July 31, 1944, in the Wolfsschanze
[On July 20, 1944, a powerful bomb shattered the conference room where Hitler was discussing military operations. The plot, known as Operation Valkyrie, was meant to overthrow the Nazi regime and facilitate a coup by the German Army. Hitler survived and the plot failed.]
Present:
The Führer
Colonel v. Below
Colonel General Jodl
Lieutenant Colonel v. Amsberg
General Warlimont
Lieutenant Colonel Waizenegger
Gruppenführer Fegelein
Major Büchs
Beginning: 11:53 p.m.
General overview
THE FÜHRER: Jodl, when I look at the big concerns today, there is first the problem of stabilizing the Eastern Front—we can’t go beyond that at the moment—and I ask myself with regard to the situation if it really is that bad that our forces are concentrated relatively closely together. Because there are not only disadvantages, but also advantages. If the area that we are occupying now can be held, then this is an area that we can still live in, and we don’t have those huge communication zones. Assuming, of course, that we really provide the combat group1 with what we created in those earlier communication zones. Then it will be a real force. If we don’t do this, but the communication zone goes into Germany instead, if we develop an ever-deeper rear army service area, where no army area is necessary, and if we still link this with the idea of executive authority, where no executive authority is necessary, because all people administer authority only in the sense of the army anyway—then in 1939 I would have had to have given up executive authority in the West as far as Hannover, Minden it was all a single deployment area. When we do away with this homegrown but other-worldly ideology—which is not at all soldierly and is not even known in other armies—then the narrowing of the area isn’t always a disadvantage, but can also be a gain. But only under one condition: that we really put that which we have developed or consumed in this gigantic area into the fight. If this prerequisite is met, it is my solemn conviction that we can stabilize the thing also in the East. [—] Italy. In Italy I would not remain in the Apennine position. I wouldn’t do that because2 I couldn’t contain a large enemy force, which will definitely be brought into action somewhere else. Because he won’t pension off the forces if we go back now. But you could seal off Germany, of course, with a minimum of forces, when I go to the Alpine front. But I need the forces elsewhere anyway, and the other one’s forces are freed up as well. In any case, it is still better if I lead a battle in a different country than if I bring it close to Germany and I have to draw the forces away when the mobility of the forces is quite limited—because his air force, as we know from experience, will move itself along. [—] In the West, in my view, there is actually one very decisive question. If we lose France as a war theater, we will lose our point of departure for the submarine war.3 We have to be clear about this. That’s the point of departure for the submarine war. We will still get some militarily important things out of this area, including the last tungsten—and the mines probably could be exploited more than they have been so far. We could do even more.4 But it’s also clear that an operation in France—and I believe we must be fully aware of this at all times—is totally impossible in a so-called open field of battle under today’s circumstances. We can’t do that. We can move with some of our troops, but only in a limited manner. With the other ones we cannot move, not because we do not possess air superiority, but because we can’t move the troops themselves: The units are not suited for mobile battle—neither their weapons nor in their other equipment. They can’t do it either. They haven’t learned that. But the total strength of the forces in France cannot be measured by the number of divisions—which we theoretically have here—but really only by the limited number of units that are actually able to move.5 That’s only a very small fraction. If the territory weren’t that important, a decision would be forced upon us—namely to clear the coast without hesitation and to lead the mobile forces immediately back into a line, which, I would like to say, we would defend unyieldingly. But one thing is already obvious now. I have here a certain number of forces. Those forces are hardly enough to defend this narrow front. If we can say that about 75% of all our mobile forces are here and a certain number of our immobile forces, and I transfer them to a line like this—then we can see the complete hopelessness of holding such a line with the forces that are available to us, no matter where I built it up. We have to realize that a change in France could only happen if we managed—even only for a certain time—to establish superiority in the air. That’s why it’s my opinion that we have to do everything—as hard as it may be right now—to prepare the Luftwaffe units, which we are setting up in the Reich now, to be used as last reserves in the worst possible circumstances. To use them—I can’t tell now where the last dice will fall, but to use them where we can possibly create a change again.6 It’s unfortunate that it will still take so many weeks and that we can’t manage it faster. Because for me there is no doubt: if we could immediately draw in an additional 800 fighters, to reach 2,000 fighters at once, as we probably could do now, this entire crisis would be overcome immediately; there wouldn’t be a crisis anymore. But even later we can only conduct the war here if we manage to rebuild the Luftwaffe to some extent. So I considered the question: what are the most dangerous moments that could occur during the entire war? First, of course, would be a breakthrough in the East with a real threat to the German homeland—whether in the Upper Silesian industrial area or in East Prussia—with the accompanying difficult psychological effects. But I believe that with the forces we are putting up now, which are slowly coming out, we are in a position to stabilize the East—I believe that—and that we will overcome this human crisis, this moral crisis. It can’t be separated from the event that took place here.7 Because the action is not to be taken as an isolated action. But this act which happened here is, I would like to say, just a symptom of an inner circulatory problem, of an inner blood poisoning, that we are suffering from. What do you expect in the end from the front’s highest leadership, if behind them (as we can see now) the most important positions are occupied by absolutely destructive people—not defeatists, but destructive people and traitors? Because it is like that. If the communications service and the quartermaster’s office are occupied by people who are absolute traitors8—and you don’t really know how long they have been in contact with the enemy or the people over there—you cannot expect that the necessary initiative to stop such a thing will come from there. Because the Russians certainly did not improve so much in morale within one or two years. That is not the case. They did not improve in a human sense either. But our morale doubtlessly became worse—became worse because we had this place over there, which constantly spread poison over the path of these General Staff organizations, the organizations of the quartermaster general, of the intelligence chiefs,9 and so on. So we only have to ask ourselves today—or rather, we don’t have to ask ourselves anymore: How does the enemy learn about our thinking? Why are so many things neutralized? Why does he react to everything so quickly? [—] It’s probably not the perception of the Russians at all, but permanent treason, constantly being carried out by some damned little clique.10 But even if it weren’t possible to put it in concrete form, it would be absolutely enough that people sit here in influential positions, who, instead of constantly radiating power and spreading confidence and especially deepening their understanding of the essence of this battle brought to us by destiny—a battle of destiny that somehow can’t be avoided or which can’t be bargained away by some clever political or tactical skill, but that it really is a kind of Hun battle, in which you either stand or fall and die: one or the other. When those thoughts are not present in the higher positions, but when those idiots imagine that they are in a better position because the revolution was brought about by generals— instead of by soldiers as in 1918—then everything just comes to a stop. Then an army must gradually be taken apart from top to bottom. I have received so many individual letters from the front—about the Party—from good soldiers, who say, “We don’t know at all what’s going on; what’s happening there can only be treason—it can’t be explained in another way.” So we also have to say, “Certainly there has been ongoing treason, and it’s partly our fault as well. We always acted too late against the traitors, out of consideration for the so-called army, or we did not act at all, although we already knew for a long time—for a year and a half—that they were traitors, again to avoid compromising the army.”11 But the army is