Under Siege: P.L.O. Decisionmaking During the 1982 War

1. Books by journalists predominate. These include: Dan Bavly and Eliahu Salpeter, Fire in Beirut: Israel’s War in Lebanon with the P.L.O.; John Bulloch, Final Conflict: The War in Lebanon; Tony Clifton and Catherine Leroy, God Cried; Alain de Chalvron, Le piege de Beyrouth; Michael Jansen, The Battle of Beirut: Why Israel Invaded Lebanon; Amnon Kapeliouk, Sabra and Shatila: Inquiry into a Massacre; Selim Nassib with Caroline Tisdall, Beirut: Frontline Story; Jonathan Randal, Going All the Way: Christian Warlords, Israeli Adventurers, and the War in Lebanon; and Ze’ev Schiff and Ehud Ya’ari, Israel’s Lebanon War. Several other books are devoted wholly or in part to the war: Richard A. Gabriel, Operation Peace for Galilee; Chaim Herzog, The Arab-Israeli Wars: War and Peace in the Middle East from the War of Independence through Lebanon; Raphael Israeli, ed., P.L.O. in Lebanon: Selected Documents; and Itamar Rabinovich, The War for Lebanon 1970–1983. For a full listing, see bibliography.

2. Costs of occupation are cited in the New York Times, September 25,1984, p. A8. Israel reported casualties until mid-August 1982 of 368 killed and 2383 wounded (The Jerusalem Post, October 10, 1983). Israeli figures since then do not include 75 soldiers killed in the destruction of the military headquarters in Tyre on November 11, 1982 (attributed to the accidental explosion of gas bottles). The number of killed recently reached 655.

3. Their situation 18 months after the war is described in Rashid Khalidi, “The Palestinians in Lebanon: The Social Repercussions of the Israeli Invasion.”

4. Details can be found in articles by Thomas Friedman in the New York Times, May 30 and 31 and June 1,1984. See also the article on the Lebanese economy by Nora Boustany in the Washington Post, February 23, 1985, p. A10.

5. The U.S. has successfully resisted Soviet involvement in the resolution of the crisis since the beginning of the war. For an assessment of how the war has provoked “a qualitative change” in superpower roles in the Middle East, see Mahmoud Soueid, “L’invasion israélienne du Liban: causes et consequences.”

6. That this did not initially seem to be the case can be seen from early appraisals by two of the best analysts of Soviet Middle East policy: Galia Golan, “The Soviet Union and the Israeli Action in Lebanon,” and Karen Dawisha, “The U.S.S.R. in the Middle East: Superpower in Eclipse.”

7. For discussion, see Rashid Khalidi, “Problems of Foreign Intervention in Lebanon.”

8. A notable book in Arabic is Lubnan 1982: Yawmiat al-Ghazw al-Israeli, Watha’iq wa Su war, published by the Arab Information Center of the al-Safir daily newspaper (Beirut, 1982). Its 491 pages contain a detailed chronology, numerous documents, and striking photographs taken during the siege. Also significant are the book by Phalange Party politburo member Karim Pakradouni, that by former Lebanese U.N. Ambassador Ghassan Tueni, the articles by P.L.O. Beirut representative Shafiq al-Hout, and the book by Col. Abu Musa, all cited in the bibliography.

9. Alexander Haig’s Caveat is the sole exception so far. It is full of distortions and omissions regarding the Lebanese war (see chapter 5).

10. Virtually all of the P.L.O.’s central archives were removed from Beirut at the end of the war. These are not to be confused with the primarily historical archives of the P.L.O. Research Center, which were seized by the Israeli army when it entered Beirut in September 1982, and returned as part of the November 1983 prisoner exchange.

11. Interview, in Tunis, with Ibrahim Souss, P.L.O. representative in Paris, July 31, 1984.

12. According to James Bamford’s book on the U.S. National Security Agency, The Puzzle Palace, p. 468, the “Agency can program its high-speed computers and 22,000 line-per-minute printers to kick out every telegram or telex containing the word oil or the word Democrat …” Since most international telex traffic (i.e., that carried by RCA, WUI and ITT) is necessarily routed via the U.S., most P.L.O. communications were undoubtedly intercepted. In Le Nouvel Observateur, May 23,1983, p. 123, Josette Alia cites Israeli intelligence claims that they were intercepting P.L.O. wartime telephone communications.

13. The P.L.O. knew that Israeli intelligence had a major listening post at a school in East Beirut and assumed U.S. interception of international communications: interview with communications consultant to P.L.O. Chairman’s Office, Tunis, September 25, 1982.

14. According to Hani al-Hassan, the first contacts with the French were “initiated by myself with the consent of Abu ‘Ammar,” and only later sanctioned by the P.L.O. leadership: interview, Tunis, July 31, 1984.

15. In the words of a French official deeply involved in the U.S.-French-P.L.O. negotiations, the Lebanese intermediaries were “pas désinterressés”: interview, French Foreign Ministry, Paris, March 8, 1984.

16. This was reported by most Western journalists in Beirut during the war, and is repeated by many of those whose works are cited in note 1.

1. Originally, the Palestinian commandos were known in Lebanon as “fida’iyeen” (self-sacrificers) and the P.L.O. as “al-muqawama” (the resistance), which symbolized their positive image with Lebanese public opinion. By the 1980’s, they were known as “al-munazameh” (the Organization), a far less favorable, if completely accurate, appellation.

2. Details on important wartime changes from positions critical of the P.L.O. to ones supportive of it by key Lebanese Muslim and leftist leaders like Walid Jumblatt and Nabih Berri can be found in chapter 3.

3. The Lebanese press in April and May was full of veiled and not-so-veiled criticisms of the P.L.O. by Lebanese public figures. This coincided with a growing anti-P.L.O. line in the government media.

4. The weaknesses of the Lebanese political system are ably discussed in the standard work on the subject: Michael Hudson, The Precarious Republic. Good accounts of modern Lebanese politics include: P. Edward Haley and Lewis Snider, eds., Lebanon in Crisis; Walid Khalidi, Conflict and Violence in Lebanon; and Kamal Salibi, Crossroads to Civil War: Lebanon 1958–1976.

5. It was based on the British policy of blowing up homes of suspected resistance members during the Palestine revolt of 1936–39: see J.C. Hurewitz, The Struggle for Palestine, pp. 83–84; and Walid Khalidi, From Haven to Conquest, pp. 357–67. With a new variation—buildings were now blown up while their occupants were still within—it was incorporated into Israeli army practice by Unit 101 (which was established by Gen. Ariel Sharon) in the Qibya and Samu’ massacres of 1955 and 1966, among others. For the “thesis underlying most of Israel’s retaliatory actions since the early 1950s” see Rabinovich, The War for Lebanon, p. 41. The origins of this entire approach are analyzed in Avi Shlaim, “Conflicting Approaches to Israel’s Relations with the Arabs: Ben Gurion and Sharett, 1953–1956,” 180–201

6. ‘Al-Hamishmar, May 10, 1978, cited in Edward Said, The Question of Palestine, pp. xi-xii.

7. Cited in John Kifner, “Southern Lebanon: A Trauma for Both Sides,” New York Times, July 22, 1984, p. 10.

8. Gur’s comment, cited earlier, is evidence of such coexistence. While most attacks on Israeli forces since 1982 have been the work of Lebanese, the P.L.O. is credited for provision of arms, organization, and training which made many of them possible. As a result, in the words of an “American intelligence analyst” cited by Drew Middleton (New York Times, October 14, 1984, p. 23), “the P.L.O. today ‘is alive and kicking in southern Lebanon.’”

9. See Rashid Khalidi, “L’impact du mouvement national palestinien sur le Liban”; and “The Palestinians and Lebanon.” As’ad Abu Khalil’s “Ideology and Practice of a ‘Revolutionary’ Marxist-Leninist Party” is a study of the effect of the P.L.O. on the Lebanese left.

10. This phenomenon was also observable among Palestinians who had left the ranks of the P.L.O. and returned in times of crisis.

11. Photographs of the mourners in the Lebanese daily papers of April 12, 1973—particularly al-Nahar and al-Muharrir—indicate that this figure is probably not exaggerated.

12. The 1975–76 war is covered in the works of Haley and Snider, Walid Khalidi, and Kamal Salibi, cited in note 4, and in John Bulloch, Death of a Country; Marius Deeb, The Lebanese Civil War; and Roger Owen, ed. Essays on the Crisis in Lebanon.

13. For the Syrian role see Adeed Dawisha, Syria and the Lebanese Crisis. Schiff and Ya’ari, Israel’s Lebanon War; Jonathan Randal, Going All the Way; and Rabinovich, The War for Lebanon, deal with Israel’s involvement. Its covert intervention is covered in “Military Intelligence against the Mossad: The Inside Story,” by Kol Israel reporter Haim Hecht in Monitin (April 1983), reprinted in the Journal of Palestine Studies (Summer 1983) 12(4): 178–185. See also Rashid Khalidi, “Problems of Foreign Intervention in Lebanon”.

14. This can best be followed in Schiff and Ya’ari, Israel’s Lebanon War, and Dawisha, Syria and the Lebanese Crisis.

15. The 1976–77 period is covered in Lawrence Whetten’s essay in Haley and Snider, Lebanon in Crisis, pp. 82–90, and Khalidi, Conflict and Violence in Lebanon, pp. 103–121.

