When Character Met Circumstance: Operation Red Wings
But how does anyone—Green Beret, Navy SEAL, whatever—learn to be that brave? I can’t explain it. No one can. We are taught to understand, correctly, that courage is not the absence of fear, but the capacity for action despite our fears.
—CAPTAIN JOHN MCCAIN, USN (ret.), Why Courage Matters
With the frequency of missions, Michael found it difficult to communicate with his family. However, on Mother’s Day, Sunday, May 8, he was able to send an e-mail to his mother, including with it a picture of his team holding a cardboard sign that read, “Happy Mother’s Day.”
Consuming an increasing amount of his team’s time was Mullah Ahmad Shah, one of Osama bin Laden’s top lieutenants. He commanded the rebel group known as the Mountain Tigers, a militia force with an estimated strength of 40 to 150 men. Shah, who was fluent in five different languages, was constantly on the move, hiding among the civilian populations of the Pashtun villages in the Hindu Kush along the border of Afghanistan and Pakistan in Kunar province.
Kunar Province
Kunar, one of thirty-four provinces in Afghanistan, is located in the northeastern-most part of the country on the border with Pakistan’s Bajaur Agency, which is part of the region known as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. It had long been a favored location of insurgent groups, because of its impenetrable terrain, extensive cave network, and border with the semiautonomous Pakistani North-West Frontier Province. There native Taliban forces mingled with foreign al-Qaeda fighters, while mujahideen militias continued their warring manner with other tribes. As a result of Operation Enduring Freedom, U.S. and coalition forces drove bin Laden and the remainder of his al-Qaeda forces underground in the Kunar cave network and neighboring Pakistan.
One of the primary missions for which Lieutenant Murphy’s team was brought to Afghanistan was to utilize their reconnaissance skills to neutralize high-profile al-Qaeda and Taliban targets. On June 3, 2005, Shah’s forces ambushed and killed three Marines from Company C, 1st Battalion near Forward Operating Base (FOB) Orgun-E, located outside the town of Orgune in the Paktika province in southwestern Afghanistan along the Pakistani border. Killed were Captain Charles D. Robinson and Staff Sergeant Leroy E. Alexander. Seriously burned was Staff Sergeant Christopher N. Piper, who subsequently died of his wounds. The Marines approached CJSOTF-A’s commanders and requested the capture or elimination of Shah. They in turn immediately contacted Commander Kent Paro, who began the initial planning for the mission.
The first planning session held included Paro, Lieutenant Commander Erik Kristensen, Lieutenant Mike McGreevy, and Senior Chief Dan Healy. As task unit commander, the planning effort was the direct responsibility of Kristensen, assisted by McGreevy and Healy. Although not directly involved in the step-by-step planning of the mission, Paro was intimately involved in the overall planning.
The name of this mission was left to the task unit commander, Lieutenant Commander Erik Kristensen. A big hockey fan, Kristensen liked to name SEAL missions after professional hockey teams. The next team on his list was the Detroit Red Wings.
An initial plan and detailed drawings based on the latest intelligence was drawn up. With Paro’s review and approval, Kristensen, McGreevy, and Healy approached Major Stephen Reich and Captain Myron Bradley of the Army’s 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR), known as the Night Stalkers, and enlisted their help with air operations. During this initial meeting, Kristensen, McGreevy, and Healy huddled with Reich and Bradley in the 160th’s Operations Center near the flight line. A large detailed map was laid out, covering the wooden table in the center of the room. At the top of the paper in large red letters were the words “Operation Red Wings.” Kristensen and Healy went over their plan in detail and sought the input of Reich and Bradley, which resulted in a few modifications.
With a command change scheduled for the last week in June, CJSOTF-A commanders made it abundantly clear that Shah was the number one target and absolutely must be neutralized before that time. While Shah was a high-profile target, there were several other concurrent operations being both planned and executed. The highly experienced Senior Chief Dan Healy, a recognized expert in counterintelligence, spent hours combing intelligence reports, continually pouring over lists, photographs, maps, and charts, which resulted in the modification of several operational plans, including Operation Red Wings. Due to the terrain, the altitude, and the strength of Shah’s forces, attempts to pinpoint Shah’s location had proved difficult and at times totally unsuccessful. Petty Officer Marcus Luttrell described the terrain in his book Lone Survivor: “The steep, stony mountain crevasses and cliffs, dust-colored, sinister places, were now alive with the burgeoning armies of the Taliban. . . . Up there, complex paths emerge and then disappear behind huge boulders and rocks. Every footstep that dislodges anything, a small rock, a pile of shale, seemed like it might cause an earthshaking avalanche. Stealth, we were told, must be our watchword on the high, quiet slopes of the Hindu Kush.”
