Chapter 8
Samuel T. Francis appears to have written Leviathan and Its Enemies in 1991 because this is when he dated its preface. He did not publish it during his lifetime. He died in 2005 and it was found by Jerry Woodruff who was given ‘a box of 3.5-inch computer “floppy disks”’ one of which was ‘labeled in Sam’s handwriting, “Leviathan and Its Enemies Complete” […] dated “3-27-95” and contain[ing] Word Perfect 5.1 text files’.1 It was published in 2016. Francis had been a firebrand paleoconservative journalist who wrote regular syndicated columns as well as speeches for Pat Buchanan. He was an early victim of ‘cancel culture’ for his politically incorrect statements about race and was fired by the Washington Times after an attack by the neo-conservative Dinesh D’Souza.2 He was known for his sharp analytical insights, blistering rhetorical style, and a barbed wit. Posthumously, he was blamed (or praised, depending on who was writing) as the intellectual basis for the rise of Donald Trump.3 Whatever controversies surrounded him in life, intellectual history will record Francis as a much more important and influential thinker than D’Souza or any neoconservative writer for The National Review. However, Leviathan and Its Enemies features none of Francis’s signature polemics and is written in a more coolly analytical mode.
Francis had long been a protégé of James Burnham having written a monograph on him in 1984 that was republished in 1999.4 Leviathan and Its Enemies can largely be read as a 1990s update of The Managerial Revolution. Francis had fully internalised the thought of the elite theorists and of his mentor, and much of the book covers terrain that we have already traversed. Thus, what is of interest to us here is what Francis adds to Burnham or else where he disagrees with him.
One important dimension of Leviathan and Its Enemies is that it has the benefit of fifty years of hindsight since Burnham wrote The Managerial Revolution during which time many objections were raised against the managerial thesis. After restating Burnham’s central arguments at some length, Francis devotes considerable space to dealing with the chief counterarguments that were raised since 1941. The foremost of these came from C. Wright Mills whose book The Power Elite, published in 1956, constituted the main left-wing rebuttal to Burnham.5 The chief contention was that although the managerial function undoubtedly exists, propertied elites maintain a controlling ownership over firms. For example, when I discussed Burnham, I used the example of the Ford Motor Company of a firm transitioning from the entrepreneurial to the managerial. However, as I noted, the Ford family maintains to this day a 40% stake in the company. In addition, William Clay Ford Jr., the great-grandson of the founder, currently serves as Executive Chairman having previously acted as President, CEO, and COO. Mills argues, therefore, that there is no distinct break with the old regime of entrepreneurial elites and thus Burnham’s ‘managerial revolution’ is a mirage. Burnham would argue that, in the case of William Clay Ford Jr., he trained as a managerial elite having attended Princeton and MIT, and is thus a professional manager whose roles have been literally interchangeable with executives from Boeing and elsewhere who do not carry the Ford name. Francis, however, argues:
[I]t is largely irrelevant whether the propertied elite acquires managerial skills, takes an active part in managing corporate enterprise, or has assimilated non-propertied elite managers into its own class and interests. What Mills and [his disciple, William G.] Domhoff and their school do not sufficiently perceive or appreciate thoroughly is that the interests of the propertied elite have changed substantially with the revolution of mass and scale. The propertied elite or ‘grand bourgeoise’ of the bourgeois order may not have changed significantly in family composition, and certainly it retains wealth and status. Its economic interests, however, have changed from being vested in the hard property of privately owned and operated entrepreneurial firms, usually comparatively small in scale, to being intertwined with and dependent upon the dematerialized property of publicly owned, state-integrated, managerially operated mass corporations.6
In other words, whether or not a man of the propertied elite such as William Clay Ford Jr. takes an active or a passive role, his interests are now synonymous with the managerial regime while those of his great-grandfather were in many respects antagonistic to it. Francis argues that a family such as the Fords are now entirely dependent on managerial capitalism for their continued existence as propertied elites and are thus, in the final analysis, subordinated to the system. ‘The propertied elite, the grande bourgeoisie, thus does not retain an economic interest in acting as the leader of the bourgeois order and defending its ideologies, values and institutions; its material interests push it toward defending the complex of managerial interests.’7
This perfectly explains why virtually none of the so-called grand bourgeoisie have taken a firm stance against what is today called ‘woke capitalism’.8 Whether they are propertied elites or not, executives who dare take a stance against the official managerial ideology are quickly removed, as was the case with Tripwire Interactive CEO and co-founder, John Gibson, who was forced to step down just 53 hours after tweeting his support for a ban on abortion in Texas.9 Similarly, John Schattner, the founder of the Papa John’s pizza chain—and a billionaire—was forced out of his own company by the board after making racially insensitive comments on a conference call in 2018.10 Brendan Eich was forced to resign after only eleven days as CEO of Mozilla after it was found he had donated to a political campaign against gay marriage and employees launched a social media campaign to oust him.11 I might continue listing examples such as these almost indefinitely, but there can be no doubt that Burnham and Francis are correct while Mills and Domhoff are wrong about whether power finally rests in the hands of the managers or the owner. The managers have primacy. If an owner does not adhere to managerial ideology—if the company in any way depends on managerial capitalism—they will find themselves removed in short order.