16. Figures on this growth can be found in Rashid Khalidi, “The Palestinians in Lebanon,” p. 257, and Cheryl Rubenberg, The Palestine Liberation Organization. Several sections of the project “The Economic and Social Situation and Potential of the Palestinian Arab People in the Region of West Asia” undertaken for the U.N. Economic Commission on West Asia (ECWA) by TEAM International analyze performance of branches of the P.L.O. para-state.

17. Many such services were systematically taken over in East Beirut by the right-wing militias, which did not relinquish them after the 1975–76 war was over and retain control over them to this day.

18. There are no reliable figures on P.L.O. finances: all published estimates on its budget are based on speculation. This is an area where a large measure of secrecy has been maintained.

19. Figures from tables T8, T9, Til and T13 on pp. 27, 29, 33, and 36 of the paper “Health Services for Palestinians in Lebanon,” Doc. Ref. No. TEAM/SD1/WP17 presented to ECWA as part of the project cited in note 16.

20. Statements by P.L.O. leaders that the Israelis were preparing an invasion, and aimed to reach the outskirts of Beirut, were numerous in the year before the war. ‘Arafat in particular repeatedly used the concept of an accordion to describe how he expected the P.L.O. to be squeezed between Israeli forces coming up from the south and areas controlled by the LF. Information to this effect was received from numerous reliable sources in the months preceding the war, and was generally believed. See the section on “P.L.O. Expectations” in chapter 3, particularly note 20.

21. At a meeting in Moscow with a P.L.O. delegation headed by ‘Arafat in November 1979, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko at no point offered Soviet assistance in spite of the intense Israeli attacks on Lebanon described by ‘Arafat, who stated, “We fought alone, and still do.” Cited on Israeli, P.L.O. in Lebanon, p. 40. Senior Soviet Middle East specialists Dr. Yevgeny Primakov and Dr. Igor Belyayev explicitly stressed the limitations on Soviet aid in meetings with Palestinian researchers: Institute for Palestine Studies, Beirut, July 11, 1979; Belyayev spoke similarly at an American University of Beirut seminar, May 15, 1980.

22. A critical perspective on P.L.O. preparations can be found in Yezid Sayigh, “Palestinian Military Performance in the 1982 War”, especially pp. 22–24. Ze’ev Schiff, “The Palestinian Surprise,” gives a more positive view of some aspects of P.L.O. military performance.

23. Israel exaggerated both the scale of the P.L.O. military build-up and the number of weapons captured during the war. This was confirmed in Haaretz by its military editor, Ze’ev Schiff, on July 18, 1982. He pointed out that barely enough weapons had been seized to equip one division (not the five claimed by some Israeli accounts), and that while Israel had asserted the P.L.O. had over 400 tanks before the war, only 38 T-34’s had been captured, as well as 46 T-55’s, most of the latter Syrian. As for artillery, far from a claimed 300-plus guns captured, only 51 had actually been taken, of which two were old French 155 mm howitzers, 32 Soviet 130 mm guns and the rest shorter-range Soviet 122 mm pieces. Many of the 130 mm guns were Syrian, Schiff added. The only weapons captured in quantity, he noted, were 26,000 rifles, of which 3500 were private and hunting weapons, and 4000 a mixed bag of modem and obsolete Western military rifles and automatic weapons; just 10,000 were P.L.O. standard-issue Kalashnikovs.

24. P.L.O. acceptance of the ceasefire was challanged by a Fateh faction linked to the Baghdad-based Abu Nidal group, leading to a military confrontation, many arrests, and two executions, the latter unprecedented in P.L.O. internal disputes. Thereafter, firing across the Lebanese frontier took place only in direct response to prior Israeli actions, except for a few failed operations by splinter groups not under P.L.O. control. This led to bitter criticism of the P.L.O. leadership by their opponents. See for example Hashim ‘Ali Muhsin’s al-Intifada: Thawra Hatta al-Nasr, pp. 226–29, distributed after 1983 by the Fateh dissidents, where pre-war P.L.O. policy, including acceptance of the 1981 ceasefire, is called “capitulationist” and is compared to Sadat’s acceptance of the post-1973 war disengagement accords. This phase is covered in Helena Cobban, The Palestinian Liberation Organization, pp. 95–98; and Walid Khalidi, Conflict and Violence in Lebanon, pp. 133–139.

25. From mid-March until the end of August 1979, official UNIFIL press releases enumerated 148 Israeli-initiated attacks, mostly in the UNIFIL area of operations, involving the firing of over 19,000 artillery and mortar rounds, while the Joint Forces were listed as responsible for initiating 10 attacks and firing just over 2800 shells. Not counted by UNIFIL were Israeli operations launched outside its area, which included 13 Israeli air raids, 14 naval and amphibious attacks, and helibome and other assaults.

26. Insights into the origins of this crisis are given in Hecht, “Mossad,” pp. 182–83, and Schiff and Ya’ari, Israel’s Lebanon War, pp. 31–35.

27. A good account of these attacks is in Schiff and Ya‘ari, pp. 35–37.

28. The extent of this problem was recognized in the Israeli press, as is indicated by the titles of these analytical articles: “The Problem of the Israeli Army: How to Silence the Sources of Fire in Lebanese Territory” (Eitan Haber, Yediot Aharanot, July 22, 1981); “Into ‘Arafat’s Trap” (Haim Herzog, Ma’ariv, July 24, 1981); “The Military Balance in the North: Israel Lost Points” (Ze’ev Schiff, Ha’aretz, July 24, 1981); “The Military Balance in the North: Artillery Question Marks” (Ze’ev Schiff, Ha’aretz, July 27, 1981); “A Different War” (Yoram Pe’eri, Davar, July 24, 1981); “A Quick Blow and We Got Stuck” (Yu’eel Marcos, Ha’aretz, July 24,1981): all translated in the Institute for Palestine Studies’ Bulletin, (August 1981) vol. 11(8) [Arabic]. In the second of his articles cited above, Schiff stated that the P.L.O.’s 1200 rockets and shells hit 33 settlements, as well as “other targets.”

29. This is brought out by Avi Shlaim in “Conflicting Approaches to Israel’s Relations”. See also the selections from former Israeli Prime Minister Moshe Sharett’s diaries in Livia Rokach, Israel’s Sacred Terrorism.

30. Sharon revealed his strategic vision in a speech prepared for delivery at Tel Aviv University in which he declared that beyond the Arab confrontation states, “Israel’s security concerns should expand to include two other geographic regions which have great security importance: … the more distant Arab states … [and] those foreign countries which … could pose a threat to Israel’s security in the Middle East and on the shores of the Mediterranean … and the Red Sea. Thus we must expand the area of Israel’s strategic and security concerns in the 1980’s to include states like Turkey, Iran and Pakistan, and the areas like the Persian Gulf and Africa, particularly the states of North and Central Africa.” Ma’ariv, December 18, 1981.

31. For a more extensive discussion of this subject, see Rashid Khalidi, “The Asad Regime and the Palestinian Resistance.”

32. For the U.S. role, see Schiff and Ya’ari, Israel’s Lebanon War, pp. 62–77, and Haig, Caveat, pp. 310–312, 317–352.

1. Figures from International Institute for Strategic Studies (I.I.S.S.) annual reference work, The Military Balance 1982–1983, pp. 56–57.

2. These include several works cited in ch. 1, n. 1 and: Sami’ al-Banna, “The Defense of Beirut”; James Bloom, “From the Litani to Beirut”; and “Six Days-Plus-Ten-Weeks War”; W. Seth Carus, “The Bekaa Valley Campaign”; Anthony Cordesman, “The Sixth Arab-Israeli Conflict”; Maj. Richard Gabriel, “Lessons of War: The IDF in Lebanon”; Chris Giannou, “The Battle for South Lebanon”; Meir Pa’il, “A Military Analysis”; M. Richards, “The Israeli-Lebanon War of 1982”; Yezid Sayigh, “Palestinian Military Performance in the 1982 War”; and “Israel’s Military Performance in Lebanon, June 1982”; Ze’ev Schiff, “The Palestinian Surprise”; and Clifford Wright, “The Israeli War Machine in Lebanon.”

3. For how many Israelis now assess the war, see Edward Walsh, “Rockets in Galilee Symbolize Futility of Israel’s Role in Lebanon,” Washington Post, February 13, 1984, p. A19. Rockets were fired at Galilee in February, March, April, and August 1984, while Israelis planes hit targets in Lebanon 15 times in the first nine months of 1984, and repeatedly in early 1985. An early assessment of Israel’s new problem with the Shi’a is by John Kifner, “Southern Lebanon: A Trauma for Both Sides,” New York Times, July 22, 1984, p. 1.

4. Ehud Yarri, “Israel’s Dilemma in Lebanon.” See also Anthony Lewis, “The Lebanon Debacle,” The New York Times, June 4, 1982, p. A19, who cites Eban, for a devasting critique of what he calls Israel’s “misbegotten war.”

5. Israel’s basic war aims are ably analyzed and documented in Noam Chomsky, The Fateful Triangle: The United States, Israel and the Palestinians, pp. 198–207. Two chapters, totaling 259 pages, are devoted to the 1982 war and its aftermath.

6. See Schiff and Ya’ari, Israel’s Lebanon War, and Schiffs “The Green Light,” for more on war planning and the extent to which prior knowledge of it was widespread in Washington.

7. The I.I.S.S. ranked Israel as the world’s fourth military power, after the U.S., USSR, and China (reported in Time, October 11, 1982), but it could be argued that on the basis of number of criteria it should be listed ahead of China.