Operation Red Wings: Planning
Under pressure to neutralize Shah, additional effort and resources were channeled into the planning for Operation Red Wings. On June 10, 2005, Commander Paro was unexpectedly and temporarily reassigned and command of the unit was assumed by Lieutenant Commander Kristensen. However, Paro and Kristensen remained in daily contact about the Red Wings mission planning. Paro later described LCDR Kristensen: “I had every confidence in Erik. He was a highly competent SEAL commander. Highly cerebral, no detail escaped his watchful eye, and he left nothing to chance. He reminded me of someone who in their later years would be in a bulky sweater, smoking a pipe and reading book after book and having highly intellectual discussions with others.”
Kristensen was assisted by Lieutenant McGreevy. Paro also described McGreevy: “They simply did not come any better than Mike McGreevy. Honor Man in his class, highly respected in the teams, detail oriented, a highly competent strategic and operation planner as well as an excellent tactician. When you put both Erik and Mike together it simply did not get any better than that.”
As the plan continued to develop, others were brought into the planning process. Included from the 160th SOAR were Lieutenant Colonel John Dunson, the commanding officer; Major Steve Reich, the acting task force operations officer; Captain Myron Bradley, the air mission commander; and Chief Warrant Officer 4 Chad Easter, the senior flight lead. Representing the SEALs were Lieutenant Commander Kristensen, Lieutenant McGreevy, Lieutenant Michael Murphy, Senior Chief Healy, and Marcus Luttrell, who served as leading petty officer (LPO).
Actionable intelligence showed that Shah’s troop strength numbered between 80 and 200 men, and his force was growing. Although the plan was fully developed, on the day of the scheduled mission it was “taken down” due to the lack of adequate air support and indefinitely postponed as commanders placed other missions higher on the priority list.
Throughout their deployments, Lieutenant Mark Hernandez and Lieutenant Michael Murphy remained in frequent communication and planned and coordinated the remaining missions which they were required to cover down. Mission planning was conducted utilizing the capabilities of the SEAL Mission Support Center (MSC), and the most recent version of SOMPE-E (Special Operations Mission Planning Environment-Maritime), the mission-planning software. A variation of the Microsoft Windows NT Office 2000, it allowed special operations planners a secure platform from which to access information, conduct Web chats and whiteboard sessions, and bring the vast military and special operations databases to operational- and tactical-level planners.
Operation Red Wings: The Mission
Most special operations missions were conducted in a relatively short period of time, several hours at the most. Red Wings would extend over a minimum of three to four days. The mission called for a four-man SEAL reconnaissance element to find Shah and document his troop strength. Once Shah was located, the recon unit was to call in a SEAL team to act as a combined assault and blocking force. They were to surround and neutralize Shah’s camp, then perform a combined direct-action assault to neutralize anticoalition militia (ACM) throughout the Korangal Valley.
The Korangal Valley is located on the southern part of the Pech River, a strategic passage the Taliban and al-Qaeda wanted to control. As such, it was among the deadliest pieces of terrain in the world for U.S. forces. Below the Korangal River and across the valley is the dark face of the Abas Ghar ridge and Sawtalo Sar. Sawtalo Sar is a 9,282-foot peak with a ridge that runs north to south and defines the eastern wall of the six-mile-long Korangal Valley. The Taliban essentially owned Abas Ghar and Sawtalo Sar. The Korangal fighters were fierce, knew the terrain, and watched the Americans’ every move.
Father’s Day
Despite his busy mission planning and execution schedule, on Sunday, June 17, at 4:58 PM, Michael sent a combined e-mail to his father, his mother, his fiancée, Heather, and his brother John.
Hey All,
I know this is really weak you guys each deserve your own e-mail but I’m really busy. I haven’t been able to talk for a while, I have been away. I hope you are all OK and in good health. I pray once in a while that all of you stay safe and are happy. I’m doing fine. My prize possession is this beard I’ve grown. It’s itchy as all hell but . . . whatever. Things are going well, I like it out here and we are doing a lot. I have some funny stories and some sad ones, but all in all things are good. I’ll write each of you separate later, I just wanted to let you all know I was OK.
