Under Siege: P.L.O. Decisionmaking During the 1982 War

The men who led the P.L.O. had gone through many harrowing experiences before the Israeli invasion. Some had endured captivity or barely escaped it, all had been under fire repeatedly, and all had experienced deprivation and various forms of extreme danger. It was understood and accepted by everyone in the P.L.O. that things would never be easy. On several occasions during grim periods in the past, ‘Arafat had asked rhetorically in speeches, “But when we started all this, did we invite you to a wedding, or a feast?”

However, what the P.L.O. had to face in 1982 was quite different from anything it had gone through in the past. It had witnessed apparently hopeless situations in Jordan in 1970 and 1971, and in Lebanon in the summer of 1976. But never before had it confronted the full weight of such a formidable or ruthless enemy, and never before had it seemed as if every possible factor was ranged against it, closing off all options except the most unpleasant.

Not surprisingly in view of this situation, many accounts at the time and afterward tended to lay stress on Israeli military pressure as the major influence on P.L.O. decisions.¹ Thus, assessing the exact impact of the pressure Israel was able to bring to bear on P.L.O. decisionmaking has particular importance.

This is a harder problem than it may seem, and not only because of the obvious difficulty of determining well after the event how the different phases of the war were perceived by and affected the P.L.O. leadership and rank and file. It is also necessary to clarify how information reached the leadership, how it was then disseminated to the combat units of the JF, and what effect all of this had on the general public in Beirut and beyond.

Public opinion was crucial in the calculations of the P.L.O. leadership during the war. It had been sensitive to Palestinian opinion in the past, especially that of Palestinians in Lebanon during its “Lebanese era.” It became even more sensitive to it as the combat got closer and closer to Beirut, where the families of most fighters and leaders were located. Their feelings ultimately became absolutely vital to the P.L.O., for a collapse of popular morale would have had devastating results on that of the combat forces.

Lebanese opinion too became increasingly important during the war, particularly among the population of West Beirut, which was besieged along with the Palestinians. It became decisive in mid-June when it grew clear that the objective of Israel, the United States, and the Sarkis government was the expulsion of the P.L.O. and that, with one exception, no leader in West Beirut was willing to oppose that demand. Even later, when in late June Lebanese public opinion shifted somewhat toward the P.L.O., morale in the capital remained a key factor in how long the P.L.O. could hold out in its attempt to obtain more favorable conditions for its withdrawal.

Above everything else, the ebb and flow of the fighting had a direct impact on popular perceptions in Beirut. These in turn influenced how much support the Lebanese in the city gave the P.L.O., and how much military, psychological, or other pressure they and the Palestinian civilian population could withstand. All of these factors were crucial in the P.L.O.’s decisionmaking.

As the fighting rapidly moved closer to Beirut, and as the perimeter under control of the JF shrunk, the problem of loss of contact diminished but others arose to take its place. One was that use of radio became increasingly hazardous, as radio transmissions were easily intercepted, and could be used by the enemy to locate and destroy commandposts. The solution ultimately adopted was the use of old-fashioned field telephones within the Beirut siege perimeter. These were supplemented by field messengers when their vulnerable ground lines were damaged by shelling or bombing. Where radio had to be used, the antennas were located as far as possible from the transmitter, or the transmitter was made mobile, or transmitted in short bursts. In spite of these precautions, several radio operators were killed and many wounded in Beirut during the siege.

There were other problems. Telephone exchanges were often hit by shellfire, necessitating emergency repairs. After the IDF cut off electricity, the telephone exchanges, as well as radios, field telephones, telexes, and other communications facilities, required emergency generators. These had to be kept outdoors, and were often damaged by shrapnel. To maintain 24-hour operation of these systems, large supplies of diesel oil were required. Some of these problems were solved by good pre-war preparation, plus at times inspired improvization in the heat of combat by courageous repair crews working under indescribably difficult conditions;² but they were never fully banished.

Notwithstanding such communications difficulties, the P.L.O. command generally had an accurate idea of what was going on, thanks to this military communications network.³ The most serious problems arose when radio contact with a regional command was lost, which usually meant the worst: the position was lost or the commandpost had been overrun or abandoned. This was not always the case: the commander of the Tyre district, Lt. Colonel ‘Azmi Sghayir, ceased radio contact but remained in the field until he was killed much later.

That the P.L.O. command’s picture of the battlefield situation was usually correct is reflected in the official communiques issued by WAFA in Beirut. When checked against Western and Israeli press accounts, they appear generally accurate in describing the military situation, and reliable in other respects, with the exception of estimates of Israeli casualties. Inflated though they often were, such estimates were at times closer to the truth than IDF‘s figures.⁴

The P.L.O. never released a figure on JF casualties. As for civilian casualties, in the south there was not accurate count of them; in Beirut most fell during heavy bombardments when the wounded and dead were coming in to hospitals so fast that records could not be kept; many of those killed were buried under destroyed buildings and could not be removed; others were never taken to hospitals. Figures on civilian casualties must therefore be treated as estimates.⁵

In the last analysis, the ultimate check on the P.L.O. media was that it was imperative for it to present the most truthful possible picture of the fighting, since most of the war was being fought in the Beirut citizenry’s backyard. Glaring discrepancies in its reporting would only have alienated these people, whose support was absolutely vital, and eroded their confidence in the credibility of those defending the beleaguered city.

The populace had alternative sources of information. Foremost were their own eyes and ears, which could tell them a great deal as the siege tightened. They could also hear news from neighbors and friends, particularly those who served as part-time militiamen, or in the extensive civil defense services which developed during the war. These people moved around the city, and could describe combat damage and casualties, and the progress, or lack of it, of Israeli offensives.

Finally there were the non-P.L.O. media: internationally, notably Monte Carlo and BBC radio; locally, the Phalangist “Voice of Lebanon”; and “Kol Israel”, which broadcast in Arabic, English, and French. The first two stations provided a valuable and much-listened-to external perspective on events, showing those under siege something of how the outside world saw their predicament, as well as the effect the long drawn-out siege was having inside Israel, in the U.S., and in Europe.

