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The discursive construction of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt
Few institutions are as central to the preservation of a liberal civil society as a free press. Indeed, it is no accident that a preponderance of early Egyptian liberal thinkers saw the media as central to their reform project: from Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid’s newspaper Al-Jarida in the early twentieth century to the pages of Ruz al-Yusuf under editor Ihsan Abd al-Quddus in the 1950s, journalism proved one of the most prominent vehicles for the articulation of liberal reform, and for the cultivation of a nascent Egyptian civil society. Regrettably, though, during Egypt’s brief 2011–13 democratic experiment and the concomitant rise and fall of the Muslim Brotherhood, journalists and news outlets with ostensibly liberal missions largely failed to live up to those ideals.
The story of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in Egypt following the 2011 uprising can perhaps best be described as one of a meteoric rise, and an equally meteoric fall. Following the ouster of Hosni Mubarak, the group went on to win five consecutive free-and-fair elections and referendums in 2011 and 2012 – four by wide margins. After decades of repression, it seemed the MB was now poised to rise to become among the most important players in Egypt’s emerging democratic order. Yet only a year after the election of Brotherhood candidate Mohammad Morsi to Egypt’s presidency, those ambitions were quickly dashed; with the military coup that brought down Morsi’s rule on July 3, 2013 came a campaign of repression hitherto unseen in the movement’s history.
Indeed, in the weeks and months that followed the coup, the Brotherhood was systematically eliminated from Egyptian political and public life, both in official and unofficial channels: thousands of Brotherhood members and supporters were killed in what Human Rights Watch called “the worst mass unlawful killings” in Egypt’s modern history; tens of thousands of anti-coup protesters and activists were arrested for political crimes; the Brotherhood was banned and declared a terrorist organization; MB members received the largest mass death sentences in modern world history; MB (and other Islamist) charitable organizations were shut down; and individual Muslim Brothers were prevented by new legislation from running for office as independent candidates. Egyptian state institutions willfully colluded with, and aggressively supported, the exclusion of the MB from Egyptian public life.
Without question, Brotherhood incompetence, inexperience, a general lack of transparency, and a series of miscalculations and mistakes – including an arguably problematic alliance with conservative Salafists (who later supported the coup) – contributed to both liberal fears about the future of Egypt, and, ultimately, the political downfall of the MB. But, in all likelihood, poor governance and incompetence alone would not have been sufficient, in the minds of many Brotherhood opponents, to warrant the forced removal of an elected president, much less the subsequent mass repression of his supporters. How did it become possible for the Brotherhood to be demoted – almost overnight – from dominating successive elections to public enemy #1? How could Egyptians willfully vote the MB into office, only to then celebrate the mass execution of Brotherhood members a mere year later?
I argue that the Brotherhood’s dramatic fall from grace was enabled in large part by a systematic discourse demonizing the group not as simply incompetent and ineffectual, but as outright treasonous to Egyptian state and society. This discourse, moreover, was emboldened primarily through the vehicle of the Egyptian news media: both the state-run press and privately owned media, discarding journalistic principles of neutrality and balance, ultimately gave credence to a hegemonic narrative portraying the MB as enemies of the state. Rather than fulfill the role of a liberal institution tasked with protecting civil society, Egyptian news media instead ultimately contributed to Egypt’s return to authoritarianism.
Accordingly, this chapter explores some of the news and political discourses that provided the necessary ammunition for a series of cataclysmic events, starting with Morsi’s overthrow. I argue here that foundational myths propagated about Morsi and the Muslim Brothers – and adopted wholesale by privately owned media outlets – likely led many Egyptians to view the group as traitors and support both the military coup and the post-coup campaign of elimination launched against the MB. The Egyptian media – both state and private – constructed a series of hegemonic discourses about the Muslim Brotherhood and Morsi. This work began before June 30, 2013, and continued with greater force in the aftermath of the coup. These discourses, I argue, helped convince many Egyptians that the problems with the Muslim Brotherhood go beyond poor governance and simple incompetence. Rather, the discourses suggested that the Brotherhood is a sinister group interested in destroying much of what is good about Egyptian society.
Arguably, a lack of professionalism among Egyptian news outlets may have contributed to the discursive campaign against the Brotherhood. The next section reviews relevant literature about the Egyptian press system, with attention to scholarly literature examining Egypt’s historically censorial political and press cultures, and the nation’s traditional lack of journalistic professionalism.
A good deal of scholarly work has been devoted to examining the Egyptian press. Work has focused on the historical trajectory of Egyptian journalism under former presidents Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak;1 Egyptian press law;2 the structure of the Egyptian press system;3 the differences between privately owned, government-owned, and opposition-owned Egyptian newspapers;4 satellite television;5 internet usage;6 and social media patterns.7 Perhaps more important for the purposes of the present research, scholarship has also examined Egypt’s traditionally censorial media environment8 – including Egyptian journalism’s historical subservience to the nation’s military – and the country’s standards of journalistic professionalism.9 The dynamic between the military, government, and journalism, and Egypt’s historical lack of professional journalistic standards are particularly relevant to this examination of news portrayals of Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood.
Government censorship
In their 1954 groundbreaking work on Four Theories of the Press,10 Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm famously noted that press systems naturally reflect the larger sociopolitical systems in which they are situated. Thus, democratic political systems will feature free, largely democratic press apparatuses, while authoritarian political systems will produce obsequious press outlets that serve as little more than government mouthpieces. Given this general rule, it is not surprising that successive Egyptian dictatorships have produced press systems characterized by a lack of journalistic freedom.