Oh yeah John, it’s summer vacation and I know you are working but make sure you start a consistent regimen of physical training. You’re going to need it if you want that job. Not to be on your ass, I heard that you did very well in college. Great job and keep up the good work.
After a lengthy delay and with the end-of-June command change just days away, CJSOTF-A commanders placed Operation Red Wings back at the top of their priority list. The four members of Murphy’s Alfa Platoon originally selected to serve as the reconnaissance element were Michael, as team leader; Petty Officer Matthew Axelson; Petty Officer Shane Patton; and LPO Marcus Luttrell. Michael was selected based on his previous Fitness Report and Counseling Records, combined with his proven performance in previous missions since he arrived in Afghanistan. However, twenty-four hours before the operation began, the task force’s commanders determined that Petty Officer Danny Dietz, currently assigned to SEAL Team Ten from SDVT-2, would replace Patton. Dietz was a communications expert, a skill that was deemed critical on this mission. Luttrell lobbied hard for Patton, who had performed superbly as a communications specialist in his previous missions. Luttrell wanted this to be an all SDVT-1 operation. But the commanders wanted more than one team to have the opportunity to participate in this mission, and so, despite Luttrell’s efforts, they went ahead with their decision to replace Patton with Dietz.
On June 25, Shah released a statement threatening U.S. forces. Commander Paro and Lieutenant Commander Kristensen discussed the threats during their daily conversation and determined that his rhetoric was essentially unchanged.
The Reconnaissance Element
Petty Officer Second Class Matthew Gene Axelson, twenty-nine, was born on June 25, 1976, in Cupertino, California, to Cordell and Donna Axelson. After graduating from Monta Vista High School in 1994, he attended California State University, Chico, where he earned a degree in political science. He enlisted in the U.S. Navy in December 2000, entering basic training, or boot camp, at Naval Station Great Lakes, near Waukegan, Illinois. After completing Sonar Technician Surface (STG) “A” school, he was selected to attend BUD/S training and graduated with Class 237.
After BUD/S, he attended Army Airborne jump school, SEAL Qualification Training (SQT), and SEAL Delivery Vehicle (SDV) School. He reported to SEAL Delivery Vehicle Team 1 (SDVT-1) in December 2002 in Hawaii, joining Michael Murphy’s Alfa Platoon. Known as “Cool Hand Luke” to his teammates, at six feet four inches tall, he was quick, slim, and a superb athlete, and was considered an expert mountain climber and a SEAL sniper, both skills required on this mission. He and his wife, Cindy, were married in December 2003.
Petty Officer Second Class Danny Philip Dietz Jr., twenty-five, was born on January 26, 1980, in Aurora, Colorado, to Danny and Cindy Dietz. After graduating from Heritage High School in nearby Littleton in 1999, he enlisted in the Navy on August 31, 1999. Following his graduation from Recruit Training Command, Naval Station Great Lakes, on November 27, 1999, he completed Gunner’s Mate “A” school at the Naval Air Technical Training Center (NATTC), Pensacola, Florida. From there he transferred to BUD/S and graduated with Class 232 in 2001. He went on to attend the Basic Airborne Course at Fort Benning, Georgia, then SQT and SDV Training.
Immediately upon checking in at SEAL Delivery Vehicle Team 2 in Virginia Beach, Virginia, on November 8, 2001, he was assigned to Task Unit Bravo as the secondary SDV pilot and the Ordnance and Engineering Department head. During a rigorous predeployment work-up he honed his skills and became one of the best pilots in the command. He married his wife, Maria, in March 2003. He leveraged his skills during a six-month deployment to European Command (EUCOM) as the lead pilot in multiple proof-of-concept rehearsals (detailed training exercises under full mission conditions). Upon his return from EUCOM, he was assigned to Task Unit Charlie as a primary Special Reconnaissance Team member and the Communications Department head. During predeployment he focused his attention on perfecting his SEAL sniper, reconnaissance, and field skills. In the barren and forbidding mountains of the Hindu Kush, his communications expertise would be critical.
Leading Petty Officer Marcus Luttrell, thirty, was born in 1975 in Huntsville, Texas. He began training for the SEALs at the age of fourteen with former Green Beret Billy Shelton and joined the Navy in 1999. He started with BUD/S Class 226; however, due to a fractured femur he suffered on the O-course, he graduated with Class 228 on April 21, 2000. After completing BUD/S, he attended Army jump school and SQT. He was then sent to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, for an additional six months of advanced training in conventional and unconventional medical skills, ranging from diagnosis and treatment of nearly every known condition to advanced emergency medicine and battlefield life support.
