Hitler and His Generals—1944

1. Meaning the combat troops—-the fighting troops.

2. He no doubt means “if.”

3. After the loss of France, the success rate of the German submarine war in the Atlantic in fact decreased to zero in the month of October, but increased again slightly during the last months of war.

4. Tungsten is important for steel production (tools and magnetic steel) and for electrical engineering (filaments and cathodes). The most important European deposits are in Portugal and Spain, with France following at some distance. The French tungsten output was capable of significant development, as was proven by the 56-fold increase from 1938 to 1954 (from 10 tons to 560, while Portugal increased from 1,831 to 2,508 tons during that same time span).

5. Hitler is constantly criticized by his former military colleagues for his habit of counting the theoretical number of divisions without regard to their mobility or readiness for action. This method of counting (which Hitler himself criticizes here) is seen as one of his cardinal faults. If this is justified (which can hardly be doubted, considering the multitude of statements), then this passage proves the presence of occasional lucid intervals in the mania and delusions of grandeur that have been so reliably testified to.

6. This happened some months later in the Ardennes offensive and eventually during Operation “Bodenplatte” against enemy airfields in Belgium and northern France on January 1, 1945.

7. Hitler is referring to the July 20 attempt on his life.

8. The Communications Inspector, General Fellgiebel, and the Army Quartermaster General, General Wagner, belonged to the circle of the July conspiracy.

9. Possibly Hitler meant “intelligence” also in a different sense. The military Abwehr [Intelligence Service] (Foreign Intelligence Office of the Armed Forces High Command/Armed Forces Operations Staff) under Admiral Canaris had already been disbanded by Hitler’s order of February 12, 1944 regarding the creation of a unified reporting service under the overall direction of Reichsführer SS H. Himmler with Walter Schellenberg as head of the new intelligence structure. Intelligence Sections I and II, namely espionage and sabotage, were first formed as an independent Military Section in the RSHA, and the Intelligence Section III was integrated into its Section IV (Gestapo). Now, after July 20, the Military Section was integrated even more into Section VI (Foreign Security Division.)

10. With his next sentence Hitler already limits the claim again. It is, of course, totally absurd to blame the development and outcome of the war on the information given here and there to the enemy by convinced opponents of the regime. However one wishes to judge such behavior, it has been factually established that the extent and success of those actions could not have been sufficient to justify even a weak connection.

11. By the spring of 1943, a substantial portion of the military conspiracy against Hitler had already been uncovered. The Customs Investigation Office in Prague had arrested two employees of the Munich Intelligence Intelligence Office [Abwehrstelle] on account of totally private foreign exchange affairs. In the hope of clearing themselves, they gave statements regarding an anti-Nazi conspiracy in Intelligence Central [Abwehrzentrale]. On April 4, 1943, the Gestapo arrested Reich legal counsel v. Dohnányi, the closest colleague of Major General Oster, the head of the Central Section in the Foreign Intelligence Office. Oster himself, who imprudently tried to cover for Dohnányi and remove incriminating papers during a search of his office, was suspended immediately. He was removed from office at the end of the year and lived from then on under supervision in a suburb of Leipzig. Two relatives of Dohnányi, Pastor Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Justus Delbrück, and the Munich lawyer Dr. Josef Müller were also involved in this affair and arrested. The investigations extended until July 20, 1944—on the one hand because of delaying tactics by Admiral Canaris and chief judge Dr. Sack, but on the other hand because of remarkable caution, apparent blind confidence, and a conspicuous lack of interest on the part of Himmler and his Gestapo chief Müller. To this day it remains unclear just how far into the circle of conspiracy Himmler and his people were able to follow the threads—which had fallen into their hands by accident—by July 20. It is widely acknowledged that Himmler’s behavior toward the entire military conspiracy was not unequivocal.—Source: Gisevius II, pp. 277ff.; Abshagen, pp. 356ff.; Ritter: Goerdeler, p. 352; Zeller, pp. 24ff. and 142.

12. It is correct that German tanks and assault guns had been drastically improved during the war, but it is a pure untruth when Hitler speculates that the quality of the Russians’ matériel had decreased. The amount of American materiel alone that went to the Soviet Union within the last few years makes this claim absurd.

13. Turkey broke off diplomatic relations two days later, on August 2.

14. Hungary leads Europe in the output of bauxite; the resources are located in the Bakony Forest, in the Vértes Mountains, and in the area south of Pecs [Fünfkirchen]. Manganese resources are mined in the Bakony Forest.

15. The “coup d’état against Mr. Horthy” was initiated on October 15, 1944, but failed due to German preventive measures.

16. He probably meant at the Strait of Dover [Pas de Calais]; Hitler moves to the West now.

17. Italy.

18. Carl Heinrich v. Stülpnagel; born January 2, 1886; 1906 Second Lieutenant, 115th Infantry Regiment; 1918 Captain in the General Staff; 1932 Colonel and Section head in the Reichswehr Ministry; 1935 Major General and division commander; 1937 Lieutenant General; 1938 Senior Quartermaster II in the Army General Staff; 1939 General of Infantry and (October) Senior Quartermaster I; June 21, 1940 Chairman of the German Armistice Commission for France; February to November 1941 Commander-in-Chief, Seventeenth Army; and February 1942 successor to his distant cousin Otto v. Stülpnagel as Military Commander in France. Stülpnagel had been taking part in the putsch plans since 1938, and became one of the most active members of the military opposition against Hitler. During the night of July 21, 1944, he successfully carried out an overthrow in Paris, eliminating the SD. After the failure of the putsch in Berlin and the refusal of the Commander-in-Chief West v. Kluge to support the mission, he had to withdraw his orders. Stülpnagel was ordered to the Führer Headquarters immediately. He attempted suicide on the way there, at Verdun; however, he only lost his eyesight. He was sentenced to death by the Public Law Court on August 30, 1944, and was executed that same day.—Source: Zeller, pp. 22f., 301 and 424; Ritter: Goerdeler, pp. 245ff., 274 and 398ff.; Schramm (W.), passim; Munzinger Archive; Keiling 211/333.

19. Somme–Marne–Saône–Jura. This position [Defense Line] had already been reconnoitered by the Commander-in-Chief West in December 1943 on an order from the Armed Forces High Command or Hitler (see below p. 594). Hitler issued the written construction order for the establishment of the field positions on August 2. The speed of the Anglo-American advance in France made all efforts useless.

20. This was in fact Montgomery’s plan. Eisenhower’s, in contrast, called for regular attacks along a wide front, without establishing any centers, in order to “reach the Rhine along its entire run” before attacking inner Germany. The final decision was made when Eisenhower took over the immediate leadership of the ground operation on September 1, after Montgomery had explained his opinion again on August 23—now directly, but again without effect.—Source: Wilmot, pp. 486ff.

21. This idea of a “Special Staff” had already been implemented by Hitler during the Norwegian campaign. Now, in 1944, Jodl was able to prevent the threatened restriction of his authority by establishing a special working group within the Armed Forces Operations Staff for this assignment. Stationed in the Führer Headquarters, this group consisted of a single officer, Lieutenant Colonel Kleyser, and was a pure farce.

22. In the Black Forest, the relevant location was probably the “Tannenburg” headquarters at the Kniebis, west of Freudenstadt. The “Tannenburg” had been used from June 27 until July 1940. Like the “Felsennest” near Münstereifel in the Eifel region (which was occupied from May 10 to June 8, 1940), it was built for the Western campaign. Because of Hitler’s state of health and the development of the situation in the East, the Führer Headquarters were not relocated into the West in the summer of 1944. Not until November did Hitler travel to Berlin, from where he moved on December 10 (for about a month) into the West, in order to lead his planned offensive more effectively. This time, however, he was further to the rear—toward Ziegenberg near Bad Nauheim (“Adlerhorst”).

23. The establishment of the Führer Headquarters was the responsibility of Hitler’s adjutancy.

24. Hitler left behind several harbors as “fortresses” in advance of the weakening front, some of which were able to hold out until the end of the war (see below note 5 on p. 686). In fact, the Allies suffered considerable supply difficulties when their armies advanced into Belgium and eastern France, because all of their supplies still had to be transported via Bayeux and Cherbourg. In October, after they had taken Dieppe and Ostende without a fight, and the “Fortresses” of Le Havre, Boulogne and Calais had been conquered, the desperate supply situation slowly improved. However, the Allies still had to deal with the lack of big dock cranes, which would have been able to unload the heavy equipment arriving directly from the United States. German troops had rendered the cranes in Cherbourg and Le Havre inoperable before the evacuation. The equipment was available only in the Antwerp harbor, which fell into English hands almost intact on September 4, but it could not be used until the end of November because of German blockades across the mouth of the Schelde.—Source: Wilmot, pp. 501ff. and 578f.