Like many Arab countries, for most of its history, Egypt has been plagued by a censorial press culture, with ruling regimes exerting near-complete control over the news system.11 Following Egypt’s 1952 coup against the King Faruk monarchy, new president Gamal Abdel Nasser, who was president of Egypt from 1954 until his death in 1970, spoke of his desire for an independent, free Egypt that would mold itself after the West, while preserving its essential cultural identity.12 Nasser, though, ultimately moved against a Western-style political system, opting instead for a de facto single-party system, political exclusion and marginalization, and very little press freedom. Nasser nationalized the press in 1960, putting all Egyptian news outlets under government ownership and ensuring a completely servile media apparatus.13 The press in the Nasser period treated the president, and, importantly, the military, as “red lines” not to be crossed. These “red lines” became firmly established as journalistic norms in Egypt, with the person of the president and military continuing to remain off limits through the Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak periods.14
Sadat took over as Egypt’s president in 1970 and ruled until his assassination in 1981. He employed democratic rhetoric to a greater extent than Nasser, arguing in 1972 that press freedom was essential to both democracy in general and Egypt in particular.15 In 1976, Sadat followed through on his rhetoric to some extent when he established a multiparty political system and gave each party the right to publish a newspaper. Although there were significant restrictions on political pluralism and press content – including the aforementioned restrictions on coverage of the president and military – Sadat’s moves were thought to be a step in the right direction. A brief period of comparatively greater press freedoms would prove to be short-lived, however, as Sadat sought, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, to quell growing opposition to his economic liberalization policy (al-Infitah) and the Camp David peace initiative. In early 1981, Sadat declared a state of emergency, arrested thousands of people, including many journalists, and shut down news outlets.16 Overall, while Sadat’s time in office included brief periods of relative political and press freedom, the “prevailing character [of the regime] was repression.”17
Mubarak was president of Egypt from 1981 until Egypt’s 2011 uprising, and his time in power was characterized by significant ambivalence regarding political and press freedom. He exhibited some democratic tendencies – highlighted by the allowing of more political parties, and, importantly, private press licenses – but he used political and press laws to maintain an essentially authoritarian system.18 In particular, Mubarak used the Press Law of 1996, the Emergency Law, and the Penal Code to maintain control over press output.
The Press Law of 1996 allowed the government to ban publications, among other things, and the Emergency Law – which was on the books for the duration of Mubarak’s presidency – gave the government the right to “order censorship on correspondence of all kinds, as well as on newspapers, publications, drawings and all means of expression...provided that the censorship is applied to matters related to public peace or national security.”19 The Penal Code ordered, among other things, “a fine not less than 10,000 pounds and not exceeding 20,000 pounds...for whomever insults a public official.”20
Journalistic professionalism in Egypt
Egypt’s authoritarian political environment has led to both institutional corruption and inefficiency, which have combined to water down the quality of Egypt’s education system (including its journalism education system).21 Scholar Joris Luyendijk argues that the difficulties associated with working in a politically repressive environment have effectively prevented the consistent, professional practice of journalism. For instance, the state’s tight control over information makes it nearly impossible for journalists to collect and verify information, two prerequisites to professional journalism.22
Journalism scholars generally view professionalism as a series of attributes that includes education, training, licensure, salary, and journalistic ideology and ethics.23 Empirical research into Egyptian news suggests that the nation’s journalists rank low on these key attributes. For example, surveys carried out in 2008 and 2013 by Elmasry et al24 showed that many Egyptian journalists work without journalism-related degrees, or without having gone through formal journalism training of any kind. Egyptian journalists have also complained about their formal university journalism education, which they said was largely theoretical and did not offer training on story ideation, information gathering, interviewing, or article construction.25 Many Egyptian journalists also work without having attained their journalism licenses through the Syndicate of Journalists.26 Additionally, journalists earn low salaries, and, in many cases, are forced to work second jobs.
Importantly, research27 also suggests that objectivity is not dominant in Egypt, where journalists often perceive themselves as activists rather than watchdogs. Some journalists have explained the process through which news stories are intentionally biased by news editors.28 A 2006 survey by Ramaprasad and Hamdy29 suggests that Egyptian journalists, in the first place, are fundamentally limited in their ability to perform democratic news functions, including gathering and verifying information.
I argue in this chapter that the relative lack of journalistic professionalism in Egypt contributed to the discursive construction of the Muslim Brotherhood as a fundamentally disloyal, anti-revolutionary group. Anti-Brotherhood discourses often started as rumor or hearsay, with many beginning as political arguments by Brotherhood opponents or as analyses written by anti-Brotherhood academics and authors. Importantly, anti-Brotherhood politicians and analysts were given prominent platforms by privately owned Egyptian news outlets bent on portraying the Brotherhood as a threat to the nation. Importantly, key discourses about the Brotherhood relied on myths, not facts, to thrive, and were uncritically echoed by these news outlets. The following pages examine two important anti-Brotherhood discourses: disloyalty, and anti-revolutionary.
One important myth propagated against the Muslim Brotherhood suggested that the group is fundamentally disloyal to Egypt. This disloyalty discourse – along with a series of closely related sub-discourses – projected the Brotherhood as a group that is not truly Egyptian and which does not give priority to legitimate Egyptian national interests. The entire discursive pattern of disloyalty represents an example of a narrative – or series of narratives – that began prior to the large June 30, 2013 protests, but which was highlighted, emphasized, and driven home in the aftermath of Morsi’s forced removal from office on July 3, 2013. The disloyalty discourse was used as a key justification both for the coup and the post-coup elimination of the Brotherhood from politics and public life.
The sections that follow specifically examine sub-discourses suggesting that the Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood are a foreign group with strong ties to Egypt’s foreign enemies, exclusively devoted to Islamists (and not Egypt at large), and more akin to a foreign occupier than part of “the nation.” Together, these three sub-discourses projected an image of disloyalty by suggesting that Morsi was conspiring with foreign enemies against Egypt, attempting to sell off vital sections of Egypt, exclusively devoted to members of the Muslim Brotherhood (at the expense of the non-Brotherhood citizens of Egypt), and not truly part of “the nation.”
Foreign group with ties to Egypt’s enemies
Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood were discursively constructed as foreign to Egypt, and as having illegitimate ties to foreign enemies. For instance, on June 21, 2013, privately owned and widely viewed news network ONTv hosted prominent novelist and political analyst Gamal El-Ghitani as a featured guest on its program The Complete Picture.30 El-Ghitani argued that the Brotherhood’s governance of Egypt constituted a “foreign occupation” of Egypt. El-Ghitani had also delivered this thesis in an interview published in online newspaper 24 on May 21, 2013.31
Mainstream news sources also fed the discursive construction of the Brotherhood as a disloyal group by presenting it as having problematic ties with foreign entities interested in destabilizing and dividing Egypt. News articles during Morsi’s one-year presidency discussed the Brotherhood’s allegedly close relations with Israel,32 the Lebanese faction Hezbollah,33 and the Palestinian faction Hamas,34 all seen as political enemies by many Egyptians.
News stories accused the Muslim Brotherhood of wanting to establish a global caliphate,35 conspiring with Hamas and Hezbollah to organize a mass prison break during the 2011 anti-Mubarak uprising,36 and suggested that the Brotherhood and Hamas had combined to murder hundreds of Egyptians during the 2011 uprising against Mubarak.37 Stories about the Brotherhood’s alleged illegal collaborations with foreign entities were featured prominently on Egyptian television evening news talk shows.