The second objection to Burnham with which Francis deals, is the idea that the managerial elite are not unified but rather a plurality. In fact, such objections were also applied to the work of Mills and his followers. Francis had in mind the work of Robert Dahl, David Truman, John Kenneth Galbraith, David Riesman, and Arnold M. Rose. As we have seen, Francis largely deals with this by acknowledging that while entry into the elite is possible its narrow and exclusively managerial character, which emphasises special qualifications and skills, in practice gives it a uniformity that is rare in history—he points out, citing Mosca, that the old capitalist entrepreneurial regime and even the old feudal system were much more diverse in terms of the makeup of the ruling class.12 The third objection came from libertarians of the Reagan era who argued that the managerial regime is being eclipsed by the rise of newly-minted entrepreneurs. Today, minds may instinctively turn to a man like Bill Gates, or perhaps the Silicon Valley types such as Mark Zuckerberg, Jack Dorsey, Elon Musk, and Peter Thiel. But virtually none of these billionaires are entrepreneurs in a manner that, say, Henry Ford was. They each made their fortunes by playing the system of the managerial regime and exploiting the ‘fusion’ of the state and the economy in one way or another. But even if there should spring forth a genuinely innovative and entrepreneurial firm, sooner or later, it becomes co-opted and is transformed into being part of the regime apparatus. Francis cites the example of McDonald’s;13 a more recent example might be Google.
Francis’s major contribution to the general corpus of elite theory is in his emphasis on the role of ideology. Where Burnham emphasised the fusion of the state and corporations, as he put it ‘managers-in-government’ and ‘managers-in-industry’, Francis immediately recognised the importance of a third category of managers involved in opinion formation, which he called ‘mass public relations’ or ‘mass organizations of culture and communication’. These include:
[N]ot only the media of mass communication, one of the most important instruments by which the managerial elite disciplines and controls the mass population, but also all other mass organizations that disseminate, restrict, or invent information, ideas, and values advertising, publishing, journalism, film and broadcasting, entertainment, religion, education, and institutions for research and development. Indeed, the mass organizations of culture and communication, which generally lack the coercive disciplines of the mass corporation and the mass state, are able to provide disciplines and control for the mass population primarily through their use of the devices and techniques of mass communication. All the mass cultural organizations, then, function as part of the media of mass communication, and they constitute a necessary element in the power base of the managerial elite.14
Francis was keenly aware of the ideological component of the managerial regime and his insights owe much to his deep understanding of the ‘cultural turn’ in Marxist literature after Antonio Gramsci, whom he cites.15
However—like both Burnham and Pareto—Francis saw ideology as mere justification for power, usually coming after the fact as a means of consolidation and control. This is to say that he saw the use of ideology as almost entirely cynical. In his ‘Afterword’ to Leviathan and Its Enemies, Paul Gottfried shares this revealing passage about his own fundamental disagreement with Francis:
Sam and I would argue about his skepticism concerning whether elites accept their hegemonic ideas (in other words, whether elites really believe their own ideology). In his understanding of circulating elites, values and ideals were mere instruments for achieving practical goals; they advanced the interests of those seeking positions of authority. Sam would quote with pleasure the Italian economist and sociologist Vilfredo Pareto (1848–1923) that those involved in the power game would exploit whatever ideas and visions were most attractive to the masses in a particular culture. But, according to Sam, these elites would approach the myths as nothing more than ladders for their own ascent.16
This is, in fact, the old disagreement between Mosca and Pareto, about whether ideas affect history, restated. Gottfried occupies the Mosca position, while Francis takes the Pareto position. However, all four thinkers would ultimately agree that the ideological function cannot be ignored in any analysis of power. The culture, even down to the everyday beliefs of the masses, must at some level reflect and ‘buy into’ the political formula of the ruling class.
