VI THE BODY

1   For the Madhyama Āgama version cf. Minh Chau 1991: p.88; and Nhat Hanh 1990: p.138. The other versions are (according to Schmithausen 1976: p.250) the PañcaviṃśatisāhasrikāPrajñāpāramitā and the Śāriputrābhidharma. In contrast, the two Satipaṭṭhāna Suttas (D II 291 and M I 56) and the Kāyagatāsati Sutta (M III 89) place mindfulness of breathing at the outset of the body contemplations.

2   Ps-pṭ I 365 explains “considering” to refer to repeated analytical observation.

3   M I 57: “he reviews this same body … as full of many kinds of impurity.”

4   A III 323.

5   Minh Chau 1991: p.89; and Nhat Hanh 1990: p.154. These are the sixth, seventh, eighth, and ninth of the body contemplations in this version, which describe the physical effect of each of the four jhānas with the help of the same set of similes found in the Pāli discourses (kneading soap powder into a lump, a lake fed by water from within, lotuses submerged in water, and a man dressed all in white).

6   M III 92.

7   e.g. various ways of dealing with unwholesome thoughts are listed as the third and the fourth of the body contemplations in this version. (Pāli parallels to these exercises are the first and the last of the antidotes to unwholesome thoughts mentioned at M I 120.) Or else the tenth and the eleventh of the body contemplations in this version are concerned with developing a “brilliant perception” and with “well remembering the contemplated image”. These could correspond to clarity of cognition (āloka-saññā) and to the sign of concentration (samādhi-nimitta) found elsewhere in the Pāli discourses. Cf. Minh Chau 1991: pp.88–90; and Nhat Hanh 1990: pp.153–6.

8   Nhat Than 1990: p.169.

9   Vibh 193. The commentary Vibh-a 252 further expands this to some extent by relating the anatomical parts to the four elements. Bronkhorst 1985: p.311, on the basis of this passage from the Vibhaṅga suggests that possibly the analysis into anatomical parts constitutes the most ancient and original approach to contemplating the body. Cf. also Lin Li-Kouang 1949: pp.122–7, who takes the entire Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta to be an elaboration of the more original Kāyagatāsati Sutta. A similar suggestion can be found in Schmidt 1989: p.41 n.3.

10 This emphasis can also be found in the fact that kāyagatāsati (mindfulness of the body), a word which in sutta usage is synonymous with kāyānupassanā (contemplation of the body), came to connote only the contemplation of the anatomical parts in the commentaries; cf. also Bodhi 2000: p.1453 n.366; and Upali Karunaratne 1999a: p.168. This shift in meaning underlines the importance of contemplating the anatomical parts as ‘the’ body contemplation.

11 Cf. e.g. M I 500; M I 510; S I 131; A IV 377; A IV 386; Sn 197–9; Sn 205; Th 279; Th 453; Th 567–9; Th 1150–3; Th 279 19; Thī 82–3; Thī 140; and Thī 466–71. These passages indicate that a somewhat negative attitude towards the body is not only a product of the commentarial writings (as suggested by Hamilton 1995b: p.61). Conversely, however, Heiler 1922: p.18, who speaks of a “vehement loathing of the body” (my translation of “ungestümer Ekel an allem Leiblichen”) as the aim of body contemplation, goes too far.

12 e.g. Vijayā at S I 131; Sāriputta at A IV 377; and Khemā at Thī 140; each stating that they feel ashamed and disgusted by their own body. However, this particular expression arose owing to the circumstances of each case, since Sāriputta was defending himself against the accusation of having physically shown lack of respect to another monk (cf. Mp IV 171), while the nuns Vijayā and Khemā were trying to discourage someone who was attempting to seduce them. In fact, the same expression occurs again at Vin III 68 and S V 320, where a number of monks engaged in contemplating the unattractive nature of the body with such fervour that they committed suicide, which is certainly not the appropriate way of carrying out this practice.

13 At S II 64 the Buddha pointed out that the body is neither one’s own nor does it belong to another, but is simply the product of conditions.

14 S V 170.

15 S IV 198.

16 Fryba 1989: p.111, fittingly speaks of “strategies of reality anchoring”. Tart 1994: p.44, explains: “instead of every thought carrying you away, you have an anchor in the here and now through your body”. Cf. also Nett 13, which points out that mindfulness of the body protects against sensory distraction.