rather more compromised when we leave it to the little soldiers to handle the call that the Russians continue to give in the name of German generals—when we leave it to the little worm, to the little front officer, who must gradually come to the conclusion that either the whole thing is true or we are too cowardly to answer to it. [—] It must come to an end. It’s not right. We have to repel and drive away those low creatures—the lowest creatures in history ever to wear the soldier’s uniform—this riffraff, which managed to save itself from former times. That is our highest duty. When we have overcome this moral crisis, the Russians will not be better than they were previously, and we won’t be worse than we were before. And with regard to our equipment and supplies, we’re even better than before. Our tanks and our assault guns are better today, whereas the Russians’ equipment has likely become worse.12 [—] In my opinion, we will also be able to fix the thing in the East. The great concern I see is obviously in the Balkans. I have the fundamental conviction: If today the Turks were persuaded—like the Finns—that we can hold out, then they wouldn’t lift a finger. Everyone has only the one concern that they might sit on the ground between all the chairs. That’s their concern. So if we managed through some act of extremely decisive resistance or even a successful big battle somewhere, if we managed to regain the trust of those people—the trust that we can hold this, and that this withdrawal is only in the end to shorten the front, because otherwise we couldn’t do it on all fronts—then I am convinced that we could bring the Turks to a more-or-less waiting attitude, even though they severed the relationship themselves.13 The Turks are not pleased that the strongest European power opposed to Bolshevism and Russia is being eliminated in favor of a totally unstable counterweight: the Anglo-Saxons—who, furthermore, are questionable in their importance and firmness. They’re not pleased. But also in Bulgaria they’re slowly coming to the idea: yes, if Germany collapses, then what? We small ones can’t do it. If the big one can’t do it, we can’t do it. There’s also something else that depends on the stabilization of the Eastern Front, in my view. In the end the attitude of all the small Balkan states depends on it: the attitude of the Romanians depends on it, the attitude of the Bulgarians depends on it, the attitude of the Hungarians depends on it, and also the attitude of the Turks. Nevertheless, we must meet certain safeguards. The most critical safeguard is and will remain the initial securing of the Hungarian area—the only possible substitute for the sources of food that we lose otherwise, and also a source of many raw materials: bauxite, manganese and so on.14 But above all for transport purposes—the prerequisite for the Southeast. Securing the Hungarian area is of essential importance to us—so important that we can’t overestimate it at all. We first must think about what in terms of new troop arrangements we can either bring in or build up there, to be able at any time, if necessary, to anticipate or prevent a Hungarian coup d’état against Herr Horthy.15 The second—just as important—is, of course, the attitude of Bulgaria. Because without Bulgaria it’s practically impossible for us to secure the Balkan area so that we can get ore from Greece, etc. We need Bulgaria for that no matter what. Also in securing against bands, etc., we need Bulgaria. But it also depends partly on the fact that we really can stand in the East, and, of course, that we don’t have a crisis in the rear or in the heart of Europe. So that’s why any British landing attempt in the Balkans—in Istria or on the Dalmatian islands—would be very dangerous, because it will immediately affect the Hungarians. We shouldn’t be surprised by the Hungarians. When we have such idiots or criminals with us, who say that even if the Russians come in we’ll make peace, but if we have the Russians to ourselves not much can happen to us—so what right do we have to complain when some Hungarian idiot or magnate says, “We’ll let ourselves be occupied by the British; they will have an interest in making sure that we aren’t absorbed, so everything will be fine.”
JODL: They might find out from those people.
THE FÜHRER: It’s not impossible that they’ve been incited by those people in that way. So the danger is here, too, that the landing of the British could lead to catastrophic results. In my opinion, a landing on the islands, etc., can hardly be prevented in the long run, if it takes place with huge forces. There’s only one question here. In the end I think it is the question of whether or not the Allies really act in agreement. If they act in total agreement, if the Russians say: we agree that you go onto the islands and we Russians in this case take, say, the Dardanelles—we would not be able to prevent it. Because I cannot prevent the landing of four or six divisions on an island with 40,000 men, and even less on a small island. We just can’t do that. We don’t know if that’s the case or not. I would like to doubt it. I don’t want to believe that the Russians would leave the Balkans to the British. I would say that in this case a fierce Russian protest would follow. At most something could happen during a period of tension between the Russian Bolsheviks and Allies: that the British might try to get at least the Aegean islands for themselves. That would be theoretically possible. Together they wouldn’t do it. [—] The Italian theater is now tying up a large number of forces that would otherwise appear operationally somewhere else. Even if a landing is made here, it would be partial units, though, that come. The great mass of all Allied forces is still concentrated there like before, whether we are in front of or within the Apennine position. One thing we have to be clear about: if we’re thrown back in the Apennines, the operation is finished for us. Then it’s over. We can’t prevent him from coming over the Po plain. We probably can’t even really prevent him from breaking up our retreat. So the Apennine position is decisive. If we’re defeated there, in my opinion, we won’t have the option of staying to fight somewhere in the Po plain. The only possibility left will be total retreat—sensible and accelerated retreat, if it even works—to the Alpine position. I don’t see any other option. [—] Here the danger is that this whole position is just as much threatened by a landing from here16—because you never know if he’s going to turn here the next minute—with a landing from the West or with a breakthrough or with a new landing from Brittany. I’ve thought everything over now and I’ve come to the following conclusion, Jodl. If a crisis develops here, we can’t leave all the responsibility to the Commander-in-Chief West. The headquarters must be here and we must, under all circumstances, lead from here. It’s such a huge responsibility, and a solution can only be found if all forces work together. We may have to make the most difficult decisions. It could be that we’ll have to accept a substantial reduction of the German living space again—possibly even to abandon the Balkans, even with the risk that our chromium will be used up within a short time. But it may be the only possibility to get the forces to operate here at all. We may at last have to deploy here, and then also draw back forces from here.17 And with that, I understand that it will be lost. We might have to retreat into the Alps directly in order to be able to operate here at all. Now I think the most important thing, Jodl, is that a number of orders are given here, which aren’t connected to each other but which correspond to a certain plan of ours—but the plan must not be distributed to the army groups at all. You can’t keep such thoughts from being immediately transmitted to the enemy these days, considering the lack of security within the inner army services. You can’t avoid this. Because we don’t know what’s here in Paris. Stülpnagel18 was here. He took part in this mess. We don’t know what relationships people have among themselves. We don’t know which operational plans that we transmit here will immediately leak through and be in the hands of the British by tomorrow. Basically that’s why I would say the following: first, we have to make it clear to the army group that, come what may, they have to lead the fight here with absolute fanaticism, because movement—or mobile combat—is totally impossible. We just have to imagine this in practice: if I turn back the whole front there, then it will go up to there. That’s the same front. So I don’t even cover a tenth or a sixth of the entire developing Western Front. You actually couldn’t do that. Now you may say: let’s take other forces. These other forces I couldn’t really get here in time. In practice, that’s impossible. We could bring some in here maybe, but it’s not actually possible. I’m convinced a total collapse would happen. I’m not yet quite sure about which position is the best: if a Seine line—
JODL: No, that one is practically out of the question. Only this19 one could be considered. That’s the best one. It is well reconnoitered, too.