Ongoing news stories also focused on Morsi’s alleged interest in selling off the Suez Canal38 and Sinai Peninsula39 to foreign entities, with some stories suggesting that deals were already in place. Importantly, these alleged sales were not discussed merely in isolated reports, but, rather, constituted ongoing news stories. Popular broadcaster Tawfik Okasha also lamented the alleged sale of the Great Pyramids of Giza on his Al-Fira’een Network,40 and ONTv discussed the alleged three- to five-year renting out of the Pyramids to foreign entities.41
These discourses were propagated in the media environment, but were not disconnected from politics. Anti-Morsi political forces played up the alleged sales and demonstrations were held in protest.42 At the time of this writing, Morsi was on trial for espionage for allegedly conspiring with Hamas and Hezbollah.
“My family and my clan”
Importantly, news discourses suggested that Morsi was loyal to the Muslim Brotherhood, but not to all Egyptians. News figures, writers, and analysts claimed that Morsi was “not a president for all Egyptians,” and that, instead, he was exclusively devoted to the MB.
News figures and politicians routinely claimed that Morsi exclusively addressed the Muslim Brotherhood – and not all Egyptians – in his speeches. Specifically, it was alleged that Morsi was in the habit of beginning his public addresses with the phrase “O my people and my clan,” which, news and political analysis claimed, was a clear signal that Morsi favored the MB and didn’t care about the non-Brotherhood citizens of Egypt. Taken in the context of other ongoing news stories about the Brotherhood’s close ties with foreign Islamist entities and attempts to sell off key parts of Egypt, this was a particularly damning sub-discourse.
The “my people and my clan” introductory line was taken as a key piece of evidence for the position that Morsi and the Brotherhood were loyal to one another, but not to Egypt or the non-Brotherhood citizens of the country. The “my family and my clan” issue became a major story in Egypt, and, in spite of a lack of substantive evidence, was discussed seriously and extensively in news media and also in some academic circles.
For example, political figures such as Amr Moussa43 and news broadcasters Lamees al-Hadeedy44 and Yousef al-Hoseiny45 took turns lamenting Morsi’s usage of “my family and my clan” in his speeches. Each intimated that Morsi was devoted to his group of Muslim Brothers, not Egypt as a whole.
In one episode of his ONTv news program Respectable Gentlemen,46 al-Hoseiny alleged that, in his first formal address as president, Morsi was “brutally honest” and forthright about his desire to exclusively address the Muslim Brothers, and exclude the Egyptian nation at large. The program showed a small portion of a clip from Morsi’s first formal televised address, during which he uses the phrase “my family and my clan.”
ONTv, however, only played a small portion of Morsi’s speech, cutting the speech off when the context would have made Morsi’s reference clear. A review of Morsi’s entire introduction clarifies that the speech defined all Egyptians – and not just the Muslim Brothers – as Morsi’s “family” and “clan.”47
Morsi says: “O Great Egyptian people...you who are celebrating democracy today in Egypt...my beloved ones, my family and my clan, my brothers, my sons and daughters, you who are looking toward the future, and you who desire good, progress, growth, stability, and safety for our nation of Egypt...all of my beloved ones...”
The speech goes on to thank Egyptians for instigating the uprising against Mubarak, which, Morsi says, led directly to Egypt’s first democratic presidential election. Morsi praises the sacrifices made by all Egyptians who protested against the Mubarak regime, including the martyrs and “the mothers of the martyrs.” He then thanks “all my family members” who have “lost those who are valuable to them and sacrificed them for the sake of the nation.” Given that the overwhelming majority of the revolution’s martyrs were not members of the Muslim Brotherhood, Morsi’s praise can be seen as general, and not exclusive to a specific group. Morsi then prayed for the martyrs and those injured in the anti-Mubarak uprising – those who “paved the road for us.”
Later in the speech, Morsi’s words make it even clearer that he is addressing all Egyptians. Morsi praises the Egyptian army and says he “loves” its members, praises the Egyptian judiciary, and refers to the Egyptian police as “my brothers and my sons.” Morsi then repeats the “my family and my clan” line:
I say to everyone [in Egypt], to all sections of Egyptian society, my family and my clan, I say to all [Egyptians] on this great day, that on this day, with your will and choice...I am a president for all Egyptians, regardless of where they are, inside of Egypt and outside of Egypt, in all of the governorates...”
He then goes on to describe the Egyptian “family” as including Nubian Egyptians and other groups. Later, Morsi says, “all my family members – all Egyptians – the Muslims and the Christians, the men and the women, the old and the young...all of these family members of mine.” Morsi’s use of “family,” then, is a general and inclusive reference.
There is no indication anywhere in the twenty-six-minute speech that Morsi intends to address only the Muslim Brotherhood. In fact, on the contrary, Morsi’s speech is clear in its attempt to address all Egyptians. Nonetheless, al-Hoseiny, Moussa, al-Hadeedy, and numerous other political and media figures allowed this myth – that Morsi addressed only the MB – to take on a life of its own. Some academics also aided in propagating the myth both inside and outside of Egypt.
In an academic presentation delivered at the University of California at Berkeley, scholar Sarah El-Tantawi48 said that Morsi’s usage of “my family and my clan” was a major concern for anti-Morsi Egyptians who protested on June 30, 2013. El-Tantawi posited that Morsi’s use of a particularly narrow address represented a “great departure from, let’s say, Gamal Abdel Nasser, who used to say ‘O my brothers and fellow citizens’, and then Sadat, who modified it to say, ‘O my brothers and sisters, fellow citizens’. So these kinds of things people noticed and were upset about.”
But Morsi’s speeches do not deviate in any meaningful way from the national citizenship discourses adopted by Nasser and Sadat. Morsi, in fact, nearly always began his speeches by addressing the entire Egyptian nation, and often made a point of addressing his “opponents.” He also regularly referred to Egyptian citizens – on the whole – as his “family,” and regularly addressed Egyptian “citizens.”
