REACTIONS TO THE ARREST OF AMES

ALL OF US, BOTH CIA AND FBI, who had worked so hard to bring Ames to justice felt a sense of relief once we knew he was under lock and key. Of course, we were aware that there was more labor ahead to produce a conviction and a sentence of life without parole. (This was the most that could be expected, because the death penalty for espionage in peacetime did not exist at the time. It has since been reinstated.) All our self-gratification began to dissipate almost immediately, however.

The FBI drafted a public statement concerning the arrest that gave the impression that they had done all the real work, while we had merely provided cooperation and support. The draft incensed the CIA, which produced its own drafts, which the FBI refused to accept. Finally, the FBI’s version was issued by the attorney general. We also issued one. There would be no joint statement. (Retired FBI Special Agent I. C. Smith has described the atmosphere at FBI headquarters on this occasion, characterizing it as an “attempt to jab a stick in the CIA’s eye.”¹) Of greater significance, news of the arrest brought Congressional wrath on the CIA and, to a lesser extent, the FBI. The investigation that led to Ames had been ongoing for years as a major effort and Congress had not been kept advised. In retrospect, this is perhaps the greatest “lesson learned” from the whole case. As one consequence, the atmosphere of CIA-FBI cooperation that had dominated the investigative phase quickly dissipated as senior managers on both sides tried to deflect criticism from the Congressional oversight committees and their own inspector general staff by shifting blame to the rival organization.

During the last year or two before the arrest, the CIA’s senior management held discussions about the advisability of notifying the majority and minority leaders of the two intelligence oversight committees, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI). Jeanne was responsible for drawing up talking points. She produced numerous drafts that were sent up the line for approval. They were returned with major revisions. Some in senior management were in favor of giving Congress ample debriefings, some wanted to provide only the bare minimum, and some did not want to tell Congress anything at all. The proponents of this last position won the day because it was never possible to fashion a draft that satisfied everybody.

Beginning the day after the arrest, CIA and FBI representatives were called to Capitol Hill to explain themselves to a largely hostile audience. Jeanne was summoned several times. In general, the SSCI was more thoughtful, or better controlled by its chairman, Senator Dennis DeConcini of Arizona. Requests for explanations, while often cold, were generally polite. The situation degenerated only when CIA Director James Woolsey was present. He and DeConcini had long engaged in mutual animosity and this affected the exchanges when they were in the same room.

HPSCI was not so restrained. On one occasion, Jeanne was the sole witness, or sacrificial lamb. This was a closed session, with no media representatives present. However, it appeared that the members of the committee were so accustomed to posturing for the press that they could not turn it off. The tone of the questions was accusatory, and the mantra was “What took you so long?” Jeanne felt like she was being cross-examined by a hostile attorney trying to make a point with a jury, rather than being asked in temperate terms to explain what she had done or not done in the investigation, and why. Representatives Dicks, Dixon, and Torricelli were especially vociferous. Representative Dan Glickman chaired the session, but did not have full control because members freely interrupted each other in their efforts to be heard. Glickman did, however, get at least one question in to Jeanne in a rather sneering tone: “What makes you think that you were capable of leading a CI investigation?” This was typical of the questioning. Jeanne left not only furious but downhearted, having lost whatever respect she might have had for our legislative branch, at least as exemplified by its lower house.

Eventually, both the SSCI and HPSCI produced reports.2 The bulk of the SSCI report consists of a case summary and was thoroughly reviewed with the CIA in draft. This was succeeded by conclusions and recommendations, some of which have been implemented. The HPSCI report also came up with a number of findings, with one of which Jeanne and Sandy take particular issue. This is the finding that the CIA personnel involved in the investigation failed to keep senior management advised in a timely manner. We suggest that, in part, this misunderstanding is due to statements made after the arrest by senior managers who wished to elude criticism, on the theme of “If I had known about it, I would have fixed it.” Senior managers were kept advised, at least in general terms, of the seriousness of the problem, the nature of the investigation, and the progress we were making. Indeed, Jeanne personally briefed two CIA directors—Judge Webster and Robert Gates. She always started her briefing with a statement about the executions of the Soviet officials who had worked for us, and she does not believe they could have missed the tenor of what she was saying. She continued by outlining what was being done to solve the problem, but accepts that they may not have absorbed the details because, after all, they had a great many knotty situations, some of extremely high priority, to contend with.

