EARTH
After the first two elements, I accept only one more, the third element; this is the element of Earth, of which I judge that the particles are so much larger and move as much more slowly, in comparison with those of the second element, as the second in comparison with the first.
The World, V. XI, 25.
The earth, insofar as its light is concerned, is not different from the moon, Venus, Mercury, and the other planets.
Principles, III, 11. IX2, 107.
The earth can be numbered among the planets, and the sun among the fixed stars.
Principles, III, 13. IX2, 108.
Because we see that the earth is not sustained by columns, or suspended in the air by cables, but that it is surrounded on all sides by an extremely liquid sky, let us think that it is at rest, and that it has no propensity toward motion, given that we do not notice any motion in it; but let us not also believe that that can prevent it from being carried along by the current of the sky, and that it follows the sky’s motion without being moved itself: just as a ship, which is not driven by the wind, or by oars, and which is not retained by anchors, remains at rest in the middle of the sea, even though the tides of that great mass of water carry it insensibly along with it.
Principles, III, 26. IX2, 113.
If hereafter, to accommodate ourselves to general usage, we seem to attribute some movement to the earth, it must be thought that this is an improper manner of speaking.
Principles, III, 29. IX2, 115.
Because there is no void around the earth, and because it does not itself have the force which makes it turn in twenty-four hours upon its axis, but is carried by the current of the matter of the sky which surrounds it and which penetrates everywhere into its pores, the earth ought to be considered as a body which has no motion.
Principles, IV, 22. IX2, 211.
That we conceive our sky and our earth as so great, as though they contained everything — that comes from our prejudices: we consider the earth as the end of all and we do not think that it is a planet, like the others, which moves as do Mars, Saturn, etc., which we do not value nearly so highly.
Burman. V, 171.
EARTH, MOTION OF
Galileo’s proofs of the motion of the earth are very good; but it seems to me that he does not present them in such a way as to persuade; for the digressions that he mixes in among them make one forget the first ones by the time one reads the last ones.
Letter to Mersenne, Aug. 14, 1634. I, 305.
I could not separate [my philosophy] from [the doctrine of] the motion of the earth, because all my physics depends upon it.
Letter to Mersenne, Dec., 1640. III, 258.
EASY
Most thinking people despise it when you make things too easy for them.
The World, VII. XI, 48.
ECHOS
The objection which was made against your experiments concerning echos does not seem to me to be of any importance: for even though it is true that the sound extends in circles on all sides, like the movement which occurs in water when a stone is thrown in it, it is necessary in any case to notice that the circles extend much farther on the side toward which the stone is thrown, or toward which one is turned when speaking, than toward the other side; from which it follows that the echo, which is only the result of the reflection of the part of the circles which go farthest, only extends toward the side from which it is reflected.
Letter to Mersenne, Jan. 25, 1638(?). I, 503-504.
EFFORT
See inclination.
ELEMENTS
There is only one material substance, which receives the action or the means for its local motion from an external agent, from which it derives various figures or modes, which make it such as we see it, in its primary composite forms, which are called elements. You have noticed, moreover; that the nature of these elements or primary composites, called Earth, Water, Air and Fire, consists only in the difference between the fragments or small and large particles of that matter, which continually change from one to the other, by heat and movement, from gross to subtle; or into “innobles,” that is, from subtle to gross, when the action of heat and movement begins to diminish. From the first mixing of these four primary elements there results a mixture which could be called the fifth element.
Letter to Villebressieu, Summer, 1631. I, 216.
I do not accept any elements other than the three that I have just described.
The World, V. XI, 26.
All the bodies of this visible world are composed of these three forms in which matter is found, as though they were three different elements: namely that the sun and the fixed stars have the form of the first of these elements; the skies, that of the second; and the earth, with the planets and the comets, that of the third.
Principles, III, 52. IX2, 129.
It seems to me that I am probably correct in making use of these three characteristics, to be luminous, to be transparent, and to be opaque or obscure, which are the principal characteristics which can be related to the sense of sight, for distinguishing the three elements of this visible world.
Principles, III, 52. IX2, 129.
EMINENTLY
See formally.
EMOTIONS
[The passions] could best be called emotions of the soul, not only because that name can be attributed to all the changes which happen in the soul, that is, to all the various thoughts which come to it, but particularly because, of all the sorts of thoughts that it can have, there are no others which agitate it and shake it so strongly as the passions.
Passions, I, 28. XI, 350.
See sensations.
EMOTIONS, INTERNAL
Our good and our bad depend principally upon internal emotions, which are not aroused in the soul except by the soul itself; in which they differ from the passions, which always depend upon some motion of the [animal] spirits.
Passions, II, 147. XI, 440.
EMULATION
[Emulation] is nothing other than a warmth, which disposes the soul to undertake things at which it hopes to be able to succeed, because it has seen others succeed.
Passions, III, 172. XI, 461.
ENDS
It is something which is manifest in itself, that we cannot know the ends of God, if he himself does not reveal them to us.