For instance, in an informal inauguration at Tahrir Square on June 29, 2012, Morsi began his address with “O great Egyptian nation...O beloved ones. O great Egyptian people...O brothers and sisters...O sons and daughters...O Muslims in Egypt...O Christians in Egypt...O honorable citizens...O Egyptians inside of Egypt and outside of Egypt...my family and my beloved ones.”49
On October 6, 2012, Morsi opened his speech at Cairo Stadium with: “O brothers and sisters. Ladies and gentlemen. All in attendance. All of the Egyptian people. Those attending this gathering, and those who are not in attendance...Great Egyptian people. I greet all of you.”50
On December 6, 2012, Morsi began his televised address to the Egyptian people in this way: “O Honorable Egyptian nation, ladies and gentlemen.” This trend continued through Morsi’s June and July televised addresses, which also began with “O great Egyptian nation.”51
In a speech delivered on November 23, 2012 in front of Muslim Brotherhood supporters, Morsi uses the phrase “ahli” (“my family”) to address his audience.52 Morsi addresses his audience in this way: “O beloved ones. O all Egyptians...O honorable gathering...I am with you [in this gathering]...but I am also with all of Egypt’s sons and daughters at the same time regardless of where they are...with those who oppose me and those who support me...[This is] “a speech to my family, to the whole of the Egyptian people, the sons and daughters of this nation...” Taken in context, Morsi’s usage of “my family” in this speech is a clear reference to all Egyptians, not just members of the Muslim Brotherhood.
“The nation”
After the large anti-Morsi protests on June 30, 2013, many analysts joined a chorus of voices suggesting that the Brotherhood was foreign, unpatriotic, and not loyal to Egypt. At the same time, Egyptian state and private news outlets began referring to anti-Morsi Egyptians as “the nation,” and pro-Morsi protesters as treasonous.
As evidence that “the nation” had risen up against a despised president and his unrepresentative (and very small) group, numerous news outlets reported that thirty-three million Egyptians had protested against Morsi and the Brotherhood on June 30. (According to crowd-sizing experts, the cited protest figures were off by many millions, with overall protest figures likely between one and two million in total53)
Upon showing a video of anti-Morsi protesters during his July 3, 2013 broadcast, Al-Nahar Network’s Mahmoud Saad proclaimed, “these are the people.” Saad referred to pro-Morsi protesters as “them,” said the pro-Morsi protests were small (standing on mere “street corners”), and claimed that the protesters there were a part of “extremist groups.”54 During her July 3, 2013 broadcast, al-Hadeedy referred to anti-Morsi protesters as “the nation,” and argued that key Muslim Brotherhood figures were guilty of espionage.55
On July 26, 2013, the CBC Network’s Khairy Ramadan said the Muslim Brotherhood does not “understand the meaning of nation.”56 During the same broadcast, Ramadan referred to the MB as “foreign agents” and “unpatriotic.” He repeatedly referred to anti-Brotherhood protesters as “the nation” and referred to the Brotherhood as “terrorists.” The CBC’s al-Hadeedy proclaimed on July 3, 2013, the day of the coup, that “Egypt is coming back to us.” She also said that no one can “rape” the people of Egypt, “neither the French, nor the English, nor the Israelis...nor the Muslim Brotherhood.”57
In August 2013, Tahrir Network anchor Dina Abdelrahman encapsulated “the nation” sub-discourse in this way: “There are not two groups (in Egypt). There is the Egyptian nation (on one side) and there is a group of Muslim Brothers (on the other side).”58
Another powerful media and political discourse about the Muslim Brotherhood – propagated in many Egyptian media outlets, political analysts and explicitly pro-military political forces – intimated that the group is anti-democratic, and, in the first place, not a genuine part of Egypt’s January 25 revolutionary movement. This discursive pattern was particularly damning given the January 25 revolution’s lofty place in post-2011 Egyptian politics and society, its taken-for-granted goodness, and its stated objective of creating a democratic order.
Egypt’s January 25 revolution quickly achieved hegemonic status as an unquestioned good in the struggle for democracy and against dictatorship. Egyptians who wanted political credibility extolled the praises of the revolution, even if they were not, apparently, on board with the revolution or its goals. The Egyptian military, Mubarak-appointed judges, Mubarak-friendly media personalities, and the police took turns exalting the “glorious January 25 revolution.” To be seen as against the revolution was to be discredited as part of the despised ancien régime.
A consensus of western scholars and experts viewed Morsi’s forced removal on July 3 as a military coup. However, inside Egypt, it was painted as a continuation of the January 25 revolution. The Egyptian military, police, and both state-owned and privately owned media suggested that the Egyptian army had moved against Morsi and the MB to restore Egypt’s revolutionary path. The narrative claimed that, by ousting a fundamentally counterrevolutionary and anti-democratic force, Egyptian democracy would be re-established. This narrative was quickly embraced by most of the liberal political forces supportive of the June 30 protest movement, many of whom had already been claiming since mid-2011 that the Brotherhood was much more interested in an Islamic dictatorship than democracy. Thus, the narratives suggesting that the Brotherhood was opposed to the January 25 revolution, its goals, and democracy in general played a key role in justifying the events that transpired in Egypt between June 30 and July 3, 2013.
As evidence, anti-Morsi forces pointed to several factors: the MB’s absence from Tahrir Square during the early 2011 uprising against Mubarak; the Brotherhood’s “secret” February 2011 meeting with Mubarak’s vice president; Morsi’s November 2012 power grab; and the Brotherhood’s attempt to “brotherhoodize” Egyptian politics. Each of these points was highlighted in Egyptian media and political circles, and, ultimately, did a good deal of harm to the Muslim Brotherhood’s reputation as legitimate democratic actors.
The Brotherhood’s January 25 presence
Brookings Institute Fellow Hesham Hellyer neatly captured the essence of the narrative that accused the Brotherhood of being fundamentally opposed to both the January 25 revolution and its democratic goals: “Some, particularly in the anti-Mubarak, but pro-military, private media, are positing the notion that the Muslim Brotherhood was essentially absent from Tahrir Square and the various squares around the country at the beginning of the uprising. It joined, according to this narrative, very late, and was essentially inconsequential.”59
Hellyer goes on to describe a more extreme manifestation of this narrative, one that suggested that the Brotherhood was fundamentally opposed to the January 25 uprising. Hellyer notes pro-military media claimed “protesters that were killed by pro-Mubarak forces...were killed, actually, by the Brotherhood.”
It is certainly fair – and, I would argue, accurate – to suggest that the Brotherhood does not deserve as much revolutionary credit as liberal Egyptian political forces who essentially instigated the uprising, or those individuals and groups who officially participated in the January 25 protests. The MB did not join the revolution in an official capacity until January 27, two days after protests began.60 Moreover, at its core, the Brotherhood is a gradualist, reformist movement, and it was not as effective as youth revolutionaries at producing dramatic revolutionary change. However, in the end, the Brotherhood played a key role in the anti-Mubarak uprising, and, for a variety of reasons, their early official absence from Tahrir Square should not be exaggerated.
