News of the Future (and the Future of News)
Just as struggles over trade routes and natural resources defined previous eras, control over information will grow as a source of conflict and strife in the decades ahead. The battles will be fought among governments and also between governments and institutions, corporations, and individuals. As technology makes information more and more accessible to people everywhere, political struggles—from elections to civil uprisings—will take place in both the physical and virtual space. It is likely that journalists will continue to be jailed and killed in record numbers. This is alarming, of course, but the news, as it were, is not all bad.
Journalists are increasingly threatened precisely because governments and other powerful institutions are finding it more difficult to manage and manipulate information. They are lashing out as a result. The outcome in the struggle to control information in the Internet age is not predetermined and will not be decided simply by who dominates the technology, although that will certainly be a factor. The outcome will also depend on the international political environment and the ability to strengthen and protect freedom of expression at a global level.
In previous chapters we’ve taken a careful look at some of the challenges to the global flow of information: a new generation of autocrats that is more adept at masking repression, terror and criminal groups that target the media directly, and governments that are asserting greater control over the Internet. This chapter looks at some steps that can be taken to meet these emerging threats.
In order to develop strategies that preserve and strengthen the global flow of information we need to make some assumptions about how global news will be delivered in the future. This is exceedingly difficult, as the only certainty is that technology will continue to transform the way news is gathered and disseminated, as well as the underlying economics of the news industry. But there are some reasonable assumptions that can be used to predict future challenges and develop responses.
As technology makes it easier for individuals and smaller outlets to gather and distribute information, power will continue to shift away from the larger media organizations that were once dominant because only they had the resources and infrastructure to maintain bureaus and field correspondents. However, this legacy media will continue to be the most important way to reach mass audiences, particularly during periods of crisis. Consolidation will slow, leaving perhaps a dozen major global brands that will compete directly for readers and viewers. The distinction between print outlets and broadcasters will continue to erode as more and more people around the world get their news online.
Many people, particularly those living in parts of the world with low connectivity and under the sway of repressive regimes, will continue to rely on radio for their international news for the time being. Government-funded networks like the BBC World Service and Voice of America will remain the dominant means to reach these individuals in their native language. However, as production becomes less expensive and distribution easier, and as the cost of smart phones plummets, making them accessible throughout the developing world, Internet radio and audio downloads will become pervasive. In Africa, where the use of cell phones is growing at an incredible rate, people without access to global media are using SMS messaging to generate and distribute original content. In the future, villagers in Zimbabwe who come together to fight for a land title will instantly form their own Internet audio channel to coordinate action and keep one another informed. They will broadcast “news” in their own language, making it accessible to the entire village via the mobile devices that they will all use.
Translation tools will also become more powerful, making the original language of publication less relevant. All Web content will be instantly and automatically translated into the language of the user, and in the future even audio translations will become routine. This will make it even easier for interested people around the world to access local news sources. For example, a businessperson in Canada planning a trip to Brazil will read the local Portuguese-language media to find if there are any protest marches planned through the streets of Rio. Students in Iran who are following protests in Cairo will be able to access Farsi translations of Egyptian and international media websites.
Internet utopians will continue to insist that information wants to be free. But in the future, you’re going to have to pay for it more often. This will be an incremental shift, affecting high-frequency users or people who need information immediately. But global news providers will develop better systems of charging for content, and this will become an increasingly important source of revenue. Foreign bureaus will not necessarily expand as a result. Instead, international news organizations will build larger networks of local stringers and correspondents. Those journalists will be vulnerable to pressure from national governments and other forces that object to the way they are being depicted to an international audience. Global media will also improve its use of technology to carry out reporting, including mining social media and using media drones that could, for example, fly above a street demonstration. These strategies will give an on-the-ground feel to stories that were once reported at a distance. More coverage will also be data driven, reducing the role of anecdotal story telling. Since virtually everyone will carry a smart phone and as photo technology continues to improve, frontline images, both video and still, will increasingly be captured by eyewitnesses rather than professional photographers.