25. Kluge had taken over from Rundstedt as Commander-in-Chief West (Army Group D) on July 3, and had also taken charge of Army Group B after Rommel’s departure on July 17, as a takeover by SS General Hausser (suggested by Schmundt) was feared. This joint staff arrangement, which Jodl justly attacks here, remained until September. Kluge led from the headquarters of Army Group B in La Roche-Guyon, while the connection to the headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief West in St. Germain, 65 km away, was maintained by telephone calls and trips by staff officers. Model, who initially replaced Kluge on August 18 in both positions, also had to adopt this leadership technique. At the insistence of the staff, and with Model’s agreement, Rundstedt returned as Commander-in-Chief West on September 5—this time to Arnberg, near Koblenz.—Source: Blumentritt, pp. 240ff.; Siegler, pp. 16 and 18; Speidel, p. 142.

26. Hitler had already declared on July 23 that he agreed that preparations for a possible reuse of the Western Wall should be initiated.

27. These captured Russian guns were also used in the fall to help build up the antitank defense of the Western Wall. But they were not remodeled into split-trail carriages (as happened earlier, since the old box-trail carriages of those guns had too limited traversing capability). Instead, they now received a specially constructed stationary makeshift carriage with a wider traversing capability. Authorities at that time doubted that there were 1,200-2,000 such captured guns still available and in a functional state.

28. This headquarters was one of the newer facilities. Huge complexes were also built at the Zobten in Silesia and in Ohrdruf. Like Diedenhofen, these had never been used.

29. Fegelein combines the names “Hofacker” and “Rahtgens.” He meant Lieutenant Colonel of the Reserves Dr. Caesar v. Hofacker; born March 11, 1896; war volunteer; 1918 First Lieutenant and Squadron Captain; 1921-1925 studied law, various industry positions; after 1936 company secretary [Prokurist] of the United Steelworks; 1940 Luftwaffe Wing Commander; 1941 official in charge of the iron and steel industry in the military administration of France; after October 1943 on Stülpnagel’s staff (although he was an officer seconded for special duty and not Chief of Staff—here he is mixed up by Fegelein again, this time with Colonel v. Linstow). Hofacker, who was a cousin of Stauffenberg, provided the connection between the Paris group of the military conspiracy and the Berlin headquarters. He stayed in Berlin for the last time from July 10 to 17, to inform Beck and Stauffenberg about his report to Rommel on July 9. The field marshal had judged the military situation in the West to be very dark, and had emphasized the necessity of concluding an immediate peace treaty detaining Hitler through an action at a central position. Hitler had returned to Rastenburg from Berchtesgaden on July 14, and it is not impossible that Hofacker was also there on that occasion. Hofacker was arrested on July 24, sentenced to death by the Public Law Court [Volksgerichtshof] on August 30, and executed on December 20.—Source: Leber, pp. 259ff.; Zeller, pp. 190f., 222, 233f, and others; Wheeler-Bennett, pp. 684ff., 706ff. and 761; Speidel, p. 133.; Schramm (W.), passim.

30. Hitler either means the large Jobourg Peninsula (Cap de la Hague) northwest of Cherbourg, where the last German bases were located until July 1, or the Cap Lévi Peninsula in front of the harbor in the east—the former location of the “Hamburg” naval battery. Furthermore, it was primarily his fault that Cherbourg was lost sooner than necessary. Although the fall of the fortress was just a question of time after the blockade of the Cotentin Peninsula (considering the increasing enemy superiority and the inadequate fortification on the land side), Hitler repeatedly ordered various advance lines to stop, making it impossible to man the fortifications adequately and in time, and thus hastening the loss of the city.—Source: Wilmot, pp. 338ff.; Hayn, pp. 41 and 59ff.

31. Hitler is obviously referring to the breakthrough at Avranches in Brittany, which was practically complete already. There the Americans spread out from the town (which had fallen on the evening of July 30) and won a bridgehead over the Selune at Pountaubault. The next day, Army Group B received the following order from the Führer Headquarters: “The enemy must under no circumstances be allowed to operate in the open. Army Group B prepares a counterattack together with all panzer units, to break through up to Avranches, to cut off the enemy penetration and to destroy it. All available panzer units are to be pulled from their current employment without replacements…The outcome of the campaign in France depends on this attack.” When Warlimont arrived at Kluge’s headquarters on August 2 (see below note 1 on p. 602) and was received by the field marshal in the early hours of the following morning, he did not in fact deliver—as Wilmot said—“the order from the Führer that the front must be reestablished.” At the time of Warlimont’s departure from Rastenburg and thus at the time of the present conference, the temporary closure of the breach near Avranches was expected (this passage confirms that) and the staff of the Führer Headquarters were of the opinion that the war in France would continue for the time being with slowly retreating fronts—as had been the case thus far in Normandy.—Source: Speidel, pp. 151f.; Wilmot, pp. 416 and 423.

32. Analogously: “…which could fall into the enemy’s hands in the case of a breakthrough…”

33. The commander at Cherbourg had been Lieutenant General Karl Wilhelm v. Schlieben, who, in the usual obituary in the German press, was described as the “brave defender of Cherbourg.” According to a German report about those battles, Schlieben was not captured until June 26, during the house-to-house fighting in the inner city. He was captured in his subterranean bunker after having fought for many hours alongside his staff, with infantry weapons, at various bunker exits. Of course, something else was obviously stated in the foreign radio service reports, which Hitler received and to which he no doubt refers here. The foreign press reported on an order of the day from Schlieben, which the Americans had intercepted on June 24, stating that anyone who did not continue the resistance until the end would be shot. The capture of the German commander was described in a June 27 UP report as follows: “[v. Schlieben and Rear Admiral Hennecke, the Sea Commander Normandy,] were captured when the Americans stormed the entrance of an underground fort. A German lieutenant suddenly appeared in front of the fort, waving a white flag. The officer arrived at the Allies’ line and declared that v. Schlieben and Hennecke were inside the fort and were ready to surrender themselves, together with the rest of the occupying forces. A few minutes later the lieutenant returned to the fort, and both officers came out with hands raised, leading a line of more than 300 soldiers. Lieutenant General v. Schlieben, who, in an order of the day a few days before had ordered the garrison to resist until the last, was imprisoned.”—Source: Hayn, p. 63; Wilmot, p. 346; NZZ of June 26 (morning edition) and June 28 (midday edition), 1944.

34. At Avranches, where the enemy’s strategic breakthrough had not been discovered yet.

35. In 1806 the Prussian fortresses were—following the strategic considerations of those times—neglected, as they were assigned to officers who had become unfit for military field service through age or illness. Not until after the Battle at Jena was the order given to arm the fortresses—and by that time the enemy was already advancing. The moral strength of the commanders collapsed under the impact of the rapid sequence of events. Erfurt, Stettin, Küstrin, Hameln, Neinburg, Plessenburg, Spandau, Magdeburg and Danzig capitulated practically without a fight. In Silesia, Schweidnitz fell after only four days, Breslau and Glogau—heavily armed—capitulated after only 20 days, and the totally neglected Brieg fell as well. The handover of Glatz and Silberberg did not take place because of the peace treaty. Neisse was overwhelmed after 36 days of brave defense. Only three fortresses—Kosel, Graudenz and Kolberg—held up against the enemy until the end of the campaign.—Source: Alten, p. 541.