First, January 25, 2011 protests were not billed as a “revolution” to begin with. According to Google executive Wael Ghonim, credited with instigating and organizing the revolution, the January 25 protesters “had no thoughts of a revolution, we just wanted a better country.”61 Second, the Brotherhood was not the only group to officially (or unofficially) avoid January 25 protest sites. In fact, the overwhelming majority of Egyptians did not participate in January 25, 2011 demonstrations. According to Hellyer, “It was a relatively small crowd that went to the streets on the Jan. 25.”62 Third, although failing to officially sign off on January 25 protests, the Brotherhood did not prevent its members from attending protests. Muslim Brotherhood youth members attended Tahrir Square protests on January 25, and they were joined by at least a small contingent of Muslim Brotherhood leaders, including Mohamed El-Beltagy63 and Abdel Moneim Abul Fotouh.64 Thus, the notion that the Brotherhood was completely absent from the January 25 scene is misleading. In any case, the Brotherhood protested alongside other revolutionaries from the “day of rage” (on January 28, 2011) through Mubarak’s February 11, 2011 resignation.
The “secret meeting” with Omar Suleiman
In an example of a sub-discourse that took on a life of its own, it was widely claimed in the Egyptian media and political circles that the Brotherhood held a secret meeting during the heart of the revolution with Mubarak’s vice president, Omar Suleiman. Political analyst Wael Eskander summarizes: “Many reports have claimed that during the turmoil of the eighteen-day uprising in February 2011, members of the MBs Guidance Bureau met secretly with then Vice President Omar Suleiman, reportedly to work out an agreement that would clear out Tahrir Square of protesters calling for the fall of the Hosni Mubarak regime.”65 Eskander, himself apparently accepting the notion, suggests that the “alleged deal eventually fell through when the MB’s youth refused to evacuate the square.”
However, reports of a secret meeting between the Brotherhood and Suleiman are inaccurate. First, the February 6, 2011 meeting in question was not secret: it was widely covered by major international press outlets.
Second, only two Brotherhood members – out of a total of fifty anti-Mubarak political figures – met with Suleiman. David Kirkpatrick and David Sanger of The New York Times reported: “They met as part of a group of about 50 prominent Egyptians and opposition figures, including officials of the small, recognized opposition parties, as well as a handful of young people who helped start the protest movement.”66 According to Reuters’ coverage of the meeting, Mohamed El Baradei’s National Association for Change was one of the groups represented at the meeting.67
Third, there is no substantive evidence – as has been widely intimated – that the Brotherhood was interested in a compromise that would have derailed a democratic transformation and witnessed Mubarak stay on as president. Immediately after the meeting, and after Suleiman announced Mubarak would not step down, one of the Brotherhood representatives who attended the meeting said, “We did not come out with results.”68 The BBC’s report on the meeting indicated that the Brotherhood’s representatives demanded “the immediate resignation of President Mubarak.” The report quotes a senior Brotherhood official as saying, “Our demands are still the same...They didn’t respond to most of our demands. They only responded to some of our demands, but in a superficial way.”69
The Mubarak government may have initially proposed the notion that the Brotherhood was trying to subvert the revolution and work out a deal with the government. Kirkpatrick and Sanger wrote: “Leaders of the protest movement, including both its youthful members and Brotherhood officials, denounced Mr. Suleiman’s portrayal of the meeting as a political ploy intended to suggest that some in their ranks were collaborating.”70
Some of Egypt’s revolutionary groups may have also advanced the notion that the Brotherhood had “betrayed” the revolution by meeting with Suleiman. Importantly, not all revolutionary groups were present at the meeting, with some, like the April 6th Youth Movement, rejecting the idea of meeting with a representative from the Mubarak government until Mubarak formally stepped down. There were legitimate disagreements among revolutionary forces about the appropriateness of dialogue with the Mubarak regime. The point, though, is that suggestions that the Brotherhood attempted to subvert the revolution are misplaced, and fundamentally lacking in substantive evidence.
Morsi’s November 2012 decree
On November 22, 2012, Morsi issued a controversial presidential decree granting himself sweeping powers and making his decisions immune from judicial oversight. According to Morsi’s spokesperson, under the decree’s provisions Morsi’s decisions were “final and not subject to appeal (by the judiciary)”.71 In addition, Morsi could “issue any decision or measure to protect the revolution.”72
Privately owned and opposition-party-owned media, and the Brotherhood’s political opponents portrayed the move as a dictatorial power grab, and suggested it was evidence that the MB wanted to create a dictatorship.
Political opposition figure Mohamed El Baradei tweeted, “Morsi today usurped all state powers and appointed himself Egypt’s new pharaoh.”73 Ghonim said, “The revolution was not staged in search for a benign dictator, there is a difference between revolutionary decisions and dictatorial decisions. God is the only one whose decisions are not questioned.”74
Morsi’s decree was legitimately controversial, and, by its nature, was bound to generate a fair amount of rebuke, particularly from opponents. However, the decree’s negative ramifications were grossly exaggerated in the Egyptian media and political circles. Disagreeing with Morsi’s decree – which was mishandled on a number of levels – was politically legitimate. Claiming that Morsi had turned into a dictator, however, represented a gross exaggeration, and fed an already existing myth about the Muslim Brotherhood’s alleged dictatorial, anti-democratic fantasies.
Context is important in examining the decree’s implications. Morsi had been engaged in a battle with Mubarak-appointed judges arguably bent on derailing Egypt’s democratic experiment. The judiciary had already disbanded Egypt’s first freely elected parliament – just four months after twenty-six million Egyptians had voted them into office. The judiciary also disbanded the first constitutional assembly, and, importantly, reportedly threatened to disband a second constitutional assembly – even after all of Egypt’s (then) twenty-two parties had agreed to its formation and specific composition. The judiciary also threatened to reverse Morsi’s August 2012 decree, which effectively removed the military from politics. The reversal of that decree would have created a quasi-military dictatorship, putting the military above the elected president and giving the military veto power over every article in the new constitution. It was in this context that Morsi decided to issue his decree and place his decisions above judicial oversight. In any case, the decree lasted just over two weeks.
Another point left out of much of the discussion inside Egypt was the decree’s duration. Had Morsi desired to become a long-term dictator, he would have likely offered up no indication that the terms of the decree would end. However, article 2 of the decree stated that it would become null and void upon the holding of a constitutional referendum (on the draft constitution which, at the time of the decree, was near completion) and parliamentary elections.