The Israeli and Phalangist radios, whose information line was obviously closely coordinated,⁶ lost credibility as the war continued. This was partly because in mid-June they were central to an intensive disinformation campaign. Their news broadcasts sowed false rumors, made exaggerated claims of Israeli advances on the ground, and alleged sweeping secret P.L.O. concessions. These reports constituted the key element in a psychological offensive meant to create a wave of panic, which would stampede the P.L.O. into agreeing to leave Beirut unconditionally and in a state of complete disarray.

In the event, this apparently carefully planned campaign failed; perhaps it could only have succeeded against a background of total Israeli victory and absolute P.L.O. defeat. In consequence, the “Voice of Lebanon” and “Kol Israel” suffered a major loss of listener confidence inside the city, particularly its besieged western half.

The main Beirut papers, the leftist al-Safir and the centrist al-Nahar, on the whole bore out the tenor of JF communiques, although on occasion they flatly contradicted them. However, they told a very different (and often more accurate) story about the negotiations to end the fighting than did official P.L.O. pronouncements, which were vague, uninformative, and at times simply untrue.

Lack of credibility on this score initially harmed the P.L.O. in its efforts to deny, in mid-June, the more alarmist stories about its withdrawal that its enemies were spreading. Only in July, with the P.L.O.’s failure to precipitously pack up and leave, as it was alleged to be on the point of doing, were these rumors finally laid to rest.

The speed of the advance, the massive amounts of firepower employed, and the willingness of the IDF to leave behind not just pockets of resistance, but entire cities, towns, and refugee camps, impressed all concerned with the extent of Israeli seriousness, as did the IDF’s willingness to take casualties. It had been noted by many in the P.L.O. that in 1978, an Israeli decision to avoid taking the Tyre pocket had been made, apparently, to avoid heavy casualties. This time things clearly would be different.

There was, moreover, an understanding among most Palestinians that in the face of this unprecedented offensive little could be expected from the Arab states. A WAFA commentary written on June 5, after two days of bombardments—and when it was obvious that the invasion was about to begin—spoke scathingly of “the near somnolence” of the Arab regimes, concluding: “The Palestinians and their allies in Lebanon are alone in the field facing the Israeli Goliath.”⁸ This commentary struck a note of defiance that, like the resistance in the field, was to be maintained throughout the war, even during its darkest days.

In the face of a massive assault (the eight divisions indicated by Herzog totaled well over ten times the forces fielded by the P.L.O., with many more times the firepower),⁹ and in the absence of any likely source of external aid, it is worthy of note that there was little sign during this first phase of the war that the leadership or the rank and file of the P.L.O. were daunted. A few individuals, like Hajj Isma‘il, left their posts, but they were exceptions. This was shown by the ferocious resistance of Sidon and the adjoining camps, notably ‘Ain al-Hilweh, which held out until June 17 against everything the IDF could bring against it.

The reason for this apparent equanimity was twofold. On the one hand, the P.L.O. was well prepared, psychologically if not materially, for this attack, and indeed expected it. On the other, reports from the front which indicated that fierce resistance was being offered, and that the Israelis were taking heavy casualties reinforced the existing willingness to fight on. Seemingly small things like the shooting down of an A-4 Skyhawk and capture of a pilot, Captain Aharon Ihyaz, near Beaufort on June 6, or the initial failures of Israeli amphibious landings at Rashidiyeh and in the Zahrani area on the same day, had an encouraging effect out of all proportion to their actual importance, even as reverses elsewhere were being admitted.

This explains at least in part how morale held up and resistance continued even as the news grew grimmer and grimmer on June 7 and 8, with the expansion of the Awwali bridgehead and the creation of another at Zahrani (meaning the isolation of Sidon was imminent), the total encirclement of Tyre, the fall of Nabatiyeh and Beaufort castle, and rapid Israeli advances in other areas, including in the Shouf.

Partly as a rationalization, but also reflecting cold realism, the P.L.O. media by June 7 was stressing that “this is not a war of positions … [and] Israel has the capability to reach almost any territorial objective it desires.” The limiting factors were time and the cost in Israeli lives, rather than external intervention, which was a chimera due to “Arab impotence, and to international indifference or complicity.” The P.L.O.’s objective, in addition to slowing the enemy down and inflicting maximum casualties on him, was “to preserve their forces in being.”¹⁰ In a nutshell, this was the strategy followed until the end of the war.

Neither the stream of bad news from the front on June 7, including Israeli attempts to advance from the Awwali bridgehead to Jiyyeh, only 25km south of the capital, nor devastating bombing raids on the Arab University area of Beirut, appear to have shaken morale. During these raids Israeli aircraft using PGMs had scored direct hits on important P.L.O. installations, but overshadowing this was the removal, long before, of the occupants, files, and functions of the key headquarters the planes were trying to hit. All within the P.L.O., and many throughout the city, knew this within a few hours, and were encouraged by another example proving that the Israelis were less than omniscient and infallible.¹¹

As the IDF came closer to encircling Sidon on June 8, and forces moving northward from the Awwali bridgehead neared Damour, Israeli columns began a rapid penetration of the Shouf, where the P.L.O. had not been allowed to station forces. The speed of this advance was deeply disturbing to the P.L.O. leadership. One June 8, Abu Jihad, Deputy Commander in Chief of P.L.O. forces, met with Druze leaders in Mukhtara to ask them to take measures to confront it, and to allow P.L.O. forces into the region. Their response was noncommittal. On the same day, a P.L.O. military spokesman recognized the seriousness of the new situation created by the impending fall of the Shouf, stating: “This indicates that the objectives of this action go well beyond the context of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.”¹²

Most worrisome to those in Beirut was that in spite of fierce P.L.O. resistance and heavy Israeli casualties throughout the south, it had yet to be proved that the IDF could be slowed down, let alone stopped. By June 9, the day Sidon was finally encircled, events close to Beirut began to preoccupy both the city’s residents and the P.L.O. leadership. The Israeli spearheads on the coast were pushing into Damour, where fierce fighting continued, and reinforcement of this major stronghold became impossible because of air and sea interdiction. More serious, amphibious landings like those successful further south threatened to initiate a leapfrogging advance to the very gates of Beirut.

