Diamonds, Hube was killed in a fatal accident—which he himself caused—on a return flight from the Führer Headquarters (Berchtesgaden). As Commanding General of the XIV Panzer Corps Hube had left the Stalingrad pocket on December 28, 1942, in order to receive the Swords award and had reported to Hitler on this occasion about the situation in Stalingrad. He did return into the pocket, but was flown out again on January 18, 1943, in order to manage the overall supply of Stalingrad.—Source: Schroter, pp. 150 and 203; Manstein, pp. 382f. and 553; Seemen; Munzinger Archive; Das deutsche Heer, p. 804; Keilig 211/145.
17. Hitler’s information agrees with the suicide statistics published in the statistical yearbooks of the German Reich (1932–1939/40). There, with surprising consistency, the following numbers are given (after 1935 including the Saar area and Austria):
1930 ..... 17,880
1931 ..... 18,625
1932 ..... 18,934
1933 ..... 18,723
1934 ..... 18,801
1935 ..... 20,928
1936 ..... 21,984
1937 ..... 22,171
1938 ..... 22,398
18. On January 8, Lieutenant General Rokossovsky had sent Colonel General Paulus, via his representatives, a request for capitulation—which expired on January 9 at 10 a.m.—promising the Sixth Army life and safety, return to their homeland or to any country after the end of war, normal provisions, and the preservation of their personal belongings, uniforms, badges of rank and decorations. Paulus did not reject this request immediately, but sent it to the Führer Headquarters and asked for freedom to act as he saw fit. Not until the following day was the Soviet ultimatum refused, on Hitler’s orders.—Source: Schroter, pp. 153ff.
19. As far as it could be deciphered from the individual legible words, Hitler explained further that it must be clear to everyone and impressed upon everyone that a surrounded fortification must fight to the very end. (Note by the stenographer.)
20. These words, according to the recollection of the stenographer, probably refer to Udet, who committed suicide after he failed in his role as the general in charge of aviation production.
21. Karl Becker; born December 14, 1879; 1900 Second Lieutenant; 1908 Instructor at the Berlin-Charlottenburg Military Technical Academy; 1911 Assistant in the Artillery Experimentation Commission; 1914 Captain and Battery Chief (42-cm mortar); 1916 Head of the Ballistics Office of the Artillery Experimentation Commission in the Reichswehr: Army Weapons Office; studied at the Berlin Technical College (1922 Diploma and Doctor of Engineering; 1921 Major in Weapons and Equipment Inspection; 1930 Colonel and Head of the Ballistics and Ammunition Detachment in the Army Weapons Office; instructor and 1932 honorary professor at the University of Berlin; 1933 full professor of Defense Technology, physics and ballistics, and permanent Dean of the Defense Technology Faculty of the Berlin; October 1932 Head of Examination System in the RWM; 1933 Major General; 1934 Lieutenant General; 1936 General of Artillery; 1937 President of the Reich Research Council; and February 4, 1938 Chief of Army Weapons Office in the RKM. Becker was the first active general to be a member of the Prussian Academy of Sciences.—Source: Berl. Borsen-Ztg. [Berliner Borsen-Zietung] of May 27, 1937; DAZ of Dec. 14, 1939 and April 9, 1940; VB of July 16, 1938 and April 12, 1940.
22. Becker was a brilliant artillery officer who nevertheless may have been a bit too conservative in carrying out the duties of an office that demanded a great deal of organizational ability, and he may not have been quite equal to the techniques of the defense industry, which it was his task to lead. He also failed in his effort to convince Hitler to establish an operations staff to supervise the three weapons offices, which would be above the various branches of the Armed Forces. Hitler withdrew an order to this effect the same day, at the urging of industry interests that wished to maintain the fragmentation. Instead, Becker suffered the affront that, with the establishment of the Reich Ministry for Armament and Ammunition on March 17, 1940, the new Reich Minister Todt was granted the right to give orders to the Army Weapons Office as well. Added to that was a criminal affair in which the general’s son was involved. Becker apparently no longer saw a way out and reached for his pistol on April 8, 1940.—Source: (regarding the Army Weapons Office): Schneider, pp. 241ff.; Mueller-Hillebrand I, pp. 101 and 121f.; Dornberger, pp. 78 and 87; Leeb, passim.