One aspect of the SSCI and HPSCI probes was particularly outrageous. Chairman Glickman and Congressman Combest of HPSCI and Chairman DeConcini of the SSCI conducted personal interviews with Ames. The only real result, as we see it, was to inflate Ames’ ego. If these officials did not trust the FBI/CIA debriefings, or had some questions we had not covered, there is no reason why they could not have sent one of their trusted staff members instead of traipsing down themselves to drink in what Ames had to say. “Disgusting” and “obscene” were words used by CIA employees when they heard of these interviews.

In the meantime, as mandated by Congress, the inspector general’s office at the CIA, under the aegis of Inspector General Frederick P. Hitz, was conducting its own investigation. This was a mammoth effort, yet a flawed one. Many of the investigators lacked knowledge of the Directorate of Operations as an entity, much less how it carried out its day-to-day business in the world of espionage. Moreover, the investigative techniques employed left much to be desired. The interviewers held long sessions with each individual who had taken part in the Ames case. These interviewers took notes, but the interviews were not recorded. At first, the IG staff did not want the interviewees to have access to the results of the interviews because this was their normal Star Chamber procedure. However, a flood of impassioned protests caused them to change the ground rules for this particular investigation.

Once the interviews had been typed, which sometimes took place only after a long delay, the interviewees could review them for accuracy. When Jeanne did just that, she was stunned by the inaccuracies. For instance, at one point she said that someone’s reappearance was fortuitous. This came out, the individual’s “report” was fortuitous. At another point she said that someone was a valid asset. The report of the interview erroneously reflects that she called the individual a “valued” asset. (In reality, in this particular case the asset was valid but not valuable!) Sloppy drafting had Jeanne stating that she did not remember having briefed DCI Casey. Obviously, if she had done so it would not be the sort of thing that she would have forgotten!

The IG team was in haste to prepare their report before Congress reconvened. They produced an unwieldy and unpolished draft that was parceled out to all who had played a significant role in the Ames case for comments. (Unfortunately this draft also contained some sensitive material that should never have had such wide distribution.) Jeanne’s were lengthy and critical. To give the IG credit, many of the changes she and others suggested were made and the final product, while by no means perfect, is reasonably accurate.3 In looking over this abstract now, however, Jeanne and Sandy notice one glaring omission. The report makes no mention of CIA management’s failure to keep Congress informed. As noted separately, this was one of the strongest lessons learned in their opinion. Another point not covered was the lack of a formal, written agreement with the FBI when Jim Holt and Jim Milburn came over to the CIA in the summer of 1991. The four of us did not need such an agreement in order to co-exist productively, but in the furor after the arrest, and attempts to play the blame game, it would have been useful for all to have such a document to point to.

Almost one year after Ames’ arrest, CIA management scheduled an awards ceremony to honor those who had participated in the investigation. As is traditional, the reception was to include family members. Sandy’s family had traveled from North Carolina; Dan Payne’s sister had come, or was coming, from Chicago. At the last minute the invitations were withdrawn. The word we heard was that DDCI Studeman had decided to cancel the event because the press might hear about it and “Congress wouldn’t like it.” This despite the fact that many of the honorees had played no role in deciding how the investigation should proceed. They were the loyal workers who had done a good job in such necessary areas as locating files for us, checking Ames’ time and attendance records, and helping the FBI bug his telephones.

The event was later rescheduled more than one year after Ames’ arrest. However, because of CIA management’s pusillanimity, the revised-version ceremony was limited to the actual awardees. No one else was allowed to be present, nor was the ceremony publicized in any way. Further, the designation of who was to receive which medal particularly offended Jeanne. Redmond got the most prestigious one; Jeanne and Dave Edger were awarded medals at the next level; and a medal one step further down was awarded to Sandy. Jeanne thought this was singularly unfair because she and Sandy had worked as a team and, after all, it was Sandy who was convinced throughout that Ames was a spy and who discovered the correlation that broke the case. Sandy was affronted also. This was a team effort and each played a significant role. Ames might never have been discovered without the participation of all the major players, from Worthen to Redmond. As she sees it, it should have been the same medal for all. Moreover, the fact that Dan and Diana did not receive medals at all was even more egregious. They received monetary awards. While money is always pleasant, it was not their primary motivation, and they were left without a permanent memento of their achievement.

In any event, the recognition was too little and too late for the dedicated employees who had been so helpful to us, the core team, in our efforts. Given their feelings, both Sandy and Jeanne boycotted the ceremony and neither has ever displayed the medals they were awarded.

By the way, Wiser, Holt, and Milburn of the FBI were also given awards at this ceremony. No official recognition from the FBI was ever received, except that Jeanne and Dan got letters from Director Freeh thanking them for their contribution. By this time Jeanne may have been a little thin-skinned because of the criticism she had received, but it sounded condescending to her—as if she were being thanked for holding the FBI’s coats while they did the real work. Paul, Sandy, and Diana did not even receive a letter.