Moreover, the constitution that Morsi desired Egyptians to vote on, absolutely prohibited single-party dominance and would have legally and constitutionally prevented a Mubarak-style dictatorship from emerging. The 2012 constitution – mockingly referred to as the “Morsi Constitution” in Egypt’s anti-Brotherhood circles – decreed regular elections and strict term limits for elected officials (including the president). The constitution also greatly reduced the president’s powers by severely curtailing his right to declare a state of emergency, stipulating a powerful prime minister, who, according to some Egyptian scholars of constitutional law, would have wielded greater power than the elected president. Moreover, the constitution included an impeachment mechanism and guaranteed political inclusion by giving all Egyptians the right to establish and join political parties. In addition, all Egyptians could have owned a newspaper without government approval.
Although Morsi’s decree was poorly timed, mishandled, and, given the timing, controversial, it did not provide an opportunity for dictatorship and could not have created a “new pharaoh.”
Brotherhoodization of Egypt
Another anti-Brotherhood discourse claimed that the MB was actively “brotherhoodizing” the state – taking over all of the state’s institution. This discourse dovetailed nicely with already circulating claims that Morsi and the Brotherhood were anti-democratic dictators bent on eliminating all political competition.
The “Brotherhoodization” claims were ubiquitous during Morsi’s one-year term. As I have written elsewhere, the Brotherhoodization discourse had become “so hegemonic that many Egyptians [took] it as a given. It [was] difficult to find an independent talk show that [did] not regularly obsess over the Brotherhood’s takeover.”75
The MB was alleged to have taken over the military, judiciary, police, media, and government. In fact, as evidence for the Brotherhoodization thesis, some media outlets claimed that Morsi’s interior minister Mohamed Ibrahim and defense minister Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi – who orchestrated the military coup against Morsi – were either closet MB members or staunch supporters of the group.
There was not serious evidence for the Brotherhoodization thesis. The MB never had control over the military, police, or judiciary, and, for legal and logistical reasons, it would not have been possible for the group to gain control in the short term. Had the Muslim Brothers desired, theoretically, to take these institutions over, it would have taken many years to develop a stable of Brotherhood members or loyalists ready to be appointed.
Nor did the MB hold a monopoly over the Egyptian media. Most Egyptian media outlets took highly critical positions and engaged in an hysterical anti-Brotherhood media campaign.76 Even the state-owned newspaper Al-Ahram, typically a staunch government ally, “seemed to abandon – to a considerable extent – the government mouthpiece role it maintained during the Mubarak era.”77
The Muslim Brotherhood did hold considerable sway over the government. However, this was to be expected given the group’s status as an elected government, and also their position as the largest and most organized political force in the country. Importantly, though, Egypt’s anti-Brotherhood opposition and media greatly exaggerated the extent of the Brotherhood’s influence in government.
Even after the June 2012 appointments, the Brotherhood only held thirty-four percent (twenty-one out of sixty-two) of the government’s cabinet and governor positions.78 Importantly, this percentage would likely have been much lower had non-Brotherhood politicians been willing to accept positions in the Morsi government. Numerous non-Brotherhood, liberal politicians were offered government positions, but declined. These included Ayman Nour of the al-Ghad Party, former presidential candidate Hamdeen Sabbahi, Ahmed Maher of the April 6th Youth Movement, political scientist Moataz Abdel Fattah, and multiple former members of the (2012) Kamal al-Ganzouri government (who were allowed to continue in their posts), among many others.
It is now clear that there were elements inside Egyptian society who were a priori unprepared to accept a Muslim Brotherhood government. Numerous scholars and experts have examined attempts, beginning as early as June 2012 (before Morsi was inaugurated president), to undermine Morsi’s political project. Political forces associated with Egypt’s ‘deep state’ – and also among anti-Islamist political parties – actively sought ways to bring down the Morsi government. Ultimately, they succeeded, aided in large part by a series of myths that suggested the Brotherhood was disloyal, foreign to Egypt, fundamentally at odds with the January 25 revolutionary moment, and essentially anti-democratic and dictatorial.
The widespread dissemination of those anti-Brotherhood myths, moreover, was emblematic of a categorical failure of the Egyptian news media to live up to the standards of liberal institutions – indeed, to the standards originally envisioned for the press by early Egyptian liberal reformers. In cavalierly disregarding their responsibility to encourage a vibrant civil society, prominent Egyptian news media outlets in effect allied with and emboldened the very deep state agenda civil society was designed to protect against in the first place. Many private news owners, many of whom were sympathetic to Egypt’s ancien régime, enthusiastically embraced anti-Brotherhood politicians and analysts, and news professionals uncritically adopted anti-Brotherhood narratives. Unsurprisingly, given Egypt’s lack of professional journalism standards, little attempt was given to provide balance or critical voice. Importantly, a relative explosion of media freedom following the anti-Mubarak uprising facilitated the coverage, which was often hysterical and could, in most cases, proceed without fear of substantive consequences for news owners, editors, and journalists.
It would have been difficult to justify the Brotherhood’s outright elimination on the basis of simple incompetence and poor governance theses, especially in the face of a democratic framework that would have allowed any of Egypt’s other political forces to take office via elections in the event of the Brotherhood’s failure. Anti-Brotherhood forces instead rode a series of myths which, at the time of writing, continue to exert a powerful sway over many Egyptians. In 2014, hundreds of Muslim Brothers were sentenced to death without due process in the largest mass death sentences in modern world history. Many Egyptians celebrated the sentences and praised the Egyptian judiciary, which did not listen to the arguments of the defense and which presided over trials that lasted just a few hours.
It is possible, of course, had the Brotherhood been allowed to continue to govern, that the group would have adopted the kind of totalitarian or extreme religious stances many Egyptians feared. As Shadi Hamid has noted, however, such fears remained purely “speculative” in nature.79 There is little evidence, if any, for many of the claims – which I have termed “myths” – made about the MB and their short time in office.
None of this should be seen as an endorsement of the Muslim Brothers, or their performance as governors of Egypt. The MB was handed a difficult set of political cards, but handled its opportunity poorly. The group failed to demonstrate sufficient transparency or to adequately separate its Islamic activism from its governance. Most of all, the MB was unable to avoid critical mistakes and miscalculations during a period that could not afford them. When Egypt needed a great government performance, it didn’t get it. Now, the Muslim Brothers and the liberal revolutionaries who helped propagate myths about them are forced to reflect on how they may be able to reverse a deeply entrenched counterrevolution and eliminate an emerging military dictatorship.