23. Nothing is known about Paulus being wounded. But the foreign correspondents in Berlin also heard about it that same day, February 1. The transmitter of the Sixth Army, in the GRU [Soviet intelligence service] building in Stalingrad, should have included in his last report that Paulus was heavily wounded.—Source: NZZ of Feb. 2, 1943 (morning edition).
24. Hitler had made General Paulus, who had become Colonel General on December 1, 1942, a field marshal on January 30, 1943. But at the same time he reminded him by telegram to take a pistol in his hand, because—as Hitler wanted it to be understood—a German field marshal had never surrendered before. Hitler did not keep his promise in any case: not only was the promotion of Colonel General v. Kleist, Busch and Baron v. Weichs to field marshal announced that same day, on February 1, 1943, but later Hitler also promoted to field marshal Colonel General Model and Colonel General Schorner, of the Army, on April 1, 1944, and March 1, 1945, respectively, and, from the Luftwaffe, Colonel General Baron von Richthofen on February 16, 1943, and Colonel General Ritter v. Greim on April 25, 1945.
25. Hitler was badly informed: the promotion of Colonel General Paulus to field marshal was already published, among other places, in the Morning Mirror of the previous day, January 31. Puttkamer was probably just an adjutant on duty at the time.
26. Hitler means Lubyanka, the GRU [Soviet intelligence service] prison.
27. Major in the General Staff Coelestin v. Zitzewitz (born January 11, 1907) of the Army High Command, who, as liaison officer, was already with the Sixth Army in June/July 1942, and remained, along with his own radio transmitter, in the Stalingrad pocket from November 25, 1942, to January 20, 1943, with the assignment of reporting as quickly and as extensively as possible. After his return he was ordered to report to Hitler for a presentation regarding the question of flying out specialists. Thus, Zitzewitz belonged to the first “pocket flyers” of the Army High Command, who then were called into action more and more frequently later, also to encourage encircled troop leaders.—Source: Schroter, pp. 190ff.; Manstein, p. 389.
28. The reference is to a Captain Adam, a son of the former head of the Troop Office [Truppenamt], General of Infantry Wilhelm Adam, who, as an orderly officer, led his division back brilliantly after the loss of the men at the front.
29. In the old Army at the time of the Kaiser, the next generation of general staff came from voluntary applications. Seeckt, on the contrary, in 1921, after the founding of the Reichswehr, extended the selection principle across the widest base: every officer now had to undergo, during his years as First Lieutenant—i.e., after about ten years of service as an officer—a so-called “Regional Army Examination” (later: “academy examination”), which lasted for a week and took place at the headquarters of the military district [Wehrkreis]. This examination determined the officers’ suitability for general staff education, which then consisted of a three-year (temporarily only two-year) visit to the Berlin War Academy, that included approximately 100 to 150 officers per year group. Approximately one-third of the participants were considered suitable for general staff service, which translated to about 5 per cent of a whole officers’ age group. Some of these men went into the departments of the Army General Staff, or served as Ic’s [intelligence officers] or transport commanders for the general commands, but most were Ib’s in the divisions. Those who did not pass the academy examinations still had the opportunity for a career in a ministry or in the higher adjutancy, or as a tactics instructor at a war school. After 1937, a small number of older officers without the military district examination were sent to the academy at the suggestion of their commanders. And finally, during the war, general staff candidates were recruited straight from the troops—also without the examination—after success at the front or through selection by their superiors.—Source: Teske, pp. 35ff.; Erfurth: Generalstab, pp. 124ff.