These ongoing disruptions to the traditional media will be compounded by the continued growth of regional media networks, many financed by governments. These stations will seek to amplify the influence of the governments underwriting them. Some states have a sophisticated understanding of what those interests are, but a portion of these new networks will be provocative, inflammatory, and irresponsible. Many will publish and broadcast in English in an effort to reach the largest possible audience and to influence global public opinion. Those media outlets that are able to meet a successful information need—like al-Jazeera in the Middle East or CCTV in parts of Africa—will gain a foothold, reducing the influence of Western media organizations in these regions.
Smaller media organizations, along with advocacy groups that use journalistic techniques to provide comprehensive information on relevant topics, will continue to refine their ability to deliver news to a specialized audience. This category includes media nonprofits and global NGOs, particularly in the human rights field. Of course, political factions, separatist groups, and terror and criminal groups will also continue to use technology to deliver information directly to their own supporters and followers.
A handful of highly placed and highly trained freelance journalists will provide specialized coverage, particularly of conflict. Their work will be supplemented by fledging freelancers, “citizen journalists,” and partisan “media activists” who will distribute information through social media or specialized websites. These groups will increasingly provide breaking news and firsthand accounts from conflict zones.
The Internet will bend but not break as a global system of information delivery. The Web will increasingly be censored and restricted at the national level, with sophisticated users working their way around the censors. As more and more people access news and information via mobile devices—and rely more on them for everything they do—government surveillance will become even more sophisticated and sweeping, and there will be a growing information gap between those who access the uncensored Web and those whose information is restricted.
If these assumptions are correct, then the global media environment will remain highly vulnerable for the foreseeable future. Meanwhile, the need for independent information at a global level will grow, as economies integrate and improved communication fuels the growth of transnational communities. What specific steps can be taken to ensure that information continues to circulate freely in the decades ahead? Here are ten strategies.
Expose the Democratators
One of the most troubling political developments of the post–Cold War era is the rise of sophisticated autocrats who are able to hide their repressive strategies. But the democratators can only reap the benefits of their subterfuge if they are able to claim some sort of democratic legitimacy. Journalists, human rights groups, civil society activists, and even governments must do everything in their power to document and expose the means of repression and must make sure that their findings affect global institutions.
This is an approach that has been shown to be effective. For example, detailed reports on Turkey’s media crackdown eroded the legitimacy of the government of Prime Minister Erdoğan. (His legitimacy was further compromised by the harsh crackdown on the Gezi Park protesters.) The actions that governments take in response to such pressure are often limited and self-serving, as, for example, Russia’s renewed commitment to investigate journalist murders. But such gestures are not insignificant. They can be exploited to leverage more meaningful action, for example successful prosecutions that reduce the likelihood of future violence.
Producing reports documenting and exposing hidden repression is a laborious and time-consuming process. Such documentation often requires specialized knowledge and deep contacts. And no number of reports—no matter how exhaustive—will change the fundamental nature of these regimes. The democratators will continue. But such strategies can be used to ensure that governments that engage in systematic human rights violations, including limiting free expression and the rights of the media, cannot as easily claim the mantle of democracy. They can be made to endure the consequences of their actions, at least in terms of their international standing. Pressure must be applied not only to the governments themselves but the full range of institutions that confer international legitimacy. Advocacy targets should include the IMF, the World Bank, and the United Nations; regional institutions and bodies like the European Union and the Organization of American States; and even quasi-independent organizations like the International Olympic Committee and FIFA, the international soccer federation that oversees the World Cup. Human rights and press freedom groups effectively used the 2008 Beijing Olympics to push the Chinese government to ease restrictions on free expression in the run-up to the games. Similar strategies were used to highlight Russia’s press freedom shortcomings in advance of the 2013 Winter Olympics in Sochi.
Increase Safety for Conflict Reporters
Covering war and conflict has long been one of the most essential tasks that journalists perform—and one of the most dangerous. But in recent years the risk has reached an intolerable level. Terrorist and sectarian groups have deliberately targeted media professionals, and national militaries have demonstrated a callous indifference to the work of journalists, resulting in numerous unnecessary deaths.