8. Schiff, “The Palestinian Surprise,” p. 43.

9. According to Herzog, currently President of Israel and former Chief of Military Intelligence in The Arab-Israeli Wars, pp. 344–45: “The strategic purpose of the central advance was to reach the Damascus-Beirut road, turn eastwards along that road, and by feinting in the direction of the Syrian border to cause the Syrian forces in the Beqa’a Valley, who would thus be in danger of being outflanked, to withdraw eastwards towards the Syrian border.” This purpose was not achieved.

10. Schiff, “The Palestinian Surprise,” p. 43.

11. Early official P.L.O. military communiques, issued by the Palestine News Agency, WAFA, stressed intense resistance to Israeli advances, while admitting deep penetrations. See, e.g., “Israeli Advance Along Six Axes into South Lebanon Halted” (WAFA no. 90/82, item 3, 6 June 1984). WAFA reports concurred with Israeli accounts in describing intense fighting around Sidon, particularly at ‘Ain al-Hilweh camp, and in the eastern ‘Arqoub region: e.g. “Fierce Fighting North & South of Sidon, Around Tyre” (WAFA no. 91/82, item 7, 7 June 1984).

12. By the morning of June 9, 1984, WAFA tacitly admitted the loss of Tyre, reporting only partisan activity behind enemy lines, such as “continuous raids on enemy positions” (WAFA no.93/82, item 1, 9 June 1982), the ambush of two Israeli tanks inside Burj al-Shemali camp (WAFA No.93/82, item 2, 9 June 1982), and the ambush of a tank inside Tyre (WAFA no. 94/82, item 6, 10 June 1982). The fall of Tyre was admitted later in the day at a press conference given by Col. Abu al-Za‘im (WAFA no.93/82, item 7). P.L.O. estimates of Israeli losses in the Tyre area given on June 11 (no.95/82, item 2) were 200 casualties and 60 vehicles destroyed.

13. Schiff, “The Palestinian Surprise,” p. 43.

14. Ibid. See also Schiff’s impressive eyewitness article on the ‘Ain al-Hilweh battle: Ha’aretz, June 15, 1984.

15. Herzog records in The Arab-Israeli Wars, pp. 346–347, that the IDF “advanced slowly along narrow roads and gorges which were easily defensible,” and faced “heavy fighting”; their advance was “very slow.” He incorrectly credits most initial resistance to Syrian forces, which were only engaged on the 10th, after four days of fighting. An Israeli officer said his unit’s advance toward Hasbaya was the most violent battle he had witnessed during his military career: Amnon Kapeliouk in ‘AJ Hamishmar July 9, 1982.

16. In 1982, according to the 1.1.S.S., the IDF had over 125 helicopters capable of moving 3500 men, and 12 naval vessels capable of putting an armored battalion and its vehicles ashore. Using all its transport aircraft (22 C-130s, 21 C-47s and others), the IDF could perhaps sustain logistically one, or at most two, brigades without land supply lines.

17. Amnon Kapeliouk, ‘al-Hamishmar, July 9, 1982. In an August 6, 1982 interview in Davar an Israeli officer stated that three brigades backed by nine warships and four squadrons of planes took this long to take complete control of Damour, as resistance reappeared after it was “cleared.” He adds that Sharon and Eytan were “constantly and violently shouting that the alotted time was up, and Damour had still not fallen.”

18. Foreign journalists traveling under Israeli escort in South Lebanon were not permitted to approach the camp, but could hear combat from a distance. See, e.g., David Shipler, “In Lebanon, White Flags Fly Amid the Misery and Rubble,” The New York Times, June 15,1982 (Shipler witnessed shelling of the camp on June 14) and Eric Pace, “In Sidon, 80 More Bodies for a Vast Bulldozed Pit,” The New York Times, 17 June, 1982. On the 16th Pace was forbidden by an Israeli guide from entering the camp because of the “risk of booby-traps.”

19. WAFA devoted extensive attention to details of the siege until June 17, sometimes issuing two or three reports per day, and quoting foreign and Israeli press accounts; al-Safir and other Beirut dailies also covered the siege closely.

20. In a speech on March 16, 1982, on the anniversary of the assassination of Kamal Jumblatt, ‘Arafat specifically predicted that the P.L.O. would soon have to fight at Khaldeh (al-Safir, March 16, 1985, p. 1). Exactly three months later, Khaldeh fell to the IDF after a fierce battle.

21. Conversation with American informant, Institute for Palestine Studies, Beirut, April 27, 1982. In interviews in Tunis, Fateh Central Committee members Abu Jihad (Khalil al-Wazir) and Abu Iyyad (Salah Khalaf) confirmed that the P.L.O. had reliable information from many sources on the imminence of the attack: Abu Jihad, March 13, 1984; Abu Iyyad: March 14 and August 31, 1984.

22. Herzog, Arab—Israeli Wars, p. 341. Rabinovich, The War for Lebanon, p. 125, states that in November 1981 and February 1982 “the United States acted to prevent an attack on Lebanon.” The P.L.O. expected a February attack.

23. Sayigh, “Israeli Military,” p. 43.

24. Sayigh, “Palestinian Military,” p. 10.

26. Schiff, “Palestinian Surprise,” p. 43. Rabinovich, The War for Lebanon, p. 151, has a higher estimation of P.L.O. military performance. He praises its strategy in the south, and states: “The P.L.O. performed quite well in the limited fighting that took place during the siege.”

27. Interview with P.L.O. information official, Tunis, September 28. 1982.

28. “Fighting Intensifies on all Fronts” (WAFA no. 95/82, item 4,11 June 1982), describes how helibome forces landed north of Rafid in the Biqa‘ were attacked by P.L.O. units they had cut off. Many similar accounts by Israeli soldiers can be found in the Israeli press.

29. Schiff, “Palestinian Surprise,” p. 42.

30. Ibid., p. 42; Herzog, Arab-Israeli Wars, p. 345, states: “The policy laid down was for the forces to advance and reach the final objectives as rapidly as possible.” Note also Sharon and Eytan’s concern with the slowness of the advance, cited in n.17.

31. Hajj Isma‘il’s flight, quickly publicized by Israel, had a detrimental impact on P.L.O. morale, and confirmed pre-war criticisms of him. In an interview in Tunis on March 9,1984, Yasser ‘Arafat agreed that there were serious lapses in his performance of his duty. Major Salah Tk‘mari, who remained in Sidon until after the city’s fall, stated that the Israeli bombardment was so intense that there was little more that the defenders of the city could have done, even with greater central direction: interview, Washington D.C., May 3, 1984.

32. Schiff’s assertion that “Their death served no apparent purpose,” and was “heroism that serves no end” (“Palestinian Surprise,” p. 43) is belied by these achievements of the defenders of ‘Ain al-Hilweh. In addition to the time they and the forces which fought at Khaldeh and Damour gained for preparing the defenses of Beirut, it is questionable whether the I.D.F. would have been so reluctant to enter Beirut had it not faced such intense resistance in these built-up areas further south.

33. Al-Banna, “Defense of Beirut,” pp. 109–110. He considers the resistance to the Israelis at Khaldeh a major factor in Beirut’s steadfastness. Rabinovich, The War for Lebanon, pp. 135, 151, is one of the few Israeli works to give the P.L.O. credit for deciding to withdraw combat forces to Beirut.

34. An Israeli engineering officer’s statement to Israeli radio on August 8,1982, “I hope we never have to enter Beirut,” was due to his high regard for P.L.O. engineering capabilities. He noted: “There are some spheres, such as obstacles and mine fields, in which their military experience is no less than that of the Israeli army … Beirut can be thought of as one great obstacle, added to which are the various obstacles which have been erected by the terrorists. These are formidable obstacles indeed, and are not simple constructions at all.” Cited in WAFA no.156/82, item one, August 11, 1984.

35. These offices, in the Arab University section of the Fakhani district, had underground shelter facilities, but were semi-public, having been used in the past for meetings, interviews, and administrative purposes. All were destroyed or rendered unusable by PGMs, one being hit with a “shelter-busting” weapon which penetrated thick reinforced concrete to explode several meters underground. Four floors were blown off the top of another building. Key personnel had been moved elsewhere by the time all were hit.

36. Those most at risk were radio operators, of whom seven were killed during the war (four men and three women: ‘Imad al-Far, Muhammad Hishmeh, Jum‘a Salem, Bilal Minawi, Nadia Abu ‘Isa, Iman ‘Isa and ‘Aiysha Yunis), five of them while at their posts: interview with the Chief of the Fateh General Wireless Section, Tunis, March 14, 1984.

37. For the impact in Beirut of this see “Al-Kata’ibiyun yuwasilun majazirihim al-fashiya fil-jabal” [The Phalangists continue their Fascist massacres in the mountains], al-Ma‘raka, no. 8, 1 July 1982, p. 1 headline. The Lebanese press prominently featured the Shouf killings.

38. Archives of the Office of the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the P.L.O., Tunis (hereafter P.L.O. Archives), Chairman’s office to P.L.O./Paris, repeated to P.L.O./N.Y., June 30, 1982.

1. An example is Bavly and Salpeter, Fire in Beirut, pp. 108–109, which greatly overemphasizes the military factor.

2. Truckloads of diesel fuel needed for the generators at the main Beirut telephone exchange, not far from the IDF lines, often had to be moved there under heavy shelling. Frequently, fuel was siphoned out of the supply stored for winter heating in abandoned apartment buildings. In one case, a vital underground telephone cable between the front lines had to be repaired by a P.L.O./LNM crew working under fire.