THE FÜHRER: As I said before, that’s the question anyway.
JODL: It’s only for the start, because it’s a clear line.
THE FÜHRER: Because it’s a “break.” The Seine line is very dangerous for us because he can destroy all the bridges over the Seine and can hinder all of our movements. That applies to every river that’s in the way of a German retreat. In the long run, with the forces we have now in the West—with 50 or 60 divisions—we wouldn’t be able to hold either this line or that line, but at best this line.
JODL: Because it’s improved.
THE FÜHRER: It’s partially improved. We could prepare it further here. Then we have another line in the back, so it’s questionable if he will interfere here at all, because he has to say to himself, “I can’t get in too deep.” He will likely lead his attack where it’s the weakest—probably up here, where he assumes he can get into our industrial area20 the fastest. We have the connection here. Here it’s the most decisive. Primarily he would also be in this area here, so we have a shorter line, and we have to secure this region to protect the industrial area. These are such wide-ranging thoughts that if I were to tell them to an army group today, then the men would be horrified. That’s why I think it necessary that we set up a very small staff of ours here,21 which, if a crisis occurs, is prepared [to work] as an operations staff. The staff would be educated about the potential problems that could arise, and would, from the headquarters—we will probably have to relocate the headquarters here, too, or into the Black Forest;22 I have to discuss that with our Below again, where we would put it23—but the Commander-in-Chief West can’t carry the responsibility anymore. That is absolutely impossible. It’s the fate of Germany. We couldn’t sit up here—I assume that we will stabilize the Eastern Front— we can’t sit up here while the fate of Germany is being decided. That is impossible. But in any case certain steps must be taken, and I would do this by giving out orders that are totally independent from each other, so that nothing points in any way to any intention or any particular direction. First, we must be clear about this among ourselves, Jodl. Which places do we want to hold under any circumstances, because they provide additional opportunities for the enemy? Because the only thing that can stop the enemy from obtaining an unlimited supply of materiel, troops and units is the number of airstrips available to him. So if he does not get a number of harbors, or ones that are efficient, then that’s the only brake on his otherwise unlimited mobility.24 That’s the only thing we can tell for sure, so we will simply have to decide to sacrifice certain troops in order to save other things. We have to do this ourselves. We have to identify these harbors in collaboration with the Navy. Their efficiency must be secured. And other harbors—which brings me to something else as well—must be handled in such a way [assuming] that the entire railway system is destroyed. And maybe it’s more important to destroy all the engines, all the railway installations, all the pumps—everything—not just the rail lines. That might be even more important. Those are the only things that could buy us some time in the end. I can’t operate myself, but by doing that I can make it immensely difficult for the enemy to operate deep into the area. I lead him into a war—I would like to say a scorched-earth war—that’s different from the German one. But we must actually carry it out here then, and ruthlessly. [—] The one thing is the establishment of the harbors that must be held at all cost—without regard for the people there, so that it’s impossible for the enemy to send in unlimited reinforcements. If he can send in unlimited reinforcements, then we absolutely have to give up the idea of withdrawing here with only our essential forces. We can’t do that. Because you can see that a breakthrough like this can happen quickly! We can’t do that at all. [—] This is the second point: now we have to demand from the Commander-in-Chief West that units which are not intended for fixed positions be made mobile—temporarily mobile—and that he report all of this. We must receive a report regarding each unit’s degree of mobility and the quantity of weapons it can carry while mobilized. We also need to secure the destruction of the intermediate units in this whole front. When I have harbors, the intermediate units are not necessary. In fact, I have to give them up, because I would rather draw those people into the harbors and establish a solid defence there. Then we should be able to hold the harbor for, let’s say, 6 or 8 or 10 weeks—and those 6 or 8 or 10 weeks will mean a lot in the months of August, September, and October. Then we might be able to gain some time. That’s the second step that he has to make independently from this. [—] Third: the line command, Jodl, must be established here by a senior officer, in my opinion. We can’t leave it to the Commander-in-Chief West. We have to put in a staff that will set up this last possible line command, based on the entire battle experience that has been gained up to now.
JODL: It happened once already, my Führer, on your order.
THE FÜHRER: That happened once.
JODL: There’s a fairly detailed report about that. Of course, we still aren’t fully aware of all the effects of the carpet-bombing efforts, but the disadvantages of all the open and unprotected sectors are pointed out in the report. They don’t have enough protection from the enemy’s superiority in the air. That’s the case in some areas. He already took that into consideration. He also discussed the various possibilities here. It’s mostly wooded and covered terrain. It’s excellent down there. The main problems begin here.
THE FÜHRER: That is the object?
JODL: That’s the object.
THE FÜHRER: In those days it was meant as a pivot, as a kind of fortress.
JODL: That’s why this line here is relocated forward. It’s not only shorter, but it also occupies better terrain, because it’s not so open as it is back there by the Somme [River] at Péronne.
THE FÜHRER: I would do just one thing, Jodl: I would set up your own development staff to improve this thing. Because it doesn’t matter at all. Even if we managed it here, I would still come back to the idea—despite everything—that we should gradually reduce the further development of the coast and proceed with the development of this land front instead.
JODL: That’s too much for the Commander-in-Chief West because he’s an army group leader at the same time. He’s not in Paris at all. He’s leading the army group. They never see him any more—his army group has been abandoned anyway. Everything calls for another Commander-in-Chief. They want to have Rundstedt back, because Kluge is hardly accessible to them.25 There should be a dedicated staff here for these assignments anyway.