The failure of one mid-day landing attempt on June 9 between Na‘meh, north of Damour, and the key intersection at Khaldeh, just a few miles south of Beirut, was no reassurance.¹³ Khaldeh, a prized strategic point in every earlier phase of the Lebanese conflict, was where all roads leading south from Beirut and its suburbs converged, and where several of the main routes leading east into the mountains began.

At noon on June 9, the P.L.O. Chief of Military Intelligence, Colonel Abu al-Za‘im, confirmed, at a hastily called press conference, the precariousness of the military situation. He admitted that the IDF was achieving a swift penetration “intended to achieve a psychological impact,” and repeated what was in effect an admission that the P.L.O. was rapidly losing ground: “We do not claim that we will fight a war of positions.”¹⁴

At nightfall, when news came of what seemed to be another major landing—this one near the Khaldeh crossroads—the peril of the situation became clear: the capital itself was directly threatened from the south, and all forces fighting in the Ouza ‘i-Khaldeh-Damour-Jiyyeh area were faced with isolation or elimination. Meanwhile, sweeping Israeli advances in the Shouf meant that West Beirut was threatened with being cut off from the southeast as well, and could soon be totally isolated.

But later that same evening, the sound of barrages of intense firing all over the southern suburbs of Beirut was preceded by astonishing good news: the menacing Khaldeh beachhead had been eliminated, and the crossroads was completely controlled by the JF. All the Israeli armored vehicles which had landed there had been either destroyed or captured in a fierce battle at the Madinat al-Zahrat School, a Shi’ite community institution, and all their occupants killed. As proof of the victory, two captured M-113 armored personnel carriers (APCs) were paraded through the southern suburbs and adjoining Palestinian camps for the rest of the night, to indescribable scenes of joy, notably the thunderous shooting in the air which had earlier been heard throughout the city.¹⁵

The battle of Khaldeh had begun, in a way which was to have a far-reaching effect on morale in a city which only a few days later was to besieged. For it was at Khaldeh, within sight and sound of all of Beirut, that it first became clear over a period of several days that the IDF advance could be held, or at least slowed down. The first phase of the war was over. No one watching the ecstatic popular reaction all over the city to the events of June 9 at Khaldeh would have assumed that Israel was on its way to an easy victory.

The five days between the commencement of the battle for Khaldeh on June 9 and the encirclement of West Beirut on June 13 saw fierce fighting along the coastal highway from Damour to Kahldeh, in the Shouf mountains, and in beleaguered Sidon. The capital was bombed daily.

But strategically, the key developments of this period took place to the east, in the Biqa‘ Valley. Here, beginning on June 9, Israeli planes eliminated Syria’s surface-to-air missile (SAM) defenses, and then shot down 86 first-line Syrian interceptors in a few days of intense aeriel combat. The import of these events was grave. First, they confirmed unequivocally that Israel was determined to take on Syrian forces in Lebanon, even if this meant a large-scale air, land, and electronic war; in addition, they implied that the Israelis had every intention of eliminating not only the P.L.O. but also Syria from the Lebanese chessboard.

There were more immediate problems for the P.L.O. The successful attacks on the SAM missiles and the crushing blows to the Syrian air force showed that the IDF now had the total air superiority necessary for it to drive up through the Syrian armor in the Biqa‘ Valley, once it pushed past the last JF units still holding out in the mountainous ‘Arqoub. This meant the IDF had the option of trying to cut the Beirut-Damascus highway either in the Biqa‘ or in the mountains to the west, thereby driving Syrian forces away from Beirut and isolating the city. These dangers were clear to the defenders of the capital, although such grim prospects were somewhat obscured for them by the equally grave events happening before their very eyes, such as the life-or-death battle for Khaldeh, whose loss would also have led to the isolation of the city.

In any case, Syria’s forced entry into the war had no appreciable effect on the battlefield situation which faced the JF at this juncture. The IDF had taken on major new tasks by attacking the Syrians, but in the days which followed it redoubled its efforts along the coast, in the Shouf, and in the air over Beirut. Because of the anomalous position prevailing in the Shouf, the P.L.O. military command had, on the eve of the war, been particularly worried about the vulnerability of its position in Beirut and on the coast down to Sidon. The strategically vital Shouf region, which was off-limits to P.L.O. forces, was defended by scattered dispositions of Syrian troops, together with the militia of the Druze Progressive Socialist Party (P.S.P.). There were not enough of the former to halt a determined Israeli offensive, while the latter could not be expected to do so single-handed, particularly in view of intensive secret pre-war Israeli blandishments to the Druze to persuade them to stay out of the conflict.¹⁶

Twice in the two weeks preceding the outbreak of fighting, Abu Jihad, together with Brigadier Abu al-Walid, traveled to Damascus for talks with senior Syrian military commanders. They met the Chief of Staff, Major General Hikmat Chehabi, and stressed to him that an Israeli invasion was imminent, requesting in particular immediate reinforcement of Syrian forces in Beirut and the Shouf. Chehabi stated that the Syrian assessment was that an Israeli attack was unlikely, but promised that Syria would take responsibility for the air defense of Beirut, and would reinforce its troops in Jezzin and the southern Shouf region.¹⁷

Unfortunately, these promises were not kept. Far from reinforcing the air defenses of Beirut, the Syrians proceeded to pull out virtually the only effective antiaircraft weapons in the Beirut area, two batteries of radar-controlled 57mm twin antiaircraft guns stationed in the vital Khaldeh-‘Aramoun area. One week before the war, they also removed a total of 107 small portable heat-seeking SAM-7 missiles from the control of pro-Syrian P.L.O. groups or P.L.A. units in or around the Beirut refugee camps.¹⁸ And when the war came, their SAM defenses and interceptors proved to be no match for the Israeli air force. The effect of all of this was perhaps more psychological than anything else: it told the P.L.O. leaders that they could count on no external assistance.

There was in any case enough close at hand to preoccupy them: on June 10, Israeli planes raided the capital and its southern outskirts down to Na‘meh five separate times, while WAFA claimed that IDF amphibious forces had made five failed attempts to land troops along the coast between Damour and Ouza‘i.¹⁹ There were six more major attacks along this vital axis over the following two days.