3. An example of how rapidly and accurately bad news on the battlefield was communicated can be seen from a listing of 20 radio messages sent by the various local commands to Central Operations from 10:10 P.M. on June 12 until 12:05 P.M. on June 13, 1982 detailing the critically important Israeli advances from Qabr Shmoun toward Souq al-Gharb (and later sent to the P.L.O. U.N. representative for submission to the Security Council as evidence of Israeli ceasefire violations): P.L.O. Archives, Chairman to P.L.O./N.Y., June 13,1982 (copy of original log of radio messages attached to telex in Archive).

4. The IDF appears to have downplayed its own casualties. One example was the initial statement after Israel’s ground offensive of August 4, 1982 that total IDF casualties were only 65 wounded, four of them “critically.” Two days later a spokesmen admitted 19 killed and 146 wounded in the same attack (WAFA quoted a P.L.O. Military Spokesman’s estimate on August 4 of 100 Israeli casualties). On the basis of obituaries published in the Israeli press, WAFA published names of 453 Israeli soldiers killed in Lebanon until August 12 (WAFA no.159/82, item 2, August 14,1982), for which period the official IDF figure was 368. The discrepancy may be explained by the IDF practice of counting only soldiers killed by enemy action as combat deaths (rather than those killed in any way in a combat theater, or who died later of their wounds), a distinction not made in private obituaries.

5. The best figure on wartime casualties is 19,085 killed and 30,302 wounded, according to an official Lebanese police report: Washington Post, December 2, 1982. No official count of P.L.O. casualties was ever issued; according to the police report, 84% of casualties in Beirut were civilians. Of 1100 combatants killed there, 45.6% were Palestinian, 37.2% Lebanese, 10.1% Syrian, and 7.1% other nationalities.

6. Ma‘ariv on June 17, 1982 quoted the head of Kol Israel’s Network D, which broadcasts in Arabic, as saying: “At one time the Voice of the Phalange was actually a branch of the Israeli broadcasts … an indirect link was actually formed with them, I was told.” A direct telex line existed between Israel and the “Voice of Lebanon,” according to information available to the P.L.O. a year before the 1982 war.

7. Brig. Abu al-Walid said this at pre-war meetings attended by a consultant to the Chairman’s office: interview, Washington D.C., August 6. Until the invasion began, WAFA (June 5 and 6, no.89/82, item 2 and no.90/82, item 1) pointed to the likelihood of a major offensive involving landings to cut the Beirut-Ras al-Naqoura coast road, interruption of communications, and capture of Beaufort and the Nabatiyeh area, none of which had been attempted in 1978.

8. “5 June 1967: 15 Years of Israeli Aggression and Palestinian Resistance,” WAFA no.88/82, item 2. It concluded: “[The P.L.O.’s] response cannot by itself deter Israel. But it shows that the Palestinians themselves are undeterred, that they will not lie back passively like the Arab states and take blow after Israeli blow.”

9. Al-Banna, “Defense of Beirut,” p. 108, suggests that “a conservative estimate of the firepower ratio between defenders and attackers was 1:5000.”

10. WAFA commentary: “Israel’s True Objectives in Lebanon,” WAFA no.91/ 82, item 4.

11. These raids and their results, discussed in note 35 in chapter 2, were well reported in Beirut. See al-Safir, June 8,1982, p.1, especially the photos of some of the buildings hit, two of them in particular known as P.L.O. headquarters.

12. Abu Jihad interview, Tunis, March 13, 1984. “Military Spokesman: Israeli Entry to Shouf Transcends Palestinian-Israeli Conflict,” WAFA no. 92/82, item 6, June 8, 1982.

13. “Israeli Landing Attempt at Khaldeh Foiled, Ship Hit,” WAFA no.93/82, item 4.

14. “P.L.O. Press Conference: Israel’s Aims in Lebanon,” WAFA no.93/82, item 7. Col. Abu al-Za‘im also admitted the loss of Sidon, Tyre, and Nabatiyeh, while affirming that none of them had been cleared fully of combatants of the Joint Forces.

15. “Khaldeh Landing Force Wiped Out, 6 Tknks Destroyed, 2 Captured,” WAFA no.93/82, item 8, 9 June 1982. The vehicles were M-113 APCs, not tanks: photos of those captured, and of the bodies of their crews, were featured in the next morning’s papers: al-Safir, June 10, 1982, pp. 1 and 5. Some are reproduced in Lubnan 1982: yawmiyyat al-ghazw al-isra’ili: watha’iq wa suwar, p. 57. It was rumored at the time that a few Israelis were killed after capture, although the photos indicate that most died when their vehicles were hit by antitank weapons.

16. Abu Iyyad remonstrated with Walid Jumblatt after the war, noting the problems created for the Druze by Israel allowing the LF into the Shouf, and adding that had they allowed P.L.O. bases there, the result might have differed. Jumblatt demurred, saying, “Don’t blame the Druze, blame me; perhaps we were short-sighted, but we simply didn’t want the P.L.O. in our area.”: interview, Tunis, March 14, 1984

17. Abu Jihad interview, Tunis, March 13, 1984. He added that 2500 RPG-7’s delivered in Syria for the P.L.O. on June 28 and never received would have been of great utility, since even in the worst days of the siege weapons were being smuggled into the city by boat, infiltration, or bribery of Lebanese and Israelis on the siege perimeter.

19. “Landing Attempt Foiled between Damour and Khaldeh,” WAFA no.94/82, item 4, June 10,1982; “Israeli Tknk Destroyed in Khaldeh Area—Air Raids in Southern Beirut,” WAFA no.94/82, item 7, June 10, 1982.

20. Adam was killed in the IDF regional HQ (in an area which was believed to be pacified) by commandos who were apparently hidden in the buildings: see “Maj. Gen. Adam Highest Ranking Israeli Officer ever Killed in Action,” WAFA no.95/82, item 6, June 11, 1982.

21. The P.L.O. claimed that a fresh armored division and two new paratroop battalions had been brought into Lebanon, raising the total of Israeli troops in the country to 120,000: “120,000 Israeli Troops in Lebanon”, WAFA No.95/82, item 1, June 11, 1982.

23. “P.L.O. Official Statement,” WAFA, no.95/82, item 7, June 11, 1982. The P.L.O. had already privately confirmed its acceptance of a ceasefire. It refused to announce this publicly because Israel had excluded the P.L.O. from the ceasefire, and the IDF was still advancing: P.L.O. Archives, Abu Lutf to Political Dept./Abu Ammar/ Abu Jihad, telex no. 221/PLO-NY/82, June 11,1982. There were differences within the P.L.O. leadership over the matter, according to an advisor to the Chairman present at a heated discussion of it: interview, Washington D.C., July 28, 1984.

24. “Israeli Attacks Continue,” WAFA no.96/82, item 1, June 12, 1982. Col. Siyam was killed on the night of June 11–12. Before he died, he managed to get off an inspirational radio message, the last from his command post. A communique quoting from it spoke of a “hand-to-hand battle,” and concluded, “our men have chosen to fight until the enemy is stopped in his tracks,” the first time during the war that such language had been used, clearly implying a critical battlefield situation: WAFA no. 96/ 82, item 14, June 11, 1982.

25. WAFA, no.96/82, item 9, June 12, 1982. The first siege was from June to October 1976.

26. Interview, Tunis, August 31, 1984.

27. A similar tone characterized a “WAFA Analysis of the Situation” (no. 95/82, item 10, June 11, 1982), which asked “Where did Israel go wrong?” noting that the invasion had lasted eight days, instead of a planned three; that Israeli casualties were “already beyond politically acceptable levels” (an IDF spokesman announced casualties as of the 11th of 91 killed, 220 wounded and 19 missing); and that most P.L.O. forces had not yet been engaged, but were awaiting the enemy in Beirut, a city eight times as big as Sidon, with four times the population and five times the regular P.L.O. forces stationed there.

28. The three denials were issued on June 17, the same day Yasser ‘Arafat declared that the battle of Beirut had not yet begun, and that the city would be “the Stalingrad of the Arabs” (WAFA, no. 101/82, item 7): “P.L.O. Official Statement about American-Israeli Lies,” WAFA no. 101/82, item 6; “Official Palestinian Information Spokesman,” no. 100/82, urgent flash; and “Abu Iyyad Statement to WAFA,” no. 100/ 82, item 11.

29. “Arafat Inspects Positions of Joint Forces,” WAFA no. 98/82, item 3, June 14, 1982; “Arafat Visits Forces for Second Day,” WAFA, no. 98/82, item 4, June 15, 1982; “Abu Jihad Visits Southern Suburbs Positions,” WAFA, no. 98/82, item 6, June 14, 1982. The rumors had a strong effect on P.L.O. supporters abroad: see, e.g., P.L.O. Archives, P.L.O./N.Y. to Chairman, June 14, 1982, telex no. 246.

30. The reasons for this are unclear: the most likely is the lack of a cabinet decision to enter the city, combined with a fear of casualties. Schiff and Ya’ari, Israel’s Lebanon War, p. 181, argue that the Israeli Cabinet “never ordered or sanctioned the IDF’s entry into Beirut.”

31. “Battle for Mountains Begins: Israeli Attack on Aley Repulsed,” WAFA no. 101/82, item 2, June 17, 1982.