THE FÜHRER: And, Jodl, even in that case I come back to my previous opinion—even if we drive back all the attacks, even if fate changes, if we really could deploy more aircraft within 2 or 3 weeks, favored by the weather conditions that are gradually worsening and assisted by the Navy, and if the enemy develops problems replenishing his units, and if he has difficulties with the landings because he doesn’t have any efficient harbors anymore—even if all that is the case, we need to have this line improved by the OT [Todt Organization]. It would be better to postpone other land missions and improve this line—in collaboration with the coastal defense from here northward, of course—because in the end it will be the most significant line for us.
JODL: The majority of the OT forces, aside from those building in advance of the Nineteenth and First Army, are now involved in the reconstruction of railways and roads.
THE FÜHRER: We’ll have to see what we can pull out from there, especially what we can get in the way of cement. Because a position that isn’t equipped with concrete bunkers—as we have seen—is worthless; it will be destroyed immediately. That works in terrain like they have in Italy. But it’s not feasible elsewhere. This position seems important to me regardless, so we have to build this thing, no matter what happens. I would not call political units for the construction, because they really can’t do this, but we have to establish a little shell organization here, which in fact consists of the OT. The political units can’t do this. We could at most put political units in Lothringen, in Alsace, for those rear positions, and for the possible restoration of our German matter.26 But not much can be done except mining at the Western Wall. Except for wire, we don’t need to do much. What’s bad at the Western Wall is the antitank defense, because back then it was built for the 3.7-cm antitank gun. Now we have to see if the heavy gun will even fit at all. We need to investigate immediately to find out how much can be done. [—] I would say the following, Jodl: we have to establish a very small operational staff now. This operational staff must deal with the different problems that could occur if a successful landing is made—either in the West, in Italian territory, or in Brittany or further north, which would be even more tragic. But this in itself shows that it can’t be done by the Commander-in-Chief West by himself anymore. Finally, we must also consider the Italian matter, because a crisis could happen there as well. In my opinion, only our central staff can do that, because the Commander-in-Chief West by himself can’t make the necessary resources available for such a purpose. In fact, one thing will happen right away: we will in fact establish such a thing—that will be decided—to arm certain positions that are not tank-secure from the beginning. That will happen very shortly, as we cannot count on the returning units to arm them. It can only come from a central point—only from a point that is available to us. So again, I am convinced that it’s wrong to give away 1,200 or 2,000 old Russian 7.6-cm or 12.2-cm weapons. Instead we should remodel them again—like we converted the Russian guns to split-trail carriages—and then we have to give them hollow shells, to add an extra level of antitank defense to our general antitank defense.27 But the operations staff has to think about all those problems carefully, so that we can in fact give clear direction to the Commander-in-Chief West right from the beginning—and on an ongoing basis. Also, we need to establish a headquarters immediately. It can’t be too far away—preferably in the Vosges, and if that’s not possible, within the Black Forest. In the Vosges would be best of all.
V. BELOW: The one at Diedenhofen is finished.28
THE FÜHRER: Is it more-or-less secure against today’s bombs?
V. BELOW: Against the 6,000s, I don’t think so, my Führer.
THE FÜHRER: I don’t think so either. [—] Is it camouflaged, so no one can see it?
V. BELOW: It’s not at all visible from above because it’s completely underground. It’s located in some of the old forts on the Maginot Line, which are not visible from above.
THE FÜHRER: Can I see pictures of it right away?!
V. BELOW: We just have to take something that already exists. We couldn’t build it anymore in that amount of time.
THE FÜHRER: I would like to have a foundation there again.
V. BELOW: Yes, Sir. Of course, I also consider this best. [—] Then, as mentioned, a OT construction staff to do the work. Then, I would like to say, establish a demolition organization early, again with the help of the OT, because we have destroyed nothing so far. That’s ridiculous. Then we need to work out general orders that will be made available to the army group, of course, and to the Commander-in-Chief West and others who would be affected. Also the concern that it’s based upon—and we have to tell this to the Commander-in-Chief West instantly: he has to make the units mobile. We’ll tell him which units we need, and he must make sure that they reach a certain level of mobility within the shortest possible time.The units that we plan to pull out are to be made mobile. He doesn’t need to know the purpose, because if he knows the purpose and it somehow goes through Paris, and if some Frenchwoman or Frenchman learns it the next day and the whole story immediately—
FEGELEIN: Rothacker29 was here 2 or 3 days before the attack—the Chief of Staff—and he helped plan the whole attack. He came from Paris.
THE FÜHRER: So it’s impossible. We must play it safe. They don’t need to know that—we’ll simply tell them: this and this and this unit must be made mobile—improvised if need be. The army group, or rather the Commander-in-Chief West, hands in suggestions of his army groups, then we’ll see to what degree they are mobile. Or better: he has to report to what degree they are mobile, how they’re made mobile, and, especially, what they can carry in the way of weapons. That’s the decisive factor. [—] And we determine the locations. We can’t leave it to him; we’ll determine them based on higher insight. We’ll have to discuss that with the Grand Admiral and all the naval experts first thing tomorrow. This harbor will be defended at all cost, this harbor will be defended at all cost, this harbor will be defended. From here on out, the OT will provide everything for the defense of those harbors! [—] One thing became clear recently. It would have meant failure here at this little peninsula near Cherbourg if we had blocked this here, and there were some concrete-protected batteries that could always shoot into everything and into the harbor.30 It is not so much about the fact that we get harbors under all circumstances, but that we have a secure position from which we can shoot into a harbor constantly. Those few batteries must be put in concrete so that they can’t be destroyed by the air force, and they must be supplied with ammunition so that we can shoot into the harbor no matter what. First we have to defend the harbor itself anyway, then finally destroy it—that is the most important thing. [—] But, as mentioned earlier, if we send out such an order in the usual form, it means that the enemy will be involved in everything we do. He is in it from the beginning and can neutralize the whole thing. We achieve no more this way than we achieve if we say that the Commander-in-Chief West doesn’t need to know any more than necessary. First, he must know that he has to fight here in any case; second, that this battle is decisive; third, that the idea of operating freely in a free area is nonsense. He must know that he has to bring together all the forces that can possibly be brought together using human judgment. [—] That’s one thing. Furthermore, he must know that certain units must absolutely be made mobile. That’s also important. The third is that we ourselves, with the staff, must consider different contingencies right from the beginning—maybe without arranging everything in detail, but just for the sake of clarifying the exchange of units and determining the routes by which the units will be brought back. [—] It’s totally clear that if he breaks through here,31 the railway system will still work for some time, but we must not risk that— we must not wait until it’s too late. Then we’ll have to make a decision. We’ll turn one part back toward the Italian Alpine front, block that here, and pull the other part up from the Southern front right away. Then it’s important that we transport those forces, which we’ll bring up here, as far as possible by railway, and get them right into the planned reception areas, so that there are at least units there that are equipped with a lot of antitank guns, tank defense, assault guns, etc. That way we can immediately break up any advance we see, also from American units, and make it impossible. We can also let mobile units go further ahead—they will always return— and they can catch something like that and win some time, so that the enemy doesn’t run right into our line immediately. That must be done from the very beginning. It will be crucial to set up a staff of ours that can deal with this under clear orders. The moment the height of the crisis is reached, the main emphasis of the entire leadership shifts to the West again—as it once was, when, in the end, we led the way and the army groups received orders. It has to shift because it impinges immediately on the Italian theater. It just can’t be done any other way. I have to turn one part down toward Italy at once to establish the front here. We can hold not