Although the defenders of this area held their ground in many places in spite of furious bombardments, Israeli armored columns were managing to inch up the coast road, leaving the sloping hills to the east under control of the JF. At the same time, Israeli troops moving north along mountain roads in the Shouf on June 10 attacked Kfar Matta, east of Khaldeh. Further advances here threatened to outflank these hillside positions from the high ground to the east, leaving them cut off from three sides.

By the morning of June 11 the remaining defenders of the Damour area had been effectively isolated, although fighting behind the lines was to continue for several more days, claiming the lives of many Israelis, including the highest ranking officer ever to fall in wartime, Major General Yekutiel Adam, together with another senior officer, Brigadier Sela.²⁰

The “southern front” was now on the outskirts of Beirut, at Khaldeh, which continued to be subjected to daily air, ground, and amphibious attacks until after Ba‘abda was taken on the 13th. Air raids on the city continued as well, but with the elimination of Syrian air defenses in the Biqa‘, Israeli attention seems to have shifted momentarily to that area and to the mountains. Large numbers of fresh Israeli units were now being brought into Lebanon to wage a two-front war, with many sources reporting a continuous stream of reinforcements flowing cross the border.²¹ Most of these fresh troops were probably intended to face the Syrians.

At the same time, there was a perception on the part of the P.L.O. that the intensity of the fight their forces had put up in some areas of the south, the ‘Arqoub, and the approaches to Beirut had had a major impact on the IDF. According to the P.L.O. media, “the Israeli military command has been stunned by the extent of the casualties inflicted on their ranks”²². Whether or not such reports were accurate, later Israeli accounts confirm the impression made on Israeli soldiers by the intensity of the fighting. The death of General Adam, former Deputy Chief of Staff and Director-designate of Mossad, could only have reinforced that impression.

At the same time, it had a powerful twofold effect on Palestinian and Lebanese morale. On the one hand, it gave those resisting the invasion the sense that there was an effect to their exertions, and that they were hurting an apparently invincible enemy. On the other, it gave credence to P.L.O. claims that the IDF did not control some of the areas it had occupied, and undermined the credibility of the latter’s communiques.

The death of General Adam in no way diminished the seriousness of the position of the JF, as was evidenced by, among other things, the P.L.O.’s expression of eagerness to accept a cease fire on June 12. This came after an official P.L.O. denial the previous day that it had taken a stand on Israel’s unilateral announcement of a ceasefire on June 11.²³ Israel, incidentally, had specified that it was a ceasefire with Syria alone. In any case, Israeli forces never ceased firing on the P.L.O., and continued their rapid advances through the Shouf and their stubborn attempts to push up the coast toward Khaldeh.

There was other evidence of the difficulty of the P.L.O.’s situation. By the morning of June 12, Israeli troops had already reached the important Qabr Shmoun crossroads, control of which meant easy access to Beirut via the Shouf from the southeast. In a two-day pitched battle at the Khaldeh intersection, the sector commander, Colonel ‘Abdullah Siyam, died of a shrapnel wound in a front-line position. His forces had by then reached the end of their tether.²⁴

The gravity of what was about to happen was reflected in the title of a commentary published on the same day—the last day of the war during which roads to and from Beirut stayed open. “The Battle for Beirut” made it clear that the P.L.O. expected the Israelis to attack the city. Defiant assertions like “it is not we who are besieged” (the Israelis had rather “walked into … a people’s war of national liberation”) did not mask how serious things were: for as the the article made clear, the siege of the city, the second in six years, was about to begin.²⁵

According to Abu Iyyad, at this critical stage one part of the P.L.O. leadership (he would mention only Ahmed Jibril, leader of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command [PFLP-GC], by name) had a failure of nerve, although the majority of the leadership had expected such a situation and showed complete equanimity.²⁶ And yet the confident tone of this commentary mirrored reality in one respect: its stress on the high morale of the men of the JF in the field.²⁷ As was attested by the Israeli troops who faced them, there seems to have been little sign of demoralization or discouragement in the demeanor of the combatants in the front lines (indeed, an Israeli spokesman stated on June 13 that IDF casualties over the preceding 48 hours—while a ceasefire with Syrian forces was in effect—had totaled 193).

The Palestinians would need all their equanimity for the upcoming phase of the war. This was the siege of Beirut, which began in an unsettling way with the triumphant entry of Israeli forces led by Sharon himself to Ba’abda, site of the Lebanese Presidential Palace, followed by a brief interlude of fighting in the mountains.

Although their forces were less deeply engaged in combat during this phase than any other, it was perhaps the most difficult of the war for the P.L.O. leadership. Until Beirut was actually surrounded, it had been possible to focus on how little Israel had gained for all its losses since June 4, 1982. But this was not longer plausible when Israel began dictating its demands for complete and unconditional P.L.O. withdrawal from a position of great strength on the outskirts of a besieged city, echoed in this by both the U.S. and the Sarkis government, and with no sign of help on the horizon.

The new weakness of the P.L.O. position was visible in two sets of moves which betrayed nervousness and hesitation. The first set was the denials issued by P.L.O. spokesmen over the next few days of persistent reports in the media regarding alleged acceptance of what amounted to Israeli demands for surrender conveyed by U.S. envoy Philip Habib. In one case, on June 17, three different denials, one by Fateh Central Committee member Abu Iyyad, had to be issued in one day.²⁸ The second set of moves was the heavily publicized visits by ‘Arafat, Abu Jihad, and Brigadier Abu al-Walid to front-line units, hospitals, and offices beginning on June 14, after rumors of their death, capture, or imminent flight had been spread by hostile media. During one such visit, WAFA told its readers, “Arafat urged all to ignore pernicious rumors and to confront the hostile propaganda campaign which is underway.” A smiling photo of him taken on this first tour appeared on the front pages of The New York Times and the local press on June 15.

These visits signified the perceived need to shore up sagging morale, reassure the troops after Israel’s isolation of the city, and to put to rest persistent reports that surrender was imminent.²⁹ Although they failed to do the latter, they seemed to have a positive effect on morale, which had reached what was probably a nadir for the whole war.