36. In Kluge’s headquarters. Warlimont’s trip was actually the unofficial reason for the present conference. His visit to Normandy (where so far, since the beginning of the invasion, only junior officers of the Armed Forces Operations Staff—up to major—had looked around), had originally been planned for the days immediately after July 20 and therefore had to be postponed. But now such a project had to be taken on with care. The matter had to be raised delicately with Hitler, as he feared that such journeys brought a defeatist influence to the front. This meeting was therefore planned by Jodl—his manner of speaking shows this—to get Hitler to give Warlimont a general overview of the situation and his opinion, and to a certain extent an oral agreement with Kluge for the discussion of the possible—as was still assumed at this hour—case of an enemy breakout from Normandy. The actual reason, the trip to the West, was then included casually in the discussion. The next day, Hitler toyed with the idea of recalling Warlimont, who was on his way through Germany. Jodl made a note in his personal diary on August 1: “The Führer has concerns about sending Warlimont into the West. I offered to fly there myself, but the Führer does not want me to. He lets Warlimont travel ahead based on my argument that calling him back would attract attention.” As Jodl reported after the end of the war, Hitler had suspected that Warlimont could discuss a new attempt on his life with Kluge. This was probably meant as a joke, as both suspects were hardly suited to revolution.

37. General Carl Heinrich v. Stülpnagel

38. Otto Abetz; born March 26, 1903; 1927 art teacher; 1930 founder of the “Sohlberg Circle” (German-French youth meetings); 1933 France Adviser of the Reich Youth Leadership; 1943 French expert for Ribbentrop’s office; July 1939 residence prohibition in France; 1940 deputy for the Foreign Office at the Military Commander France; anf from August 1940, German ambassador based in Paris. [—] Despite numerous disagreements regarding the treatment of France and despite the judgment given here by Hitler, Abetz was not relieved until the middle of November 1944 from his position as German representative at the French government-in-exile in Sigmaringen. In 1949 he was sentenced to 20 years of forced labor by a French military tribunal, but was released in April 1954. Abetz died in an accident on May 5, 1958.—Source: Abetz, passim; Munzinger Archive.

39. Ludwig Beck; born June 29, 1880; 1899 Second Lieutenant; after 1913 and in World War I in the General Staff; transferred into the Reichswehr as Major; 1931 Major General; 1932 Lieutenant General; October 1933 chief of the Trop Office [Truppenamt] at the Army Command; and 1935 General of Artillery and Army Chief of General Staff. In this position Beck became more and more opposed to Hitler’s military policy and pursued, before the Sudetenland mission, a collective step of the generals against Hitler, but he was abandoned by Brauchitsch at the decisive moment. As a consequence, Beck handed in his resignation in August 1938 (effective October 31, 1938, with reassignment to the post of Colonel General in the reserve). He then became a central figure in the conspiracy against Hitler, which reached its climax with the July assassination attempt. After the mission’s failure, General Fromm forced him to suicide, which had to be concluded by a coup de grâce.—Source: Beck, passim; Foerster, passim; Keilig 211/18.

40. Maurice Gamelin; born September 20, 1872; colleague of Joffre in World War I as chief of the Operations Department in the primary French headquarters; 1925-1929 Commander-in-Chief in Syria as Weygand’s successor; 1931 Army Chief of General Staff; and 1935 Army Inspector General, Vice President of the Supreme War Council, and thereby also Generalissimo in the event of war. After the French failures in the German Western campaign, Gamelin was relieved by Weygand on May 19, 1940, whose replacement so far had failed due to Daladier’s resistance. Vichy France put him—without issuing a verdict—before the National Law Court in Riom. He was held by the French until April 1943, and was then in German custody afterward. In May 1945 he was freed by American troops in Germany. Gamelin died on April 18, 1958.—Source: Munzinger Archive.

41. Beck had been in Paris from June 16 to 20, 1937, officially as a guest of his personal friend, the military attaché Lieutenant General Kühlenthal, and as visitor to the World Fair, and he naturally also took this opportunity to pay a courtesy visit to the leaders of the French army. In reality, however, Beck had four quite extensive talks with Gamelin during those days, and he characterized Gamelin in his official travel report as follows: “After my repeated meetings with General Gamelin, I must say that he gives me an unusually fresh, youthful impression. He is clear, military and highly educated. He says little and keeps his word. His outward behavior is also excellent.” Therefore, it is correct that Gamelin impressed Beck. However, Hitler could have known of his supposed enthusiasm only second hand, as the Chief of General Staff had not given him a report on his visit to Paris.—Source: Beck, pp. 295ff.; Foerster, pp. 63ff.

42. Hitler (or his source) probably exaggerated a bit here, but back then even Kesselring was not satisfied with the development. He had visited the Apennine position at the beginning of July and had noticed some progress and satisfactory results, but considered other parts—in particular the focal point patrols [Schwerpunktstreifen]—to be “far behind.”—Source: Kesselring, p. 297.

43. He most likely meant General Förster, who was followed by Hitler with almost pathological aversion.

44. In his Verlorenen Siegen, Manstein states that the Dnieper Line had initially been improved against Hitler’s will, but was later described by him with great exaggeration as the “Eastern Wall.” Manstein also described as a “Developed Position” the Melitopol’–Zaporozh’e Line mentioned here. The Sixth Army had withdrawn to this line at the end of September 1943, and, after a Soviet breakthrough at the end of October, the line was “taken back surprisingly quickly toward the West.” When Manstein establishes this in his usual careful phrasing, one can easily imagine Hitler’s indignation and his search for the guilty parties.—Source: Manstein, pp. 537f., 544 and 550.

45. Because there were practically no steel ties in the East, the problem of a suitable rail cutter was not that urgent until the beginning of the retreat from France. Furthermore, no special equipment was needed for steel ties, as they could be ripped out using a standard steel cable wound around the end of the tie. From the 35 possible models that were shown to Hitler in September 1943 in Arys, a reconstruction of a Soviet type was finally selected. It was mass-produced by Schwartzkopf as a “track wolf” for wooden ties.

46. A presentation of the Armed Forces Operations Staff on July 28 regarding the “combat procedure in the event of an enemy breakthrough in Normandy,” which suggested to Hitler a retreat from the coastal front.

47. The 8th SS Cavalry Division “Florian Geyer” and the 22nd SS Volunteer Cavalry Division (which had just been built up using parts of the 8th SS Division).—Source: Order of Battle, pp. 341 and 347.

48. Damage to both eardrums and an irritation of the auditory canal were the worst effects on Hitler’s health resulting from the July 20 bomb explosion. Only after a lengthy period of bed rest did those injuries heal. He also had burns on his leg, a wound on his right elbow, and a bruise on his back from a collapsed ceiling beam.—Source: Bullock, pp. 746 and 767; Görlitz/Quint, pp. 605 and 613.

49. Hitler had received the attendees of a meeting of “the men responsible for armaments and war production,” called by Speer, and had spoken to them. The text of this speech was published by DNB on July 5. According to the recollection of a participant, this meeting had already taken place on June 26 in the Platterhof at the Obersalzberg. The attendees—about 100 armament experts—had been brought by special train from their meeting point at Linz to Freiburg/Berchtesgaden. Hitler had obviously given several other speeches around that time as well, which are also possibilities—for example, a speech before the generals and officers on June 22, also at the Platterhof.

50. The reference here is probably to Sonnleithner, who had joined the meeting in the meantime, though he is not included in the list of participants. Sonnleithner had taken part in the situation report on July 20, when Stauffenberg made the assassination attempt.

51. Today, physicians assume that Hitler’s severe nerve problem was paralysis agitans, or Parkinson’s Disease (not to be confused with the progressive paralysis of syphilitic origin), a degenerative disease of certain brain parts, which manifests itself in serious organic nerve damage and also influences the mental and emotional life, often leading to paranoid and manic delusions. The illness first appeared—probably as a result of the stress of the first Russian winter—at the beginning of 1942, with heavy dizzy spells. At the same time, the stomach problems he had complained about for long time worsened. That same year, or in early 1943 at the latest, he also began to suffer from a shaking of the limbs on the left side of his body (first the arm, later also the leg), which steadily worsened—apart from the temporary improvement mentioned here, which was obviously the result of the shock from the attempted assassination. Hitler’s physician, Dr. Morell, treated him with 28 different medications, both pills and injections. These medications, however, did not prevent his illness from worsening toward the end of the war, to the point where he usually had to use a cane for walking, and he attempted to use his right extremities to keep the left ones as still as possible. Physically, Hitler was a sick man after 1943, in the fall of 1944 (September to November), and again even severely ill in April 1945.—Source: Bullock, pp. 720 and 767ff.; Zoller, pp. 64 and 70; Trevor-Roper: Hitlers letzte Tage, pp. 62ff.; Görlitz/Quint, pp. 579f.; Guderian: Erinnerungen, pp. 402f.