only the Alpine front with those units, but with those units we can hold the whole Italian front, and maybe get one or two divisions free for the whole Ligurian front. That could be possible under some circumstances, so that we’re at least totally secure here. The rest we would lead up here then. Positions that are key to our ability to continue the war, and which could fall into the enemy’s hands right away,32 must be determined by a senior officer. Nonetheless, the Commander-in-Chief West himself will get the instructions to improve the positions. This and this position must be improved, this one is to be completed, this one is to be completed. He will also get instructions from us. He must in any case report which units he can shift into those areas. It’s always presented as if they can’t be moved at all. He has to make sure that the bravest officers get into those positions, not talkers like this character who went into Cherbourg and made a glorious appeal, who went ahead into the bunker at the very front and waited until the others approached, and then raised the white flag immediately. When the other one said then, “How can you reconcile this with your honor after you gave such an appeal?” he just shrugged his shoulders.33 [—] But we must find such officers. And so I’ve also come to the decision now that I don’t care about this damned hierarchy at all. Here it’s about men, nothing else! If I imagine what men we have—like this little major in Berlin who made such a hard decision. If I put a man like him into such a position, instead of some lieutenant general or commanding general, he’s worth ten times as much. It really depends on one man, and the others are bastards. We raise them so they consider it to be obvious that others sacrifice themselves, but they don’t even consider it themselves. They already have one eye squinting over here: what can happen to us? If we’re imprisoned, we’ll be treated according to our rank, especially those of us from noble families, so we’ll be dealt with in keeping with our station and won’t be put together with all the plebian masses. [—] Well, that’s unbearable, and that’s why we have to check all the commanders again. The Cherbourg case must be a warning. It cannot be like that—it’s a disgrace! It won’t do to keep saying that we must not write about something like that in order to avoid damaging the army, and that it’s better to praise such a person. [—] We do exactly the same thing that we have criticized in the Italians for years. Cowards are praised as heroes—characterless swine, who really behave worse than some Communist pig, because at least he’s an idealist and is fighting for something. They’re not mentioned, or they’re even praised somewhere eventually, so that in the end this whole mess is camouflaged. I’m convinced that we can’t do this! [—] I would put the staff together immediately; maybe you can bring some suggestions tomorrow, Jodl. Also concerning the fortress, so that we go over here if a crisis really occurs. I can’t leave the Western campaign to Kluge. That’s absolutely impossible because everything depends on it. The troops would not understand that either, if we sit in East Prussia while the decisive actions are taking place here. One can’t know if we are here or here, or behind. Here are the most valuable parts, and behind it is the Ruhr area!
JODL: The one thing that concerns me is that in case something happens here34 within three, four or five days, we haven’t yet ordered anything—
THE FÜHRER: You can’t give any orders—or rather, you can order something, but nothing will be done.
JODL: Nothing has been prepared yet!
THE FÜHRER: You can give some orders, since we have to take on the responsibility anyway. That would be of no use. We would have to take it on anyway, if something happened within the next three, four or five days. We can order anything we want, but nothing can be done in the meantime. [—] So I can’t leave the responsibility to Kluge even then. That’s not possible. But orders regarding preparations that would be important in that case (in three, four or five days) can be given out right now. Mobilization of those and those units, determination of the harbors that are important to us, choice of commanders for those positions. And the people we bring here must know about a German officer’s honor—not like those 16 people who handed over the Prussian fortresses one after the other in 1806,35 but like the one who held his fortress until the end!
JODL: That is the question, if General Warlimont should present verbally what was intended. He wanted to go there tomorrow36 because they wanted to have someone from us.
THE FÜHRER: I would only bring up those few things that don’t have anything to do with the big story, but that have to be done anyway. We must not give these people the slightest hint, and we can’t prevent that otherwise in this pigsty. It’s as bad here as anywhere else. If I imagine that a man37 sits here for two years, who has done nothing in those two years but help to undermine the German front! Furthermore, the whole base in Paris is this man’s fault. It’s a fiasco! I didn’t want him back then—you know that. A short time would have been enough. That man in the armistice commission and Mr. Abetz38 in Paris as our German representative—those two together would have given it all away within a few months. Everything that we had gained in our glorious six-week victory would have been gone within a few months! That was the best teamwork one could imagine: the one in the armistice commission and the other one in Paris. He is a totally incapable man, and besides he has taken his revenge. We should be able to find, say, 30 officers in the German Army that are heroes! It would be sad! But then I must not look at their insignias—I can put the insignias on them. I can do that. When I think of such people having received insignias—people who have become generals when they in fact deserved to be hung upside down—why shouldn’t I name a good courageous front officer who has limited duties?! He doesn’t need to operate tactically; I don’t need a general who has proven to me that he led gloriously in the sandbox or on the troop training grounds somewhere! And by the way, I have seen myself what our generals have done on the troop training grounds, and how terribly they operate. They prove what they are capable of in organizational achievement, if they want to do something like this—a man like the Chief of the General Staff, Beck,39 who wanted to do this. That man has done nothing else in his life but busy himself with ridiculous little plans. How do I establish an army that, without ever provoking an enemy, is always in a position to take over the entire executive authority at home, without confronting the enemy at all? [—] This man does not travel to Paris without reason. He admired Gamelin.40 When he came back, he shook his head ceremoniously.41 I said that I don’t even consider Gamelin to be clever. If he had been a genius, he would not have watched while I armed! [—] It’s interesting to read the assessment of Gamelin and Beck: those two big heroes of mankind met there! But if I imagine a scamp like Tito compared to a Gamelin or a Beck! But we have those people here, too, and if I want to defend a fortress here, you can’t say, “My Führer, that doesn’t work—the seniority of rank!” [—] I don’t care about that at all! Here we need to bring in brave men who are willing to die if necessary, and we do have them! If we didn’t have them in the German Armed Forces anymore—they are there among the German people—it would only be proof that the Armed Forces had made a totally negative selection. But that is not the case; they are there! Now, I’ve received letters from generals, etc., who are finally coming out and saying, “We saw this coming the whole time—it couldn’t have turned out differently!” [—] So such people exist, and if the form is good enough, we still can do something. We’ll go there in the name of God and promote the people! I’ll do that with lightening speed because it absolutely does not matter. If a Napoleon could become a First Consul at the age of 27, I don’t see why a 30-year-old man here can’t be a general or a lieutenant general—that’s ridiculous! We lead a revolutionary war! It is absolutely correct when they call Tito a marshal. A man who, with nothing, keeps an entire enemy war force constantly on the jump and continually recovers again, deserves the title of marshal more than anyone here deserves the title of Colonel General or field marshal who is not able to operate skillfully even with the best instrument that has ever existed. Such a man deserves this, and why shouldn’t I treat good, brave officers in the same way here? We only have to give them the opportunity. [—] But looking at the big picture, we can’t make any preparations from one day to the next that will be decisive in 5 days, or in 10 or 14 days. If it goes the normal military way, Jodl, absolutely nothing will happen. If it goes the normal way, only conferences will take place. I just spoke with a man who once again looked into the Apennine position. He says that it’s a great fallacy if someone imagines that this is a position. This is no position at all!42 [—] An expert who was down there—also an officer—says the same thing: this is no position at all; it’s a big fallacy! [—] You know, in every position you have a display example that is presented. Now you wrote once yourself, Jodl, that a position is as strong as its weakest spot, because the enemy will discover its weakest spot and attack there, not at the strongest one.