At this point, the P.L.O. was under intense pressure to leave Beirut. The U.S. and Israel were exerting that pressure diplomatically, while within Lebanon both its enemies and its Muslim and leftist allies were exerting it politically. But at a crucial stage, when Israel for the first time seemed to be on the verge of achieving its aims vis-à-vis the P.L.O., the IDF let up its pressure on the Beirut siege perimeter.³⁰

Shelling of the city and its suburbs continued sporadically from June 15 to 20. It intensified markedly from the 21st until the ceasefire five days later, during which time there were four days of air raids on the city, which caused heavy casualties and great destruction. But on the ground, there was little action. Aside from a determined effort which ended the last resistance in ‘Ain al-Hilweh, the IDF restricted itself to a minor advance in the direction of the Lebanese University Faculty of Sciences in Hadeth on June 16, feeble probes at Khaldeh and Shweifat on the 21st, and a failed landing attempt at three points on the sea front near the Riviera Hotel on June 25.

Meanwhile the heaviest fighting shifted to the mountains, notably the towns of ‘Aley and Bhamdoun along the Beirut-Damascus road. The first Israeli attacks there after the taking of Ba‘abda came on June 17 and 18, with unsuccessful attempts to advance in the direction of ‘Aley. They were anticipated by the P.L.O., for a communique spoke of the commencement of “the long-awaited battle of the mountains.”³¹ In fact, these were exploratory attacks, followed by two days of quiet on this front.

During this comparative lull, an intense debate took place within the P.L.O. Its outlines are reflected in the differing tones of statements by two members of the Fateh leadership, Brigadier Abu al-Walid and Abu Iyyad. The words of the former were restrained, stessing the P.L.O.’s readiness to do “absolutely everything in its power to save Beirut,” implying a considerable willingness to compromise on the terms of the settlement then being discussed, but concluding that the P.L.O. “may face no alternative but legitimate self defence of itself and Beirut, whatever the consequences.³²

Abu Iyyad was much more uncompromising; he described the proposals being offered by the U.S. as “surrender terms,” which he said the Palestinians “reject categorically.” He stressed that “no one can disarm this revolution … we will never be transformed into a political party no matter what the circumstances.” He claimed further that a public statement of Fateh Central Committee member Hani al-Hassan relating to the Palestinians laying down their arms as part of a political solution to the conflict had been “distorted,” and later rectified by him.³³

This brings us to a watershed in the internal P.L.O. debate, as will be seen in the study (in chapter 4) of the factors behind the decision to leave Beirut. What is relevant here is how events on the battlefield affected this debate. It seems clear from the tone of these and earlier public remarks by Abu Iyyad that as Israel delayed its long-awaited assault on Beirut, those who called for holding out so as to obtain better terms, as well as those who saw accepting discussion of the terms being offered as a delaying tactic, were greatly reinforced in their positions.

Some time during the week following Israel’s arrival at Ba’abda, a potential turning point seemed to disappear. What might have developed into panic induced by the shock of this event was dissipated by the efforts of individuals at both the leadership and cadre levels, who were convinced that all was not lost, and that the P.L.O. should fight for better terms than Israel and the U.S. were offering it.

In late June, this resolve was strengthened by several things: among them were the battle of the mountains, which began in earnest on June 21; the resignation of U.S Secretary of State Alexander Haig on June 25; and an important shift in Lebanese attitudes at this time. By July, advocates of accepting the Habib terms were being savagely satirized in some P.L.O. journals as “The Withdrawal Now Movement” (a takeoff on the Peace Now Movement in Israel),³⁴ signifying their isolation, and the ascendancy of the more tough-minded trend.

Before this, however, the big Israeli push on ‘Aley and Bhamdun was launched, with immediate positive effects on P.L.O. morale. By the end of this battle, on June 26, the Israelis had pushed the Syrian army and its Palestinian allies completely out of both towns, and with them a vast swath of the Shouf and a long stretch of the Beirut-Damascus highway.³⁵ Nevertheless, the Syrians were at last taking some of the pressure off Beirut, and the Israelis were taking so long to achieve their objective—sources of encouragement to the defenders of the city.

The new tone could be detected in an impromptu T.V. interview by ABC and Visnews with Yassir ‘Arafat on June 20, in which the Palestinian leader affirmed that “no one will accept to lay down his arms,” and that “the situation we are in now is stronger than ever.” He repeatedly stressed the P.L.O.’s determination to resist, concluding: “I am here and I am staying here.”³⁶

As the battle in the mountains grew fiercer in the days which followed, P.L.O. confidence seems to have grown. The war’s prolongation was described as a sign of Israel’s weakness, as were its failure for 21 days to achieve its stated objective, and its “repeated unfulfilled threats to attack Beirut.” A commentary which stressed the P.L.O.’s desire to avoid the battle of Beirut, and willingness to accept some compromise formula involving reciprocal withdrawals under international guarantees, was at the same time firm: “It must be clear to all that there is a ‘red line’ beyond which the P.L.O. will not go.”³⁷

Behind this note of defiance lay a clear belief that Israel was incapable of storming Beirut, or unwilling to suffer the casualties involved, or otherwise prevented from doing so by domestic or external restraints. This belief persisted in most P.L.O. circles inside Beirut until the end of the war.

Although the last days of the bitter fighting in Bhamdun were ones of heavy bombardment of Beirut, and intense P.L.O.-Lebanese and (indirect) P.L.O.-U.S. negotiations, there was little change in this belief, or in the P.L.O. position: the stand relayed confidentially to the U.S. via the French on June 27 was identical to that laid out in the commentary of three days earlier, just cited.³⁸

In addition to the discreet encouragement the Palestinians were receiving from their new French interlocutors, there were more immediate reasons for their tough position: among these was that the IDF‘s mountain offensive and bombardment of Beirut had backfired politically. The result was the resignation of several key Lebanese leaders from a “National Salvation Council,” meant to sanction the U.S.-Phalangist-Israeli position on the expulsion of the P.L.O. from Lebanon.