30. The correct name could not be determined.
31. Hitler’s happiness came too soon. But he was not the only one who did not realize that the commander of the Romanian 6th Infantry Division did not die in the Don bend, but, on the contrary, had been captured by the Soviets. Lieutenant General Mihal Lascar was the first foreigner to whom Hitler gave the Oak Leaves, on November 26, 1942. (Then followed: Lieutenant General Muños Grande, Grand Admiral Yamamoto, Major General Teodorini, Colonel General Dimitrescu, Major General Dumitrache, Grand Admiral Koga, Colonel General Lakatos, Marshal Baron v. Mannerheim and SS Sturmbannführer Leon Degrelle.) The Oak Leaves recipient Lascar reappeared at the end of 1943 at Special Camp 20, in Planernaia, near Moscow, as a member of the Communist Romanian Legion and rose to be Romanian Minister of Defense in Groza’s second cabinet, from November 1946 to December 1947.—Source: Manstein, p. 276; Schröter, p. 49; Puttkamer, p. 58; Seemen, p. 49 (incomplete) and pp. 281f.; Keesings Archive 1946-47, p. 937.
32. Not until a year and a half later, after the execution of the July conspirators and after he had joined the National Committee to Liberate Germany, did Paulus speak via the Moscow radio station—on August 13, 1944.—Source: NZZ of Aug. 14, 1944 (evening edition).
33. According to the recollection of a participant at the meeting, this and the earlier reference to the “proud, beautiful woman” concerned one of Göring’s secretaries. She committed suicide after an unjust accusation by the Reichsmarshal, and received as a reward for her heroic attitude a state funeral.
34. Erwin Jaenecke; born April 22, 1890; 1912 Second Lieutenant, 12th Engineer Battalion; taken into the Reichswehr as a cavalry captain; 1936 Colonel; November 1938 Chief of Staff at the Inspectorate of Fortifications; 1939 Major General and Senior Quartermaster, Eighth Army and Commander-in-Chief, East; July 1940 Senior Quartermaster, West; 1941 Lieutenant General; February 1942 Commander, 389th Infantry Division; November 1942 General of Engineers and Commanding General, IV Army Corps (on January 27, 1943, flown out of Stalingrad); April 1943 Commanding General, LXXXVI Army Corps; June 1943 Commander (October Commander-in-Chief), Seventeenth Army; February 1, 1944, Colonel General; May 1, 1944, Führer Reserves; and January 31, 1945, honorable discharge. While in Soviet captivity, Jaenecke was sentenced to 25 years’ imprisonment; he was released in October 1955.—Source: Army High Command staff files (Nbg. Dok. NOKW-141); Munzinger Archive; Keilig 211/ 150.
35. Hitler assumed correctly. Seydlitz had been with Paulus in the southern pocket.
36. Otto Förster; born March 16, 1885; 1904 Second Lieutenant, Guard Engineer Battalion; in World War I company commander and General Staff officer; Reichswehr; 1929 Lieutenant Colonel and Commander, 4th Engineer Battalion; 1932 Colonel; 1933-1938 Inspectorate of Engineers and Fortifications (5th Inspectorate); 1934 Major General; 1937 Lieutenant General; April 1938 General of Engineers; and end of 1938 Commanding General, VI Army Corps (Münster). Förster had led this corps in various campaigns until he was suddenly relieved of his command by the Army Commander-in-Chief, Colonel General Strauss, on December 30, 1941, in Staritsa (in the Rzhev area), on Hitler’s order. Without bidding farewell to his troops, he was to turn over his responsibilities immediately to his successor, Air General v. Richthofen. The Armed Forces Honor Court initiated investigations into the allegation against Förster—that he had arbitrarily given withdrawal orders. However, with the help of his corps war diary, he was able to prove that this accusation was unfounded, and that he had only recommended such a withdrawal in a situation analysis—which was passed on without his knowledge to Hitler—because the position in his sector had become untenable. The case was dismissed, but Förster received no new assignment; he was honorably discharged in February 1944. The whole affair was related to Hitler’s “cleansing action” during the winter of 1941-42, to which also Rundstedt, Guderian, Ritter v. Leeb, Hoepner and others at that time fell victim. On this occasion, of course, Hitler could not overlook Förster, who had been out of favor with him since 1938 (Hitler will again mention General Förster and his alleged failure later on).