Letter to “Hyperaspistas,” Aug., 1641. III, 431.
It would be an absurd and puerile thing to claim in metaphysics that God, in the manner of a vain man, had no other end in constructing the world than being praised by men, and that he had created the sun, which is many times greater than the earth, with no other design than to give light to man, who occupies only a very tiny part of the world.
Letter to “Hyperaspistas,” Aug., 1641. III, 431-432.
See causes, final.
ENEMIES
I even include, under the name enemies, all those who are neither friends nor allies, because one has the right to make war upon them, when one finds it to his advantage.
Letter to Elisabeth, Sept., 1646. IV, 488.
ENUMERATION
To complete our science, we must review, as a whole and one by one, with a continuous and absolutely uninterrupted movement of thought, everything which concerns our subject, and include them in a sufficient and ordered enumeration.
Rules, VII. X, 387.
This enumeration or [mathematical] induction is thus a review or inventory of all those matters that have a bearing on the problem raised, which is so thorough and accurate that by its means we can clearly and with confidence conclude that we have omitted nothing by mistake.
Rules, VII. X, 388.
We should note that by sufficient enumeration or [mathematical] induction, we understand only that by which one arrives at a truth with greater certitude than by any other type of proof, with the exception of simple intuition.
Rules, VII. X, 389.
We have defined enumeration as an inference based upon a large number of diversified propositions.
Rules, XI. X, 407.
ENVY
What is commonly called envy is a vice which consists in a perversity of nature which makes certain people vexed over the good which they see happen to other men. But I use the word here to signify a passion which is not always vicious. Envy, therefore, insofar as it is a passion, is a species of sadness mixed with hate, which comes from seeing good happen to those who are not thought to be worthy of it.
Passions, III, 182. XI, 466.
EQUALITY
Equal things correspond to one another reciprocally; but we recognize those which are unequal only by comparing them to equal things, and not conversely, etc.
Rules, VI. X, 383.
Because there is no proportion, nor any order, which is simpler to understand than that which consists in a perfect equality, I have supposed here that all the particles of matter were, in the beginning, equal among themselves, both in size and in motion, and I have not wanted to conceive any other inequality in the universe, except that which is in the position of the fixed stars, which appears so clearly to anyone who looks at the sky during the night, that it cannot be doubted.
Principles, III, 47. IX2, 126.
ERROR
Error can exist only concerning composite objects which the understanding itself fabricates.
Rules, VIII. X, 399.
In all these things we are subject to error: when someone tells us a fable, and we believe that it is a true story; when also a man who suffers from jaundice believes that everything is yellow, because he has a yellow color in his eyes; finally, when, due to the effect of an illness of the imagination (as with melancholics), we believe that the disordered images which are formed there represent true realities.
Rules, XII. X, 423.
It is in our power to avoid an error if we are on our guard always to establish a connection between two things such that we see by intuition that the connection of one with the other is absolutely necessary.
Rules, XII. X, 424-425.
The human mind generally falls into two sorts of error, when it supposes more than it has been given for the determination of the question, and when it neglects something that has been given.
Rules, XIII. X, 435.
Error can only exist in the understanding, which I suppose, nevertheless, to remain free and to consider as doubtful that which is doubtful.
Letter to Reneri, Apr.-May, 1638. II, 35
The error which is born [of precipitate judgment] is a privation with respect to ourselves, and a pure negation with respect to God.
Letter to Regius, May 24, 1640. III, 65
I know that error, insofar as it is error, is not something real which depends upon God, but is simply a lack.
Meditations, IV. I, 43.
Error is not a pure negation, i.e., is not the simple lack or absence of some perfection to which I am not entitled, but rather is a privation of some knowledge which it seems that I ought to possess.
Meditations, IV. IX, 43-44.
I find that they [my errors] depend upon the concurrence of two causes, namely, the power of knowing which is in me, and the power of choosing, or rather my free will; i.e., my understanding and with it my will.
Meditations, IV. IX, 45.
I think that all the errors that happen in the sciences come from our having judged too hastily in the beginning, admitting as principles things which were obscure and of which we did not have any clear and distinct notion.
Search for Truth. X, 526.
Because it often happens that we make mistakes, even though God is not a deceiver, if we wish to search out the cause of our errors and discover their source, in order to correct them, we must take note that they do not depend upon our understanding so much as upon our will, and that they are not things or substances which require the actual concurrence of God to be produced: such that they are not, from his point of view, anything other than negations, that is, that he has not given us all that he could give us, and that we see by the same means that he was not required to give it to us; even though, from our point of view they are faults and imperfections.
Principles, I, 31. IX2, 38-39.
See Falsehood.
ESSENCE
I think that it is necessary to show that between the efficient cause, properly so called, and no cause, there is something which holds to the mean, as it were, namely, the positive essence of a thing.
Replies, IV. IX, 185.
A distinction must be drawn between things which from their nature can change, like the fact that I am at present either writing or not writing, that one man is prudent, another imprudent; and things which never change, such as are all the things that pertain to the essence of anything, as is generally acknowledged by philosophers.