The notion that journalists are neutral observers to war and serve all sides by publicizing their grievances and concerns has been shattered by the proliferation of new technologies that allow the warring parties to communicate directly. The old paradigm cannot be restored. And there is virtually no way to influence terrorist groups, especially those aligned with al-Qaeda, that deliberately target the media.
The onus thus falls on media organizations to do more to protect the safety of the reporters and support staff they employ. Hostile environment training for journalists working for major media organizations has become routine, but the training is not sufficiently specialized to meet the needs of all reporters. Data compiled over two decades make clear that journalists working in conflict zones are much more likely to be murdered than step on a landmine. Safety training should more adequately address this specific risk, teaching journalists how to detect surveillance and respond to threats, not just how to take cover in a firefight.
Because hostile environment training is extremely expensive, it is not generally available to freelancers, much less stringers, fixers, and local reporters, who face the greatest risk. When considering risk and responsibility media organizations must take the broadest possible view of the information ecosystem in which they operate and develop specific policies and practices to mitigate risk to informal support staff, including drivers and translators. Information security must also be a greater focus of training. A smart phone that falls into the wrong hands endangers not only journalists but all of their sources.
Increasingly, some of the most dangerous conflicts are covered not by trained and seasoned professionals but freelancers with smart phones and even local “media activists.” There are many reasons why this trend is troubling, ranging from the heightened risk to those gathering the news to the quality of the information itself. But lamenting the change accomplishes nothing; the trend is not reversible. Moreover, the value of the information that these informal journalists bring the world cannot be denied. The only way to improve the safety and security for this category of journalist is to carry out aggressive outreach, create a community of freelancers who share information and tips and to make accessible to them appropriate training at low cost. This is being done, but informally and at a modest level.1
Governments and militaries can obviously do much more to reduce the risk to conflict reporters. We can exclude for the moment rogue states like Syria that routinely target and detain journalists and are largely impervious to international pressure. But militaries that profess adherence to international humanitarian law have engaged in grave abuses that endanger journalists on an ongoing basis. This includes the U.S. military, whose overly liberal rules of engagement led to the killing of at least sixteen journalists by U.S. forces in Iraq.2 It is unconscionable that media facilities are routinely targeted in conflict, despite clear prohibitions in international humanitarian law. Recent examples include Israel’s assault on media facilities in Gaza during the December 2012 Operation Cast Lead and the NATO airstrike in Libya in July 2011. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1738, ratified in December 2006, reiterated the civilian status of journalists in conflict zones, affirming that “media equipment and installations constitute civilian objects, and in this respect shall not be the object of attack or of reprisals, unless they are military objectives.” This is a crucial standard that must be upheld to ensure that conflict reporters can carry out their work with some modicum of safety.
Break the Cycle of Impunity
After years of indifference, the international community has begun to tackle the issue of impunity. There is a good reason for this. The systematic murder of journalists has staunched the flow of information from areas experiencing conflict, allowing violent actors to exercise censorship and dictate what the world knows. In 2013, the UN Security Council held two separate discussions on the topic, and the UN General Assembly passed a resolution declaring November 2 the International Day to End Impunity in crimes against journalists. UNESCO is implementing a UN Plan of Action on the Safety of Journalists and Issue of Impunity, targeting initially a handful of countries in which the violence is persistent.
But what does all this attention mean in practical terms? Ultimately, the crimes will have to be prosecuted by national governments that have demonstrated neither the political will nor the capacity to reduce the violence. As noted in chapter 7, the problem of impunity seems intractable. But focusing attention on the relative handful of countries where the situation is particularly acute can produce progress. The challenge is to create the political will to solve the crimes and then support the development of judicial and investigative infrastructure in those countries that have demonstrated a commitment to bringing the killers of journalists to justice. UN agencies can also play a valuable role by supporting efforts of national governments to protect journalists under threat.