Francis, however, recognised perhaps more than any other thinker that under the managerial regime the ideological vision must be totalising, which is to say no vestige of the previous regime can be allowed. He illustrates the point in a much livelier way than in Leviathan and Its Enemies in two pieces that were republished in the collection Beautiful Losers: ‘The Cult of Dr King’ and ‘Equality as a Political Weapon’. In the former, he spots—in what has now become almost a commonplace insight—that the ideology of the managerial regime takes on an almost religious air with its own sacred heroes and symbols as embodied in the figure of Martin Luther King. While the symbolic significance of Christmas is fair game to debate politically every year, no such freedom is afforded to the annual celebration of Martin Luther King Day, which must be observed with solemn reverence and can only ever be about one thing: the righteous struggle of the Civil Rights movement. In a blistering conclusion, he writes:
[Martin Luther King’s] legacy, as its keepers know, is profoundly at odds with the historic American order, and that is why they can have no rest until the symbols of that order are pulled up root and branch. To say that Dr King and the cause he really represented are now part of the official American creed, indeed the defining and dominant symbol of that creed—which is what both houses of the United States Congress said in 1983 and what President Ronald Reagan signed into law shortly afterward—is the inauguration of a new order of the ages in which the symbols of the old order and the things they symbolized can retain neither meaning nor respect, in which they are as mute and dark as the gods of Babylon and Tyre, and from whose cold ashes will rise a new god, levelling their rough places, straightening their crookedness, and exalting every valley until the whole earth is flattened beneath his feet and perceives the glory of the new lord.17
What may have seemed like hyperbole in 1988 is an observed daily reality in the 2020s, when statues of everyone from Confederates to Founding Fathers are physically torn down by state-backed feral mobs with the full approval of every major corporation, university, and media outlet. In 2020, after the Black Lives Matter protests following the death of George Floyd, massive statues of Floyd were erected in many public places across the USA, while Edinburgh University renamed ‘David Hume Tower’ to ’40 George Square’ citing eighteenth-century Enlightenment philosopher’s ‘racist views’.18 For Francis, such displays do not signal anything more than the victory lap of the new order over the old order which must be emptied of all significance.
In ‘Equality as a Political Weapon’, we see Francis’s essential cynicism as regards actual belief in the doctrine of equality. He seizes on a passage in Pareto:
The sentiment that is very inappropriately named equality is fresh, strong, alert, precisely because it is not, in fact, a sentiment of equality and is not related to any abstraction, as a few naïve ‘intellectuals’ still believe; but because it is related to the direct interests of individuals who are bent on escaping certain inequalities not in their favour, and setting up new inequalities that will be in their favour, this latter being their chief concern.19
One may think of any number of affirmative action programmes as an example of this, but it also brings to mind the central logic of the Jouvenelian alliance between the high and the low. The high can always promise to liberate the low from ‘oppressors’ by promising to transfer advantages to them. Francis sees that this is little more than a cynical power ploy:
In the twentieth century, egalitarianism has been used principally as the political formula or ideological rationalization by which one, emerging elite has sought to displace from political, economic, and culture power another elite, and in not only rationalizing but also disguising the dominance of the new elite.20
Francis points to the behaviourism of B. F. Skinner and others, the belief in human beings as equal ‘blank slates’ differentiated only by their upbringing, as one of the chief strains of egalitarianism in the twentieth century:
Egalitarianism played a central role in the progressivist ideological challenge, and the main form it assumed in the early twentieth century was that of ‘environmentalism’—not in the contemporary sense of concern for ecology but in the sense that human beings are perceived as the products of their social and historical environment rather than of their innate mental and physical natures. […] Indeed, the ideological function of progressivism in delegitimizing bourgeois society was accomplished by its identification of the society itself as the ‘environment’ to be altered through social management.21
The logic of environmentalism or behaviouralism thus always points in the direction of ever-increasing managerial control, since it is ‘society’ that must be changed, and such change can only take place through management.