After SDV Training, he completed a two-year tour in Iraq. A highly competent and battle-proven corpsman, his medical training was a critical element in the preferred four-man SEAL units, although hopefully it would not be needed. If that were the case, he would serve as the backup sniper.
The Plan
The plan seemed simple enough. Murphy and his team were to spend the first day monitoring Shah’s location and movements from a concealed position in the hills above Asadabad, the capital of Kunar province. On day two, once Shah’s location was verified, SEAL Team Ten had orders to call in the prearranged SEAL assault force designated to neutralize Shah, his headquarters, and his Mountain Tigers. A combined task force of ground troops would then be deployed on the third day to begin conducting mop-up operations throughout the valley. This would, it was believed, neutralize any remaining ACM in the Korangal Valley.
Bagram Airfield, Sunday, June 26, 2005
The air mission briefing was conducted at the 160th SOAR Planning Center. Present from the 160th were Major Steve Reich, the operations officer; Captain Myron Bradley, the air mission commander; Chief Warrant Officer 4 Chad Easter, the senior flight lead; and the pilots and flight crews of the two assigned helos. Attending from the SEALs were Lieutenant Commander Erik Kristensen, Lieutenant Michael McGreevy, Lieutenant Michael Murphy, Senior Chief Dan Healy, and Leading Petty Officer Marcus Luttrell.
During the briefing every aspect of the mission was thoroughly detailed, including the all-important abort criteria. Abort criteria were a predetermined set of circumstances that could cause the immediate cancellation of the mission. The abort criteria for this mission were ACM at the helicopter landing zone (HLZ) and inadequate air support. Captain Bradley later related, “Nothing was overlooked, no detail was too small for consideration, everything was gone over in ‘eye-bleeding’ detail.” Although not openly discussed, all were acutely aware of the insistence from CJSOTF-A commanders for successful completion of the mission. At the conclusion of the one-hour meeting, it was announced that the mission was a go for the next operational period—the next period of darkness.
Operation Red Wings: Execution
Monday, June 27, 2005
Early in the morning of June 27, confirmed intelligence pinpointed Shah’s location. By that afternoon, Kristensen and McGreevy had laid out the updated detailed maps and other photographic intelligence of the terrain for Murphy and Luttrell to review. Murphy, highly skilled in land navigation, drew a much smaller version of the map for his use. The target village location contained thirty-two houses—or, more accurately, straw huts.
After two additional delays during the day, Operation Red Wings was on for that night. A couple of hours before the operation commenced, during an electronic conversation with Hernandez, Murphy related that Operation Red Wings was proceeding. He said that this was the operation they had hoped for since their arrival and that it was fitting that this would be their last mission before they left Afghanistan. Both were pleased that the SEALs were being utilized on this mission because it was the type for which they were specifically trained, and their after-action report and direct experience would provide excellent training material for future teams and deployments. Hernandez related that he was “happy for them” and that he was still working on a plan that would allow Murphy’s squad to bypass the other cover-down operations and meet up with them in Iraq soon. Both looked forward to the reunion.
Zero Hour: Insertion
Just after dark, two helos were waiting on the flight line. Murphy, Dietz, Axelson, and Luttrell loaded into the lead Chinook MH-47E, which had the call sign Turbine 21, piloted by Easter and Chief Warrant Officer 3 Steve Swartz. Also on board were Captain Bradley; Staff Sergeant Ron Oster, the flight engineer; and three crew chiefs. Kristensen and McGreevy, the mission commanders, and a quick-reaction force (QRF) of twenty-five ground troops loaded into the other helo, which had the call sign Turbine 22. The QRF was a contingency in case there were any problems with the insertion or during the first twenty-four hours while the team was on the move to its target.
The Boeing MH-47E is a derivative of the CH-47D Chinook heavy-duty lift helicopter developed specifically for the 160th SOAR. It is a long-range special operations forces insertion/extraction platform with integral command and control capabilities. With a maximum speed of 154 knots, and a service ceiling of 11,000 feet, it features twin SATCOM (satellite communications) links, and is also equipped with an AN/APQ-174A multilode (terrain following, terrain mapping, air-to-ground ranging) radar, an AN/AAQ-16 forward-looking infrared (FLIR) system, and the integrated GPS-based scrolling map display system. The FLIR uses the detection of thermal energy to create a “picture” assembled for the video output that helps pilots and drivers steer at night, in fog, or detect warm objects against a cold background when it is completely dark.