52. Siegfried Westphal; born March 18, 1902; 1922 Second Lieutenant; 1934 Cavalry Captain; 1935-38 in the Operations Branch of the Army General Staff; 1939 Major and Ia, 58th Infantry Division; August 1940 member of the German Armistice Commission; June 1941 Ia German Africa Corps (later: Panzer Group Africa); October 1942 Chief of General Staff, Africa Panzer Army; 1942 Colonel; February 1943 chief of the operations section, Commander-in-Chief, South, and June 1943, Chief of General Staff Commander-in-Chief South; November 21, 1943 to June 5, 1944 Chief of General Staff, Commander-in-Chief, Southwest; April 1944 Lieutenant General; after the beginning of September 1944, Chief of General Staff, Commander-in-Chief, West succeeding Blumentritt (after March 25, 1945: Commander-in-Chief South); and January 1945 General of the Cavalry.—Source: Westphal, pp. 331f.; Siegler pp. 142f.; Rangliste 1944-45, p. 29; Das deutsche Heer, p. 430; Keilig 211/363.

53. See list of participants. Krebs, General of Infantry as of August 1, 1944, became Chief of General Staff of Army Group B in the West, as the successor to Speidel, at the beginning of September.

54. Record number unknown—Fragment No. 46—A first transcription, of which the lower third was destroyed on the first 15 pages.

55. Since 1942, Kluge—then Commander-in-Chief of Army Group Middle in the East—had been wooed constantly by the conspirators, who thought they needed an active field marshal with troop command to start their actions. The Ia [operations officer] of the army group, Colonel v. Tresckow, who belonged to the resistance group, had meaningful personal influence on Kluge, but was unable to get more from him than an assent in the case of Hitler’s death. Kluge stepped down in October 1943 after an accident, and did not receive a new front command for three-quarters of a year. On July 3, 1944, he took over from Rundstedt as Commander-in-Chief West, and then on July 18 also took over from the wounded Rommel as Commander-in-Chief of Army Group B. In these positions he maintained his wait-and-see attitude toward the conspiracy, and gave his final rejection to Stülpnagel only on the evening of July 20, after Hitler’s survival had been confirmed. Throughout the course of the following weeks, news filtered into the Führer Headquarters about the ambiguous attitude of the field marshal, who was also incriminated by involuntary or forced statements from those who had been arrested. The statements made by Hitler here indicate that Kluge was finally pulled into the assassination investigation only on August 30—that is, 11 days after his suicide. Another issue in his removal had obviously been the suspicion that Kluge was flirting with the idea of a separate peace in the West, as well as Hitler’s anger over the Americans breaking out of their beachhead and the encirclement of the Seventh Army at Falaise. But in a file note from Bormann, dated August 17, 1944, regarding Kluge’s discharge, it was already stated that he has been “the commander-in-chief over Tresckow and other traitors.” The note said: “Field Marshal Kluge’s behavior is not entirely acceptable; according to investigations conducted thus far, Kluge must have known about individual thoughts and ideas of individual traitors. He did not report these.” Because Hitler no longer trusted him completely, he could not remain commander-in-chief. Without prior announcement, Kluge was replaced by Field Marshal Model on August 17 and was ordered to report to headquarters immediately. Kluge wrote a letter to Hitler—in which he emphasized the necessity of signing a peace treaty soon, but which was at the same time a panegyric to Hitler’s greatness (see Wilmot, pp. 779ff.)— and got into his car for the trip home on the morning of August 19. Between Clermont-en-Argonnes and Domnâsle he pulled off the road and poisoned himself.—Source: Bormann’s file note of August 17, 1944 (Archive IfZ, Fa 116, Bl.13); Wheeler; Bennett, pp. 551f., 609, 650, 684ff. and 693ff.; Wilmot (Engl.), pp. 420f.; Zeller, passim; Schramm (W.), pp. 65, 335ff. and others.

56. The Public Law Court trial concluded on August 30. Accused were the Military Commander in France, General of Infantry Heinrich v. Stülpnagel, his Chief of Staff Colonel v. Linstow, Kluge’s Senior Quartermaster, Colonel Finckh, as well as the Lieutenant Colonels v. Hofacker, Rahtgens and Smend. All the accused were sentenced to death and executed that same day, except v. Hofacker (December 20, 1944) and Smend (September 8, 1944).—Source: Zeller, p. 427; Pechel, pp. 335f.; Wheeler-Bennett, pp. 759ff

57. Kluge was without connection to his headquarters for more than twelve hours on August 15, after he left at 9:30 a.m. for a trip into the Falaise pocket. After his return, he reported that he had spent most of the day in a trench because of heavy artillery fire and a fighter-bomber attack. His staff officers considered this claim to be true, and it is supported by Hitler’s accusations here, which the Allied side has not yet confirmed. In any case, nothing is known about a released German officer who was supposed to get in touch with Kluge. Despite Schramm’s repeated explanation of the escort officer Tangermann, the behavior of the field marshal remains peculiar that day. At this critical moment, the Commander-in-Chief West goes to a front area—which, as no one could know better than he, was made practically impassable by the swarms of enemy fighter-bombers—to seek death on the battlefield, but then, facing death, chose rather to spend the afternoon sleeping in a shelter (see also below pp. 620f.). When the message arrived at the Führer Headquarters on July 16 around 6 o’clock that Kluge had established contact again, Hitler had already called Model back from Russia a few hours before and ordered him to immediately take over of both of Kluge’s commands. [—] The field marshal’s son, Lieutenant Colonel in the General Staff v. Kluge, had been appointed by his father as head of the Eberbach group, which was located inside the pocket.—Source: Wilmot, pp. 444f.; Liddell Hart: The German Generals, pp. 246ff.; Schramm (W.), pp. 353ff.

58. Hitler’s reproaches against the staff of the Seventh Army were probably based mostly on his aversion to the long-time commander-in-chief of this army, Colonel General Dollmann, who died of a heart attack during the battle in Normandy on June 27 (29?). On August 31, General of Panzer Troops Eberbach had just been replaced by General of Panzer Troops Brandenberger as commander of this army.

59. The Seventh Army, together with the Fifteenth Army, had been under Field Marshal Rommel until his car accident during the fighter-bomber attack on the afternoon of July 17. It cannot be stated for certain whether Hitler already knew at this point about Rommel’s involvement in the July 20 assassination attempt (which forced Rommel to suicide on October 14), as the following text suggests. But it can be assumed that this whole complex was initiated by the proceedings against Stülpnagel and his officers at the end of August. Zeller points out that Rommel’s house in Herrlingen, near Ulm, had been under observation by Bormann’s representatives long before October 14. Also, his Chief of General Staff, Speidel, had been recalled without explanation on September 5 and arrested September 7—one week after this meeting—and taken into the cellar at Prinz Albrecht Street.—Source: Speidel, pp. 170 and 175ff.; Zeller, p. 309.

60. Hitler meant the Italian theater of war, because it had never been considered for the West.

61. That was Hitler’s opinion, but it was less justified after the reserves coming over the Mediterranean failed.

62. Obviously, Hitler has the picture of the retreat movement in mind, since it should be “on the right side.” He is referring to the western Egyptian Qattāra depression, a sand-drift desert of about 20,000 square kilometers, 134 meters below sea level at its lowest point, sprinkled with numerous salt lakes and impassable for motor vehicles. South of El Alamein, the Qattāra comes closest to the coast—within 65 km.

63. Hitler’s claim is a bit bold.On the evening of October 23, 1942, the English prepared to attack the German-Italian Alamein position, after the Axis troops that had reached the Alamein line on June 30 had failed to break through to the Nile 70 km away. The massed Allied forces and English air superiority put such heavy pressure on the German-Italian units (which were suffering from lack of supplies) that on the evening of November 2, Rommel asked the Armed Forces High Command and the Comando Supremo for permission to retreat—an action he had already initiated. This report from Rommel is the one referred to by Hitler here. It had in fact been presented to him late due to a mistake by the Armed Forces Operations Staff officer in charge. It arrived on November 3 at 3 a.m., but did not reach Hitler until about 10. (The officer in charge was demoted and put into a penal punishment unit, and General Warlimont fell out of favor for some time.) In response, Hitler, not understanding the seriousness of the situation, ordered Rommel to hold the position and not to give up a single meter of territory: “It would not be the first time in history that the stronger will has ruled over the stronger battalion. You can only show your troops the way to victory or death.” Rommel initially obeyed and reversed the retreat movement, under considerable difficulty. But the following day, the English—in addition to breaking through the German lines—were able to create a 20-km-wide hole in the front after the destruction of the Italian XX Corps. Rommel had no more reserves to fight back the danger, and he ordered a retreat to the Fuka Position on the early afternoon of November 4. This retreat, however, took on an avalanche-like character and really only ended on May 7-12 in Tunis. Hitler agreed to this November 4 retreat command the next day, via radio message. That first order from the Führer, on November 3, actually did reach Rommel belatedly (1:30 p.m.), which resulted in more difficulties, especially in relocating the Italian troops. However, Rommel would have been defeated by the English the following day in any case—after a quiet night.—Source: Tippelskirch, pp. 334ff.; Westphal, pp. 186f.; Rommel Papers, pp. 317ff.; Rintelen, pp. 176f.