Francis locates Edward Bernays as one of the chief culprits for inculcating this view among the elites in the 1920s and 1930s:
Edward Bernays, a nephew of Sigmund Freud, also helped develop behaviourist psychological techniques for the managed economy in the science of ‘public relations’, which he helped found. ‘Treating all people as mechanically identical’, writes historian Stuart Ewen, Bernays, ‘called for the implementation of a “mass psychology” by which public opinion might be controlled.’22
What is striking if one turns to Bernays is his naked and unapologetic elitism. In Public Relations, he speaks openly about ‘The Engineering of Consent’,23 and warns leaders against following public attitude polls explicitly because they might hinder the progressive agenda:
Society suffers when polls inhibit leaders from independent thinking, from anticipating change, or from preparing the public for change. […] Polls exert pressure that may play society under what Jefferson called the tyranny of the majority and throttle progressive minority ideas.24
Bernays does not see public opinion as something to be followed but something to be managed and, if necessary, transformed—preferably by using his services and expertise.
Bernays’s fellow elitist, Walter Lippmann, was sceptical about the extent to which ‘public opinion’ even exists other than as a fabrication of the media—as a ‘pseudo-environment’25—and wrote a book on this topic called The Phantom Public. It begins with a portrait of ‘The Disenchanted Man’, which is a neat summation of the passive masses:
The private citizen today has come to feel rather like a deaf spectator in the back row, who ought to keep his mind on the mystery off there, but cannot quite manage to keep awake. He knows he is somehow affected by what is going on. Rules and regulations continually, taxes annually and wars occasionally remind him that he is being swept along by great drifts of circumstance. Yet these public affairs are in no convincing way his affairs. They are for the most part invisible. They are managed, if they are managed at all, at distant centers, from behind the scenes, by unnamed powers. As a private person he does not know for certain what is going on, or who is doing it, or where he is being carried. […] In the cold light of experience he knows that his sovereignty is a fiction. He reigns in theory, but in fact does not govern.26
But Lippman does not, as one might imagine, lament this fact, but rather uses it as a call for a reign of experts—one might say, a managerial elite. He says:
I think it is a false ideal. I do not mean an undesirable ideal. I mean an unattainable ideal, bad only in the sense that it is bad for a fat man to try to be a ballet dancer. An ideal should express the true possibilities of its subject. When it does not it perverts the true possibilities. The idea of the omnicompetent, sovereign citizen is, in my opinion, such a false ideal. It is unattainable. The pursuit of it is misleading. The failure to achieve it has produced the current disenchantment.27
Lippmann’s solution is simply to do away with democratic fictions and let the elites get on with the task of managing their affairs:
[The thesis of The Phantom Public] does not assume that men in action have universal purposes; they are denied the fraudulent support of the fiction that they are agents of a common purpose. They are regarded as the agents of special purposes, without pretense and without embarrassment. They must live in a world with men who have other special purposes. […] I have no legislative program to offer, no new institutions to propose. There are, I believe, immense confusions in the current theory of democracy which frustrate and pervert its action.28
The role of the public is simply to rubber stamp which party of the elites gets to govern, even if there is little difference between the choices on offer:
Although it is the custom of partisans to speak as if there were radical differences between the Ins and Outs, it could be demonstrated, I believe, that in stable and mature societies the differences are not profound. If they were profound, the defeated minority would be constantly on the verge of rebellion. An election would be catastrophic, whereas the assumption in every election is that the victors will do nothing to make life intolerable to the vanquished and that the vanquished will endure with good humour policies which they do not approve.29
In the 2020s, it is perfectly clear that, according to Lippmann’s criteria, the USA is no longer a ‘stable and mature’ society. Lippmann viewed the masses as a ‘bewildered herd’ whose opinions needed to be ‘managed only by a specialized class whose personal interests reach beyond the locality’,30 in other words by men like Edward Bernays. However, it strikes me that this narrow vision of democracy as a mere rubber stamp of rule by experts who engage in ‘perception management’ is running towards its death throes. This is primarily because the internet—a modern Gutenberg Press—has destroyed the ability of elites to control narratives, which is causing them to become more desperate, coercive, and brittle. As more people come to see them as unmistakably totalitarian in nature, and as the gap between elite and popular values widens, it is only a matter of time until we see a circulation of elites because the managerial regime is failing precisely at the moment of its apparent victory lap.