17 According to M I 266, neglecting mindfulness of the body leads to delighting in feelings and therewith to attachment.

18 M III 95.

19 M III 89.

20 M III 96.

21 The importance of a foundation in body contemplation for the practice of samatha or vipassanā is stressed by Ledi 1983: p.38, who compares attempts to practise either without a previous grounding in awareness of the body to driving an ox-cart yoked to an untamed bullock without a nose-rope. The importance of the body contemplations for the development of samatha is also reflected at Ps I 301, which points out that mindfulness of breathing, of the anatomical parts, and of the bodily decomposition after death are satipaṭṭhāāna contemplations particularly suitable for the development of concentration.

22 e.g. in the Majjhima Nikāya aspects of body contemplation are separately expounded as independent discourses (ĀĀnāpānasati Sutta, M III 78; Kāyagatāsati Sutta, M III 88). Similarly the satipaṭṭhāna commentaries devote as much space to the body contemplations as to the remaining three satipaṭṭhānas: Ps I 247–74 against Ps I 274–301 (each 27 pages).

23 e.g. at M III 94–9; A I 43; and Dhp 293.

24 A I 45.

25 A I 43. Cf. also D III 272 and S II 220.

26 Th 1035. (This statement was made by Ānanda after the passing away of the Buddha.)

27 Th 468.

28 Lin Li-Kouang 1949: p.124; and Schmithausen 1976: p.254. The impression that contemplation of the body was known in ancient India is also to some extent supported by the introductory part to the Kāyagatāsati Sutta,M III 88, where the monks spoke in praise of the Buddha’s way of presenting body contemplation in such a manner that it would have manifold benefits. If the act of contemplating the body were in itself an innovation, it would most likely have merited their explicit praise.

29 Ps I 247 and Ps-pṭ I 348 maintain that other dispensations do not teach body contemplation as completely as the Buddha.

30 S V 326.

31 S V 326.

32 S V 317.

33 As a four-step satipaṭṭhāna in the (Mahā-)Satipaṭṭhāna Suttas at D II 291 and M I 59; as a sixteen-step practice in the Ānāpānasati Sutta at M III 79; as a saññā e.g. at A V 111; and as ānāpānasatisamādhi in the Ānāpāna Saṃyutta (e.g. at S V 317); cf. Vajirañāoṇ 1975: p.227.

34 SV 317–19 list the overcoming of worldly intentions, of aversion and attraction, attaining the four jhānas and immaterial attainments, and realization as potential benefits of mindfulness of breathing.

35 S V 321 and S V 316.

36 A III 449; Ud 37; and It 80. The Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam explains that mindfulness of breathing is particularly suitable for countering discursive thought because the breath is a bland meditation object, devoid of colour or outer form, and therefore does not in itself stimulate the imaginative tendency of the mind (in Pruden 1988: p.917).

37 M I 426.

38 M I 56.

39 From these three, the root of a tree stands in a particularly close relation to the practice of meditation; so much so that at M II 118 the mere sight of secluded trees led a king to associate them with the practice of meditation and thereby reminded him of the Buddha. Similarly, the space occupied by the root of a tree can act as a standard for measuring the area a meditator is able to pervade or suffuse with his or her practice (cf. M III 146). The root of a tree as a dwelling place constitutes also one of the four basic monastic requisites of a Buddhist monk or nun (together with almsfood, cast-off cloth for robes, and cow urine as medicine) and thus conveys nuances of contentment with the most minimal necessities of life. The “forest” and the “root of a tree” form part of the standard expression for introducing formal meditation (e.g. at D I 71). The “root of a tree” and the “empty hut” come up in the Buddha’s emphatic exhortation to meditate (e.g. at M I 46). In addition to forming part of the introduction to mindfulness of breathing, the same three types of place occur in relation to various other meditation practices: at M I 297 in relation to reflection on emptiness; at M I 323 in relation to overcoming the hindrances; at M I 333 in relation to the attainment of cessation; at M I 335 in relation to the divine abodes; at M I 336 in relation to unattractiveness of the body, awareness of repulsiveness in food, disenchantment with the whole world, and contemplation of impermanence; and at A V 109 in relation to the aggregates, to the sense-spheres, to various bodily illnesses, and to recollection of Nibbāna.