64. He is probably referring to Rommel’s demands to end the war, which the field marshal had presented to Hitler during his visit to the West on June 17 and again during his report in Berchtesgaden on June 29. Otherwise, Hitler could already be speaking about Rommel’s contacts with the July men, which militarily could hardly have happened yet, as long as men like Speidel, for example, were still at large.—Source: Speidel, pp. 118 and 127; Blumentritt, pp. 233ff.

65. In fact, Hitler would rather have avoided war against the “Germanic brother nation” and was never able to understand why England refused to give him continental supremacy. When he speaks here of “renouncing everything,” he means only English territory and English reparations, of course. A renunciation of his conquests so far would never have been considered. The remark about the year 1936 means the appointment of Ribbentrop as German ambassador to London, who was given the explicit command to probe the possibility of a German-English understanding. “Ribbentrop, bring me the English union!” are said to have been Hitler’s words of farewell. Further above, Hitler speaks of the “offer” that he made to the English ambassador Henderson on August 25, 1939: He would agree to the British Empire and was willing to commit himself personally to its existence—as well as, if necessary, to use the strength of Germany for its defense—under the preconditions that a) the Danzig corridor problem would be “solved,” b) the colonial demands of Germany would be met, and c) his obligations toward Italy and the Soviet Union would not be touched. After the French campaign, Hitler—without mentioning any details—made an “appeal to reason” during his Reichstag speech on July 19, 1940: He had never planned to “destroy or even damage” the British Empire and therefore did not see any reason for the continuation of the war.—Source: Hofer, p. 94; VB of July 20, 1940; Ribbentrop, pp. 91ff.

66. Robert Gilbert Vansittart; born June 25, 1881, and after 1941 Baron of Denham, had entered the British diplomatic service in 1902 and held office from 1928 to 1930 as Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; 1930-37 as Permanent Under-Secretary also in the Foreign Office; and 1938-41 as Chief Diplomatic Advisor to the Foreign Secretary. Vansittart was used by Goebbels as a symbol of anti-German behavior and was constantly attacked. He died on February 14, 1957.—Source: Who is Who 1950, pp. 2856; Vansittart, passim.

67. Model had taken over the command of Army Group Center on June 28, 1944, from Field Marshal Busch, whose entire front had been torn open by the Soviet attack that started June 22.—Source: Tippelskirch, pp. 530ff.; Siegler, p. 132.

68. Here Hitler is probably repeating Rommel’s statements, which were made during the meeting between Hitler, Rundstedt and Rommel on June 17, 1944, near Soissons.

69. Hitler himself had ordered the transportation of both SS panzer divisions into the East on March 25, 1944; they had been employed in front of Tarnopol. Furthermore, he had been notified several times about materiel and personnel shortages among most of the Western units. In fact, the 700-series of divisions located on the so-called Atlantic Wall were in no shape for a major battle—neither with respect to personnel nor equipment. They were immobile fortress divisions with, in many cases, older age groups, and equipped with captured French, Czech and Russian weapons. All other divisions were only present in the West temporarily—either for initial formation or for rehabilitation before being sent back into the East or to Italy. The latter was true also for the panzer divisions, with the exception of the 21st Panzer Division. This division had been set up 1943 in the West and equipped laboriously with captured French vehicles, but, like the 700-series divisions, it had no battle experience.

70. Of the possible Schulenburgs, the one probably meant here is Friedrich Werner Graf v. d. Schulenburg, born in 1875. Schulenburg, who succeeded Nadolny as ambassador in Moscow from October 1934 until June 1941, had welcomed the German-Soviet rapprochement of 1939 as a resumption of Bismarck’s traditional orientation toward the East, and was disturbed by Hitler’s attack on the Soviet Union in 1941. After Stalingrad, he joined the conspirators and competed with Ulrich v. Hassell as Stauffenberg’s candidate for Foreign Minister in a possible Goerdeler cabinet, as he had asked for an immediate peace with Russia, provided that contact could be made with Stalin. Even though Ritter in his Goerdeler book in no way characterizes Schulenburg as a blind adherent of an “Eastern Solution,” his political concept of Hitler’s situation at the time is likely presented correctly here. Schulenburg was executed on November 10, 1944.—Source: Goerdeler, pp. 364, 379ff., 534f., 542 and 602f.; Zeller, pp. 391 and 432; Wheeler-Bennett, pp. 352, 637 and 764.

71. With those remarkable words, Hitler judges his own policy during the final years of the war. If he considered it so “stupid” to play the Russians off against the English, his expansion of the war toward Stalingrad and Tunis, and at least up to Avranches, could have the single purpose of lengthening his life and the lifespan of his regime at the expense of the German people—while his propaganda slogans trumpeted that the cause must be more important than anything else, and that even the last German must be willing to give himself up.

72. It is correct that Hitler lived in his headquarters in dangerously unrealistic isolation—in an atmosphere that Jodl in Nuremberg called a cross between a monastery and a concentration camp—and that he gave up all private life. The time span mentioned here is to be taken with a grain of salt, however, as Hitler’s isolation was not that intense in the first years of war, and was of quite limited duration. It was not until partway through the war, for instance, that he finally gave up his habit of watching films after dinner.—Source: IMT XV, p. 325; Bullock, p. 723.

73. Rudolf Gercke; born August 17, 1884; 1904 Second Lieutenant; Reichswehr; 1923 left the service as brevet Major; 1933 re-entering as Major and detachment leader in RWM; 1937 Colonel and Chief of the Transportation Department in the Army General Staff; 1939 Major General and head of the Armed Forces Transportation System (in both positions until the end of the war); 1940 Lieutenant General; and 1942 General of Infantry. Gercke died in 1947 in American captivity.—Source: Keilig 211/98; Seemen, p. 285; Order of Battle, p. 553; Das deutsche Heer, p. 11; Rangliste 1944-45, p. 16.

74. With the July 20 events.

75. Here he refers to Army Group Center in the East, where, in Hitler’s opinion, the collapse of June 1944 was accelerated by the fact that the Soviets used captured German officers to cross back over the line (made possible by the total breakdown of the front), rejoin the command system, and cause confusion. No evidence came to light after the war that could support this claim; the only certain thing is that several of the German generals and officers captured during this Soviet offensive did immediately step over to the side of the National Committee and offer themselves to the Russians.

76. Only in Paris did the conspirators—led by the Military Commander in France, General Carl Heinrich v. Stülpnagel—experience a brief triumph on July 20, despite the first indecisive then negative attitude of the Commander-in-Chief West. At 11 p.m., when everything was already over in Berlin, they had rounded up the senior SS and police commanders in France, including Gruppenführer Oberg and the men from his headquarters on Avenue Foch, and, within half an hour, had secured the vast majority of the 2,000 men (Schramm: 1,200) in the Parisian SS and SD forces, and had put them out of action. At dawn on July 21, the captured men had to be set free again, in consideration of the hopeless general situation and Kluge’s attitude.—Source: Wheeler-Bennett, pp. 683ff.; Schramm (W.), passim.