A near perfect illustration of this failure of narrative control took place in early January 2022. On December 31 2021, Joe Rogan interviewed Dr Robert Malone—the inventor of the nine original mRNA vaccine patents, the author of nearly 100 peer-reviewed papers with over 12,000 citations—for three hours, during which he highlighted many unanswered questions about the COVID-19 vaccine.31 In addition to the interview, Dr Malone leads a coalition of over 16,000 doctors and scientists ‘dedicated to speaking truth to power’.32 Madhava Setty, MD, who also holds a degree in electrical engineering from MIT, then asked whether this was the ‘most important interview of our time’.33 The interview was promptly banned by YouTube and Twitter, who suspended any attempts to upload it, and Dr Malone was personally banned from Twitter.34 Defenders of the regime such as Dr Dan Wilson—whose video was pushed to the front of the algorithm by Google’s managers in perception—quickly denounced Dr Malone as having gone ‘full anti-science’.35 Legacy mainstream media outlets quickly set to work to ‘debunk’ Dr Malone, who—despite his obvious credentials—was said to have ‘no academic credibility’ by ‘experts’ and reported breathlessly by twenty-something journalists in well-known and once respected newspapers.36 Then CNN ran a piece hosted by Brian Stelter entitled ‘Is the Media Out of Touch with the Country over COVID?’ Stelter’s colleague, Oliver Darcy, said:
A lot of the media does seem, as I look at it, and travel the country, to be very out of touch with people. I mean if you travel the country, people are not really living in the same bubble […] it seems that the media is messaging toward. […] And so, I think this is an issue, because if people are tuning out what’s going on in Cable News, if we’re not messaging towards the general population, then they’re just ignoring everything and living their lives […] and we’re not really getting the information that they need to them.37
From the standpoint of what we have been discussing as regards managerial elites, this episode is remarkable for at least three reasons. First, it is obvious that Dr Malone and his band of 16,000 doctors and scientists are managerial elites by the classic Burnham definition—technical experts—and they have broken decisively with the regime over its management of the pandemic. Second, Joe Rogan’s podcast has become more watched and listened to than CNN or any other legacy media outlet—to the extent that one might question whether the labels ‘alternative’ and ‘mainstream’ are still appropriate. Third, the managerial masters of persuasion openly complained that their ‘messaging’ is not working and that, in effect, no one is listening to them. If only the White House or CNN could hire Edward Bernays maybe things might be different—but one suspects that even if Bernays himself was managing this, he could do nothing about the loss of monopoly control over information flow that has been caused by the internet.