The existing data on impunity—including CPJ’s Impunity Index, first created in 2008—show clearly that progress is incremental but can be measured over a period of time. The best example is Colombia, which has seen the rate of killing of journalists decline in the last five years. In fact, Colombia’s Impunity Rating, which is the number of unsolved killings divided by the total population, dropped from.439 in 2008 to .171 in 2013.3 There are three fundamental reasons for this. First, the overall political environment improved, with the violence associated with the ongoing civil war and the drug trade more contained. This had led to a pronounced decline in the number of new killings. Second, prosecutors have won convictions in at least three journalist murders, reducing the number of unsolved cases and creating a disincentive for those who might consider the use of the targeted violence against the press.4 Third, Colombia has implemented a highly regarded journalist protection program, a government-NGO partnership in which journalists under threat are provided with security, bodyguards, and internal relocation.5
Despite the reduction in violence, Colombia remains an exceedingly difficult and dangerous environment for the press. Journalists are routinely threatened, and self-censorship is rife. Still, it is probably the best model for other countries looking to tackle the issue of violence against the press in an effective way. For the international community—including the United Nations—the goal must be to raise the cost of inaction by ensuring that those countries that fail to stem the tide of violence against the press face international opprobrium. The issue should be a frequent topic in bilateral discussions with donor nations and others in a position to exercise influence. Those countries that demonstrate a willingness to tackle the problem should expect support in developing the investigative and judicial resources they need to solve the crimes. The culture of impunity can only be defeated by ensuring that those who carry out the killings of journalists face justice. Progress can be objectively measured. Currently the global rate of impunity for journalists’ killings stands at a staggering 88 percent. If the scourge of violence against the press is to be defeated, that number must decline over time.
Keep the Internet Open and Free
The Internet has become the primary means through which information is disseminated at a global level. Online communication has transformed the way that news and critical opinion are shared within repressive societies. Put another way, there is no press freedom without Internet freedom. Yet as we have seen, the decentralized system that makes the Internet so difficult to control is threatened by the actions of a number of countries around the world that are more effectively restricting online speech within their own societies and seeking to create a new Internet governance structure that will give greater power to governments.
The battle to preserve the multistakeholder model of Internet governance and keep the Internet open is being waged by civil society groups, Internet companies with a clear commercial stake in preserving the existing system, and governments with a tradition of support for freedom of expression. Journalists and media companies have been largely absent from the debate, although some press freedom groups, including CPJ and Reporters Without Borders, have become increasingly involved. The global media has a tremendous stake in the outcome; if the Internet becomes fragmented or balkanized the ability to gather information and disseminate to a global audience will be deeply impaired. Direct participation by global media companies in advocating for and supporting an open Internet does not compromise their responsibility to report the news fairly and objectively since the Internet is merely the medium through which the information is delivered and has no bearing on the content itself. Journalists and global media companies need to participate more actively in defending Inter net freedom, recognizing their own stake in the outcome.
Limit Government Surveillance
In an April 2013, UN Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression Frank La Rue released a report on the effect of surveillance on freedom of expression. La Rue concluded,
States cannot ensure that individuals are able to freely seek and receive information or express themselves without respecting, protecting and promoting their right to privacy. Privacy and freedom of expression are interlinked and mutually dependent; an infringement upon one can be both the cause and consequence of an infringement upon the other. Without adequate legislation and legal standards to ensure the privacy, security and anonymity of communications, journalists, human rights defenders and whistle-blowers, for example, cannot be assured that their communications will not be subject to States’ scrutiny.6
La Rue’s report was published before documents provided by the former NSA contractor Edward J. Snowden demonstrated that a global surveillance effort is being carried out on an unprecedented—perhaps unimaginable—scale. There is limited evidence thus far to suggest that journalists are specific targets of NSA surveillance, yet it would be prudent for all reporters to assume that their electronic communication is actively monitored. Even if that is not currently the case, the staggering ability of the NSA to store massive amounts of data indefinitely means that communications information could be accessed at some point in the future.