Not everything was this downbeat, however. After Ames was arrested, the Department of justice officials who had been involved in his prosecution, headed by U.S. Attorney Helen Fahey and prosecutor Mark Hulkower, hosted a relaxing private party at a tavern in Alexandria for the CIA and FBI. During the latter part of the Ames investigation, the CIA’s legal advisers had opened up a direct channel to the lawyers who would be responsible for the prosecution. We soon became close colleagues, bypassing the FBI. Indeed it was decided that Jeanne, instead of anyone from the FBI, would testify at the trial as the expert on the KGB. During the party, they gave us all framed certificates, plus some joke gifts. Ms. Fahey made a speech in which she pointed out that this sort of recognition was given only rarely to those outside the DOJ community. All in all, this was a very pleasant evening and Sandy and Jeanne are proud of their certificates.

Jeanne was present at one other noteworthy event. A day or two after Ames’ arrest, there was a meeting at the White House between Clinton/Gore and congressional leaders to discuss whether Ames’ activities would or should have any impact on our relations with Russia. (It was agreed that they should not.) Woolsey was invited to attend. He asked Jeanne and Ted Price, who by that time was DDO, to accompany him, in case he needed our expertise to answer a question. We sat behind him in the chairs reserved for various staffers. Before the meeting got under way, when everyone was milling around, Woolsey went up to Clinton and told him who Jeanne was. Clinton came over, shook hands, and then gave his famous “thumbs-up” signal. Gore also came over later and shook her hand. When Clinton said “Congratulations” or some such word, Jeanne told him that she would take his message back to our team.

While all this was going on, the wheels of justice were turning. On 28 April 1994, in the Alexandria Federal Courthouse, Ames and his wife, both dressed in jailhouse olive drab, pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit espionage. The small courtroom was packed. Sandy was out of town, but Jeanne was there, as were Diana Worthen, Dan Payne, and numerous other representatives from the CIA and FBI. Rosario spoke first. She looked as if she had not slept in weeks, and she was clutching a large, stagy crucifix more suited to warding off vampires than providing solace in a difficult moment. About the only thing that Jeanne remembers from her statement was her reference to her intellectual attainments. She had it put into the record that she was a PhD candidate at Georgetown. Her sentencing was delayed until Ames’ debriefings had been completed.

When it was Ames’ turn, he rose in a dignified manner. True to form, he pontificated at great length. What he said perhaps sounded convincing to the uninitiated. Parts of his speech were attempts at self-justification, characterizing espionage as a sham and saying that the Soviet officials he had betrayed had made “similar choices and suffered similar consequences.” He omitted to point out that many of them were executed, while he did not face the death penalty. His bitter reaction to the way that the government had treated Rosario seemed to be sincere. He had seemingly blanked out of his mind that, for the last year at least, she had known that he was committing espionage on behalf of the Russians and had greedily shopped away the profits. After he had his say, Ames was sentenced to life imprisonment.

The debriefings of Ames began the day after his conviction. They were managed by the FBI, and at first they did not want anyone from the CIA present. After some high-level negotiations it was agreed that Jeanne could represent the CIA. She was thus present at the first thirteen sessions. Initially it was awkward. None of the FBI debriefers had any prior professional relationship with Ames, but Jeanne had known him at least casually since the 1970s. They had been colleagues working against the Soviet target, and in 1983 were fellow branch chiefs located only a few doors away from each other.

Ames was told on the way to the first debriefing session that Jeanne would be there. He responded by muttering “Oh, shit!” (Perhaps he said something stronger, but this is what Jeanne was told.) When he first entered the debriefing room, and his shackles were removed, the FBI shook hands with him. Jeanne felt she could not do the same, so she kept somewhat in the background and merely said “Hi, Rick!”

As a rule, we debriefed three days a week, for most of the day with a break for lunch. The venues varied. Sometimes we met at the Alexandria City Jail, but Ames disliked this because he could not smoke. On other occasions we met at the FBI’s Washington Field Office at Buzzard’s Point. At first, Ames was shackled whenever we took a break. However, the FBI soon relaxed and only chained him up at the end of the day. Ames seemed not to be embarrassed by this. When it was time to go, he just held out his arms for the cuffs. For Ames, lunch was the high point of the day. The Alexandria City Jail did not employ a cook. The inmates cooked for themselves, with generally dismal results. On debriefing days, Ames got to enjoy a pizza of his selection, a meatball submarine, or some other tasty dish. And he smoked like a chimney all day, with little concern for the non-smokers in the room.