77. Günther Blumentritt; born February 10, 1892; 1912 Second Lieutenant; Reichswehr; 1933 Major; 1938 Colonel and Chief, 4th Section in the Army General Staff; 1940 Chief of Staff, Fourth Army; 1941 Major General; January 1942 Senior Quartermaster I in the Army High Command; September 1942 Chief of Staff, Army Group D and Lieutenant General; and April 1944 General of Infantry. After this meeting, Blumentritt was replaced by Westphal during the first few days of September. In October 1944 he became Commander, XII SS Corps; January 1945 Commander, Twenty-Fifth Army; end of March Commander, 1st Parachute Army; and after April 15, Commander-in-Chief, Blumentritt Army. Hitler’s opinion about Blumentritt was also shared by his commander-in-chief, Rundstedt, who wrote in his assessment on September 9, 1944: “He deserves special mention for his clear position and his firm measures surrounding the events of July 20, 1944, in the area of the Commander-in-Chief West.”—Source: Army High Command staff files; (Nbg. Dok. NOKW-141); Order of Battle, p. 530; Siegler, p. 113.

78. Eberhard Finckh; born November 7, 1899; came from the 41st Artillery Regiment; 1934 Captain, War Academy; 1938 assigned to the 10th Section of the Army General Staff; November 1942 Colonel in the General Staff Senior Quartermaster for Army Group Don/South; and after April 1944, Senior Quartermaster for the Commander-in-Chief West. On August 30, 1944, as a participant in the July conspiracy, Finckh was sentenced by the Public Law Court to death by hanging and was executed that same day.—Source: DNB of May 11, 1944; Das deutsche Heer, p. 12; Manstein, p. 326.

79. Wagner, who had been close to Beck and who already agreed with his attitude toward Hitler before the war, had been a participant in the July 20 conspiracy and had committed suicide on July 23 (22?), 1944.—Source: Wheeler-Bennett, pp. 481 and 765.

80. Neither Kluge’s promotions nor his decorations were particularly unusual. He had been Colonel General for only nine months when he received the marshal’s baton during the great field marshal promotion on July 19, 1940. At that time, however, when ranks were even skipped, this quick success was nothing out of the ordinary. The highest award he received was the Schwerter [swords], while Hitler had already awarded the Brillianten [diamonds] to four Army generals (Rommel, Hube, Model and Balck) that same day. But Kluge—like all generals from the army commander rank upward—had, in addition to his field marshal salary of 36,000 Reich Marks [RM] (gross), received special tax-free bonuses from Hitler’s private funds. He also received a check from Hitler for more than 250,000 RM for his 60th birthday on October 30, 1942, as well as a building permit for his property in Brandenburg worth about half of that sum. Kluge had accepted the check as well as the building permit.—Source: Wheeler-Bennett, pp. 552f.; Schlabrendorff, pp. 61f.

81. Karl Ernst Rahtgens, Lieutenant Colonel in the General Staff, was a relative of Kluge, as his mother was born a v. Kluge—probably a cousin of the field marshal.

82. Roland Freisler; born October 30, 1893; law studies; Communist; from Russian war imprisonment Bolshevik commissioner; after his return lawyer in Kassel; after 1925 member of the NSDAP; 1932 Landtag member in Prussia; March 1933 as Ministerial Director head of the Personnel Department in the Prussian Ministry of Justice; in that same year Under-Secretary of State (after the unification of the Reich Ministry of Justice); and Prussian State Council and member of the Reichstag. As Thierack’s successor, Freisler became president of the Public Law Court in August 1942, and tried to compensate for this demotion and his politically dubious past by carrying out his duties with extraordinary enthusiasm and an excess of toughness and cruelty. Freisler died during an air raid on Berlin on February 3, 1945, in the cellar of his office building.—Source: Reichstags-Handbücher; Munzinger Archive; Schlabrendorff, pp. 213f.

83. Stieff had contacted the conspirators via Tresckow and was one of the actors in the July 20 assassination attempt. In the main trial, the “smallest and youngest Armed Forces general” was sentenced to death by hanging on August 8, 1944, and executed two hours later.

84. Erich Hoepner; born September 14, 1886; 1906 Second Lieutenant; Reichswehr; 1933 Colonel; 1936 Major General; 1938 Lieutenant General and Commander, 1st Mobile Division; November 1938 Commanding General, XVI Army Corps (Berlin); 1939 General of Cavalry; with his corps in Poland and France; July 1940 Colonel General; and in the Eastern campaign Commander, Fourth Panzer Group (October 1941 renamed Fourth Panzer Army). On January 8, 1942, Hoepner received his dishonorable discharge from the Army, “for cowardice and disobedience,” because he had carried out unauthorized retreat movements and because he had spoken disparagingly—which had reached Hitler’s ears—about the “non-professional leadership.” At the end of 1943, Hoepner was introduced to the revolt plans by Olbricht, his neighbor in Dahlem, and was tapped for the role of commander-in-chief of the Replacement Army. He was also sentenced to death by hanging by the Public Law Court on August 8, 1944, and executed that same day.—Source: Munzinger Archive; Siegler, p. 124; Keilig 211/139; Zeller, passim; and others.

85. At that time (since the end of December 1941) Commander-in-Chief of Army Group Center, to which Hoepner’s Fourth Panzer Army belonged.

86. It is not quite clear what Hitler meant here. He, at least, was certainly not silent “back then.”

87. Kluge’s death was not made public; on short notice Hitler prohibited the planned burial ceremony on his [Kluge’s] Böhne estate in Altmark. According to Blumentritt’s statement, a state funeral was originally planned as well, but was cancelled after the poison was discovered during an examination of the corpse (ordered by Keitel); at first, only a heart attack had been discussed. After the field marshal’s corpse had been stored in the Böhne church for nearly two weeks, and tumult was increasing among the population, the propaganda department emphasized via verbal propaganda that Kluge had died of a heart attack. Keitel informed the military district commanders of the death on August 31, and requested that the generals be informed in a “suitable way.” This g.Kdos text said: “From a letter Kluge left behind, we read that he obviously acted under the impression that he was heavily responsibility for the outcome of the battle in Normandy.” And, in conclusion: “There will be no further discussion of these events.” The discussion began, though, at least abroad, as the Allies captured this order at the end of December 1944.—Source: RdSchr. Parteikanzlei 219/22 gRs.; Report RpropAmt Dessau Sept. 5, 1944 and others (Archive IfZ, Fa 116, Bl. 18); Files of the Propaganda Department in the German central archives in Potsdam, Bd. 863; Schramm (W.), pp. 376f.; NZZ Dec. 29, 1944 (midday edition).

88. Transcript number unknown—Fragment No. 28—During the second transcription in May 1945, the stenographer remarked: “In preparation for the Ardennes offensive starting on December 16, 1944, Hitler spoke on December 11 and 12 to about 20-30 senior officers—army leaders, commanding generals, and division commanders with their staff officers. These officers had been called to the ‘Adlerhorst’ headquarters for an introduction to their assignments during the attack. This fragment contains the first part—about half—of the speech held on December 12. Hitler spoke without a script; the machine transcription is only a fragment and was made from the stenographic record with only minor stylistic changes. The stenographers who had been responsible for recording the original meeting deciphered the fragment—very poorly preserved, especially the severely burned upper portion of the pages. The parts in parentheses were added based on the meaning and on Hitler’s mode of expression.” Hitler had arrived at the “Adlerhorst” command post—fitted out for him in Ziegenberg at Bad Nauheim—with a small operations staff on December 10.—Source: Westphal, p. 279.

89. A gap of about three lines; the gaps below are generally smaller.

90. A speech of a similar kind had preceded this, on December 11.

91. Hitler tries to justify initiating the war and the moment chosen to initiate it. This means admitting responsibility for a preventative war, which was denied at this time in the official propaganda.

92. This memorandum was printed as document 052-L in the “Blauen Reihe” [“Blue Series”] Der Prozess gegen die Hauptkriegsverbrecher vor dem Internationalen Militärgerichtshof [The War Crimes Trial before the International Military Tribunal], vol. XXXVII, pp. 466ff. It is dated October 9, 1939, and is directed to the commanders-in-chief of the Armed Forces branches and the Chief of the Armed Forces High Command, under the title “Denkschrift und Richtlinien über die Führung des Krieges im Westen.[Memorandum and Guidelines for the Conduct of War in the West]” Here Hitler had written quite clear-sightedly on page 7: “Time—in this war, as in the course of all historical events—is not a factor that has inherent value in and of itself, but one which has to be evaluated. In the current situation, under these conditions, time can be seen as an ally of the Western forces rather than an ally of ours.” And further below, on page 16 and following, under the headline, “The Dangers of the German Situation”: “The first danger for Germany is that in a long war, some states might be drawn to the opposite side, either because of their economic necessity or because special interests have arisen. The second danger is that a long war could alarm states that might in principle wish to join Germany’s side— they might remember the last war and take it as a warning, and therefore refrain from joining us. The third danger in a long war is the difficulty of securing nourishment for the people, based on the restricted food and raw-material base, and getting the means to conduct war. Also, the mental attitude of the people will at least be burdened by it.”