Let us return to Francis who longed for a ‘revolution from the middle’ and saw its scope in what he called ‘the post-bourgeois resistance’ made up of the middle classes—including ‘kulaks’ or petite bourgeois—the lower middle class and the working class. This is a straightforward ‘foxes versus lions’, or Class I residues vs. Class II residues, analysis derived from Pareto’s strong influence on Francis’s thinking:
Post-bourgeois groups manifest hostility not only to the ideology of the soft managerial regime and to the psychic and behavioural patterns of its elite but also to the manipulative style of dominance that characterizes the elite and the tendency to acceleration on which the elite relies for the preservation and enhancement of its power. The managerial use of manipulation and acceleration not only alienates post-bourgeois groups culturally and morally but also threatens their economic position and social status.38
When commentators say that Francis ‘predicted’ the rise of Donald Trump, it was for passages like this, in which he perfectly encapsulates the essential problem. It does not appear that Francis was aware of Jouvenel’s work, but he spots the alliance between elites and ‘the underclass, particularly its non-white components’.39 Although Francis could not have foreseen the rise of the internet, he recognises several vulnerabilities in the managerial regime. Drawing from Mosca, he views the fact that the elite are monolithic and uniform as being a weakness, which is ironic given their famous slogan ‘diversity is our strength’:
The formal mechanisms of mass liberal democracy—regular elections, competing political parties, universal suffrage, and legal and political rights—do not significantly mitigate the monolithic and uniform concentration of managerial power. […] The ‘despotism’ of the regime—its tendency toward the monopolization of political, economic, and cultural power by a single social and political force of managerial and technical skills and the expansive, uniform, and centralized nature of its power—is a direct consequence of the contracted composition of the elite and the restriction of its membership to elements proficient in managerial and technical skills […] The narrowness of the elite that results from this restriction insulates it from the influence of non-managerial social and political forces and reduces their ability to gain positions within the elite from which they can moderate, balance, or restrain its commands […] their exclusion from the elite contributes to the frustration of their aspirations and interests and encourages their alienation from and conflict with the elite and the destabilization and weakening of the regime.40
This destabilization takes the form of decomposition and fragmentation in the social order, which we have undoubtedly witnessed in the three decades since Francis was writing. Since the managerial regime is ‘soft’ and frequently does not actually solve problems but opts rather simply to ‘manage perception’ or ‘engineer consent’, it seems likely that de facto balkanisation will begin to occur in both the USA and Europe. So-called ‘No-Go Zones’, in which the authorities have essentially given up policing have already emerged in major cities.41 While these have, to date, occurred in non-white areas populated by ‘the underclass’, as post-bourgeois white populations become more disaffected by managerial elite rule, and even if they come to distrust the authorities themselves, it is perfectly possible that de facto autonomous ‘No-Go Zones’ could occur in white areas too. In the USA, both the Trump and Biden presidencies have been characterised by widespread state-level non-compliance with federal and executive edicts. If half the country declare that the President is ‘not my president’ no matter who wins the election, the regime has a serious problem on its hands. As I have mentioned previously, the current strategy of simply writing off thirty percent or more of the population as ‘undesirables’ simply cannot serve. In Mosca’s terms, there is a lack of ‘moral unity’ between the rulers and the ruled, and historically this situation has not and will not persist for long.42
1 Jerry Woodruff, ‘Introduction’, in Samuel T. Francis, Leviathan and Its Enemies (Arlington, VA: Washington Summit Publishers, 2016), pp. xi–xii.
2 Howard Kurtz, ‘Washington Times Clips Its Right Wing’, The Washington Post (October, 1995): https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/lifestyle/1995/10/19/washington-times-clips-its-right-wing/dd009c93-883b-446c-bbbf-94c0a0570a1a/. A book-length collection on the tendency of neo-conservatives to ‘cancel’ voices to their right can be found in Paul E. Gottfried and Richard B. Spencer (eds), The Great Purge (Arlington, VA: Washington Summit Publishers, 2015).
3 Rod Dreher, ‘Nation First, Conservatism Second’, The American Conservative (19 January 2016): https://www.theamericanconservative.com/dreher/nationalism-conservatism-trump-samuel-francis/.
4 Samuel T. Francis, Thinkers of our Time: James Burnham (1984; London: The Claridge Press, 1999).
5 C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (1956; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
6 Francis, Leviathan and Its Enemies, p. 124.
7 Francis, Leviathan and Its Enemies, pp. 127–8.
8 Carl Rhodes, Woke Capitalism: How Corporate Morality is Sabotaging Democracy (Bristol: Bristol University Press, 2022).
9 Matt Egan, ‘Video Game CEO is Out After Praising Texas Abortion Law’, CNN (8 September 2021): https://edition.cnn.com/2021/09/07/business/tripwire-ceo-texas-abortion-law/index.html.
10 Ewan Palmer, ‘Papa John’s Founder John Schnatter Says Board Conspired to Oust Him, Vows “Day of Reckoning Will Come”’, Newsweek (26 November, 2019): https://www.newsweek.com/papa-johns-john-schnatter-interview-1474073.
11 Alistair Barr, ‘Mozilla CEO Brendan Eich Steps Down’, The Wall Street Journal (3 April 2014): https://www.wsj.com/articles/mozilla-ceo-brendan-eich-to-step-down-1396554132.