JODL: See the Western Wall; see the Atlantic Wall!
THE FÜHRER: See the Atlantic Wall!! [—] Now the display examples are shown. They wanted to do it the same way with me. Had I had myself been in command at the Western Wall, I would have seen only the display examples: between Bingen and the Pfälzer Forest, the drilling area at Zweibrücken, Saarbrücken—a few spots. I didn’t want that. I went everywhere—the entire wall, up and down—and looked at the weak spots. Then this fellow43 came and said, “There are only 5 emplacements per kilometer here because it’s not an attack area anyway.” [—] I asked, “How can it not be an attack area?” [—] He said, “Tank-proof!” [—] But tank-proof is absolutely out of the question.” [—] So if I hadn’t pushed back there, there would have been nothing in those spots. But then it was put in! Something must happen here, too. I can’t leave it to the army group, who can’t do it at all. They have other things on their minds and can’t do anything. So if we leave it to the army group the same thing will happen as what we experienced in the East. I should have taken Kitzinger then—he offered himself. He would do that. He had the people and would round them all up. But then the Army was indignant at such an idea. That wouldn’t work—it could only be done by the army group; the army groups should rule in their rear territory. This is what we were told, with the result that nothing—absolutely nothing—happened. Not a single spade thrust. And the positions that supposedly existed between Melitopol’ and Zaporozh’e were faked.44 I was simply lied to—nothing had ever been there. In the fall of 1941 a few minor efforts were made there. That was all. It was a pure swindle, and it would be the same here. I’ve seen on a large scale what happens in reality. The people have had lots of time to develop the Black Forest at least. They know themselves—I don’t need to repeat this—what is in the Black Forest: nothing. Absolutely nothing! [—] So we really will have to set up a small staff here, and we need to get Jacob and the OT here. Jacob and Dorsch together must put in a staff which will be in charge of making the developments, without regard for anything else. If we can’t make the extension solid here, it will be at most a very short delaying line. A proper defense can only be established where we have either the Western Wall or at least ground conditions to permit this—and that would be the Vosges [Mountains]. There we can organize resistance.
JODL: But it hasn’t been reconnoitered yet. That must be done first.
THE FÜHRER: It must be done immediately, and as far out as possible, so that we have the option of going back to a main line—and especially so that we can blow up the streets. Here in this country we can do something, of course. There must not be a single bridge that isn’t prepared for demolition—not one bridge! It doesn’t matter if the enemy blows it up or we do.
JODL: Quite a few are already destroyed here.
THE FÜHRER: Many have been destroyed already, but also the last that remain! The tracks must be destroyed. Those are all general orders; it must all be prepared. Of course, it can’t be done by a central staff; the local authorities should destroy all the track in such a situation. Everything must be prepared so that we can destroy at least the most critical sections of each track. We won’t be able to destroy all the lines. That will be a problem because we need, for example, to provide rail cutters. Here’s a question. Some time ago I ordered rail cutters to be made for usual railway tracks and also for steel posts. These were rejected—some agency has forbidden further construction! We ask ourselves how an idiot like that could dare to do such a thing? I give Speer the order to build these things, and a different department comes along and just says, “Not for steel tracks!”45 [—] That means I can’t demolish anything in the West because almost all the tracks are steel. But that’s no problem. We can give the order right now to carry it out. [—] But in the basic combat instructions,46 the first part has to be agreed to absolutely, and we have to make it clear to him. That it must be held at any cost! If he loses this he cannot operate. That’s the decisive factor—we must take away from him every thought of being able to operate. The forces are ridiculous for that, of course.
JODL: He doesn’t mean that. He’s absolutely determined to hold it.
THE FÜHRER: Maybe tomorrow we can already—think about it!—put together a staff of some equally intelligent and inventive heads. Because if we really want to transport this back, it’s not so much systematic work— nothing happens systematically, because the enemy is able to destroy everything systematically—but it must be intelligent work. If we don’t do it intelligently, the whole thing will be lost. Then we can’t do anything about it. Then, as mentioned before, the second point: I have to push the Luftwaffe so that these 12 or 15 groups will be finished, which initially, I would like to say, must be led in an informal and flexible manner. We can’t make a long-term plan because it might have to be thrown out in the next few days. All we need is for a revolt to break out in Hungary or something like that. So what we need to secure we must secure now! So I would think about what we can still pump into Hungary.
JODL: Replacement formations, except for those two brigades.
THE FÜHRER: Yes, put them in there, so that at least something is in the country.
FEGELEIN: There are still two cavalry divisions in there, and they’re also getting stronger.47
THE FÜHRER: What do they look like? What do they consist of?
FEGELEIN: They have three regiments.
THE FÜHRER: And the people?
FEGELEIN: Ethnic Germans [Volksdeutschen] and Reich Germans [Reichsdeutschen].
THE FÜHRER: There are Reich Germans?
FEGELEIN: Yes, Sir. One division has about 60% Reich Germans right now. The other division, the volunteers, also has 30% Reich Germans—all the commanders and so on. But there are three strong cavalry regiments, one artillery regiment with three detachments (two heavy and one light), one engineer battalion with two companies, one intelligence detachment with one radio company, one reconnaissance detachment with a Volkswagen reconnaissance detachment.