Also equipped with two pintle mounts, one located at the right-side crew door and the other on the left-hand side at the first window, the MH-47E is capable of accepting a single machine gun, either an M60D single-barrel 7.62-mm medium machine gun or a single M134 7.62-mm six-barreled Minigun capable of firing two thousand to four thousand rounds per minute. With two guns up front at the cabin door and the left-side gunner’s window (M134s) and two guns in back at the machine-gun cutouts (M240 7.62-mm machine guns), it is a well-armed aerial platform.
After the flight-readiness check, Easter took the lead helo, Turbine 21, skyward. Turbine 22 followed. Both helos headed northeast toward the treacherous and unforgiving Hindu Kush range, a sixty-two-minute trip by air. To decrease the signature, or noise, of approaching forces, Turbine 22 broke formation at a predesignated point and proceeded to Asadabad to wait, then relocated to the forward operating base (FOB) at Jalalabad (J-bad), about a fifteen-minute flight from the designated insertion point. There, commanders monitored both the reconnaissance element insertion and the first twenty-four hours of the mission. In a cold, driving rain, Turbine 21 continued up Sawtalo Sar on its seven-minute trip to an altitude of nine thousand feet in search of its landing zone (LZ). The engines struggled in the thinning atmosphere and driving rain, and the helo lurched to the left and right, shuddered, and vibrated. As they gained altitude and headed away from the lights of J-bad, Easter, Bradley, and Swartz noticed the ominous campfires and lights of local villagers and ACM.
“Ten minutes!” yelled Oster as he turned toward the SEALs. Murphy acknowledged and gave a thumbs-up. The SEALs reviewed their plan of operation, equipment, and communications. Murphy and his team mentally prepared for their insertion. Bradley heard a radio communication from an AC-130 gunship circling overhead stating that it was “breaking station”—leaving its assigned area due to low fuel. Although another AC-130 was on its way, it had not arrived, thereby depriving the helo of air support, one of the all-important abort criteria. As the air mission commander, Bradley had a decision to make: abort the mission, or continue on and hope the relieving AC-130 arrived quickly. Aware of the critical importance of the mission to CJSOTF-A commanders, Bradley requested a status report on the primary helicopter landing zone, Nez Perce, and the alternate, Neka. Bradley was informed that LZ Nez Perce was clear but infrared sensors placed four individuals at LZ Neka. The two LZs were about 3.2 miles (5 kilometers) apart. Bradley informed the flight crew and the SEALs of the situation and his decision to continue with the mission. Murphy nodded affirmatively.
“Six minutes!” Murphy again acknowledged as Oster opened the rear ramp and both he and the crew chiefs prepared the aircraft for landing. “Three minutes!” Murphy again acknowledged, then he and the SEALs got on their feet and checked their equipment to ensure it was secure. Oster noticed Murphy communicate with each of his teammates, who all responded with an affirmative nod. As the helo approached, LZ Nez Perce was covered with fifteen-to-twenty-foot-tall trees, large tree stumps, thick brush, and large boulders. Easter tried repeatedly to find a safe “sweet spot” to set the helo down but was unsuccessful, which necessitated a fast-rope insertion. Oster immediately pulled the 1¾-inch-diameter nylon fast rope down from the fast rope insertion/extraction system (FRIES), secured it to the helo’s frame, and kicked it out the door. He then turned to Murphy and said, “One minute.”
Easter handed off the visual control to Oster, who obtained a direct visual of the LZ. Oster acknowledged visual contact: “Roger, Budweiser!” Oster gave Murphy a thumbs-up, which he returned.
Easter performed a flare maneuver by pitching the nose up, which would normally cause the helicopter to gain altitude, while at the same time reducing power to prevent a climb from occurring. This allowed the aircraft to hover over a suitable site. With the rear ramp down, Oster monitored the fast rope dangling from the back of the aircraft to the landing zone some thirty feet below and ensured that the rope reached the ground. Two crew chiefs manned the helo’s Miniguns and kept an eye on the LZ for enemy activity and fire. Oster gave Murphy another thumbs-up, which he again returned. The SEALs walked toward the rope with their hands over their heads, hanging onto the overhead FRIES support bar. Murphy and his men were dressed in full combat gear—knee and elbow pads, weapons, helmet, goggles, a rucksack containing about eighty-five pounds of food, ammunition, communications, and other supplies—and were wearing their all-important Kevlar Cobra tactical gloves, which prevented friction from burning their hands as they rapidly descended the rope. As the cold driving rain continued, the first one down was Dietz, followed by Luttrell, Murphy, and Axelson.