40 Cf. Ps I 247. Ps I 248 stresses that it is not easy to develop mindfulness of breathing in the presence of noise and distractions. Similarly Vibh 244 speaks of a forest and the root of a tree as solitary and silent places and therefore appropriate for retirement into meditative seclusion.

41 Gunaratana 1981: p.10; and Khantipālo 1986: p.11.

42 The expression “having folded his legs crosswise” is not further explained in the discourses. The commentaries take it as representing the lotus posture (e.g. Sv I 209), but in view of modern practical experience it seems reasonable to include any crosslegged sitting posture in which the back is kept straight and which can be maintained for a reasonably long time without causing pain.

43 The description of the sitting posture occurs in relation to overcoming the hindrances and developing absorption as part of the standard expositions of the gradual path, e.g. at D I 71; in the context of practising the divine abodes (brahmavihāras) at D III 49 and A I 183; in relation to contemplation of the five aggregates at M I 421; in the context of recollecting realization or levels of insight gained at A I 184; Ud 46; Ud 60; and Ud 77; in relation to mindfulness of the body at Ud 27 and Ud 77; and in the context of meditation in general at Ud 43.

44 This ambiguity arises because mukha can assume a variety of meanings, among them “mouth” and “face”, and also “front” and “top”, cf. T.W. Rhys Davids 1993: pp.533–4.

45 Paṭis I 176 explains sati qualified as parimukhaṃ to mean that it “provides” a “way out” (of forgetfulness). Fessel 1999: p.79, suggests understanding the term in contrast to the Sanskrit bahir mukha (averting one’s face), parimukhaṃ then implying presence of mind directed to the immediate environment. T.W. Rhys Davids (1993) has: “to surround oneself with watchfulness of mind” (p 672), and “to set one’s mindfulness alert” (p 431). The corresponding passage from the Chinese Āgamas reads: “with thoughts well controlled, not going astray” (in Minh Chau 1991: p.99). In fact, in several discourses the expression “mindfulness established in front” was used by people who were apparently quite unfamiliar with meditation in order to describe the Buddha seated in meditation (a Brahmin searching for his ox at S I 170, a woodworker at S I 179, and some Brahmin students at S I 180). It is difficult to imagine that these people should have been able to know, from merely seeing the Buddha seated, that he was directing awareness to his nostrils. The more probable explanation for these instances is that “mindfulness established in front” was used by them just to express the visible fact that the Buddha was sitting in meditative composure.

46 Vibh 252 explains it to refer to the nose tip or the upper lip; same at Paṭis I 171; and in Ehara 1995: p.157. Vism 283 further explains that the nose tip is the appropriate point of observation for meditators with a longer nose, while the upper lip fulfils the same function for those who have a shorter nose.

47 D III 49;M I 274; and A IV 437 relate mindfulness established “in front” to overcoming the hindrances; A I 183 to the divine abodes. Other occurrences of the expression “establishing mindfulness in front” occur in the context of forming the determination not to change one’s posture until realization is gained (at M I 219), in relation to developing a mind set on the welfare of both oneself and others (at M II 139), when directing the mind to the reflective understanding that the defilements have been eradicated from one’s mind (at A I 184), or as part of the description of a monk well versed in meditation (at A III 320). It may also be worth while to point out that the qualification “in front” appears to be more than simply part of a stereotype formula, since in several passages in the Udāna it is missing from otherwise identical descriptions of meditators sitting down cross-legged (Ud 21; Ud 42; Ud 43; Ud 46; Ud 60; Ud 71; and Ud 77).

48 According to the standard expositions (e.g. D III 49; M I 274; M III 3; or S V 105) the antidotes for each respective hindrance are: attending to the unattractiveness of the body, loving kindness, clarity of cognition, mental calm, and being unperplexed about wholesome states. Particularly interesting in this context is M I 421, where Rāhula sat down to establish mindfulness “in front” in order to contemplate the aggregates, but was only at a later point given instructions in mindfulness of breathing. This suggests that he had not previously received instructions in mindfulness of breathing, so it is not very probable that he was directing awareness to his nostrils during the contemplation of the aggregates that he had been taught previously.