Journalists who are not U.S. citizens are even more vulnerable since they have no constitutional protections against NSA spying. Reporting on national security issues requires that journalists be able to promise confidentiality to their sources. The scope and uncertainty of the NSA spying program has compromised their ability to do so, according to Janine Gibson, editor-in-chief of the Guardian US. “You can’t guarantee anonymity to a source,” Gibson stated. “That’s a terrifying thing for the journalists we work with and a profound shift.”7 Gibson could have added that editors and reporters can no longer communicate securely. Gibson frequently found herself on a plane to Rio, where the then Guardian reporter Glenn Greenwald resides, just to have a conversation or review and edit one of his stories on the Snowden leaks. Gibson, prudently, did not trust phones or e-mail, even when it was encrypted.
In July 2013, a coalition of Internet freedom and privacy groups led by the San Francisco–based Electronic Frontier Foundation came together to develop a set of principles on human rights and surveillance for the Internet age. As noted in the preamble to the principles,
The explosion of digital communications content and information about communications, or “communications metadata”—information about an individual’s communications or use of electronic devices—the falling cost of storing and mining large sets of data, and the provision of personal content through third party service providers make State surveillance possible at an unprecedented scale.8
Signatories called on all states to comply with thirteen principles that include ensuring due process, judicial oversight, transparency, and user notification when carrying out surveillance.
Beyond the broad objections to the sweeping scope of the NSA surveillance program journalists have specific concerns. These were laid out in a detailed October 2013 letter prepared by the Washington-based Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press and signed by dozens of media organizations. The letter, addressed to the high-level Review Group convened by President Obama to examine U.S. government surveillance programs, called on the government to limit the scope of leak investigations so as not to impede legitimate news gathering, to ensure that communication between journalists and their sources are protected, and generally to be more open and forthcoming about the scope and nature of government surveillance.9 While nothing rivals the scale of the NSA surveillance program, these principles of course need to apply globally.
End Censorship
In the Internet age—when information moves at the speed of light—censorship should be a thing of the past. But it isn’t. Around the world information is censored for a variety of reasons. In China, “subversive” websites are routinely blocked, and critical comments are routinely removed from social media platforms. In the advanced democracies of Europe, censorship is practiced under a different and obviously more legitimate rubric. Those who engage in “hate speech” can be legally prosecuted, and the expression of certain ideas, including support for Nazism and Holocaust denial, is subject to prior restraint.
But there is one region of the world where censorship is prohibited by law. Article 13 of the American Convention on Human Rights states that the people of the hemisphere have the right “to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing, in print, in the form of art, or through any other medium of one’s choice” and that the right to freedom of expression “shall not be subject to prior censorship but shall be subject to subsequent imposition of liability.”10
What does this mean in practical terms? The American Convention of Human Rights is an international treaty that is legally binding, superseding domestic law in countries in which it has been ratified. This includes nearly all of the countries of Latin America with the exception of Cuba. (The American Convention has been signed but not ratified by the United States.)11 While the clearly stated prohibition on censorship in the Americas does not mean that prior restraint has been abolished, it does make it more difficult for governments in the region to justify such measures. And it makes it easier for advocates of freedom of expression to fight such restrictions through the use of regional human rights mechanisms, like the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Indeed, in 2001 the Inter-American Court ruled that Chile had violated the prohibition on censorship when it banned the showing of Martin Scorsese’s film The Last Temptation of Christ.12
Each region of the world has its own traditions and its own challenges especially with regards to hate speech and incitement to violence. But limiting government response to “the subsequent imposition of liability” is always the preferred approach. Articulating a prohibition of censorship in international law would be an important step in the creation of a global standard for freedom of expression. While countries like China, Vietnam, and Saudi Arabia will continue to censor the news, such actions will appear increasingly illegitimate and outside the international mainstream. An explicit prohibition on censorship at the international level would also make it easier to campaign around a variety of freedom-of-expression issues including, for example, impunity.
Catalina Botero, the special rapporteur for freedom of expression of the Organization of American States, has argued that threats and violent attacks on journalists constitute a form of “indirect censorship” and therefore violate Article 13 of the Inter-American Convention of Human Rights. Botero’s interpretation could help define the systematic government failure to stem the killing of journalists as a violation of international law.