Notes against a Program, II. VIII 2, 347.
Everything that can be clearly and distinctly conceived in a chimera is a true being, and not fictitious, because it has a true and immutable essence, and that essence comes from God just as does the actual essence of other things.
Burman. V, 160.
See natures, true and immutable.
ESTEEM
To wonder is joined esteem or scorn, according to whether it is the greatness or the smallness of an object that excites our wonder.
Passions, II, 54. XI, 373.
Esteem, insofar as it is a passion, is an inclination of the soul, to represent to itself the value of the thing esteemed, which inclination is caused by a particular movement of the [animal] spirits, flowing in such a way in the brain, that they fortify the impressions there which pertain to this subject.
Passions, III, 149. XI, 443-444.
ETERNITY
The time that we live in this world is so little a thing in comparison with eternity that we ought not to care much whether we are taken too soon or too late.
To Colvins, June 14, 1637.
[Eternity] is all together and all at once if you understand that nothing can be added and nothing taken away from the nature of God. But it is not all together and all at once if you understand that it exists all at the same time.
Burman. V, 148-149.
ETHICS
One of the points of my ethics is to love life without fearing death.
Letter to Mersenne, Jan. 9, 1639. II, 480.
EVILS
See good.
EVILS
There is a very great difference between the things which are made by the positive action of God, which could not be other than very good, and those which happen because of the cessation of that positive action, like all the evils and sins, and the destruction of a being, if any existent being were ever destroyed.
Letter to “Hyperaspistas,” Aug., 1641. III, 429-430.
EXCESS
There are two sorts of excess: one which, changing the nature of the thing, and from good, making it bad, prevents its being submitted to reason; the other simply augments the measure, and only makes the good thing better.
Letter to Elisabeth, Nov. 3, 1645. IV, 331-332.
EXHALATIONS
See vapors.
EXISTENCE
Each person can see by intuition that he exists and that he thinks.
Rules, III. X, 368.
I exist; therefore, God exists.
Rules, XII. X, 421.
It is necessary to make a distinction between possible existence and necessary existence; and to notice that possible existence is contained in the concept or the idea of all the things which we conceive clearly and distinctly, but that necessary existence is contained only in the idea of God.
Replies, I. IX, 92.
In the idea or the concept of each thing, existence is contained, because we cannot conceive anything except under the form of a thing which exists; but with the difference that, in the concept of a limited thing, possible or contingent existence alone is contained and in the concept of a supremely perfect being, perfect and necessary existence is comprised.
Replies, II. IX, 128.
It is necessary only to know what is meant by the word [existence]; one knows it immediately as completely as it is possible for man to know it, and for this there is no need of definitions; they obscure the thing rather than clarifying it.
Search for Truth. X, 525.
We can conceive essence without actual existence, as the rose in winter; but they cannot be separated in reality, as they are usually distinguished, because the essence has not been before the existence, which is nothing other than the essence existing, so that the one is not prior to the other, and it is neither different nor distinct.
Burman. V, 164.
EXISTENCE, NECESSARY
Necessary existence is contained in the idea of a supremely powerful being, not by any fiction of the understanding, but because it belongs to the true and immutable nature of such a being to exist.
Replies, I. IX, 94.
The idea of an all-perfect Being is not in [thought] as a fiction, as is that which represents a chimera, but on the contrary, it is imprinted there by an immutable and true nature, and which must necessarily exist, because it cannot be conceived except with a necessary existence.
Principles, I, 15. IX2, 31.
EXPERIENCE
Philosophers who neglect experience seem to think that truth will be born out of their heads, like Minerva out of the head of Jupiter.
Rules, V. X, 380.
EXPERIMENTS
It is almost impossible to reason well concerning the experiments which others have done, because each person looks at things from a bias which is particular to himself.
Letter to Mersenne, Jan. 9, 1639. II, 489.
Even experiments often give us occasion for being deceived, when we do not pay enough attention to all the causes that they can have.
Description of Human Body, II. XI, 242.
EXTENSION
By extension we understand everything which possesses length, breadth, and depth.
Rules, XIV. X, 442.
By extension we do not mean anything which is distinct and separate from the subject itself.
Rules, XIV. X, 442.
I do not conceive any extended substance in God, the angels, or in our soul; but only some thing extended in potency or an extension in potency; so that an angel could proportion this power of extension, sometimes to a larger and sometimes to a smaller part of corporeal substance.
Letter to More, Apr. 15, 1649. V, 342.
EXTERNAL OBJECTS
Since I am assured that I cannot have any knowledge of external objects except by the intermediary of the ideas of them which I have in myself, I am very careful not to report my immediate judgments [as though they were] about objects, nor to attribute anything positive to them other than what I previously perceived in their ideas; but I also believe that everything which is found in these ideas is necessarily in the objects.
Letter to Gibieuf, Jan. 19, 1642. III, 474.