32. “Brig. Abu al-Walid: Resistance has no Option but Self-Defence,” WAFA no. 103/82, item 4, June 19, 1982.

33. “Abut Iyyad Statement Spells out Palestinian Position,” WAFA no. 102/82, item 5, June 18, 1982. He said much the same thing here as he had on June 16 (cited in note 28), but more aggressively and in a far more confident tone. A major press furore arose over al-Hassan’s statement and the denials, which will be treated more fully in the next chapter.

34. “Harakat al-insihab al’an: harakat al-insihab munthu zaman,” al-Ma‘raka, no. 25, July 19, 1982, p. 3.

35. The Israelis paid for their victory: “some thirty dead” according to Bavly and Salpeter, Fire in Beirut, p. 103.

36. “Arafat in TV Interview: Our Situation is Stronger than Ever,” WAFA no. 105/82, item 1, June 21, 1982.

37. “The Palestinian ‘Red Line,”’ WAFA no. 108/82, item 1, June 24, 1982.

38. P.L.O. Archives, Chairman to P.L.O./Paris, June 27, 1982.

39. Several groups of drivers were captured and spoke at press conferences held by the West Beirut Higher Security Committee: “Car bombs linked to Israelis,” Beirut, Reuters, The Guardian (London), July 8, 1982; “Begin and Sharon: The Car Bomb Murderers,” WAFA no. 112/82, item 2, June 28, 1982; and “Car Bombs from Israel via the ‘Good Fence,”’ WAFA no. 122/82, item 3, July 8, 1982. Newsweek correspondent Tony Clifton reported seeing Hebrew-marked wrappings on explosives in a car meant to explode inside the Lebanese Information Ministry: God Cried, p. 45.

40. “Berri: ‘Lebanon is Indeed a Target of the Invasion,”’ WAFA no. 111/82, item 3, June 27, 1982; “Strengthening of Lebanese National Position Accompanies Phalangist Massacres in Mountains,” WAFA no. 114/82, item 2, June 30, 1982; and “Lebanese Nationalist Opposition to Palestinian Withdrawal,” WAFA no. 115/82, item 1, July 1,1982. Jumblatt’s statement was seen as so important it was telexed to offices abroad: P.L.O. Archives, Chairman’s Office to P.L.O./Paris, June 25, 1982. A Central Operations situation report noted that support for the P.L.O. resulted from these Phalangist actions (P.L.O. Archives, Central Operations to all offices, June 30, 1982, 6:00 P.M. local time). Bern’s remarks about “the new Palestinians” are in WAFA no. 121/82, item 6, July 7, 1982.

41. E.g. P.L.O. Archives, P.L.O./Paris to Chairman, July 5, 1982, reporting French officials’ “apprehensions of a severe and heavy Israeli assault against Palestinian positions in West Beirut.”

42. The P.L.O. Military Spokesman reported that “intensive counter-battery fire of the Joint Forces” had scored direct hits on Israeli artillery positions and armored vehicles in Ba’abda and Shweifat, WAFA no. 119/82, item 3, July 5,1982, a claim which was corroborated at the time by foreign reporters on the spot.

43. The police figures were reported by Chris Drake, in “Battered Beirut Cries for its Dead,” The Guardian, July 13, 1982. The P.L.O. estimated more than 300 casualties: “Beirut an Inferno: Three Hundred Civilian Casualties,” WAFA no. 125/82, item 9, July 11, 1982.

44. The P.L.O. claim regarding IDF casualties is in WAFA, ibid. Reuters reported that “Palestinian fighters scored direct hits on Israeli positions in the hills and correspondents yesterday [July 11] saw Israeli armoured units pulling back from exposed forward positions,” The Guardian, July 13, 1982.

45. “Abu Iyyyad: We Will Not Surrender”; “Arafat: P.L.O. to Remain in Beirut,” both in WAFA no. 116/82, items 5 and 4 respectively, July 2, 1982.

46. “Abu Iyyad: No Climb Down from Bottom Line Defined in PLO Document,” WAFA no. 131/82, item 5, July 17,1982. The 11 points were first sent to Paris on July 8: P.L.O. Archives, Chairman to Souss, July 8,1982. Hani al-Hassan stated that the P.L.O. consciously toughened its stand when Israeli military pressure was applied: interview, Tunis, August 31, 1984.

47. “Israeli Attacks Thrown Back as Battle of Beirut Begins,” WAFA no. 119/ 82, item 3, July 5, 1982.

48. "Abu Iyyad Explains P.L.O. Negotiating Position”; “Brig. Abu al-Walid: No Departure from Beirut by Land, Sea or Air,” both in WAFA no. 123/82, items 4 and 2 respectively, July 9, 1982. There is a striking contrast between Brig. Abu al-Walid’s confident statement of July 9 and the subdued tone of that of June 19, cited in note 32 above.

49. “WAFA Comment: The Balance Sheet after 5 Weeks of War,” WAFA no. 125/82, item 4, July 11, 1982.

50. “Arafat Attacks Silence, Impotence of Arabs over Lebanon War,” WAFA no. 125/82, item 2, July 11, 1982.

51. “WAFA Commentary: Israel’s Losses after 5 Weeks of War,” WAFA no. 126/82, item 1, July 12, 1982.

52. “WAFA Military Analysis: Israel’s Vietnam or Israel’s Verdun?”, WAFA no. 128/82, item 5, July 14, 1982.

53. After some confusion at P.L.O. offices abroad (and in the Western media) regarding the P.L.O. negotiating position, the 11 points received general distribution by telex and radio beginning on July 11, 1982: P.L.O. Archives, Abu ‘Ammar to Abu Maher (Damascus), July 11, 1982, later repeated to other offices.

54. This fact was extensively reported by foreign and Lebanese reporters on the spot, and was the subject of a protest by the Canadian Ambassador, whose residence was damaged in the bombing, as were several other embassies. His comments are quoted in R. Wright, et al., “Beirut: The Liquidation of a City,” The Sunday Times, August 8, 1982.

55. P.L.O. Archives, P.L.O. Central Operations to all offices, July 25,1982, 6:00 P.M. local time.

56. Interview with Abu Iyyad, Tunis, March 14, 1984.

57. These citations are taken from the following situation reports: P.L.O. Archives, Central operations to all offices, July 26, 1982, 2:00 P.M. local time; ibid.; July 27, 1982, 5:00 P.M. local time; July 31, 1982, 2:00 P.M. local time.

58. “WAFA Commentary: 242 Revisited,” WAFA no. 144/82, item 6, July 30, 1982.

59. “Israeli Savagery Pours 80,000 Shells into West Beirut,” WAFA no.145/82, item 4, July 30, 1982.

60. P.L.O. Archives, Central Operations to all offices, August 1,1982, 7:00 P.M. local time.

61. The text, part of an exchange of letters between the U.S. and Lebanon on August 18 and 20 which constituted an agreement between the two governments, was published in the Department of State Bulletin (September 1982) 82 (2066), pp. 2–5.

62. “Abu Iyyad: Where are the Arabs?” WAFA no. 145/82, item 4, July 31, 1982. He later repeated these demands, adding that Egypt should abrogate its peace treaty with Israel.

63. “WAFA Commentary: The Battle of Beirut Airport,” WAFA no. 147/82, item 1, August 2, 1982.

64. “Israel Admits 165 Casualties Wednesday,” WAFA no. 151/82, item 4, August 6,1982, reports an August 4 P.L.O. estimate of 100 Israeli casualties, the IDF spokesman’s initial admission of only 64 wounded, and the later revision upward to 19 killed and 146 wounded. Other sources give the casualties as 18 killed and 76 wounded: Bavly and Salpeter, Fire in Beirut, p. 108.

65. WAFA report cited in preceding note; Yasser ‘Arafat and Abu Iyyad interviews, Tunis, March 9 and 14, 1984.

66. Tony Clifton and photographer Catherine Leroy give vivid eyewitness accounts of the Sanaye’ bombing in God Cried, pp. 45–46. Another is that of John Bulloch, who was 100 yards away when the building was hit: Final Conflict, pp. 132–33.

67. The P.L.O. estimate of casualties on August 12 was 300: “P.L.O. Military Spokesman: 300 Casualties in 9 Hours of bombing,” WAFA no. 157/82, item 6, August 12, 1982, while the Lebanese police counted “at least 128” killed and 400 wounded, according to an AP report in The New York Times, August 13, 1982.

68. “WAFA Commentary: Israel’s Seventy Day War,” WAFA no. 157/82, item 7, August 12, 1982.

69. “Abu Iyyad Condemns U.S. as Responsible for Israel’s War,” WAFA no. 157/82, item 9, 12 August 1982.

70. P.L.O. Archives, Central Operations to all offices, August 12, 1982, 6:30 P.M. local time.

71. “WAFA Editorial: All Options are Still Open,” WAFA no. 154/82, item 1, August 9, 1982.

72. Interview, Tunis, March 9, 1984.

1. For an excellent study of the subject, see Nadine Picaudou, “La bourgeoisie palestinienne et l’industrie: étude socio-historique”.

2. This emerges clearly from the standard works on the pre-1984 period, Ann Mosely Lesch, Arab Politics in Palestine, 1917–1939: The Frustration of a Nationalist Movement, and Y. Porath’s The Emergence of the Palestinian-Arab National Movement 1918–1929, and The Palestinian Arab National Movement 1929–1939: From Riots to Rebellion.