Redrafting international legal instruments to include a specific prohibition of censorship is not in the cards in the current political environment. In fact, any effort to open international human rights treaties and conventions to revision would almost certainly result in a weakening, rather than a strengthening, of existing protections. Instead, advocates of freedom of expression should seek to create a new norm through jurisprudence, interpretation of existing standards, public debate, and campaigns. A global campaign to end censorship will resonate with a generation that grew up online and who recognize that while people need to be accountable for what they say, governments should not be moderating the global conversation.
Clearly Define Incitement to Violence
Within the contours of the global freedom of expression movement, there must be zero tolerance for speech that incites violence. The problem is that international law is a muddle on this issue. The vagueness of the standards not only makes it difficult for well-intentioned governments to understand and act on their responsibilities; they also make it easier for repressive leaders to justify suppression of speech that is merely critical by citing their obligation to stem incitement.
Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)—which has been formally ratified by 167 countries around the world and is legally binding—echoes the language of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It states that “Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference” as well as “freedom of expression,” which includes the right “to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.” However, this right is subject to certain restrictions so long as they “are provided by law and are necessary . . . for respect of the rights or reputations of others” or “the protection of national security or of public order . . . or of public health or morals.” Article 20 of the ICCPR puts the onus on governments to take action. It states that “any propaganda for war shall be prohibited by law” along with “any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence.”
The limitations on speech permitted under Article 19 and 20 have been the subject of extensive debate and discussion for decades. In August 2011 the UN Human Rights Committee issued a “General Comment” on Article 19 based on input from leading experts. While not legally binding, the General Comment serves as an authoritative interpretation of international law. The General Comment emphasized that any restriction imposed on freedom of expression must be both “necessary” and “proportionate” to achieve a limited aim and that governments must take extreme care when imposing such restrictions because “when a State party imposes restrictions on the exercise of freedom of expression, these may not put in jeopardy the right itself.”13 The 1995 Johannesburg Principles on National Security, Freedom of Expression, and Access to Information, drafted by leading experts convened by the global freedom of expression organization Article 19, state, “Expression shall not be subject to prior censorship in the interest of protecting national security, except in time of public emergency which threatens the life of the country.”14
In December 2012, Article 19 (the group) published a policy brief on how governments should interpret their responsibility to prohibit “incitement to discrimination, hostility and violence.” Noting that “in the absence of an agreed uniform definition, ‘hate speech’ is the subject of a great deal of confusion, globally as well as nationally” the report recommended that national courts apply a six-part test to determine if speech constitutes incitement and give preference to civil remedies over criminal sanctions in all but the most severe cases. Among the factors courts should consider are the context of the expression; the position of the speaker; and the likelihood that the speech will result in action, with “imminence” requiring the most aggressive response.15
But few governments apply these commonsense guidelines, and the issue of incitement is highly emotional. This is particularly true in parts of the world in which the media has been used to incite mass violence. As has been well documented, radio played a key role in both inspiring and facilitating the 1994 Rwandan genocide, during which an estimated eight hundred thousand Rwandans were killed. In December 2003, the UN International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) convicted three media executives of genocide, incitement and conspiracy to commit genocide, and crimes against humanity, and they were sentenced to terms ranging from thirty-five years to life. Two of those convicted, Ferdinand Nahimana and Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, were executives of Radio Télévision des Mille Collines (RTLM), the notorious radio station that was used by the genocidal government not only to poison the minds of Rwanda but also to mobilize the population and direct the actual killing. The third defendant, Hassan Ngeze, the owner of the newspaper Kangura, was convicted based largely on inflammatory writing his paper had published several years before the genocide commenced.
In Europe as well, media has been used to inspire ethnic killing. Fears that expressions of hate can quickly escalate to violent actions in a European context are based not only on the experience of World War II but also more recent history. During the 1990s in the Balkans, state-sponsored Radio Television Serbia (RTS) broadcast a steady diet of programming that denigrated Muslim Bosnians, inspired fear, and rallied support for the campaign of ethnic cleansing.