During the insertion Oster communicated with the crew: “First man on the rope . . . second man . . . third man . . . last man on the rope . . . last man on the ground.” The precision fast-rope insertion took approximately fifteen seconds. Without the weight of the SEALs on the rope, the prop wash of the helicopter’s rotor blades caused the fast rope to snake around a small tree and become entangled in the heavy brush, which anchored and threatened the aircraft. With everyone on the same communication frequency, Oster informed both Easter and the SEAL team about the fast rope. Easter carefully maneuvered the helo in an attempt to free the rope, but without success. Although it was not part of the operational plan, Oster advised both the SEALs and Easter that cutting the rope was the only way to free the helo. Dietz acknowledged and Oster cut the fast rope. Looking down from the ramp, Oster saw Dietz and Axelson run toward and secure the rope as Murphy and Luttrell monitored the perimeter. Dietz acknowledged possession of the rope. The ramp was raised, and Easter pointed his helo back down the mountain toward J-bad airfield. Dietz and Axelson covered the rope with brush, weeds, grass, sticks, rocks, and dirt, then each member of the team moved about twenty yards apart and froze into the landscape for fifteen minutes in total silence—no movement, no communication.
By this time, Easter had returned the helo to J-Bad. Upon entering the Operations Center, Lieutenant Colonel John Dunson and Captain Bradley were approached by Lieutenant Commander Kristensen and Senior Chief Healy, who had monitored mission communications regarding the cutting of the fast rope. All agreed that it was not part of the operational briefing. After the Army officers described the situation at the LZ and the reason for cutting the rope, Kristensen and Healy accepted the explanation, but inquired as to the possibility of the 160th returning and retrieving the rope to prevent its detection by ACM. Their thinking was that due to the size of the rope, the SEALs would be unable to carry it with them.
Bradley explained that the only way to retrieve the rope in that terrain was to lower a man by hoist, find the rope, which had been hidden, and then extract it. Bradley also explained in detail the difficulties they had just encountered with the insertion and that such an attempt could bring unwanted attention to the SEAL team. Dunson concurred and voiced his concern about such a return mission. Kristensen and Healy recognized the danger in such a mission and withdrew their request.
Flight crews and mission commanders in the Operations Center were able to monitor the team’s progress because it was carrying a tracking beacon. As the SEALs moved slowly toward their target objective in the cold, driving rain, they counted two fires or lanterns in the village below, an estimated mile away, and reported “eyes on” several local goat herders as they progressed toward their layup (LUP) position. The terrain to the right featured huge, thick trees; to the left were the forbidding mountains, low tree stumps, and thick foliage. The men were soaked and worked to keep their body temperatures up by remaining in constant motion. Although on the ground, the team was far from its planned area of operation. Dietz established quick communication with an AC-130 gunship arriving high overhead, and the team prepared to move on its preplanned four-mile journey along Sawtalo Sar’s ridge, which stretched into a long right-handed dogleg. Conditions for the team were so bad that despite being expert mountain climbers, each member fell back down the mountain within the first half hour. Murphy periodically radioed back to Kristensen with news of their progress as they slowly reached each predesignated checkpoint.
Exhausted after the seven-hour trip, the men rested and Dietz radioed J-bad headquarters that they were “good to go.” Murphy informed Kristensen that even though they were not at their intended layup point, he believed they had reached an even better one than anticipated and were going to lay up for the day. Hearing that, Kristensen turned to Bradley and said, “We are at a stopping point here. They are going to lay up for the day. We are good here.” The QRF loaded back up in the two helos and returned to Bagram to prepare for the assault of Shah’s compound during the next operational period. As a planned contingency, Marine forces and helos were placed on ready alert as a QRF in case Murphy’s SEALs needed them.
After a short rest, Murphy and his SEALs relocated against some trees and rocks; however, due to an incoming fog bank, their view of the village was severely limited—only two huts were visible—resulting in the team relocating yet again. After an hour-long reconnaissance by Murphy and Axelson, a perfect location was found to observe the village; however, it provided little cover. Although the new site was only about a thousand yards away, it took the team over an hour to cover the treacherous and sheer terrain.