Because of the length of the siege, it would be pointless to give a blow-by-blow description of how the fighting affected P.L.O. decisionmaking. However, a clear periodization of these seven weeks is possible. Following the June 26 ceasefire, there was one week, until July 4, without any significant hostilities. Nevertheless, tension remained high in the besieged city. On July 1 and 2, Israeli planes, beginning at dawn, screamed over Beirut in mock air raids, while a psychological war of formidable proportions was waged against the P.L.O., with rumors regarding its imminent departure being spread constantly.

This war was waged against the background of an ever-present fear of car bombs, after a devastating series of explosions of boobytrapped vehicles. A sequence of public confessions by captured drivers made clear these were being utilized by the Israelis and their Phalangist allies to increase the pressure on the P.L.O. to leave.³⁹

Both were doing the P.L.O. a backhanded favor in another domain at the same time as they were randomly killing people in the streets of Beirut with cars packed with high explosives. As has already been mentioned, the entry of the LF into the Druze-populated areas of the Shouf under the aegis of the IDF in late June was accompanied by outrages and massacres which had a major impact on Lebanese Muslims and leftist opinion. This was the first intimation of what an Israeli victory over the P.L.O. would mean in Lebanese terms.

The immediate result was a series of forceful statements by prominent Lebanese political figures calling for defiance toward Israel and support for the P.L.O. These included former premiers Rashid Karami and Selim al-Hoss, as well as Walid Jumblatt, Nabih Berri, and Ibrahim Qulielat, all three key militia leaders. At one point, Berri prophetically stated of his Shi’a followers: “If the Israelis stay in Lebanon, we’ll become the new Palestinians.”⁴⁰

This was the first time since June 4 that such important leaders had come out openly in support of the P.L.O. It had the effect of reinforcing its stand of holding out at least for matching Israeli withdrawals and fail-safe guarantees of a settlement, backed up by the entry of reliable international forces to Beirut, before it would withdraw from the capital. This position was later summed up in an 11-point document which remained the basis of the P.L.O. negotiating position until the end of July [see appendix].

Even before the shooting started again, persistent reports were being received by the P.L.O. from a variety of sources that Israel was preparing a major assault against Beirut.⁴¹ In view of how accurate such reports had been in the past, these were taken quite seriously by the military command, particularly those which pinpointed the starting point of the offensive as the Fourth of July weekend, when many U.S. policymakers would be out of Washington, and the handover from Haig to his successor, George Shultz, was still incomplete.

Beginning on July 4, Israel did in fact begin to increase the military pressure. For the first two days, this involved an escalating series of attacks in the southern suburbs of the city and around the airport, marked by intense artillery exchanges. The Israeli forces gained little ground in spite of several attempts to advance, and were discomfited when P.L.O.gunners effectively supported front-line units of the JF in breaking up their attacks, and their shells and rockets hit a number of Israeli artillery positions.⁴²

This was followed on July 6 by intensive shelling of several areas of West Beirut, well to the north and west of the scene of the ground combat. When IDF attempts to advance were resumed the following day, they achieved little, and the shelling of residential districts of the city continued. The fighting reached a peak on July 11, when heavy and repeated Israeli assaults brought IDF lines right up to the eastern runway of the airport, as furious bombardments of West Beirut left 63 civilians dead and 211 wounded, according to Lebanese police figures.⁴³

One unpleasant surprise for the Israelis during the fighting of the 11th was the return fire of JF artillery and rocket units. Directed at IDF positions in the Ba’abda and Hazmieh areas, this hit an Israeli ammunition dump whose explosion was heard throughout the city, inflicting eight casualties according to an IDF spokesman (a P.L.O. spokesman estimated Israeli casualties at 75).⁴⁴ A ceasefire intervened at this point, and held with minor breaks for 10 days.

It is interesting to gauge the effect of these eight days of combat on the P.L.O.’s outlook and negotiating position. Whereas before this pressure was applied, the P.L.O. line was firm and uncompromising, with Abu Iyyad claiming, “We will not surrender,” and ‘Arafat telling a French paper the P.L.O. was not yet prepared to leave Beirut,⁴⁵ there was little apparent change after the fighting died down. On July 17 Abu Iyyad stressed again that there would be no climbdown from the minimum position laid out in the P.L.O.’s 11-point negotiating position.⁴⁶

In contrast with mid- and late June, when the tone of the P.L.O. media was strident, reflecting the intense stress the Palestinians were under, the eight days of Israeli attacks in early July seem to have had little effect on their mood. A WAFA report had spoken on July 5 of the new assault marking “the first phase of what promises to be a long battle of Beirut,”⁴⁷ but in the midst of the fighting, the agency carried statements by both Brigadier Abu al-Walid and Abu Iyyad stressing that there was no change in the P.L.O. position, with the former emphasizing that the city had been turned into a fortified stronghold, and that the effect of the siege on the Joint Forces was minimal.⁴⁸

On the last day of this round of combat, a WAFA commentary drew up a sober balance sheet of the war after five weeks, betraying neither any particular despair, nor any excessive confidence (“the Joint Forces [never] … claimed that they were able to stop the Israeli army single-handedly”).⁴⁹ On the same day, ‘Arafat drew David and Goliath parallels between the P.L.O. and Israel, and blasted the silence and impotence of the Arab regimes.⁵⁰ His focus on the latter rather than Israel betrayed what was and continued to be a primary concern of the P.L.O. leadership.

A sarcastic WAFA commentary after the ceasefire finally came into effect, entitled “Israel’s Losses after 5 Weeks of War,” ridiculed Israeli Chief of Staff General Eytan’s claim that there was only one P.L.O. gun left in Beirut, citing Western news agency reports that P.L.O. artillery and rocket fire had scored direct hits on IDF positions and had forced the withdrawal of Israeli tanks from exposed areas of Shweifat the previous day.⁵¹ The clear message of this commentary—that Israel was fighting a war of attrition which it was far from winning—was repeated a few days later in a similar piece which spoke of the war not only as Israel’s Vietnam, but also as her Verdun.⁵²

Nothing said publicly by the P.L.O. during this round of fighting or in the ten days which followed indicated that Israel’s military pressure had achieved anything, an impression which is amply confirmed by the confidential diplomatic exchanges going on at this time, discussed in chapter 4, which show little change in the P.L.O.’s stand.