These examples make clear why governments and the international community must have the legal authority to intervene directly when incitement to violence threatens communities with genocide, ethnic violence, war crimes, or other mass atrocities. Under the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine—which affirms that governments and the international community have an obligation to protect vulnerable populations—military action to knock RTLM off the air would have been legal and appropriate. UN forces operating inside Bosnia repeatedly jammed RTS in order to forestall ethnic killing.
It is precisely because governments and the international community must have the authority to punish and in the most dire cases censor speech that incites violence that clear and concise standards are essential. In the Nahimana case, the ICTR conflated vague national laws outlawing incitement to hatred with prohibitions on incitement to genocide, an international crime.16 While that legal reasoning was refined by the Appeals Tribunal, the vagueness of definition allows governments to redefine critical speech as incitement and restrict it on that basis. In Africa, dozens of journalists from Rwanda to Ethiopia have been arrested and prosecuted on trumped-up charges like “divisionism,” “incitement to tribal hatred,” and “incitement to genocide” merely for criticizing those in power. In Putin’s Russia, “extremism” is a criminal offense, and journalists are routinely prosecuted for advocating unpopular views.17
As a free-speech absolutist, I’m not a big fan of laws prohibiting hate speech or discrimination because these offences are exceedingly difficult to define and enforce. But as a practical matter, Article 20 of the ICCPR not only empowers government to enact such laws; it requires that they do so.18 Incitement to violence is a much clearer concept, and the necessity of international action to stop incitement that threatens whole communities is obvious. The current muddled understanding of what constitutes incitement not only makes it more difficult for governments and the international community to act decisively when lives are at stake; it also makes it easier for governments to exploit the fear of violence to justify suppression of legitimate criticism. In the current environment, developing a unified global standard of what constitutes incitement and what actions governments may legitimately take will not be easy. But it must be a priority.
Make Access to Independent Information a Development Goal
In 2000, the United Nations established the Millennium Development Goals, eight specific targets intended to guide development assistance and set global priorities through 2015. The goals range from halving global poverty; to achieving universal primary education; to reducing child mortality, HIV/AIDS, and malaria. The process for setting, achieving, and measuring the MDGs, as they are called, has been much debated. But one thing is clear: When the next round of development goals are established in 2015 expanding freedom of expression must be among them.
In May 2013 a High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons chaired by Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Liberian President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, and UK Prime Minister David Cameron presented a report on A New Global Partnership to UN Secretary General Ban-Ki Moon. The report, which is intended to lay the groundwork for the establishment of the next round of MDGs, recommended that one of the goals should be to “ensure people enjoy freedom of speech, association, peaceful protest and access to independent media and information.”19
The process for finalizing the 2015 MDGs will play out throughout 2014, and many governments can be expected to resist the establishment of any goal centered around free expression. This is precisely why an MDG that expands access to independent media and information would be a milestone. Its inclusion would mobilize resources to develop global news networks and would disarm governments that view independent information as a threat to their power and control.
Support Ethical Standards and Quality Media
Those fighting for global freedom of expression should resist being drawn into debates with governments on how to ensure that the media is “responsible” or that the information circulating on social media is “accurate” or “truthful” or “constructive.” This means engaging with governments on their own terms and risks legitimating state intervention and control. The goal instead should be to build a global information environment in which all voices are heard, constrained only by legally defined prohibitions against incitement to violence.
Of course, there is no guarantee that thoughtful, responsible, or moderate perspectives will emerge from the global cacophony. But the lack of an assured outcome can never be used to justify control over news, information, or thought.
That said, it is of course the goal to all those who support freedom of expression to nurture an environment in which people around the world have access to high-quality, accurate information. There are a variety of groups supporting such efforts by carrying out media development, investing in journalism education, training journalists in ethical standards, working to improve the quality and accuracy of citizen journalists, or seeking to ensure access to appropriate technology. This is critically important work that must be supported. Ethical, high-quality journalism improves the press freedom environment. While it in no way justifies the violence, I have seen over and over that journalists who compromise their ethical standards, sometimes at the point of a gun, are more vulnerable. To give one example, journalists in Mexico are often approached by one cartel and told that if they do not agree to “work” for them they will be killed. With no other option, they agree to do so, only to then be targeted by a competing cartel that now views the journalist as a threat to its interests.