37. Walther Heitz; born December 8, 1878; 1899 Second Lieutenant; 1914 Captain; Reichswehr; 1930 Colonel; 1931 Commander of Königsberg; 1933 Major General; 1934 Lieutenant General; 1936 President of the Reich War Court; 1937 General of Artillery; September 1939 Military Commander of Danzig-West Prussia; and after October 1939 Commanding General, VIII Army Corps. Heitz, surrounded with his corps in the Stalingrad pocket, was separated from the main pocket into a smaller “central” pocket by a Russian advance on January 28, 1943. This pocket was the first to be forced to surrender, on January 31. Heitz—promoted that same day to Colonel General—was taken into Soviet captivity and died there in February 1944.—Source: DNB of Jan. 31, 1943; Munzinger Archive; Schröter, pp. 210 and 221ff.; Keilig 211/ 127.
38. Meaning in the Soviet report.
39. Alexander v. Hartmann; born December 11, 1890; 1911 Second Lieutenant; Reichswehr; 1934 Lieutenant Colonel; 1937 Colonel and Commander, 37th Infantry Regiment; 1941 Major General and Commander, 71st Infantry Division; and September 1, 1942 Lieutenant General (subsequently m.W.v. January 1, 1943, General of Infantry). Hartmann died on January 25 in Stalingrad.—Source: Keilig 211/121; Schröter, pp. 207f.
40. The militia divisions could not be organized as new Fascist divisions before the collapse of the regime; the only exception was the “M” panzer division of the militia.
41. Reference to the battle in the Bismarck Sea, which took place March 2 to 5, 1943. U.S. B-25 bombers attacked and destroyed a supply convoy sailing from Rabaul to Lae. The convoy was made up of eight ships, and was escorted by eight destroyers under the command of Rear Admiral Kimura. Only four destroyers escaped back to Rabaul. On orders from General MacArthur, the U.S. motor torpedo boat group fired at the survivors floating in the water to prevent them from reaching the coast and reinforcing Japanese garrisons. Immediately after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the 51 U.S. submarines stationed in the Pacific Ocean launched an all-out submarine war against Japanese ships. Because of the long distance to the target and defective torpedoes (faulty ignition and controls that were too deep), initial success was rather limited. But the Americans soon improved their performance, because until late 1943 the Japanese continued to send out single unescorted ships to increase the utilization of their tonnage. The average monthly tonnage sunk was 50,000 GRT in 1942, 120,000 GRT in 1943, and 200,000 GRT in 1944. U.S. submarines sank a total of 4.9 million GRT, the U.S. Air Force 2.7 million GRT, and surface ships 0.1 million GRT. 0.8 million GRT were destroyed by mines and 0.4 million GRT sank as a result of naval accidents. 52 of 288 submarines were lost. The tonnage of the Japanese commercial fleet—6.1 million GRT at the beginning of the war—was reduced to 5 million GRT at the end of 1943, 2.8 million GRT at the end of 1944, and 1.8 million GRT (of which 1.2 million GRT were operational) at the end of the war. The construction of new ships, which was increased only in 1943 (a total of 260,000 GRT in 1942; close to 800,000 GRT in the first half of 1944), could make up barely half of the huge Japanese losses even in the best of times. The Japanese submarine force, on the other hand, was only occasionally involved in economic warfare and was used almost exclusively in combating enemy battleships, especially the terrifying aircraft carriers. All German attempts to persuade the Japanese to participate more actively in economic warfare failed—including the transfer of two German submarines to the Japanese in hopes that they would be copied.—Source: Ruge: Seekrieg, pp. 196, 225, 237f. and 290f.; Rohwer: Die japanische Ubootswaffe, passim.