3. The P.L.O.’s organizational structure is depicted in the chart in the frontispiece and is described in C. Rubenberg, The Palestine Liberation Organization, pp. 7–17 and Helena Cobban, The Palestinian Liberation Organisation (which focuses on Fateh) pp. 3–18, and in Aaron David Miller, The P.L.O. and the Politics of Survival.

4. Both these feelings towards ‘Arafat were evident during a March 14, 1984 interview with Abu Iyyad, notwithstanding his differences at that time with ‘Arafat over his visit to Cairo. The early ties between the historic leaders of Fateh are described in Abu Iyyad, My Home, My Land, pp. 19–37.

5. Interviews with Abu Sa‘id are the source of most of the considerable amount of previously unpublished original material about Fateh and the P.L.O. in H. Cobban, The Palestinian Liberation Organisation.

6. The P.L.O. telex traffic between Beirut and New York was extremely heavy at the beginning of the war. Between June 11 and 26, 89 messages were sent by the P.L.O.’s U.N. mission, an average of six per day, nearly all of them dealing with the Security Council’s deliberations on the Lebanese war: P.L.O. Archives, Abu Lutf (N.Y.) to Political Department, Abu ‘Ammar, Abu Jihad, no. 221, June 11,1982; P.L.O./N.Y. to Abu ‘Ammar, no 310, June 26, 1982.

7. Ample evidence for the existence of crossed signals within the administration during the first few days of the war can be found in Alexander Haig’s Caveat, pp. 337–339, dealing with the internal debate over the U.S. veto of June 8, for which Haig takes credit.

8. Ibid., pp. 318–319; and Henry Kissinger, “From Lebanon to the West Bank to the Gulf,” The Washington Post, June 16, 1982.

9. P.L.O. Archives, Abu Lutf (N.Y.) to Political Department/Abu ‘Ammar/Abu, no. 221, June 11, 1982; Ibrahim Souss, P.L.O. Paris, to Chairman, June 11, 1982.

10. P.L.O. Archives, Abu Lutf to Pol. Dept., June 11. The Saudi prince also asked ‘Arafat to agree to postponement of an Arab League foreign ministers or summit meeting, “until the international situation clears up.” The meeting was postponed indefinitely.

11. Daily situation reports are replete with comment on U.S.-Israeli-Lebanese rightist collusion: e.g. P.L.O. Archives, Central Operations to all offices, June 30,1982, which makes this reference and another to “American-Israeli-isolationist pressures” preventing an accord with the Lebanese government.

12. This new situation led P.L.O. leaders to take Saudi claims regarding their influence on the United States less seriously than in the past. This is confirmed by a study of the telex traffic and interviews with P.L.O. leaders (notably with ‘Arafat, Tunis, March 9, 1982), and flatly contradicts the claims by Haig that the P.L.O. was strongly reinforced in holding out against U.S.-Israeli demands by Saudi encouragement from June 13 onward (Haig, Caveat, pp. 343–345).

13. P.L.O. Archives, Chairman to Abu Lutf (N.Y.), June 13, 1982. The Central Operations list is cited in note 3 in chapter 3.

14. P.L.O. Archives, Chairman to Zuhdi/Abu Lutf, urgent, June 13, 1982.

15. In an interview at the Quai d’Orsay on March 8, 1984, an official in the Cabinet du Ministre stated that as of June 15,1982, France began to attempt to achieve a settlement on this basis after a P.L.O. request conveyed by Hani al-Hassan to a French emissary in Beirut, Francis Gutman, the Secretary-General of the Foreign Ministry. This was confirmed by Hani al-Hassan, interview, Tunis, August 31, 1984, and by Ibrahim Souss, interview, Tunis, August 31, 1984.

16. At the very outset, according to Hani al-Hassan in an interview, ibid., the idea of negotiations via the French on this basis were “initiatied by myself with Abu ‘Ammar,” and only later approved by the rest of the leadership. Criticism of this approach, expressed most forcefully in public by Abu Iyyad, was referred to in section II C of the preceding chapter, and is discussed further below.

17. Much of the following paragraph is based on details provided by Abu Iyyad in an interview in Tunis, March 14, 1984.

18. Interview on August 6,1984 in Washington D.C. with Advisor to Chairman’s Office who attended several meetings of the P.L.O. Higher Military Council throughout April and May 1982, and the meeting of the night of June 6–7, 1984.

19. Abu Iyyad interview, March 14, 1984. See note 20 for Jumblatt’s confirmation of this.

20. In an August 1 interview with Jumblatt by Selim Nassib cited in his Beirut: Frontline Story (London: Pluto Press, 1983), p. 106. In answer to a question about “a certain wavering” in the postion of the LNM at the beginning of the war, Jumblatt replied: “Yes, that’s true. At one point we were completely lost. We did not expect such a rapid development of events, nor such a spread-out operation. The invasion was a shock.” (ibid., p. 104).

21. Interview with Yasser ‘Arafat, Tunis, March 9,1984. This was confirmed by Abu Iyyad: Tunis, 14 March 1984.

22. Selim Nessib, Beirut, p. 106.

23. Al-Safir, July 3,1982, p. 1 for Wazzan’s statement. Summaries of the pledge can be found in P.L.O. Archives, Chairman to P.L.O./N.Y., copy to Souss/Paris, July 2, 1982, and a Central Operations situation report of July 4, 1982. Several individuals besides the recipients saw the text briefly at the time, but no copy could be found in the Archives of the Chairman’s Office.

24. The effect on Palestinian opinion in Beirut was discussed in the preceding chapter; that on offices abroad can be seen from a telex from Tarazi to WAFA on June 14, asking for information on some of the more outrageous rumors about the situation of the P.L.O. in Beirut, and from a telex two days later from the P.L.O. New York office to Chairman ‘Arafat (no. 246) reporting that comments attributed to Hani al-Hassan had caused concern among P.L.O. supporters.

25. P.L.O. Archives, memo to Chairman ‘Arafat from P.L.O. Unified Information official (unnamed in text), June 17, 1982, annotated as having been read by ‘Arafat. The memo was later passed on by ‘Arafat to al-Hassan: interview with Hani al-Hassan, Tunis, August 31, 1984.

26. Three of these statements were issued in the WAFA bulletin of June 17, although two were actually made late on the night of the 16th; the fourth, made late on the 17th, appeared in the bulletin of the 18th: “Official Palestinian Spokesman,” urgent flash [no number]; “Abu Iyyad Statement to WAFA,” WAFA no. 100/82, item 10; “P.L.O. Official Statement about American-Israeli Lies,” WAFA no. 101/82, item 6; “Nobody Can Disarm the Joint Forces,” WAFA no. 102/82, item 1.

27. “Arafat: This Battle will be the Stalingrad of the Arabs,” WAFA no 101/82, item 7, June 17, 1982.

28. The matter was public knowledge within the P.L.O. in Beirut at the time, as was the news of the resolution of these differences the following day: interview on July 28, 1984 in Washington D.C. with Advisor to Chairman’s Office who attended the meeting at which the disagreement took place.

29. In interviews, Yasser ‘Arafat and Abu Iyyad (Tunis, March 9 and 14, 1984, respectively) confirmed that it was the position of their Lebanese allies which forced the P.L.O. to make this commitment. Abu Iyyad termed this “a surprise,” and said it was the most important factor in the June decision. Other P.L.O. sources confirm this: e.g., Abu Lutf interview, Tunis, August 31, 1984; Hani al-Hassan interview, Tunis, August 31, 1984; Ibrahim Souss interview, Tunis, August 30, 1984.

30. The first discussion of this took place at a meeting on the night of June 26–27: “P.L.O. Leadership to Discuss U.S. Proposals,” WAFA no. 109/82, item 8, June 26, 1982 notes that “The P.L.O. leadership tonight received via the French Foreign Ministry a number of important proposals regarding the situation in Beirut. WAFA has learned that the Palestinian leadership will meet tonight to study these proposals and present a reply. Similar messages had been received from the Indian Foreign Ministry.” The document finally agreed on was the result of deliberations during this and several later meetings.

31. In the P.L.O. Archives, Arabic originals of outgoing telexes are kept together with the English versions actually sent, while incoming texts are filed with their Arabic translations.

32. In one of his first messages to the French, ‘Arafat said, “I wish to extend our gratitude to President Mitterand, the French government and people for their friendly and solid stand.”: P.L.O. Archives, Chairman to Souss, June 24,1982,10:00 P.M. Beirut time.

33. Interviews with official of Cabinet du Ministre, French Foreign Ministry, Paris, March 8, 1984, and official of French Foreign Ministry, Beirut, January 12, 1983.

34. P.L.O. Archives, Souss to Chairman, June 19, 1982.

35. Haig, Caveat, p. 345.

36. Ibid., pp. 345–46.

37. P.L.O. Archives, Souss to Chairman, urgent, June 25, 1982.

38. Cited in Rashid I. Khalidi, British Policy towards Syria and Palestine 1906–1914, pp. 184, 199.

39. Interview with official of Cabinet du Ministre, French Foreign Ministry, Paris, March 8, 1984.

40. Interview with Director of the Archives, Office of the Chairman of the P.L.O. Executive Committee, Tunis, March 11, 1984.