Location Compromised
The team’s new location was over the brow of the summit, approximately eighty feet from the uppermost escarpment at an altitude of about nine thousand feet. As daylight approached, they determined that their current location was too dangerous to stay there. Despite the fact that SEALs lie low in the daylight and move at night, Murphy ordered the team to “move in five.” The men retraced their route about a hundred yards and found a prime location in the trees that overlooked the target village. The village was nearly a mile and a half away, but their location provided a clear line of sight with good concealment. With their specialized equipment, the distance proved no obstacle to their reconnaissance efforts.
In perfect hiding locations, they waited in full combat gear, soaked from the night’s rain, baking in the searing Afghan sun. In a tactical diamond-shaped formation about thirty yards apart, each was waiting with heightened vigilance and in perfect silence when a man carrying an ax and accompanied by about a hundred goats was spotted by Axelson. In perfect silence, he placed the goat herder in the crosshairs of his weapon as he approached Luttrell’s position. As the goat herder jumped down from the log under which Luttrell had positioned himself, the petty officer broke cover and the man nearly stepped on him. Immediately upon seeing Luttrell, the man tossed his ax on the ground in front of him. While Luttrell took control of the man, Axelson signaled that two more goat herders were closing in on his position. As they neared, they appeared to the carefully observing SEALs to be a father and his young son. It was clear to the team that despite the fact the first goat herder had been carrying an ax, these individuals were civilians, not ACM members. The SEALS were now in a situation known as a soft compromise. Not knowing if the entire team’s presence had been compromised, the SEALs could not afford to allow the other two herders to proceed unchallenged. The other three SEALs also broke cover as the man and his son reached their position.
The two goat herders were startled as the SEALS surrounded them. They stood motionless alongside the first man, just staring at the four Americans. In response to the team’s questions, the goat herders replied in heavily accented, broken English, “No Taliban! No Taliban!” The goat herders were directed to sit together on a nearby log as the team engaged in several minutes of discussion, followed by attempts at interrogation, which failed. Although they acknowledged understanding the team’s questions, the goat herders gave the SEALs no information and continued to stare at them. Luttrell gave the young boy a PowerBar. Without taking his eyes off Luttrell, the boy accepted it, but placed it on a rock beside him instead of eating it.
Despite the sometimes-blurred lines between different-ranking members of a SEAL team, each of the men understood the chain of command and would follow orders without question. Despite their open discussion that day,* each man understood that the team structure was not a democracy—there was to be no consensus, and there would be no voting. After requesting and receiving appropriate and valuable input from the other members of his team, the final decision unquestionably would be made by the team leader, Lieutenant Michael Murphy. He was acutely aware of their situation and reminded his team of several important pieces of information.
1. These three individuals were clearly civilian goat herders.
2. If they aborted every mission in which they were compromised, no mission would ever be completed.
3. The SOP and ROEs for this situation were clear.
4. If they were to eliminate these three civilians, who would do the execution, how would they dispose of the bodies, and what would they do with more than a hundred goats with bells around their necks?
5. CJSOTF-A commanders were insistent on mission completion before command change.
6. Shah’s forces were continuing to inflict U.S. causalities.
7. This might be the best chance to neutralize Shah.
8. This was their last scheduled mission before deploying to Iraq.
9. This mission was why they had come to Afghanistan.
Utilizing his innate leadership and interpersonal skills, and after listening to the input of his team, Michael Murphy explained the situation and shared each of the items of concern and led his team to the only acceptable option: to set the civilian goat herders free. Murphy then gave the order. While they watched the goat herders run up the mountain and disappear out of sight, Michael ordered the team to prepare to move to a new location. Again, trained to move only at night, the team found itself in a catch-22. Within twenty minutes the men were on the move. As the OIC, Murphy understood the essence of leadership: in any moment of decision, doing the right thing was always the right thing to do . . . regardless of the consequences.
The team headed for the best defensive position it could find—up the mountain. Approximately forty yards from the summit was a location with tree cover and concealment that made them nearly impossible to see. Their immediate strategy was to remain in defensive positions until the cover of darkness, then relocate. Murphy reminded his men to remain on high alert. They took up a defensive diamond position with each member about thirty yards apart. Axelson was charged with the responsibility of using binoculars and a scope to watch for Taliban fighters and monitor the village. About twenty minutes later Luttrell assumed the watch; Murphy followed him. More than an hour later, they were still in their new position, and all remained quiet.