The debriefings covered a lot of ground, some of it only superficially because we were aware that a damage assessment team would take over when we had gone over the FBI’s and CIA’s priority requirements. Jeanne was always allotted time to ask Ames about some of the Directorate of Operations cases that he might have compromised. This was a somewhat frustrating exercise because generally the requirements she received from the various DO components were organized by cryptonym. Ames did not do well in remembering cryptonyms. One had to tell him something about a case before he could remember if he had told his Soviet handlers about it. Naturally, the people preparing the requirements did not always want to reveal this sort of sensitive information, fearing that someday Ames might be exchanged for some U.S. spy held by the Soviets, or might find some way of communicating with them from his jail cell. However, we did manage to clarify a number of points. In general, Ames appeared cooperative. He only expressed significant anger on one occasion, in relation to what he had heard about Rosario’s travails at the hands of the prosecution, particularly leading attorney Mark Hulkower.

Did Ames tell the truth during the debriefings? Jeanne believes that he did for the most part. He knew that if he were caught in a lie it would affect Rosario’s sentence. He had not had access to sensitive Soviet operations for some years and he had no way of determining what knowledgeable sources we had acquired in the KGB and GRU during the interim, and what they had told us. Therefore, he could not know when it was safe to lie and when it was not.

In one area, however, he was less than forthcoming. This was his description, or lack thereof, of his KGB handlers and his relationship with them. For instance, he said he could not positively identify a photograph of Viktor Cherkashin, the KGB CI chief in Washington whom he had met in the embassy on at least one occasion. (“Oh, yeah . . . it sort of looks like him . . . could be . . . maybe.”)4 He was also very vague when it came to his two regular contacts, Yuriy Karetkin and Vladimir Mechulayev, obfuscating which one was present at which meeting. Further, when asked about the details of the meetings, and what they discussed, he would say that he had been drinking and could not remember much. It was plain that his loyalties were to them, and he did not want to do anything to cause them trouble. Moreover, it was no doubt in the back of his mind at the time that perhaps at some future date he would be swapped for a U.S. spy in Russian hands.

All this meant a heavy workload for Jeanne. It takes at least one day of writing to cover one day’s debriefing. The pressure for rapid processing of the reporting was intense at first. All the CIA powers-that-be wanted to be the first to have it. And the FBI could not write up their notes with such speed. The sessions were taped, but the FBI took notes longhand while Jeanne used a laptop. Therefore they depended on Jeanne’s reports to brief their own management. Probably the biggest drawback to Jeanne’s notes was that they were arranged strictly in the order of discussion. Jeanne did it this way as an aid to the transcriber of the tapes, because the transcriptions would be the formal record. However, the notes would probably have been more useful to management had they been arranged in some other fashion.

While their relationship had always been casual, Jeanne rather liked Ames back in the days when they were fellow officers working against the Soviet target. To some extent this bled over during the debriefings. When they were discussing a topic of mutual interest, Jeanne would sometimes forget that she was dealing with a convicted felon who had no conscience and who was responsible for many deaths. He would just be good old Rick. Part of this was because the debriefings frequently turned into dialogues between the two about cases or programs known to both of them but with which the FBI was not familiar. Sometimes Jeanne would consciously have to pull back and regain her distance and objectivity.

One event at the beginning of the debriefings has attracted a certain amount of attention and become part of the lore of this case. At the first session, Ames was asked if he had given any names of CIA or FBI personnel to the KGB. The intent of the question was to determine if he had signaled anyone who might have some vulnerability, which would make him or her an attractive recruitment target. Ames mentioned a couple of names and then told Jeanne offhandedly that he had also given her name to his KGB handlers. Jeanne absorbed this, but was not particularly surprised. During the early days of Ames’ contacts with the KGB, she had been a single female stationed in a remote African outpost and she knew that the misogynist KGB considered single women tempting targets, vulnerable to the wiles of a strong and handsome male. Indeed, during this tour she had sometimes wondered why the local Soviet contingent treated her with marked coolness.

At this point, debriefing time ran out but we returned to the subject the next day. We soon learned that we had been misinterpreting what Ames had to say. He had given the KGB the names of persons he thought could be the scapegoats for his treasonous activities. In other words, the suggestion was that the KGB could mount a disinformation operation pointing to someone other than Ames as the traitor, somewhat along the lines of the Mister X case discussed in Chapter 10.