41. On June 26, 1984, for example, the P.L.O. received an analysis of the situation within the administration from a source in Washington which clearly outlined the differences between Haig and the National Security Council over the handling of the Lebanese crisis: P.L.O. Washington to Chairman’s Office, June 26, 1982. The conflict between Haig’s approach and that of Judge William Clark, the President’s National Security Advisor, can be seen, e.g. in Haig, Caveat, pp. 338–341. The Chairman’s Office also received complete and extensive media reports from P.L.O. offices in the U.S. and major world capitals.

42. P.L.O. Archives, Souss to Chairman, very urgent, June 26, 1982.

43. P.L.O. Archives, Chairman to Souss, urgent and secret, June 25, 1982.

44. P.L.O. Archives, Chairman to Souss, June 27, 1982.

45. P.L.O. Archives, Souss to Chairman, urgent, June 28, 1982.

46. P.L.O. Archives, Chairman to Souss, June 28, 1982.

47. P.L.O. Archives, Souss to Chairman, urgent, June 29,1982, no. 1; and Souss to Chairman, June 29, 1982, no. 2, which contained a similar message after a second meeting with French Foreign Ministry officials that evening.

48. P.L.O. Archives, Souss to Chairman, urgent, June 29, 1982, no. 3; Souss to Chairman, most urgent, June 29, 1982, no. 4 (the second dispatch contains an English translation of the American note, which had been sent immediately in French “as it was submitted to me by the Foreign Minister” in the first); and Souss to Chairman, most urgent, June 30,1982. Souss was usually invited to the Foreign Ministry to receive messages from Washington, some of which he saw in the original French, and which he and Ministry officials translated into English for transmission to Beirut: interview, Tunis, August 30, 1984.

49. P.L.O. Archives, Chairman to Souss (copy to Zuhdi/N.Y.), June 30, 1982, 1:30 P.M. local time, no. 1; Chairman to Souss, (copy to Zuhdi/N.Y.), June 30,1982, no. 3. In Chairman to Souss (copy to Zuhdi/N.Y.), June 30,1982, no. 4, ‘Arafat informed both that he had just learned, via Habib and Wazzan, of the dropping of the U.S. condition regarding light weapons which had previously been transmitted by the French. This is an early example of the delays inherent in the roundabout lines of communication between Habib and the P.L.O. when compared with the French channel.

50. P.L.O. Archives, Chairman to Souss (copy to Zuhdi/N.Y.), June 30,1980, no. 3.

1. See, e.g., the statements of Wazzan, Salam, Jumblatt, and Berri on 5 July (al-Safir, July 6, 1982, p. 1), the first of many in this regard.

2. Interview with Abu Iyyad, Tunis, March 14, 1984.

3. Harrison Salisbury, The 900 Days: The Siege of Leningrad; Dov Joseph, The Faithful City: The Siege of Jerusalem, 1948.

4. For the quintessential expressions of these allegations, see Martin Peretz, “Lebanon Eyewitness,” The New Republic, August 2, 1982, and Norman Podhoretz, “J’Accuse,” Commentary, December 1982.

5. New York: Stein and Day, 1984.

6. Interview with Nabil ’Amir, Director of “The Voice of Palestine” Radio, Tunis, March 18, 1984. He describes the wartime problems faced by the radio, especially that of finding new sites for it, in his Ayyam al-hub wal-hisar, pp. 41–45.

7. Interview with Director of the Office of the Chairman, Tunis, March 7, 1984.

8. Interview with Director of the PRCS’s Gaza Hospital, Washington D.C., March 16,1985. Every book by a Western journalist actually in West Beirut during the siege confirms that shelling was indiscriminate. See, e.g., those by Bulloch, Randal, Clifton and Leroy, Jansen, and Nassib cited in note 1 of chapter 1. Use of the word “indiscriminate” by Tom Friedman of the New York Times to describe the Israeli bombardment of August 4 led to a clash with his editors, who saw fit to excise the word. The text of an angry telex by Friedman to them is reproduced in full in an article by P.L.O. Alexander Cockburn, “A Word Not Fit to Print” The Village Voice, September 22, 1982. (Cockburn later had to leave the Voice after accusations about money he received from the Institute for Arab Studies.] For a survey of the controversy over press coverage of the war, see Roger Morris, “Beirut—and the Press—Under Seige.”

9. In the words of a French Foreign Ministry official, Habib’s plan was already fully formed by June 15, and its essentials never changed: interview, March 8, 1984.

10. The text was transmitted to ‘Arafat in P.L.O. Archives, Souss to Chairman, July 2, 1982; a detailed AFP summary can be found in Revue d’Etudes Palestiniennes, (Autumn 1982), no. 5 p. 145. Details in this and the following three paragraphs are based on this text. On the same day, Le Monde published an appeal for Palestinian self-determination and mutual recognition and negotiations between the P.L.O. and Israel by former French Premier Pierre Mendes-France, former World Zionist Organization President Nahum Goldmann, and former World Jewish Congress President Philip Klutznick, which was publicly welcomed by ‘Arafat, who invited the three to travel to besieged Beirut. Mendes-France and Goldmann died before this could be arranged. See M. Merhav, P. Klutznick and H. Eilts, Facing the P.L.O. Question, pp. 14–15.

11. In a later message (P.L.O. Archives, Souss to Chairman, July 13,1982, 8:00 P.M.), a Foreign Ministry official told the P.L.O. this language was also included in the draft out of fear that Bashir Gemayel might stage a putsch at the time of the Presidential elections on September 23. According to a reliable Israeli account, this concern was not far-fetched: Schiff and Ya’ari, Israel’s Lebanon War, pp. 231–232.

12. The Washington Post, June 16, 1982.

13. P.L.O. Archives, Souss to Chairman, July 5, 1982, no. 1.

15. Haig, Caveat, p. 348.

17. P.L.O. Archives, Souss to Chairman, July 8,1982, no. 1. The Saudi Military Attaché in Washington, Prince Bandar Ibn Sultan, told the French Ambassador to the United States François de Laboulaye that he had been instructed by phone by King Fahd to help obtain French participation in a force “not essentially placed under U.N. supervision.” Souss reported that “The French do not seem to be very reassured by the Saudi position”: P.L.O. Archives, Souss to Chairman, July 10, 1982, no. 2, 2:30 P.M.

18. These telexes were the following: P.L.O. Archives, Chairman to P.L.O.-N.Y./Souss-Paris, July 2, 1982, 10:00 P.M.; Souss to Chairman, July 3, 1982, no. 1; Chairman to Souss, July 3, 1982, no. 1; Souss to Chairman, July 3, 1982, no. 2; Chairman to Souss, July 3, 1982, no. 2; Souss to Chairman, July 8, 1982, nos. 1, 2, 3; Chairman to Souss, July 8, 1982, no. 1.10:00 P.M.; Chairman to Souss, July 8,1982, no. 2. The latter was the 11 points, which were repeated to P.L.O. offices abroad on July 9, 1982, and to Damascus (Abu ‘Ammar to Abu Maher, July 11, 1982).

19. P.L.O. Archives, Souss to Chairman, July 8, 1982, no. 4.

20. Ibid., July 9, 1982, no. 2.

21. Ibid., July 10, 1982, no. 1.

22. Ibid., July 10, 1982, no. 2, 2:30 P.M.

23. Ibid., July 12, 1982, 5:45 P.M.

24. P.L.O. Archives, Chairman to Souss, July 11, 1982, 3:00 P.M.

25. Z. Schiff & E. Ya’ari, Israel’s Lebanon War, p. 211.

26. See, e.g., ibid., pp.212–213, 222–227.

27. P.L.O. Archives, Souss to Chairman, July 19, 1982, 8:15 P.M.

28. Ibid., July 21, 1982, 8:30 P.M.

29. Z Schiff & E. Ya’ari, Israel’s Lebanon War, pp. 42–44. Other key points made by the French find support in this book.

30. P.L.O. Archives, Souss to Chairman, July 21, 1982, 8:30 P.M.

31. Examples of such warnings are ibid., July 11, 1982, 1:45 P.M. hrs; and ibid., July 17, 1982, 7:45 P.M.

32. The French query was in ibid., July 14, 1982, 1:00 P.M.; ‘Arafat replied describing Habib’s offer in P.L.O. Archives, Chairman to Souss, July 14,1982, 2:30 P.M. Some of Wazzan’s points were confirmed by Habib in an interview, Washington D.C., December 3, 1984.

33. P.L.O. Archives, Souss to Chairman, July 24, 1982, 7:30 P.M.

34. Ibid., July 27, 1982, 2:30 P.M.

35. Ibid., July 24, 1982, 7:30 P.M.

36. Ibid., July 15,1982, 8:30 P.M. The Algerian and United Arab Emirates Foreign Ministers, Souss, and the Arab League Ambassador in Paris were present at the one-hour meeting.

37. Ibid., July 30, 1982, 2:00 P.M.

38. S Nassib, Beirut, p. 126.

39. “WAFA Commentary: Israel’s Seventy Day War,” WAFA No. 157/82, item 7, August 12, 1982.

40. Interview, Tunis, March 10, 1984.

41. P.L.O. Archives, Chairman to Abu Tayeb (Cairo), July 11, 1982, 5:30 P.M.

42. P.L.O. Archives, Zuhdi to Chairman, July 5,1982. This is confirmed by the envoy, who was then in the P.L.O. delegation at the U.N.: Hassan ‘Abd al-Rahman interview, Washington D.C., October 26, 1984.

43. Syrian policy towards the P.L.O. and the region since 1970 are discussed in R. Khalidi, “The Asad Regime and the Palestinian Resistance”.