THE FÜHRER: They are already mostly mobile?!
FEGELEIN: Yes, Sir, with three squadrons. [—] Then they also have one assault gun detachment.
JODL: Readiness for action?
FEGELEIN: Two were made out of the one—that’s why it will take until October 1 for them to be ready. But if we have a revolt within the country they can be used right away. The one has to pull up the other one, though, or it won’t work.
THE FÜHRER: And to what extent are they still mobile at this time? Can we at least everywhere—
FEGELEIN: It always works in Hungary because they can make themselves mobile in the customary manner.
THE FÜHRER: I really wanted to go over here to the West, but I can’t do it now, as much as I would like to. For at least the next eight days, I won’t be able to fly because of my ears.48 It is also questionable for the second one, but when one is completely better, then I don’t care anymore—then I would risk it. But if I get into an airplane now with the roaring and all those changes in pressure, it could be catastrophic. And what would happen if I suddenly got a middle-ear infection? I would have to be treated. The risk of an infection is there as long as the wound is open. It didn’t go off without affecting my head, either.
FEGELEIN: Everybody suffered from a light concussion.
THE FÜHRER: Of course, I can stand and I can also talk for a certain length of time, but then I have to sit down suddenly. Today I would not dare speak to 10,000 people. A speech like the one I held at the Obersalzberg recently49 I would not dare to hold today, because I might suddenly get a dizzy spell and collapse. A moment like that can even occur while walking, and I have to pull myself together in order not to make a false step. But, of course, if all else fails, I’ll do anything; then I don’t care at all. Then I will go in a single-engine aircraft and be the target shooter up front, so I get there quickly. I don’t care at all. Of course, it would be better if I were well again. [—] Only we have to lead very flexibly within the next few days. So I consider it necessary that the Reich Foreign Minister comes over here more frequently, since you50 don’t go to the Reich Foreign Minister. I really would like to talk through everything with him myself, but it’s too long for me, and I can only tell him what you would tell him anyway. You are also exhausted, no doubt, but I get so many matters all the time that deal with other things, including absolutely critical ones. Normally I would have stayed in bed for 10 or 14 days, but altogether I have worked at least 8 hours every day, not counting reading the dispatches. Eight hours went by anyway, reading memoranda and other things. So in my current state of health I do about the same amount of work as our gentlemen in their stressful offices in Paris, etc. But if it is not necessary I don’t want to push it and possibly cause a collapse; that’s not necessary. [—] Otherwise, the amazing thing is that this blow seems to have caused my nerve problem to almost disappear. I still have some shaking in my left leg, if the meeting takes too long, but this leg used to shake in bed. It has suddenly disappeared almost entirely because of the blow, though I don’t want to say that this is the best cure.51
End: 12:58 a.m.
* * * * *
August 31, 1944, at the Wolfsschanze54
Also present: Field Marshal Keitel
Beginning: 3:35 p.m.
THE FÜHRER: You know that Field Marshal Kluge has committed suicide.55 There are very strong suspicions that if he had not committed suicide, he would have been arrested immediately anyway. Yesterday the trial at the People’s Law Court was interrupted.56 Unfamiliar with this (procedure, the chairman) turned to Field Marshal (Kluge) [—] (It is to be assumed that the thing failed due to an enemy fighter-bomber) attack. He sent away his General Staff officer. The action did not succeed then, though. British-American patrols advanced forward, but apparently no connection could be established. He also sent his son into the pocket. The British have reported that they are in contact with a German general, and the officer, who was probably the contact, has been arrested.57 It is claimed that he was exchanged out of British captivity because of malingering. But he was arrested for other reasons. That was the man who was supposed to mediate in this thing, who was, in those people’s opinion, supposed to bring about a change of fate. The idea was that we would surrender to the British and then join together with them against Russia—a totally idiotic concept. Especially with the criminal abandonment of German territory in the East! They thought we would have to (abandon) up to the Vistula [River] anyway, maybe up to the Oder … up to the Elbe [—] August 15 was the worst day of my life. Thanks to a coincidence, this plan was not fulfilled. All the army group’s measures can only be explained under those circumstances; otherwise, they would be absolutely inexplicable. The staff of the Seventh Army—I must also tell you—is not in good shape.58 It would be good if you, General Krebs, could take all the men you think are worth your trust, and give the orders necessary to clean up this staff entirely. Unfortunately, Field Marshal Rommel59 is a very great and enthusiastic leader in successful times, but he is an absolute pessimist when the slightest difficulties arise. Before, I faced the difficult question of whether I should send Kesselring’s staff there or if I should hand the task over to Rommel.60 Before, I always blamed (Kesselring) for (seeing things) too optimistically [—] North Africa totally lost his nerves, so that after the abandonment of El Alamein he got worked up about an idea that could not be accomplished. He had to stay out front—that was the only possibility to save everything.61 Because the enemy’s superiority was not balanced out when he went into the wide-open area—it made it even more effective. At this narrow spot, 60 km wide, an attack could possibly be withstood. Once pushed out of there, and without the coverage of Schott on the left side,62 then, based on desert warfare experience, there was the possibility of constant overtaking, and then he was not able to maneuver, but the enemy could maneuver. When I was informed about the decision that night—unfortunately I learned about it only the next morning—I ordered right away that it shouldn’t happen. As a result of the unfortunate tangle of circumstances, the matter remained here and was handed over to me too late, and my order to cancel (the thing) immediately63 [—] he did the worst that could be done in such a case for a soldier: He looked for non-military solutions.64 In Italy back then, he also predicted that the collapse would come very soon. It hasn’t happened yet. In fact, it was totally disproved by those events, and I have been justified in my decision to keep Field Marshal Kesselring there. I see in him an unbelievable political idealist, but also a military optimist, and I think that one can’t lead militarily at all without optimism. I consider Rommel in certain circumstances to be an extraordinary bold and also clever leader. But I don’t consider him tenacious, and that that is also the opinion of all the others.
KEITEL: Yes, that has become more and more obvious.