42. In the spring of 1942, the Japanese, on their way to occupying Australia, had also occupied the Island of Guadalcanar (or, more accurately, Guadalcanal), which is part of the Solomon Islands. On August 7 of that same year, the Americans landed 13,000 men there, but failed to drive the Japanese from the western part of the island. In the following period a number of naval battles were fought for supplies, the climax being two battles involving Japanese convoys on November 13 and 15, 1942. The deployment of an increasing number of U.S. battleships put a strain on Japanese supply lines, eventually forcing the garrison of 30,000 troops to be evacuated. The Japanese evacuated the final 11,700 men during the nights of February 1 and 2, 4 and 5, and 7 and 8, 1943. The retreat could indeed be considered successful, because it was superbly disguised. According to American opinion it was “the most clever evacuation in the history of naval warfare.” Not until the morning of February 8, after the last Japanese had left the island (which had been hotly contested for six months), did the enemy realize that the island had been evacuated. The Americans had mistaken the evacuation transports for reinforcements.—Source: Ruge: Seekrieg, pp. 240 and 244ff.; Ruge: Entscheidung, pp. 129ff.; Tippelskirch, pp. 265f.; Morison: Guadalcanal, passim.
43. Dr. Hans-Heinrich Dieckhoff; born December 12, 1884; joined the diplomatic service after his graduation in 1912; 1914-16 cavalry officer; 1916-18 embassy secretary in Constantinople; after being posted in Santiago and Prague, he served from 1922-26 as councilor at the Washington embassy, then later at the London embassy; 1930-36 he was head of Dept. III (England-America) of the Foreign Office; subsequently head of the Political Department; and in the winter of 1936-1937 he temporarily attended to the business of the Undersecretary of State. From March 1937, Dieckhoff served as ambassador to Washington. Because of the violent reaction of many foreign countries to the “Kristallnacht” [“Night of the Broken Crystal”], he, like many other delegation heads, was recalled and did not return to his post. Beginning in April 1943 he represented the Reich in Madrid as the successor to Moltke, and in early September 1944 he was recalled for consultations and was then relieved of his duties. Dieckhoff died in March 1952.—Source: Berliner Börsen-Zeitung of March 25, 1937; Frankfurter Zeitung of April 19, 1943.
44. Meaning those who express such opinions. This assessment of American public opinion regarding the primary importance of the Pacific theater of operations was as correct as the above-mentioned Japanese presumption that the Americans would still give priority to the battle against Germany, as had been decided by Washington (“Arcadia”) as early as the beginning of 1942 (“Germany first”).
45. Sonderführer Baron von Neurath.
46. The underestimation of American soldiers revealed in this comment was to have fateful consequences in the battles accompanying the invasion during the summer of the following year. The American part of the landing stage in Normandy was neglected, and the Americans eventually succeeded in breaking through in France.
47. The naiveté with which Hitler judges the American farmers (based on photographs!) could hardly be surpassed. The man who had led Germany into another world war based his judgment of opponents on these criteria!
48. A statement most likely made during a visit to the Obersalzberg in October 1937. Whether the duke (whose sympathy for Hitler’s Germany is well known) actually made this or a similar remark is open to debate.
49. This comment by Hewel does not make sense at all, of course. Although Australians of German descent were the most important component of the non-British population of the country, they amounted to less than 2% of the population before World War II (approximately 90,000 out of a population of 5 million in 1925). Although the cultivation of fruits, vegetables and grain was indeed advanced by the German settlers, the superlatives used by Hewel come from the nationalistic arrogance that was widespread in those circles.—Source: Lodewyckx, passim; Nowack, pp. 91ff.
50. Perhaps Hitler is referring to the acerbic statement issued by TASS on March 2, 1943, in reply to the February 25 announcement by the Polish government in exile, stating that the 1939 eastern border of Poland was inviolable and irreversible. The Russian statement, accusing the Poles in London of usurpatory policy, imperialist tendencies and a friendly attitude to the Fascists, read: “Leading Soviet circles hold the view that the Polish government, by denying Ukrainians and Poles the right to unification, gives expression to its imperialist tendencies. Their claim is based on the stipulations of the Atlantic Charter, but in the Soviet view the Atlantic statutes do not contain anything that would support these claims…” Apart from this, no differences between the Western Allies and the Russians are known to have developed during the previous weeks, not even regarding Asian or Pacific issues.—Source: NZZ of March 2, 1943 (evening edition).