49 The instructions describe a form of radiation (e.g. at M II 207) that does not seem to be in any way related to mindfulness of breathing.

50 Dhammadharo 1987: p.16, and Maha Boowa 1983: pp.14–16, instruct one to fix attention at the nose at first, but to shift to the chest or solar plexus area later on. Kamalashila 1994: p.168, proposes to counter slackness of energy by observing the breath higher up in the body (e.g. the nose), while in case of excess energy one can calm down by using a spot lower down (e.g. the abdomen). Brahmavaṃso 1999: p.17, suggests not locating the breath anywhere physically. On the other hand, Kassapa 1966: p.242, sharply criticizes the Mahasi tradition for observing the movement of the breath at the abdomen. However, in order to avoid contradiction with the commentarial explanation, the Mahasi tradition has always taken care to present their main meditation practice as a contemplation of the air element (as one of the elements mentioned in the instructions for meditating on the four elements), not as a form of mindfulness of breathing.

51 According to Chit Tin 1989: p.44, this instruction refers in particular to clearly distinguishing between the in-breath and the out-breath.

52 The relation of shorter breaths to the development of some degree of concentration is noted by Dhammadharo 1996: p.19; Dhīravaṃsa 1989: p.46; Goenka 1999: p.29; and Khantipālo 1981: p.30.

53 D II 291 and M I 56.

54 Ariyadhamma 1995: p.3, moreover explains the simile of the turner to indicate fixity of attention.

55 Paṭis I 185 in commenting on the third step of mindfulness of breathing.

56 According to Buddhadāsa 1976: p.63, the first two steps are preliminaries, and the real practice starts with this “training”.

57 In fact at S V 326, which documents the Buddha’s own practice of mindfulness of breathing, all occurrences of “he trains” are replaced by “I know”. This indicates that, unlike the ordinary practitioner who has to make an effort in order to proceed through the sixteen steps, the Buddha, with his meditative expertise, was able to do so effortlessly.

58 Cf. also Kor 1993: p.35; van Zeyst 1981: p.94; and Vimalo 1987: p.158. Shapiro 1984: p.588, suggests that from a psychological perspective awareness of the breath teaches one to be self conscious. Observation of the breath is indeed an appropriate vehicle for such self-observation, because emotional changes are reflected in the breath, such as when one yawns out of boredom, sighs in grief, or snorts in anger. Moreover, since breathing is a process that can take place either involuntarily or deliberately, it stands in a distinctive conditional position in regard to body and mind, and therefore offers a convenient opportunity to contemplate the conditional interrelationship between physical and mental phenomena. Cf. also Govinda 1991: pp.27 and 110.

59 Buddhadāsa 1989: p.38; Debes 1994: p.105; Goenka 1999: p.29; Kor 1993: p.38; and Solé-Leris 1992: p.80.

60 Vism 273.

61 At M III 83.

62 Nhat Hanh 1990: p.42.

63 At M I 301 and S IV 293 (cf. also Ñāṇamoli 1982a: p.6 n.1).

64 The calming of the bodily formation (in the sense of in- and out-breathing) reaches its culmination with the attainment of the fourth absorption (cf. D III 270 and A V 31), because during this attainment the breath completely ceases (cf. S IV 217). Pa Auk 1995: p.15, explains: “with the attainment of the fourth jhāna the breath completely stops. This completes the fourth stage in the development of ānāpānasati, calming the breath body.” Such complete calming, however, does not form part of the sixteen steps, since it would be difficult to reconcile with the subsequent progression towards experiencing joy (pīti) and happiness (sukha); mental qualities that have been left behind with the attainment of the fourth jhāna. In fact, once the breath has completely ceased, it is impossible to carry out the instruction to breathe in (and out) while calming the bodily formations.

65 Paṭis I 184; Ehara 1995: p.161.

66 According to Vism 274, calming body and mind leads in turn to calming the breath. Cf. also Jayatilleke 1948: p.217, who suggests that breathing may be taken as one concrete instance of bodily formations in the general sense of bodily reflexes. In fact “bodily formation” occurs at times as bodily action in general (e.g. at A I 122; or at A II 231–6), a usage that is not restricted to the breath. Cf. also Schumann 1957: p.29.