In fact, by mid-July the attention of the P.L.O. leadership was turning increasingly to what would be done in Washington by an Arab League delegation composed of Saudi and Syrian Foreign Ministers Prince Sa‘ud al-Faisal and ‘Abd al-Halim Khaddam, and Fateh Central Committee member Khaled al-Hassan, It was here that they looked for the emergence of something new, whether positive or negative, rather than on the battlefield, where Israel had done little over the preceding 25 days to make them believe it could impose its own will single-handed.

That belief was about to be tested, for on July 21 Israeli attacks recommenced with an attempt to advance on the airport. It marked the beginning of an almost continuous escalation of violence which continued until the war’s final ceasefire on August 12. This 22-day period witnessed 16 days of Israeli bombing, as well as the two largest Israeli ground operations of the entire siege.

In deducing the effect of these three weeks of attacks on P.L.O. perceptions and decisionmaking, it is necessary to realize that by the last half of July, there was only one decision left for the P.L.O. to take: whether to accept the generally unsatisfactory terms being offered by Habib, or to continue to hold out further in the hope that some external factor would change the situation in their favor and thereby allow acceptance of their own terms: the “11 points.”⁵³

Although both plans entailed the withdrawal of the P.L.O.’s forces and leadership from Beirut, the 11 points featured a number of highly significant additional provisions. These included prior arrival of international forces with a firm and explicit mandate, reliable international guarantees for the safety of civilians in West Beirut, and matching IDF withdrawals (both at an initial and final stage of a P.L.O. withdrawal), as well as the P.L.O.’s continued political presence in Beirut, and a limited military presence elsewhere in Lebanon.

The key point to keep in mind when assessing the effect of what the IDF was doing during this final apocalyptic period of the war is that the P.L.O. dropped its own plan as a basis for negotiations before the end of July. It had definitely done so, and had begun to negotiate on the basis of the terms offered by Habib, well before August 1, when the two major ground assaults and the most massive bombing raids began.

Equally important, as we shall see in the next chapter, it seems to have been the utter failure of Arab efforts during July to change the U.S. position—worse, tacit Arab acceptance of that position—which brought the P.L.O. to decide that there was little point in holding out further. At this point, acceptance of the Habib plan became an unpleasant but inevitable choice.

As to what the P.L.O. perceived the IDF to be doing at this stage, it was seen not so much as pushing it to leave Beirut, or do so under certain conditions, as trying to circumvent the entire negotiating process so as to crush the P.L.O.—psychologically if not physically—and thereby make a negotiated settlement redundant. While perhaps not totally accurate, such a perception does not seem far-fetched in light of the grandiose Israeli objectives discussed earlier, and Israel’s frustration at not having achieved them.

Although they had little effect on the negotiations, or on the outcome of the conflict (except in terms of losses in lives and property), these three weeks of Israeli attacks deserve special mention here, for at least three reasons. The first is that during this period there were two serious Israeli attempts to make significant ground advances, which met with limited success. The second is the intensity of the Israeli bombing of Beirut, which surpassed that in any period of the war. The third is that this round of fighting was marked by determined Israeli attempts to kill P.L.O. leaders via aerial bombardment of densely inhabited buildings.

The next day, July 27, was one of unparalleled ferocity, with 36 air attacks during one two-hour period. Its high point was an air strike which devastated three densely populated apartment buildings in the Raouche area at the westernmost tip of the city, leaving over 350 casualties, virtually without exception civilians.⁵⁴ According to rumors in Beirut at the time, the target was an apartment used by a P.L.O. leader, but no one was killed, nor was evidence ever adduced that anyone had been in the area or frequented it.

The IDF tactic of trying to kill P.L.O. leaders was not unexpected, and had been the subject of repeated warnings from foreign sources. A Central Operations situation report issued two days before this attack warned of “either special or extensive regular military operations in Beirut against institutions, individuals, or leaders, or against specific areas. This is confirmed by all reports received, and has always to be considered as priority in our planning.”⁵⁵

In a postwar interview, Abu Iyyad, the head of the P.L.O. security services, revealed that seven Israeli agents of a group of 24 (all of them Arabs) had been captured by P.L.O. counterintelligence in July and August. They had confessed that their mission, which began in January 1982, was to discover the meeting places, offices, and residences of the leadership, as well as military targets, so as to pinpoint them for air attack. Ironically, he pointed out, ten of these agents were killed in air strikes they themselves called in on presumed targets, victims of the callousness of their bosses, or of pilot error.⁵⁶

The Raouche bombing appears to have made little impression on P.L.O. leaders, as is clear from Central Operations situation reports during this period. Far from stressing the effect of Israeli bombing, they focused on “the paralysis of Arab action”; “this Arab slave market”; and the seven Arab foreign ministers meeting at Jedda “at their leisure, as if no Arab capital were being besieged,” and asked “Don’t the Arabs worry about the fate of their capitals in the near future … ?” which give an indication of the P.L.O.’s preoccupations.⁵⁷ A bitter WAFA commentary on July 30, the day the results of the Jedda meeting became known, stated that the U.S. was “twisting the arms of virtually every Arab state.”⁵⁸ Clearly, nothing could be expected of the Arabs, and U.S. pressure and Israel’s attacks would continue unabated.

As if to underscore this, the next day there were two hours of fierce air attacks on heavily populated residential areas along the Corniche al-Mazra‘a, in the heart of the West Beirut, and in neighboring districts, as well as the southern suburbs and the Palestinians refugee camps. Artillery simultaneously pounded the entire city from dawn until just after 9 P.M.⁵⁹

The worst was yet to come: this was especially ironic in view of the P.L.O. leadership’s acceptance in principle of the Habib plan. While it is impossible to date the decision precisely—memories are hazy, the negotiations were highly confidential, and many key agreements were apparently oral (and certainly do not exist in any of the archives consulted)—it can definitely be placed before August 1.

Negotiations on the new basis had proceeded so far by that point that a Central Operations situation report of August 1 notes that the P.L.O. had already presented a working paper for withdrawal, including a timetable, which was to have been the subject of a P.L.O.-Lebanese military meeting at which U.S. and Lebanese responses to it were to be discussed.⁶⁰ The meeting had to be postponed due to Israel’s escalation.