THE FÜHRER: As long as things (go) well, (he) is shouting for joy. When the first [—] imagined the further development at all. I said right away: It’s not yet time for a political decision. I think I have proven enough in my life that I am able to gain political successes. I don’t have to explain to anybody that I wouldn’t let an opportunity like this pass by. But it is, of course, childish and naive to hope for a convenient political moment to do anything during this time of heavy military defeat. Such moments can arise if we have successes. I have proven that I (have done) everything possible to deal with the British. In 1940, after the French campaign, I offered my hand to the British and renounced (everything). I did not want anything from them. On September 1, 1939, (I) made a suggestion to the British— rather, I repeated a suggestion, which had been transmitted by Ribbentrop already in (1936)—the offer of (a) union, whereby Germany would (guarantee the British) Empire65 [—] recommended. Churchill, in particular, and that entire circle of hatred around Vansittart,66 opposed all those suggestions; they wanted the war and can’t go back now. They are staggering toward their ruin. But there will come moments in which the tension between the Allies will become so great that the break will happen then nevertheless. Coalitions in world history have always been ruined at some point. We must only wait for the moment, no matter how hard it is. It is my duty, especially since 1941, (not to) lose my nerve under any circumstances, but if there is a (collapse) somewhere, to (find) a way out and a means to repair the mess somehow. I could (well say): you can’t imagine a bigger crisis than the one we have experienced already in the East this (year). When Field Marshal Model came, Army Group Center was in fact only a hole.67 There was more hole than front, and then finally there was more front than hole [—] has, to say that those divisions were completely immobile, that they didn’t have any German materiel, that they were equipped with God knows what kind of guns, that we sent all the prepared divisions into the East, that there were only training divisions in the West, that we had the panzer divisions in the West only to fill them up, and once they were ready we sent them to the East.68 If I had had the (9th) and 10th SS Panzer Divisions in the West, the (thing) probably would not have happened at all. But this was not done, due to a—I must say—(criminal) urge69 to (cause) an overthrow here. The people imagined they could go either with the British against the Russians or—in the second, (Schulenburg,) direction70—with the Russians against the British or—in the third and stupidest direction—to play one off against the other. Pretty naïve!71 (The judgment) of all the people who have (seen) the guilty in court now goes as far as a shocking [—] continue the fight, until the opportunity for a reasonable peace arises—one that is acceptable to Germany and that can secure the life of later generations. Then I will do it. Because everyone can imagine that this war is not comfortable for me. I’ve been cut off from the outside world for five years now; I haven’t visited a theater, listened to a concert, (seen) a film.72 I live only for the single task of (leading) this battle, because I know that if there is no strong will (behind) it, the war cannot be won. I reproach the General Staff, because instead of always exuding (this) iron will, it weakened front officers who (came here), or spread (pessimism) from the General Staff to the rest of the forces, when (General Staff) officers came to the front. It is tragic when the young officers, who face sentencing now, declare in front of the court: [—] department of the General Staff, in which the chief was absolutely fine, namely with Gehrcke,73 where not a single man has been found so far who is involved in this thing,74 while in the other departments, the quartermaster general, the organization departments, foreign armies, etc., the leaders supported this base action. What happened here was directed against me. If it had been successful, it would have (been) a catastrophe for Germany. The fact that it didn’t succeed gives us the possibility to finally get rid of this abscess (inside) our organization. We can’t foresee, though, how badly it may have damaged our foreign policy—with (the Romanians), the Bulgarians, the Turks, the Finns, the other neutrals, and so on. How it has hurt the German people—(now), of course, the speech restrictions have been loosened, and things have come to light that are hair-raising. Until now the German people were silent, but now everyone is speaking out. [—] have experienced. The fact that we’ve had to experience terrible things here with Army Group Center, which are just now slowly becoming clear75—the disgrace that German officers can be found, who deliver speeches over there, and that German officers and generals capitulate—all that cannot be compared with what happened in the West. That’s the most outrageous of all.76 I believe that you, Westphal, are joining a (staff that) is basically sound. First of all, Field Marshal Rundstedt (is) absolutely clean and a man of integrity. (Further), Blumentritt77 is very sound and personally (decent; I) just think he lacks a bit of experience to command (such a staff) and that he was heavily affected by this whole (thing). But absolutely (nothing) has been submitted against him.
KEITEL: The only one in this staff was the quarter(master, who) had been sent there a few weeks before, Colonel Fink.78 He was one of (Wagner’s79) men [—]
THE FÜHRER: [—] thought very highly of. I promoted him twice myself, gave him the highest awards, gave him a great gift to help him get settled, and gave him a large bonus in addition to his salary as field marshal.80 So for me, this is the most bitter and disappointing thing of all. The way he came here, it (might) have been tragic. Maybe he slipped into it by accident—I don’t know—and maybe (then he) couldn’t (see) any way out anymore. He saw a number of (officers) being arrested, and he feared their statements. His nephew is blamed the most, who stated this in front of the court,81 and, as a result, President Freisler82—which was correct—interrupted the trial immediately to (get proof) of this and to hear the field marshal. But he (was no) longer alive. Freisler also said, of course: there is a limit; all (trust) in the German Armed Forces command will collapse. [—] It is like a Western. When you look at the people—Stief83 and all those people—the level is really shocking. I got rid of a man like Colonel General Höppner84 back then not only because he disobeyed a command but (because) he was really a small character. Kluge himself85 (was also) convinced that he had to go. Now I’ve been (justified). The trial showed everyone (in the courtroom) how little they were. The observers said, “How could those (people ever) become officers at all?!” Yes, how could they? I had to take what was available, and I’ve tried to make the most of it. [—] (The staff) that you, Krebs, are taking over, is no doubt (messed up)—we have to be clear about that. I can only (tell) you: take care that you (clean up) this lot as fast as (possible), that you … Field Marshal Model the [—] We will fight—if necessary even at the Rhine. That doesn’t matter at all. We’ll keep fighting this battle at all costs, until, like Frederick the Great said, one of our damned enemies gets tired of fighting, and until we (get) a peace that will secure life for the German nation for the next 50 or (100 years) and that (does not) damage our honor a second time the way it (happened) in 1918. Because this time we would not (be silent) anymore. (Back then) we were silent about it.86 (Destiny) could have gone in a different direction. If my life had ended, personally, for me—(I can say)—it would only have been a relief from worries, sleepless (nights and a) serious nervous disease. It’s only (a fraction) of a second, then you are freed from all of this (and have) everlasting peace and quiet. But I nevertheless thank providence that I (survived), because I believe [–] I don’t want to spread it any further. I don’t want to disgrace the German Armed Forces by talking about this thing any longer. If it became public knowledge that Field Marshal Kluge wanted to lead the entire Western army to capitulation and go over to the enemy himself, it might not lead to a collapse of (morale) in the German nation, but at least to (contempt) for the Army. That’s why I want to (be silent) about it (now). We have informed only the generals that he has committed suicide.87 He did commit suicide. The (things that) were said before were wrong. That was … It was said that he had already earlier … and had suffered from a stroke. In (reality), he was waiting for the British patrol, which … They missed each other. He lost his … in the fighter-bomber attack. Now he was (in the area), could not get any further, and (drove back) again. [—]