51. General Hirosho Oshima, successor to Togo (who was transferred to Moscow), was promoted to head of the Japanese mission to Berlin on October 8, 1938, after having served as military attaché for four years. He disappeared in late 1939. Probably at German request, he was appointed ambassador on December 23, 1940, to succeed Kurusu, but, because of his extremely pro-German attitude he was sidelined by his government—in particular during the Japanese-U.S. negotiations in 1941, but also afterward, when he was not always informed of things that one would expect someone in his position to know. The then Undersecretary of State in the Foreign Office, Weizsäcker, noted on September 4, 1941: “Oshima was grateful for it [i.e., information on the Japanese-American talks], because his Foreign Minister has left him almost completely in the dark until now. According to him, even private information which he used to get from his Tokyo friends, bypassing the Japanese Foreign Office, has not been available since the beginning of the Russian campaign.” Similar information was noted by a representative of the Foreign Office at the Army High Command, VLR v. Etzdorf, on September 22, 1941: “Ambassador Oshima complained that he was not informed by his home country and had to get information and advice in Berlin.” After the collapse of the Reich, Oshima was captured by the Allies but survived the post-war trials.—Source: Nbg.Dok. NG-4017 and NG-5156; NZZ of May 14, 1945 (morning edition).
52. The two Japanese super-battleships Yamamoto and Musashi were, at 63,659 tons, the heaviest units in World War II (in comparison: the Iowa was 45,000 tons, Vanguard 42,500 tons, Bismarck 41,700 tons, Jean Bart 39,000 tons). The two ships were put on keel in 1937-38, launched in 1940 and commissioned in December 1941 and August 1942. They were armed with nine 45.7-cm guns in three triple turrets (Iowa: nine 40.6-cm, Vanguard: eight 38.1-cm, Bismarck: eight 38-cm, Jean Bart: eight 38-cm guns), plus six 15.2-cm and twenty-four 12.7-cm anti-aircraft guns and 150 2.5-cm guns. In spite of their novel armor, the two battleships were hit and sunk relatively early: Musashi on October 24, 1944, and Yamamoto on April 7, 1945.—Source: Hadeler, passim.
53. From the beginning of the war the Japanese had ten aircraft carriers compared to a total of seven U.S. carriers, of which only four were operating in the Pacific Ocean. The Japanese completed additional aircraft carriers during the war, but these had little impact, as Japan was unable to provide the required number of planes and, in particular, skilled crews after the losses it sustained in the Battle of Midway. Prior to Midway, the Japanese had lost their four best aircraft carriers on June 4, 1942, so that with the commissioning of the new U.S. carriers built under the “Two Ocean Navy” building program, the American superiority increased constantly from mid-1943.
54. In the large air-naval battle near the Midway Atoll (west of the Hawaiian Islands), which was decisive for the progress of the Pacific war, the Japanese lost four carriers and one heavy cruiser due to enemy strafing. The Americans, in contrast, lost only one carrier and one destroyer. This compelled Grand Admiral Yamamoto to not attack Hawaii. Hewel’s remark about “down there” probably refers to one of the battles in the waters of the Solomon Islands, as details on the complete elimination in the Bismarck Sea of the Japanese convoy headed for Lae (March 2 to 5, 1943) certainly were not available in the Führer Headquarters.—Source: Ruge: Entscheidung, pp. 95ff. and elsewhere; Ruge: Seekrieg, pp. 241ff. and elsewhere.
55. Saburo Kurusu; born in March 1886 to an American mother; and a career diplomat from 1910. Kurusu was Japanese Ambassador to Berlin from December 1939 to December 1940 and signed the Tripartite Pact on September 27, 1940. In November 1941, he was sent to Washington to assist Ambassador Admiral Nomura in the negotiations of the peaceful settlement of the Japanese-American differences. When Kurusu, following the destruction of secret papers, handed the declaration of war to Secretary of State Hull on December 7, Pearl Harbor had already been attacked an hour earlier. Although Kurusu later claimed that he had no knowledge of the attack, Hull believed he did. This remark by Hitler, on the other hand, backs the view that Kurusu, like Nomura (who was considered to be the main advocate of an American-Japanese understanding), was left in the dark about the true intentions of his government until the very end.—Source: Munzinger Archive; The Memoirs of Cordell Hull II, p. 1062; Langer/Gleason, passim (in particular pp. 932ff.).