93. Already in his speech before the Reichstag on September 1, 1939, Hitler had stated that he had spent “more than 90 billion for the building up of our Armed Forces.” This number is in contrast to the statements of Schwerin-Krosigks, who calculated 60 billion Reichsmark for Armed Forces and armament costs between January 1, 1934, and August 1, 1939. This figure is validated by all the documents available today. Hitler might have included all costs that contributed to armament even indirectly—such as railway, canal, and street construction, and similar investments—and he probably rounded up to achieve the desired propaganda effect. That Hitler’s statements are not quite correct is evident from the fact that in the time span mentioned, total Reich expenditures were 101.5 billion RM.

94. The KV I was a heavy tank of 43.5 tons, and the famous T 34 a medium tank of initially 26.3 tons (after 1944 T 34-85 of 30 tons), both armed with a 7.62-cm KwK L/30.5 (T 34-85: 8.5-cm KwK L/53). At first, they dominated everything the German attacking armies could bring up and hindered their mobile warfare. A KV II is unknown; Hitler probably meant the KV I S with the 7.62-cm KwK L/41.5.—Source: Senger-Etterlin, pp. 120ff. and 240ff.

95. Here Hitler is fantasizing freely. Although Britain did start arming in 1936 as a result of the Ethiopian War and the German conscription measures, neither universal conscription nor a two-billion-pound credit was introduced. On the contrary, after one year, on January 6, 1937, the British Minister of Defense, Sir Thomas Inskip, explicitly declared that the government was not thinking—despite problems with replacements—of introducing universal conscription. The armament credits were 119 million pounds in the fiscal year 1935-36 and 188 million pounds in the fiscal year 1936-37. Not until a white paper was published on February 16, 1937, did the government demand 1.5 billion pounds for armament purposes, to be spent over the next 5 years. Because 400 million of this sum was to be covered by a loan granted on February 18, this meant an increase in the defense budget of only about 220 million pounds per year over the following five years. Perhaps Hitler confused pounds and marks, in which case it would be correct that the English defense budget surpassed 2 billion RM in 1936 for the first time.—Source: Keesings Archive 1935-37; Times from Jan. 7, Feb. 17, and Feb. 19, 1937.

96. In this famous, disastrous term—here supplemented by a strange concept of “territorial armament”—Hitler’s policy of war lies in nuce. Today it seems unbelievable how widely accepted an axiom could have become back then, when—even just considering the unavoidable and significant overlapping of claims—it could only have been valid for a small minority of desperados.

97. Here Hitler was talking about the “war in sight” crisis of 1875, but he confused the facts for his own purposes. It is true that the Prussian General Staff under Moltke had been rattling swords quite heavily and had approved a preventative war because Moltke thought—which later proved to be wrong—that France would not be able to support its armament weight much longer and would have to free itself of it soon through war (the origin of this crisis was a new French Army organization law, which was quite overrated in Germany at this time). But the plans for this preventative war did not fail, as Hitler pretends here, because of the “internal German parliamentary situation,” but because of Bismarck’s dislike for preventative war, at least after 1870—which has been substantiated, even if the chancellor was using the threat of war to further his political chess game at that time. Also, this crisis—in which Bismarck tried to halt the French rearmament program through intimidation and bluffing—was the first time, as a prelude to later alliances, that England and Russia took France’s side.—Source: Ritter: Staatskunst, pp. 289ff.; Eyck: Bismarck III, pp. 149ff.; Herzfeld, pp. 222f.; Meyer, A.O., pp. 513ff.; Oncken I, pp. 145ff; Jeismann, pp. 91ff.

98. This is, of course, just the opposite of reality: The allies dropped out when an offensive war was no longer possible. Hitler expanded on this thought in his daily order to the Armed Forces on January 1, which included the following: “If in this immense struggle—which is fought not only for Germany, but for the future of Europe—we have had to bear setbacks, the responsibility does not lie with the German people and its Armed Forces, but with our European allies. From the breakdown of the Romanian-Italian-Hungarian front along the Don and the subsequent total dispersal due to sabotage of our joint warfare, to the Italian royalty, to the putsch against the Fascist Italy of the Duce who was on our side, it is a straight line of betrayal. It has continued with the dreadful capitulation of the Finnish state leaders, with the breach of faith by the Romanian king and his circle, with the self-abandonment of Bulgaria, and with the disgraceful conduct of the former Hungarian State Administrator. These betrayals had serious effects on the political and military warfare.”—Source: VB of Jan. 2, 1945.

99. This passage is not clear, as there are no known memoranda or files from the year 1917 to which Hitler’s statements could apply. Perhaps he is referring to the peace resolution of the majority parties, which demanded a compromise peace and the explicit renunciation of annexations; the Reichstag accepted the resolution on July 19, 1917, by a margin of 212 votes to 126.

100. The decision to take offensive action in the West had developed in Hitler’s mind as early as during the Polish campaign, where the extent of German military successes brought up this possibility in answer to the unexpected entry of the Western forces into the war. Hitler’s ideas had met with immense resistance, especially among Army General Staff. The resistance was based on various reasons: a general reluctance to engage in war, concerns about violating the neutrality of Belgium and the Netherlands, objections against the winter date initially suggested by Hitler, and other issues. The decisive factor was undoubtedly the fact that the leaders of the Army High Command obviously did not have the necessary strategic genius, which was soon found in Hitler and the Chief of General Staff of Army Group “A,” Lieutenant General v. Manstein. Only later did the General Staff accept the plan for the attack internally and then—apart from the usual exactness of the composition—expanded the plan significantly [check this whole note…].—Source: Jacobsen: Fall Gelb, passim, especially pp. 145ff.

101. In the European and North African theater, American deaths totaled 174,000 in World War II. Even if Hitler here—as was common practice— used the term “losses” to include wounded and imprisoned as well as deaths, his number seems very high for a period of only three weeks.

102. Hans v. Obstfelder, born September 6, 1886; 1906 Second Lieutenant; 1915 Captain; Reichswehr; 1933 Colonel; 1936 Major General and Commander, 28th Infantry Division; 1938 Lieutenant General; 1940 General of Infantry and Commanding General, XXIX Army Corps; August 1943 Commanding General, LXXXVI Army Corps; December 1944 Commander, First Army; and after March 1, 1945, Commander, Nineteenth Army in exchange with Foertsch. From March 26 until the capitulation Obstfelder, commanded the Seventh Army.—Source: Army High Command staff files (Nbg. Dok. NOKW -141); Siegler, p. 133; Seemen; Order of Battle, p. 601.

103. While the Ardennes offensive was grinding to a halt, Hitler believed he could take advantage of the fact that the American reserves were tied up in the Ardennes region and conduct an operation in lower Alsace (Operation “Nordwind” [“North Wind”]). He wanted to retain the initiative in the West at all costs, and prevent the Anglo-Americans from making a simultaneous attack in conjunction with the expected Soviet winter offensive. On New Year’s Eve the eight divisions mentioned here—from the Saar region and the area around Bitsch—attacked during the night in the direction of the Zabern valley. After initial local successes and small penetrations into the Maginot Line, the attack was sauandered by an advance northward from the Colmar bridgehead in upper Alsace, in the direction of Strasbourg. Eisenhower, who in fact did not have any more reserves in this area, considered a temporary evacuation of Strasbourg and a complete retreat to the Vosges, but was initially hindered by French pride. Soon it became evident that the strength of the German attack was waning, well before the defense of Strasbourg became necessary. The outcome of Operation “Nordwind” [“North Wind”] was little more than the forward movement of the front line between Bitsch and the Rhine, which gained some ground in front of the Western Wall in this area and allowed for the building of a useless new small bridgehead on the left bank of the Rhine, north of Strasbourg.—Source: Tippelskirch, p. 610; Görlitz II, pp. 445f.; Wilmot, pp. 650f.; Supplements to the KTB/WFSt [War Diary of the Armed Forces Operations Staff?] from Jan. 3 and 4, 1945 (Nbg. Dok. 1797-PS).