From this point on, and in spite of a number of obstacles which arose during the course of negotiation, an agreement had been reached in all but name, and only the details of the accord finally announced on August 18 still had to be worked out.⁶¹ But twelve more days of bitter fighting had to pass before a lasting ceasefire was imposed.

Because these had little or no effect on P.L.O. decisionmaking or on the solution finally arrived it, they can be reviewed briefly. The three high points of these last twelve days were the airport attack of August 1, the major ground assault of August 4, and the nine hours of air raids involving over 220 sorties with which the fighting ended on August 12.

The August 1 attack was covered by more than 200 sorties by Israeli planes, and involved attempts to push up the coast from Khaldeh, as well as a seaborne assault against the Summerland Beach, both of which failed. The main thrust of the assault was directed against the airport, which was lost by the JF after a 15-hour battle.

This new defeat was the occasion for another attack on the passivity of the Arab regimes by Abu Iyyad who, in the first such critique to refer to specific states, said that if they were serious in their claims to support the P.L.O., Saudi Arabia should cut off oil to the U.S. and Syria throw its full military weight into the battle.⁶² It was perhaps not coincidental that these were the two countries which had sent their foreign ministers to Washington, and had later jointly presided over the seven-party Jedda meeting.

At the same time, a WAFA commentary claimed that politically the battle marked “perhaps the most spectacular failure Israel has suffered since the war began.” This was the case since the attack had failed to intimidate the P.L.O., and at the same time resulted in a Security Council resolution condemning Israel, thus removing settlement efforts from friendly U.S. hands, even if only temporarily.⁶³

The IDF offensive of August 4 was even more intensive. It involved an attempt to push into West Beirut at five points. Israeli troops pushing off from the newly captured airport achieved success on the southern axis of advance, reaching a Lebanese Army barracks only a few hundred meters from Shatila camp. They were finally halted before the Kuwaiti Embassy, which they could not take in spite of repeated attacks backed by heavy air strikes. On the other four axes of advance, the port, Tayyouneh, the Museum, and Summerland Beach, the IDF could not advance at all, suffering relatively heavy losses (in the neighborhood of 100 according to both sides⁶⁴.

Although the siege perimeter was tightened in the south by the advance to the Kuwaiti Embassy, the IDF’s failure to break through along all four axes of attack located in built-up areas—the southern advances having been along the last remaining area of open ground on the front lines—seems to have had more of an impact on the defenders than the loss of a few hundred meters of ground.

This was the opinion of many P.L.O. military officers at the time. It was mirrored in a WAFA report, which stressed that the IDF’s sole advance of the day was a few hundred meters in “the open terrain between the airport road and Ouza‘i.” In a later interview, however, ‘Arafat himself noted that after Israeli forces reached the Kuwaiti Embassy they were in rifle range of Corniche al-Mazra‘a, the Fakhani area, and Shatila, a situation which had to be taken seriously. On the other hand, Abu Iyyad stated that after a visit to forward P.L.O. positions at the Kuwaiti Embassy following the battle, he had been impressed by how little progress the IDF had made.⁶⁵

The IDF was now up against the unbroken chain of multistory concrete buildings which formed the battlements of fortress Beirut, having taken all the flat clear terrain where its armor could maneuver freely and its planes see their targets. Perhaps for this reason, the attack of August 4 was the last major Israeli ground offensive (although three limited attacks were launched at the Museum on August 9, 11, and 12, all unsuccessful).

The IDF thereafter restricted itself to concentrated air and artillery bombardment, including both indiscriminate barrages and pinpoint attacks like the bombing raid on August 6, which completely flattened a nine-story building in the Sanaye’ district killing perhaps 200 people (‘Arafat had reportedly been seen there just before the attack ⁶⁶). The combat phase of the war ended with the intense day-long bombing raids of August 12. The 220 sorties flown on this last day of punishment of Beirut inflicted over 500 casualties.⁶⁷

Strange as it may seem, there appeared to be little despair in P.L.O. ranks after it was all over. A commentary on the last day of the bombing even struck a cautiously optimistic note: Israel had shown it could destroy Beirut and starve its inhabitants if it wanted to, but 10 hours of nonstop bombing were proof that it had not yet succeeded in its aims. In spite of “the cowardice and treachery of the Arab world … Israel has not prevailed,” the commentary continued. Indeed, after 70 days of war, Beirut was still resisting, which meant to the Palestinians that in spite of their superiority, “the Israelis … are not invincible.”⁶⁸

Striking the same note, Abu Iyyad stated just after the bombing stopped that the only possible explanation for the raids was to mask Israel’s “failure to confront the Joint Forces on the ground,” and to “raise the morale of their soldiers who have been forced to fall back in attack after attack on our positions.”⁶⁹ At the same time, a Central Operations situation report pointed out that three IDF attempts to advance while Beirut was being turned into an “inferno” by the bombing had been foiled with heavy casualties, and that attacks were still being launched by the JF behind enemy lines. It concluded with Koranic verse warning against sadness, “for God is with us.”⁷⁰

If the P.L.O. had been beaten after 70 days of fighting, its leader’s statements and the tone of its media certainly did not show it. That the combat phases of the war had ended with the P.L.O. battered but still dug in behind its fortified positions in Beirut and with the vastly superior Israeli army still besieging the city, prevented from storming it for whatever reasons, apparently meant more to the defenders of Beirut than the fact that they had lost and would be forced to evacuate the city.

In an unequal contest, they had fought longer than had all the Arab armies put together in all their wars with Israel, doing better than anyone could have expected. But, as an August 9 editorial August concluded, “In the end, the only thing which we were unable to affect was the immobility, the paralysis, the frozen will of the Arab world.”⁷¹ Speaking much later, ‘Arafat reflected that because the P.L.O. had fared better against Israel than the Arab regimes, they could not allow it to leave Beirut with even a symbolic victory, and thus extended no help whatsoever.⁷² This, and their demonstrated ability to stand up to Israel under the right conditions, were the main lessons the Palestinian fighters carried away from Beirut with them.