Ames made no apology to Jeanne when describing how he had tried to set her up in this manner. Her first instinct was to leap across the table and strangle him, but almost immediately she saw how ironic and even humorous it was. Here he was sentenced to life without parole, the object of great opprobrium from his colleagues and the nation at large. He would have to put on his chains and go back to his cell and his bologna sandwich when the day was over, while she was free to go where she wanted, and do what she wanted. Her evening might be spent with a gourmet meal at a restaurant, including a glass or two of wine, or watching an episode of Masterpiece Theater. For the rest of his life, his choices would be severely limited. He would never go to the theater again, never eat in a restaurant, or sip vintage wine, and if he had access to a group television set, he would have to watch what his generally lowbrow prison mates wanted to watch, which surely did not include the intellectually stimulating programs he would prefer. For a moment, but a moment only, she almost felt sorry for him.

The FBI team plus Jeanne spent one session talking to Rosario. Jeanne had never met her, but had heard a great deal—almost all of it unfavorable—from the FBI. She was described as totally self-centered, controlling, obsessed by money and material acquisitions, and psychologically abusive to her son Pablo.5 Our meeting certainly did nothing to dispel this impression. Her lawyer, William B. Cummings, a southern gentleman, was present. As she entered the room, she kissed him and whined that she did not know why we wanted to badger her. If we asked a question that she did not want to answer, she would break into tears and exclaim to Cummings, “Bill, they’re being mean to me!” When given a chance, she would expound on how much better Colombia was than the United States, to include her judgment that there were no good universities in the United States—not like they have in Colombia. Also, she characterized American women as peasants. It was obvious to her that we were uncultured because we went to the supermarket in jeans and sneakers while she, being a lady, always dressed in a pants suit. Little useful information was obtained from the session.

Overall during this period Jeanne, Sandy, and the other investigators realized that there was a certain amount of ambivalence regarding them. Were they villains or heroes? Jeanne’s treatment by HPSCI clearly showed her that there were those who, with a less than complete grasp of the facts, put them in the former camp, invoking the theme that if the investigation had been undertaken by more competent people Ames would have been arrested in no time flat. The IG report has it both ways, saying that the investigation was inadequate but placing most of the blame on senior management. As described, both Jeanne and Sandy were given medals but under circumstances that led them to view the medals with a jaundiced eye. On a more positive note, however, Sandy and Jeanne always felt that they had the support and approval of their peers and colleagues, and these are expressed even to the present day. And they are in demand on the lecture circuit, presenting their story to a wide variety of television and live audiences. This was strange to them at first because CIA officials are taught to avoid publicity at all costs and indeed a person who needs outside appreciation would probably not be happy in the CIA. Yet in time they became used to the limelight and frankly admit that the ego gratification they receive is not unpleasing.

In addition to the television interviews, there have been five books written about the Ames case so far. Only three of them are worth mentioning. By far the most complete coverage comes from Pete Earley in Confessions of a Spy. This is the only book that we, Redmond, Worthen, Payne, and others cooperated with, having been asked to do so by senior CIA management. This book appeared about a year after other publications, and Earley used the time to do a lot of digging and interviewing, including a trip to Moscow, to round out the story.

David Wise’s Nightmover contains some interesting material, and he obviously has some good sources among present and former CIA officers. He does, however, make one major error in postulating that Ames’ espionage began in Mexico City in the early 1980s, orchestrated by a KGB officer named Igor Shurygin. We and the FBI accept the statements by Ames and Cherkashin that Ames volunteered in April 1985. This coordinates with the facts as we know them. Ames first got access to information on sensitive Soviet cases in September 1983, yet these cases continued to run successfully and productively until the summer of 1985, when they began disappearing at an alarming rate. Furthermore, during the period September 1983 to April 1985 Ames sank deeper and deeper into debt, while in the summer of 1985 his situation markedly improved.

A third book of some interest is Peter Maas’ Killer Spy. This was written with FBI cooperation and is mainly a blow-by-blow account of the FBI’s role in the investigation. As an insider description, it contains material not found elsewhere.

One made-for-television movie also exists. This is Aldrich Ames: The Spy Within, with Timothy Hutton playing Ames. It has some value as a psychological study because Hutton does a good job of portraying Ames as a person. However, from a factual viewpoint, it leaves a great deal to be desired. It is decidedly off base when attempting to portray the inner workings of the CIA and the individuals who worked there, as well as some basic facts of the case. This movie was produced by a man who was a friend of Ames’ during his youthful University of Chicago phase. He telephoned Jeanne in an effort to get her to cooperate with his project, but she declined.