104. At the site of penetration in the Ardennes.

105. This reference is also to the Ardennes offensive.

106. In contrast to the Ardennes offensive, this attack did not take the Americans by surprise.—Source: Wilmot, p. 650.

107. Hitler probably feared that the Americans—as turned out to be true—would pull back to the south into the region of Strasbourg, and would thereby escape the planned encirclement and destruction. The original plan was obviously to conduct this pincer movement only from the Palatinate or the Saar against American forces in the northeastern corner of Alsace. Hitler obviously did not yet have great faith in the chances of success for Himmler’s attacks from the south and the newly built bridgehead north of Strasbourg—an operation that Hitler, against Rundstedt’s resistance, would later turn into a main focus.

108. At the climax of the crisis in the West, when their armies were falling back hastily onto the Reich’s borders, the German leadership faced the problem of occupying the Western Wall and the upper Rhine—at least in a makeshift manner—in time to take in the stream of returning units there. As regards the manning of the actual Western Wall, there were several fortress battalions and fortress tank destroyer detachments, etc., while for the upper Rhine there were no troops at all except from some training battalions from Military District V. In this situation, Hitler named the Reichsführer SS and Commander-in-Chief of the Replacement Army as Commander-in-Chief, Upper Rhine. He did so, as he once said himself, based on the following thoughts: “Himmler always has reserves of police or SS units that no one knows about and which he does not give away. If he is responsible for the front along the upper Rhein, he will be forced to bring together everything that he can get a hold of.” And Hitler was right. So for Himmler’s first employment as a military leader, it was not his military leadership qualities that were decisive.

109. The extremely heavy 653rd Tank Destroyer Detachment was the first and only “Jägdtiger” [“Hunter-Tiger”] unit. This Tank Destroyer VI was armed with a 12.8-cm antitank gun 44 L/55 and was the only German armored vehicle with a long weapon of this caliber, which penetrated 202 mm tanks from a distance of 1 km. The speed of 12-15 km/h mentioned in the following discussion can only be correct for certain difficult terrain conditions, as the highest speed of this Hunter-Tiger was 35km/h, although it was said to be rather difficult to move. When 250 mm armor is mentioned here, it could only be referring to the turret shield, because the armor on the nose was 100 mm at a 40° angle (driver’s front 150 mm), and the sides and rear were armored with 80 mm plating at a 60° angle (the real strength of these armor plates measured vertically to the surface was accordingly lower). In spite of the fragmentary character of these statements by Hitler, and in spite of the contradictions in his statements, one can exclude the possibility that at a certain point he was talking about his 180-ton monster tank “Maus,” which was also supposed to be armed with a 12.8-cm gun. For the “Maus,” the construction design had actually called for 250 mm armor plating; this was achieved if the measurements were taken horizontally (actual armor strength on the nose, measured vertically to the surface: 200 mm). Two “Mäuse” were built, one of sheet metal and one with armor plating, both of which fell into the hands of the Russians.—Source: Senger-Etterlin, p. 192.

110. Hitler’s assessment of the Maginot Line was probably correct; critical parts such as electrical installations, etc., had been dismantled.

111. The combat weight of the “Hunter-Tiger” according to Senger-Etterlin: 70.6 tons.

112. Himmler had already taken control of the border police—whose responsibility was to supervise the German border traffic—in 1937, and in September 1944 he also incorporated the customs border guard into the Amt IV/RSHA, i.e., into the Gestapo. The job of the border guards, who until then had reported to the Reich Ministry of Finance, was to safeguard the financial security of the Reich through border protection measures. The staff was about 55,000 men at that time, but shortly thereafter 10,000 were given to the Waffen SS. It seems, however, that the incorporation into the RSHA had not been fully completed. A few days before the end of the war, the whole organization was moved back into the Reich financial administration.—Source: IMT I, p. 297, XI, pp. 343f. and XXII, p. 578; Nbg. Dok. Gestapo (A) 31.

113. A “decree from the Führer regarding the concentration of armaments and war production,” dated June 19, 1944, published in the “News from the Reich Minister for Armaments and War Production,” No. 41, says under section II/2 concerning the Armed Forces: “The capacities of the forces employed in the ordnance offices of the Armed Forces branches, and the specialists of all kinds, who until now have been working in business— including businesses owned by the Armed Forces and responsible for new developments for the Armed Forces branches—can be employed by the Reich Minister for Armaments and War Production in the pursuit of revolutionary new developments, as determined by me, without regard to these persons’ former obligations to the Armed Forces branches, so that these new developments will come to fruition as soon as possible.” As in this case concerning the specialists, Speer probably later obtained authorization concerning the raw materials stored by the Armed Forces. This is quite likely, as it was Speer’s usual method of operation to get “Führer orders” for everything possible—even for such things as the confiscation of streetcars in Brussels.

114. August Frank; born April 5, 1898; commercial apprenticeship; participant in World War I after 1916; 1920-1930 in the Bavarian police service (lastly as police secretary); merchant; after 1933 SS administration; 1935 Sturmbannführer and Hauptabeilungsleiter Haushalt [?] in the SS administration office; 1938 Oberführer and Stabsführer for the head of SS administration; and 1939-42 head of the SS Administrative Offfice and permanent deputy of the chief of the Head Office, Pohl. In addition, after 1940 head of war direction for the Waffen SS, 1943 Gruppenführer and chief of economic administration in the head office of the Ordnungspolizei order police, after August 1944, chief of Army Administration in the Army High Command, and October 1944, Obergruppenführer. At the Nuremberg Pohl trial, he was sentenced on November 3, 1947, to life im-prisonment; in 1951 the sentence was reduced to 15 years.—Source: SS staff files (Nbg. Dok. NO-1592); Aff. [?] Frank from Jan. 17, 1947 (NO-1576).

115. This 38-ton, known as the “Hetzer” [“Hustler”], was a very low—and difficult to locate in open terrain—16-ton tank destroyer with a 7.5-cm antitank gun 39 L/48 and 1 machine gun, and a speed of 38 km/h. The 38-ton was originally a Czech tank, whose production was discontinued in 1942. To use the unexploited production capacity, especially in the Bohemian and Moravian Machine Factory, the model was redesigned as an assault gun or tank destroyer. The prototype was presented in January 1944 in Rastenburg, and on April 20, 1944, the first 16 38-ton vehicles were ready for action and participated in a tank parade in Klessheim. In July 1944, 83 units were built, and by the end of the year the monthly production had risen to 400 units. Even in the first quarter of 1945, 1,138 pieces were built—all in the protectorate. The very unusual (for the time) increase in production indicates the perceived importance of this weapon. Speer’s Führer Protocal of November 29, 1944 (No. 30) says the following about the 38-ton: “The Führer points out again the especially high value of the 38-ton and urges that everything be done to reach the target production rate in the shortest possible time. He considers this vehicle one of the biggest successes of this war in terms of weapons technology and therefore expects that its further production—especially the new type with the air-cooled Tatra diesel engine—will receive every imaginable support.” In April 1945, the prototype of a significant improvement in weapons technology was completed: the 38-ton with a recoilless gun (providing more room for ammunition, crew, etc.).—Source: Die deutsche Industrie, p. 115; Lusar, pp. 34f.; Senger-Etterlin, p. 192.

116. This relates to the fact mentioned above, that the 38-ton was built very low (height: 220 cm, compared with Panzer III: 244, Panzer IV: 268, Panzer V: 310 and Panzer VI: 288 cm). On the other hand, however, the rather weak armoring of the 38-ton (nose 60 mm, sides 20 mm, rear 8 mm) argued against the dug-in employment demanded by Hitler.—Source: Senger-Etterlin, p. 192.

117. Surprisingly, on December 22, the British government had ordered the conscription of an additional 250,000 men to “strengthen our armies on the front.” For the most part, these were men who had turned 18 since the last regular conscription, as well as men released from the armaments industry; some were also transfers from the Navy and RAF to the Army. At that time, it must have been explicitly stated that these conscriptions were in no way related to the significant worsening of the situation in the West, but were to be interpreted as a reflection of the decision to continue the war with all possible means.—Source: NZZ of Dec. 24, 1944.

118. Here even Himmler tries—though in vain—to pour cold water on Hitler’s ideas. Even in these fragments, one can clearly see how Hitler loses himself more and more in flimsy arguments, blowing the enemy’s minimal difficulties out of proportion and resorting more and more to unfounded wishful thinking.