56. The Japanese disguised their raid against Pearl Harbor, at least in part, based on German advice. For instance, briefly before the action, the Japanese ship Taturo Maru left for San Francisco, and the War Ministry invited officers and their ladies to an event on the evening of December 7. On the other hand, foreign radio stations had reported Japanese fleet movements as early as December 6, and British, U.S., and Dutch naval forces were alerted—showing that the attempted disguise had little effect. [NDT: Despite many disputes, most historians have concluded that President Roosevelt was not aware of the specifics of a Japanese attack, although the Pacific forces had been on the alert many times in the months leading up to December 7. It is also agreed that FDR expected and hoped for an incident that would put America at war with Germany, not Japan. See Gordon W. Prange, At Dawn We Slept, McGraw Hill, New York 1981.]—Source: Feis, passim; Langer/Gleason, passim; Tansill, passim; Wagner, passim (see further references noted); Rohwer: Zum 15. Jahrestag…, passim, Nbg. Dok. NG-4396.
57. Hitler’s hopes were unfounded, as the Japanese never brought out anything spectacular in the development and production of tanks.
58. Following the shelving of operation “Sea Lion” [“Seelöwe”] and after defeat in the Battle of Britain had shown that the war against Great Britain would not end soon, Germany began in the winter of 1940-41 to try to persuade Japan to declare war against England. Beginning in February 1941, the Reich government urged Tokyo to take action against Singapore. However, after careful preparations and Matsuoka’s visit to Berlin at the end of March, Wilhelmstrasse changed its course during the summer and requested in late June and early July that Tokyo launch an attack against the Soviet Union. Although Foreign Minister Matsuoka backed this plan, a different decision was reached due to the influence exerted by part of the Japanese armed forces. At the imperial conference on July 2, Japan decided not to take part in the war against the Soviet Union for the time being, but to engage instead in southward expansion, even at the risk of becoming embroiled in armed conflicts with Great Britain and the U.S.A. This decision remained unchanged despite the subsequent diplomatic moves by Wilhelmstrasse, which stuck to its guns and favored Japanese action against Vladivostok, or Singapore if need be, but certainly not what actually came about: an attack against the U.S.A. The German leadership overestimated the Japanese potential, and never lost hope in subsequent years that the Japanese would eventually fight against Russia and thus relieve the German Eastern front. However, peace between the two countries in the Far East continued until the Soviet Union declared war against Japan shortly before the Japanese capitulation on August 8, 1945, so as to have a say in Japanese affairs.—Source: Nbg. Dok. NG-1433, NG-1951, NG-3437/38, NG-3459, NG-3825/26, NG-4371, NG-4423/26, NG-4448/51, NG-4640, NG-4657, NG-5156, etc.; Feis, passim (in particular pp. 213ff.); Langner/Gleason, passim (in particular pp. 625ff.).
59. This is not entirely true. The first armed Japanese-Russian conflict in these border skirmishes took place as early as July and August 1938 on Lake Khasan at the Manchurian-Soviet border, where the Japanese were defeated and had to concede to the evacuation of the disputed no-man’s land border strip. They also came off second-best the following year, in the battle for a 20 km-wide border strip east of Khalkhin Gol, on the border between Manchukuo and Inner Mongolia. This was almost a regular campaign, which began in May 1939 and ended with the expulsion of the Japanese from the contested area after a major Soviet attack on August 20, 1939. The War Ministry in Tokyo admitted 18,000 dead, while Moscow even spoke of the elimination of the Japanese 6th Army.—Source: Jones, pp. 180f. and 183f.
60. The old armored cruiser Izumo, which was deployed as the flagship of the China fleet.