1 N. Mellor, The Making of Arab News (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005).
2 W. Rugh, Arab Mass Media: Newspapers, Radio, and Television in Arab Politics (Westport: Praeger, 2004); N. Sakr, “Contested blueprints for Egypt’s satellite channels: Regrouping the options by redefining the debate,” International Communication Gazette 63 (2001): 149.
3 M. H. Elmasry, “Producing news in Mubarak’s Egypt: An analysis of Egyptian newspaper production during the late Hosni Mubarak era,” Journal of Arab & Muslim Media Research 4, no. 2&3 (2011): 121–44.
4 K. J. Cooper, “Politics and priorities: Inside the Egyptian press,” Arab Media & Society 6 (Fall 2008), http://www.arabmediasociety.com/?article=689
5 L. Pintak, “Satellite TV news and Arab democracy,” Journalism Practice 2, no. 1 (2008); Sakr, “Contested blueprints for Egypt’s satellite channels.”
6 R. Abdulla, “Taking the e-train: The development of the internet in Egypt,” Global Media and Communication 1, no. 2 (2005): 149–65.
7 S. Khamis and K. Vaughn, “We are all Khaled Said: The potentials and limitations of cyberactivism in triggering public mobilization and promoting political change,” Journal of Arab & Muslim Media Research 4, no. 2&3 (2011): 145–63.
8 Elmasry, “Producing news in Mubarak’s Egypt”; Mellor, The Making of Arab News; Pintak, “Satellite TV news and Arab democracy.”
9 M. H. Elmasry, D. M. Basiony, and S. F. Elkamel, “Egyptian journalistic professionalism in the context of revolution: Comparing survey results from before and after the January 25, 2011 uprising,” International Journal of Communication 8 (2014): 1615–37.
10 F. S. Siebert, T. Peterson, and W. Schramm, Four Theories of the Press (Books for Libraries Press, 1956).
11 Mellor, The Making of Arab News.
12 P. Woodward, Nasser (London: Longman, 1992).
13 S. Dabbous, “Egypt,” Mass Media in the Middle East: A Comprehensive Handbook, ed. Y. Kamalipour and H. Mowlana (London: Greenwood Press, 1994), 60–73.
14 Elmasry, “Producing news in Mubarak’s Egypt.”
15 K. J. Beattie, Egypt During the Sadat Years (New York: Palgrave, 2000).
16 M. K. Nasser, “Egyptian mass media under Nasser and Sadat: Two models of press management and control,” Journalism Monographs, no. 124 (1990).
17 M. H. Elmasry, Producing the News in Egypt: A Press System Study of Cairo Newspapers (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Iowa, 2009), 9.
18 A. Goldschmidt, A Brief History of Egypt (New York: Facts on File, 2008).
19 International Research and Exchange Board “Media Sustainability Index 2005 – The Middle East and North Africa,” 2005, 19, accessed January 31, 2009, www.irex.org
20 Egyptian Council of Lords & Council of Representatives. The Penal Law, number 58 of 1937 (modified by law 147 of 2006): According to its Latest Revisions (Dar al-Haqqaaniya. Cairo, 2008), 196–8. (In Arabic.)
21 P. J. Vatikiotis, The History of Modern Egypt: From Muhammad Ali to Mubarak (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991).
22 B. Kester, “Working at the end of the assembly line: A conversation with Joris Luyendijk about the impossibility of doing Western-style journalism in Arab countries,” International Journal of Press/Politics 13, no. 4 (2008): 500–6.
23 D. Weaver, R. Beam, B. Brownlee, P. Voakes, and C. Wilhoit, “The American journalist in the 21st century: Key findings,” John S. and James L. Knight Foundation, 2003, accessed June 2, 2009, http://www.knightfoundation.org/research_publications/detail.dot?id=178211
24 Elmasry, Basiony, and Elkamel, “Egyptian journalistic professionalism in the context of revolution.”
25 Elmasry, “Producing news in Mubarak’s Egypt.”
26 Elmasry, Basiony, and Elkamel, “Egyptian journalistic professionalism in the context of revolution.”
27 See Elmasry, “Producing news in Mubarak’s Egypt”; M. H. Elmasry, “Unpacking Anti-Muslim Brotherhood discourses,” Jadaliyya, June 28, 2013, http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/12466/unpacking-anti-muslim-brotherhood-discourse; Elmasry, Basiony, and Elkamel, “Egyptian journalistic professionalism in the context of revolution”; A. Schleifer, “Egypt’s media quagmire worsens,” Al-Arabiya, April 3, 2013, http:///English.alarabiya.net/en/views/2013/04/03/Are-Egypt-s-journalists-all-activists-.html
28 Elmasry, Basiony, and Elkamel, “Egyptian journalistic professionalism in the context of revolution.”
29 J. Ramaprasad and N. Hamdy, “Functions of Egyptian journalists: Perceived importance and actual performance,” International Communication Gazette 68, no. 2 (2006): 167–85.
30 The Complete Picture, ONTv, June 21, 2013, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f8HFDJigLJM&app=desktop
31 “Gamal Al-Ghitany: The Brotherhood is a foreign organization and their governance of Egypt constitutes a foreign occupation,” 24, May 21, 2013, http://24.ae/Article.aspx?ArticleId=20861
32 Al-Iraqi and Al-Sawi, January 8, 2013, http://www.masrawy.com/news/egypt/politics/2013/january/8/5483862.aspx; Al-Hooti and Said, “Bil Suwur, Khatib al-Tahrir: al-Ikhwan Sana‘a sahyuniya hadafha taftit al-watan al-‘Arabi,” January 25, 2013, http://www.youm7.com/News.asp?NewsID=921174#.U8CL6_1FbS8
33 K. Lotfy, “Prosecution: ‘The Brotherhood conspired with Hamas and Hezbollah to open the prisons during the revolution,’” Al-Ahram, June 22, 2013, http://gate.ahram.org.eg/News/362475.aspx
34 S. Ibrahim, “The Brotherhood, Hamas, and the Caliphate,” Al-Masry al-Youm, November 23, 2012, http://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/191647
35 Abou Al-Makarem, “The Brotherhood seeks an Islamic Caliphate in Sinai with the help of Hamas,” Al-Wafd, June 9, 2013, http://www.alwafd.org//494624