12 Francis, Leviathan and Its Enemies, pp. 134–62, 660–5.
13 Francis, Leviathan and Its Enemies, pp. 166–7.
14 Francis, Leviathan and Its Enemies, pp. 11, 17.
15 Francis, Leviathan and Its Enemies, p. 75.
16 Paul E. Gottfried, ‘Afterword’, in Leviathan and Its Enemies, p. 738.
17 Samuel T. Francis, ‘The Cult of Dr King’, in Beautiful Losers: Essays on the Failure of American Conservatism (Columbia, MI: University of Missouri Press, 1993), p. 160.
18 ‘Edinburgh University renames David Hume Tower over ‘racist’ views’, BBC News (13 September 2020): https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-edinburgh-east-fife-54138247.
19 Vilfredo Pareto, The Mind and Society, ed. Arthur Livingstone, trans. Andrew Bongiorno and Arthur Livingstone, 4 vols (1916; New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1935), vol 2, §1227, pp. 735–6.
20 Samuel T. Francis, ‘Equality as a Political Weapon’, in Beautiful Losers, p. 211.
21 Francis, ‘Equality as a Political Weapon’, pp. 213, 217.
22 Francis, ‘Equality as a Political Weapon’, p. 218. Quotation from Stuart Ewen, Captains of Consciousness: Advertising and the Social Roots of the Consumer Culture (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1976), p. 83.
23 Edward Bernays, ‘The Engineering of Consent’, in Public Relations (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1952), pp. 157–68.
24 Edward Bernays, ‘Attitude Polls – Servants or Masters?’ in Public Relations, p. 263.
25 Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co.: 1922), p. 17.
26 Walter Lippmann, The Phantom Public (1927; New York: Routledge, 2017), pp. 3–4.
27 Lippmann, The Phantom Public, p. 29.
28 Lippmann, The Phantom Public, pp. 188, 190.
29 Lippmann, The Phantom Public, p. 117.
30 Lippmann, Public Opinion, p. 204.
31 The Joe Rogan Experience, ‘#1757 – Dr Robert Malone, MD’ (31 December 2021): https://open.spotify.com/episode/3SCsueX2bZdbEzRtKOCEyT.
32 He is President of the Global Covid Summit: https://globalcovidsummit.org/.
33 Madhava Setty, ‘Rogan and Malone: Most Important Interview of Our Time?’, The Defender (4 January 2022): https://childrenshealthdefense.org/defender/joe-rogan-robert-malone-interview-covid-vaccine/.
34 Shannon Thaler, ‘YouTube and Twitter Delete Joe Rogan Interview with Scientist who Helped Invent mRNA Vaccines’, Daily Mail (3 January, 2022): https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-10364679/YouTube-Twitter-delete-Joe-Rogan-interview-scientist-helped-invent-MRNA-vaccines.html.
35 Debunk the Flunk with Dr Wilson, ‘Robert Malone Goes Full Anti-Science on Joe Rogan’s Podcast’, YouTube (5 January 2022): https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xjszVOfG_wo.
36 Gino Spocchia, ‘No Academic Credibility’: Experts Debunk Mass Psychosis Covid theory Floated by Doctor on Joe Rogan Podcast’, The Independent (10 January 2022): https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/covid-psychosis-theory-joe-rogan-b1989552.html.
37 Video excerpt can be found on Zack Heilman, ‘CNN Accidentally Admits Their ‘News’ Isn’t Working, People Are Just Living Their Lives, Ignoring Us’, Red Voice Media (10 January 2022): https://www.redvoicemedia.com/2022/01/cnn-accidentally-admits-their-news-isnt-working-people-are-just-living-their-lives-ignoring-us/.
38 Francis, Leviathan and Its Enemies, p. 576.
39 Francis, Leviathan and Its Enemies, p. 588.
40 Francis, Leviathan and Its Enemies, p. 662, 667–8.
41 Raheem Kassam, No Go Zones: How Sharia Law Is Coming to a Neighborhood Near You (Washington, DC: Regnery, 2017).
42 Gaetano Mosca, The Ruling Class, ed. Arthur Livingston, trans. Hannah D. Khan (1895; New York: McGraw-Hill, 1939), p. 10.