The existence of ethical journalism also removes a common pretext that governments use to justify state intervention and control. We see this most clearly in the case of the democratators, particularly in Venezuela, where Chávez took measures to contain the “corrupt,” “oligarchic” media that openly supported the political opposition. One growing tactic that governments use in this environment is to build a parallel media structure loyal to the state and staff ed with journalists who parrot the government line and rail against its opponents.
While efforts to improve media performance are absolutely essential, there is no guarantee that they will succeed, often because they are subverted by governments themselves. In many instances I have seen investments in media training and development squandered because newly trained journalists are not given the opportunity to practice their profession in an ethical manner. Journalists trained in objective, balanced reporting are often unable to find a job in an environment in which every media outlet is allied with the government or opposition forces. Governments often then exploit the partisan media environment to impose further restrictions.
Build a Free Expression Coalition
There are many powerful constituencies that benefit from the circulation of ideas and information at a global level. They include civil society and advocacy groups, especially those fighting to protect human rights and to safeguard the environment; business and financial institutions that operate in international markets; communications and technology companies that move information across borders; and governments and intergovernmental institutions making foreign policy, evaluating security threats, and promoting trade. And of course there are journalists and media organizations that operate internationally or report on global developments. The interests of these groups do not always align. Yet they all benefit from expanding the flow of information.
Together, they must build a grand coalition to advance the shared goal of expanding global freedom of expression. One way to bring these diverse constituencies together would be to develop a freedom-of-expression charter articulating their shared goals. The Internet and other modern communication technologies have made real the ideals expressed in Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: the right to freedom of expression transcends borders. Governments that accepted Article 19 when it was an abstract ideal are less comfortable in a world in which the vision could be realized. They are pushing back, asserting that freedom of expression is not a universal right but must be adapted to national circumstances. A global charter affirming this basic right would not have the force of law, but it would be a critical way to stand up and assert the importance of freedom of expression in an interconnected world.
While there are various statements, principles, and declarations on freedom of expression and Internet freedom, many are technical, legal, regional, or narrow in scope. What is needed is a new document that does not merely restate principles that are long established in international law but that translates those principles into concrete and verifiable terms. The freedom-of-expression charter should ban censorship, condemn those who use violence or the threat of violence to suppress ideas and information, call for a free and open Internet and clear limits on surveillance, and demand that people all over the world be given access to the information they need to make informed decisions about their lives.
The charter should be formally endorsed by participants in the freedom-of-expression coalition: human rights and press freedom groups, international NGOs, global businesses and independent financial institutions, and prominent individuals in the freedom-of-expression field. Governments should be asked to declare their public commitment to its principles. Some leaders will readily embrace them, others can be compelled to do so, and many others will resist. The goal must be eventually to build broad enough support that governments refusing to endorse the charter will be perceived as outliers. Governments that commit to the principles, meanwhile, should also agree to undergo a periodic independent assessment to evaluate compliance.20
Even if these principles are realized, the international media environment will continue to be a messy, tumultuous place in which no single force is dominant. Global media organizations will compete with regional and national outlets, bloggers, activists, citizen journalists, and political organizations to meet the world’s information needs. People in every corner of the world will be able to access a range of independent information in their own language. Of course there will continue to be challenges. State secrets will be published and confidential documents exposed; provocative and destabilizing ideas will be put forward; the voices of violent groups will be heard; people’s religious views will be mocked; and myriad ideas, good, bad, and otherwise, will all compete for public attention. This is the necessary reality determined by the role of information in a global community united as never before by a set of common interests and experiences. It is only when information is democratized and decentralized, when news is truly harder to control and manage, and when the voices of the marginalized and disenfranchised are heard that the full potential of the information revolution unleashed by technological innovation can fully and finally be realized.