44. P.L.O. Archives, Abu Maher to Abu ‘Ammar, July 11,1982. Details of these meetings were confirmed by Abu Mazin, who participated in them: interview, Tunis, August 30, 1984.

45. The French reported the result of many of their contacts with the Soviets to the P.L.O., at times asking that it also take the matter up with Moscow: P.L.O. Archives, Souss to Chairman, July 5, 1982, no. 1; ibid., July 9,1982, no. 1; ibid., July 9, 1982, no. 2; ibid., July 13,1982, 8:00 P.M. ibid., July 24,1982, 7:30 P.M. Abu Mazin stated that at a July 5 meeting with an Arab League delegation visiting Moscow, Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko had expressed anger at Syrian claims that Soviet weapons were defective, while other Soviet officials expressed dissatisfaction about Syria’s posture during the war: interview, Tunis, August 30, 1984.

46. P.L.O. Archives, Abu Maher to Abu ‘Ammar, July 13, 1982.

47. P.L.O. Archives, Souss to Chairman, July 13, 1982, 8:00 P.M.

48. P.L.O. Archives, Chairman to Abu Maher, July 13, 1982.

49. P.L.O. Archives, Abu Maher to Abu ‘Ammar, July 17, 1982. The Syrian position was apparently based on the belief that in a Reagan-Asad exchange of letters on June 10, the U.S. had committed itself to obtaining a complete Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. This was indirectly confirmed by Philip Habib in response to a question at a talk at the American Enterprise Institute, Washington D.C., November 15, 1984.

50. P.L.O. Archives, Chairman to Souss, copy to Zuhdi, July 16, 1982, 8:03 P.M.

51. P.L.O. Archives, Abu Sa‘id to Chairman, July 17,1982, via P.L.O./N.Y., no. 483/82.

52. P.L.O. Archives, Abu Sa‘id memo to Chairman, July 19, 1982 no. 1.

53. Interview with P.L.O. official present at July 19,1982 meeting of the P.L.O. leadership, Tunis, March 14, 1984.

54. P.L.O. Archives, Chairman to Abu Sa‘id, July 19, 1982, 3:30 A.M.

55. P.L.O. Archives, Abu Sa‘id to Chairman, July 19, 1982, no. 1.

56. Ibid., July 19, 1982, no. 2. Khaled al-Hassan explained the reasons for the seemingly conflicting signals sent to Beirut in interviews in Tunis on August 29 and 31, 1984.

57. P.L.O. Archives, Chairman to Abu Sa‘id, July 20, 1982, 2:45 P.M.

58. Ibid., July 22, 1982, 11:30 A.M., no. 1; and ibid, July 22, 1982, 9:45 P.M., no.2.

59. P.L.O. Archives, Abu Sa‘id to Abu Lutf, July 22, 1983, via P.L.O./N.Y., no 510/82; enclosed in Zuhdi to Chairman, July 22, 1982, no 513/82.

61. This was confirmed by the Arab journalist in Washington who received the original document from the Saudi diplomat.

62. A telex from Abu Jihad to New York on July 23, 1982, reporting an “American-Saudi-Syrian agreement on the method of resolution under an Arab scenario (ikhraj Arabi)”, is evidence that this was the initial understanding in Beirut.

63. P.L.O. Archives, Souss to Chairman, July 28, 1982, 7:30 P.M.

64. French perplexity at Khaled al-Hassan’s apparent opposition to the Franco-Egyptian resolution, and ‘Arafat’s efforts to reassure them, including a directive to al-Hassan to support the French initiative can be followed in P.L.O. Archives: Souss to Chairman, July 22, 1982, 11:30 P.M.; Chairman to Souss, July 22–23, 1982, 2:00 A.M.; Chairman to Abu Sa‘id, July 24,1982,11:30 A.M.; Chairman to Souss, July 17,1982, 6:30 P.M., urgent. In an interview, Khaled al-Hassan denied this was his fault: Tunis, August 29, 1984. This is confirmed by Hassan ‘Abd al-Rahman: interview, Washington D.C., October 26, 1984.

65. P.L.O. Archives, Chairman to P.L.O. offices in Paris, N.Y., Bonn, Vienna, London, Geneva, representatives in Washington and Cairo, July 29, 1982.

66. The P.L.O. delegation headed by Abu Lutf included Fateh Central Committee members Abu Mazin, Khaled al-Hassan, Abu Shakir (Rafiq al-Natshe), and P.L.O. Executive Committee member Yasser ‘Abed Rabbo. In interviews in Tunis, the first three confirmed details regarding this meeting (August 31,1984; August 30,1984; and August 29, 1984 respectively).

67. P.L.O. Archives, Central Operations to all offices, August 1, 1982, 7:00 P.M.; and Chairman to Souss, August 2, 1982, contain the first references to the decision which could be found, but specify that it was taken several days earlier.

68. Abu Iyyad interview, Tunis, March 14,1984. None of these messages could be found in the P.L.O. archives, since none were issued by the Chairman’s office (causing problems with the Soviets, who would accept communications only from ‘Arafat, in his capacity as Chairman). The message to the Soviets was drafted by Abu Iyyad, Abu Saleh, Nayef Hawatmeh of the DFLP and Abu Maher al-Yamani of the PFLP, while Abu Saleh wrote the one to Asad.

1. For details of the massacre see J. Randal, Going All the Way, 90–91, 130; and H. Cobban, The Palestinian Liberation Organization, 73–74. Both were present at the fall of the camp.

2. P.L.O. Archives, Chairman to Souss, August 1982.

3. P.L.O. Archives, “U.S. Comments on Palestinian Proposal of 3 August,” typed memo on plain paper, n.d. [3–4 August 1982]; P.L.O. response, August 4.

4. P.L.O. Archives, Brig. Qureitem to Hani al-Hassan, August 4, 1982; Sa’eb Salam to Hani al-Hassan, August 4, 1982.

5. P.L.O. Archives, “U.S. Comments on Palestinian Views of 4 August,” typed memo on plain paper, n.d. [August 4, 1982]; “American Point of View on Palestinian note of 6 August,” typed memo on plain paper, n.d. [August 6, 1982].

6. P.L.O. Archives, Chairman to Souss, August 11, 1982. The final text of the accords and the notes exchanged between Lebanese Foreign Minister Fu’ad Butros and U.S. Ambasador to Lebanon Robert Dillon are in the Department of State Bulletin, (September 1982) 82 (2066): 2–5.

7. Philip Habib interview, Washington D.C., December 3, 1984. Sharon’s ambitious war aims are confirmed by another U.S. diplomat privy to the negotiations: interview, Washington D.C., March 27, 1985, as well as by the retiring U.S. Ambassador to Israel, Sam Lewis, and a State Department spokesman: The Washington Post, May 25, 1985, pp. Al, A15.

10. Ibid. Habib indicated that both Haig and Sharon were less than truthful in their dealings during the war: “Haig was lying; Sharon was lying,” he said.

11. Ibid., and Philip Habib interview, Washington D.C., November 15, 1984.

12. See, e.g., D. Bavly and E. Salpeter, Fire in Beirut, 112–113.

13. Hani al-Hassan interview, Tunis, August 31, 1984.

14. Interviews in Tunis with: Yasser ‘Arafat, 9 March 1984; Abu Jihad, 13 March 1984; Abu Iyyad, March 14 and August 13, 1984; Abu Lutf, August 31, 1984; Hani al-Hassan, August 31, 1984.

15. Yasser ‘Arafat interview, Tunis, March 9, 1984.

16. Abu Iyyad interview, Tunis, March 14, 1984.

17. P.L.O. Archives, Souss to Chairman, August 11, 1982, 3:40 P.M.

18. P.L.O. Archives, Chairman to Souss, August 12, 1982.

19. For the view in Washington of the mission of the MNF in Beirut, see the Department of State “Fact Sheet on the Departure,” which was “made available to news correspondents Acting Department Spokesman Alan Romberg” in the Department of State Bulletin (September 1982) 82 (2066): 5–7, especially p. 6, where this mission is described without specific reference to the Palestinian camps.

20. Philip Habib interview, Washington D.C., December 3, 1984.

21. Department of State Bulletin (November) 82 (2068): 48.

22. Schiff and Ya’ari, Israel’s Lebanon War, 258–260.

23. These are the White House statement of September 15; the State Department statement of the 15th; the White House statement of the 16th; the President’s statements of the 18th and 20th; and the White House statement of the 23d, all in the Department of State Bulletin (November) 82 (2068): 47–50.

24. “U.S. Comments” of August 3 and 4, and “American Point of View” of August 6, cited in notes 3 and 5.

25. My attention was first drawn to these documents by Loren Jenkins of the Washington Post and Tom Friedman of the New York Times, who received copies of them from P.L.O. leaders soon after the massacres. A knowledgeable U.S. diplomat confirmed that these documents originated with the U.S. mediator: interview, Washington D.C., March 27, 1985.

26. See, e.g., all the documents in the Department of State Bulletin (September 1982) 82 (2066): 1–27; and ibid. (November 1982) 82 (2068): 46–51.

27. The President’s statement of September 14, 1982, cited in ibid., p. 47, and those cited in note 23. U.S. officials on the spot were late to realize what was happening. One stated: “Even Friday [September 17] we didn’t believe a massacre to be possible. Once we realized, and got nervous, we did everything we could. We had taken Begin at his word.” Interview, Washington D.C., March 27, 1985.