36 Lotfy, “Prosecution.”
37 M. Mamdouh, “The organizer of the Sulaiman Ultras: The Brotherhood and Hamas killed the revolutionaries,” June 2, 2012, http://www.alwafd.org/
/219471
38 H. Sobhi, “Human chain in Port Said protests the sale of the Suez Canal,” Al-Watan, January 24, 2013, http://www.elwatannews.com/news/details/118661; I. Nabih, “The sale of the Suez Canal to the people of Gaza and the division of Egypt into sections is a present for those who are sleeping,” Al-Wafd, May 25, 2013, http://www.alwafd.org/
/482203-
; M. Mokhtar, “Israeli newspaper: The Muslim Brotherhood intends to sell the Suez Canal to foreigners,” Youm 7, May 27, 2013, http://www.youm7.com/News.asp?NewsID=1085282#.U8Ld2_1FbS8
39 A. Abdelmoneim, “The kidnapping of soldiers reveals the scenario of the sale of Sinai,” Youm 7, May 21, 2013, http://www1.youm7.com/News.asp?NewsID=1075889#.U8Leo_1FbS8; A. Sorour, “The families of Sinai to Morsi: The Land of Fairuz is not for sale,” Al-Masry al-Youm, December 31, 2013, http://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/268749
40 Okasha, Show clip about sale of pyramids, 2012, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v3l93qQX_IA
41 Clip from show alleging rental of Pyramids for three years, ONTv, 2013, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b3XkhN-mWkA
42 Sobhi, “Human chain in Port Said protests the sale of the Suez Canal.”
43 Al-Hayat, Amr Moussa clip about Morsi’s alleged allegiance to his “family and clan,” 2013, http://m.youtube.com/watch?v=LAYOixBoNIQ
44 I. Al-Sharnoobi, “Al-Hadeedy: When Morsi said ‘My family and my clan’ I knew the country was being stolen,” Veto, July 3, 2013, http://www.vetogate.com/440158
45 A show clip about Morsi’s “My family and my clan,” reference Respectable Gentlemen, ONTv, 2012, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bYMU31GfiUM
46 Ibid.
47 M. Morsi, President Morsi’s first televised address, June 24, 2012, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QZ1eVceQFl4
48 S. El-Tantawi, Berkeley speech, 2013, http://vimeo.com/75790556
49 M. Morsi, President Morsi’s informal inauguration speech from Tahrir Square, Cairo, Egypt, June 29, 2012, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N_DqkzqHTAM
50 M. Morsi, President Morsi October 6th commemoration speech from Cairo Stadium, Cairo, Egypt, October 6, 2012, https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=
+2012
51 M. Morsi, President Morsi televised address, December 6, 2012, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jScbDgnZBxQ
52 M. Morsi, President Morsi speech from Ittahidiyya Palace, November 23, 2012, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DV3-DK_-zdY
53 Middle East Monitor, “June 30 anti-Morsi crowd figures just don’t add up,” Middle East Monitor, July 16, 2013, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/resources/commentary-and-analysis/6574-30-june-anti-morsi-crowd-figures-just-dont-add-up
54 Tahrir Network, Akher Al-Nahar, July 3, 2013, http://televisionmasr.blogspot.com/2013/07/3-7-2013_5463.html
55 CBC Egypt, Huna Al-Aasima, July 3, 2013, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=huJGw6TxOuI
56 CBC Egypt, Huna Al-Aasima, July 26, 2013, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z9jJUHjdHv8
57 CBC Egypt, Huna Al-Aasima, July 3, 2013
58 Tahrir Network, Akher Al-Nahar, August 14, 2013, http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x134rjj_a5er-alnahar-14-8-2013-p1_news?search_algo=2
59 H. A. Hellyer, “Faking Egypt’s past: The Brotherhood and Jan. 25,” Al-Arabiya, January 20, 2014, http://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/middle-east/2014/01/20/Faking-Egypt-s-past-the-Brotherhood-and-Jan-25.html
60 Ibid.
61 S. Hattenstone, “Protesters’ stories: Wael Ghonim and Egypt,” Guardian, January 13, 2012, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jan/13/protesters-egypt-tahrir-wael-ghonim
62 Hellyer, “Faking Egypt’s past.”
63 R. F. Worth, “Egypt’s human bellweather,” New York Times, January 19, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/22/magazine/mohamed-beltagy-future-of-egypt.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0
64 Z. El Gundi, “Abdel-Moneim Abul-Fotouh,” Al-Ahram Online, April 2, 2012, http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/36/124/36854/Presidential-elections-/Meet-the-candidates/AbdelMoneim-AbulFotouh.aspx
65 W. Eskander, “Brothers and officers: A history of pacts,” Jadaliyya, January 25, 2013, http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/9765/brothers-and-officers_a-history-of-pacts
66 D. Kirkpatrick and D. Sanger, “After first talks, Egypt opposition vows new protest,” New York Times, February 6, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/07/world/middleeast/07egypt.html?pagewanted=all
67 M. Awad, “Egypt’s Suleiman meets opposition parties,” Reuters, February 6, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/06/us-egypt-dialogue-idUSTRE7150K520110206
68 Kirkpatrick and Sanger, “After first talks, Egypt opposition vows new protest.”
69 “Egypt protests: Opposition wary after Suleiman talks,” BBC News, February 7, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12377179
70 Kirkpatrick and Sanger, “After first talks, Egypt opposition vows new protest.”
71 R. Spencer, “Mohammed Morsi grants himself sweeping new powers in wake of Gaza,” Telegraph, November 22, 2012, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/egypt/9697347/Mohammed-Morsi-grants-himself-sweeping-new-powers-in-wake-of-Gaza.html
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid.
74 H. Hendawi, “Morsi’s constitutional declarations grant Egypt’s president far-reaching power,” The Huffington Post, November 22, 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/22/morsi-constitutional-declaration_n_2175651.html
75 Elmasry, “Unpacking Anti-Muslim Brotherhood discourses.”
76 Ibid.
77 M. H. Elmasry and M. El-Nawawy, “One country, two eras: How three Egyptian newspapers framed two presidents,” Global Media Journal: Mediterranean Edition 9, no. 1 (2014): 27–39; 36.
78 Elmasry, “Unpacking Anti-Muslim Brotherhood discourses.”
79 M. Al-Salih, “‘Mursi was a Muslim Brotherhood enforcer’: Brookings Analyst,” Asharq Al-Awsat, July 4, 2014, http://www.aawsat.net/2014/07/article55333754