The Battle for Murphy’s Ridge
Suddenly the silence was interrupted. “Sssssssst. Sssssssst.” It was Lieutenant Murphy’s warning sound—a familiar one to his men. He began calling out orders, among them instructions to Dietz to call for immediate reinforcements from HQ. As Murphy directed the team’s attention up the mountain, they saw about eighty to one hundred heavily armed Taliban fighters, each with an AK-47 pointed in their direction and several carrying launchers for the all-too-familiar shoulder-fired rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs). Within minutes the Taliban worked their way down the mountain on three sides, including the team’s left and right flanks. The team was sure that Axelson and Dietz’s position had in all likelihood not been compromised, but the same could not be said about Murphy and Luttrell’s. If spotted, they were trapped, with the only avenue of escape down the near-vertical nine thousand feet to the open valley below.
Up to this point, no shots had been fired. Dietz established radio contact with the J-bad communications center just as gunfire finally erupted and the sound of AK-47s filled the mountain air. A fierce firefight ensued between the four SEALs and the much larger enemy force. J-bad relayed the information to Bagram. Despite being flanked on both sides, the SEALs kept fighting. However, the sheer number of Taliban closing in on them, as well as the intensity of the gunfire and the frequent explosions of RPGs, made remaining in their current position impossible.
Nearly thirty minutes into the firefight, Dietz and Axelson had each received multiple wounds and Murphy had suffered a bullet wound to the abdomen. The wounded men began bounding down the mountain’s steep sides, making blind leaps of thirty to fifty feet into the trees, rocks, boulders, and thick shrubbery below, all the while providing each other with alternating cover fire. During their leaps downward, each man had lost his rucksack and Luttrell all of his medical supplies.
About forty-five minutes into the fight, the severely wounded Dietz sought open air space to place another distress call back to the base, but before he completed his call, he suffered another gunshot wound, this one to his right hand, shattering his thumb. Their ammunition was running low, and Dietz, Axelson, and Murphy had been severely wounded by gunfire or RPG rounds. Someone yelled, “I’m hit!” Murphy yelled back, “We’re all hit! Keep moving!”*
“Iron-Souled Warrior”
More than an hour into the fight, Dietz was dead and Axelson was suffering from multiple gunshot wounds, including one in his head. Despite being severely wounded with multiple gunshot wounds himself, Lieutenant Michael Murphy, in a last-ditch effort to save his men, broke cover and deliberately walked onto open ground in one final attempt to acquire a cell-phone signal. Recognizing the desperate condition of his team, he made the conscious decision that the only way any of his men were going to survive was to call in reinforcements. And the only way to do that in this rugged mountain terrain was to get to open ground, regardless of the cost.
Murphy used his encrypted Iridium satellite cell phone and called back to the Operations Center at J-bad. Luttrell yelled at Murphy to take cover, but he kept walking and finally made contact. Luttrell described Murphy’s actions: “He walked until he was more or less in the center, gunfire all around him, and he sat on a small rock and began punching in the numbers to HQ. I could hear him talking, ‘My men are taking heavy fire . . . we’re getting picked apart. My guys are dying out here . . . we need help.’ Right then he took a bullet straight in the back. He slumped forward, dropped his phone and his rifle, but then he braced himself, grabbed them both, sat upright again, and once more put the phone to his ear. I heard him speak again. ‘Roger that, sir. Thank you.’”
Having completed his call, he knew help was on the way. Luttrell saw Murphy pick up his weapon and flank to his left out of the line of sight. Luttrell then saw Axelson take another round and rushed over to him, but he could do nothing to help without his medical supplies. Axelson was unable to hold his weapon, but despite his mortal wounds, he placed his weapon on a rock and continued to return fire. Luttrell moved to another location and continued to fight on.
After about another thirty minutes the sound of gunfire diminished. Luttrell heard only the familiar sound of the AK-47s, which continued to fade, then ceased altogether. All around him Luttrell heard enemy voices yelling, screaming, and chanting. After several minutes, he heard several more rounds from an AK-47, followed by dead silence. He was alone.
* Their discussion is detailed in Marcus Luttrell’s book Lone Survivor: The Eyewitness Account of Operation Redwing and the Lost Heroes of SEAL Team Ten (New York: Little, Brown, 2007).
* Luttrell, the only remaining eyewitness, described the epic battle in graphic detail as only a battle-tested eyewitness can in his best-selling book Lone Survivor.