67 M III 82. Cf. also Kor 1993: p.38.

68 According to Vism 277, and 287–90, the second and third tetrads are practicable for jhāna-attainers only. (Cf. also Ehara 1995: p.161; and Ledi 1999c: pp.27 and 29.) Vism suggests two alternatives, either actual development of jhāna, or insightful contemplation after emerging from jhāna. Nevertheless, both of these would only be practicable for someone able to enter absorption. The net result is that, for someone unable to attain jhāna, a considerable part of the Buddha’s exposition on mindfulness of breathing moves beyond reach. Quite possibly because of this, additional methods came into being for the less proficient in concentration, such as counting the breaths (cf. Vism 278–83 for detailed instructions). Instructions of this type are not found anywhere in the discourses of the Buddha. Though counting the breaths may be helpful for the newcomer to mindfulness of breathing, it does to some extent constitute a change in the mood of this contemplation, since sustained counting can dull the mind (which is the reason underlying the traditional advice to use counting exercises to conquer insomnia) and also tends to stimulate the conceptual activity of the mind instead of quietening it.

69 Kheminda 1992: p.5: “the four foundations of mindfulness begin with a serenity (samatha) subject of meditation, namely, mindfulness of in-breathing and out-breathing”. Soma 1995: p.360: “the placing of the first tetrad of the Ānāpānasati Sutta at the very beginning of the two main Satipaṭṭhāna Suttas is clear indication of the necessity of at least the first jhāna … the development of insight is impossible to one who has not brought into being … at least the first jhāna.” Ps I 249, however, only suggests that based on the breath jhāna may be attained, not that mindfulness of breathing in the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta is only a samatha object of meditation. This impression is further supported by the fact that the Satipaṭṭhāna subcommentary Ps-pṭ I 349 makes a point of stating that an external development of mindfulness of breathing cannot yield absorption attainment. This shows that in the eyes of the commentaries mindfulness of breathing in the satipaṭṭhāna context can be undertaken independently of absorption attainment.

70 In fact the definition of joy (pīti) in this context at Paṭis I 187 uses a set of expressions that are not restricted to absorption attainment. Similarly at M II 203 the joy of the first two absorptions is contrasted with the joy arising through sensuality, documenting a type of joy (pīti) distinctly different from that experienced during absorption attainment. Cf. also Buddhadāsa 1989: p.51.

71 Dhp 374.

72 Such use of the breath as a means to develop insight into impermanence has a parallel at A III 306 and A IV 319, where a recollection of the inevitability and unpredictability of death is related to the unpredictability of the next breath. Cf. also SV319, where the practice of the sixteen steps of mindfulness of breathing leads to realization of the impermanent nature of feelings.

73 Cf. e.g. Th 548, which recommends practice of mindfulness of breathing in “right order”, demonstrating a clear awareness of this inherent progressive character. A detailed exposition of the sixteen steps as a single integrated practice can be found in Buddhadāsa 1989: pp.53–89. Cf. also Gethin 1992: p.59; Levine 1989: pp.32–6; Ṭhānissaro 1993: p.67; and Vimalo 1987: p.158.

74 M III 78. Cf. also S V 315, where the Buddha introduced a monk, who was already practising some form of mindfulness of breathing, to the sixteen steps in order to further his practice. Cf. also Debes 1994: p.197.

75 At M III 83 the Buddha related each tetrad from the sixteen-step scheme to a particular satipaṭṭhāna, while at M III 87 he provided the relation to the awakening factors. The same correlations occur at S V 323–36. S V 312 moreover relates mindfulness of breathing to each awakening factor singly.

76 The insight potential of any of the sixteen steps is described at Paṭis I 95, which points out that each step can lead to realization. Paṭis I 178–82 illustrates this potential by relating the first step of mindfulness of breathing (long breath) to experiencing the rise and fall of feelings, cognitions, and thoughts, to the awakening factors, and to the experience of Nibbāna. Cf. also Ñāṇamoli 1982b: p.163.

77 M I 56.

78 Cf. M I 120, where a progression from fast walking to slow walking, to standing, to sitting, and finally to lying down, is each time accompanied by the comment that in this way a gross posture is substituted by a subtler one. Cf. also Fessel 1999: p.111.

79 Proprioception is the ability to sense the position, location, and movement of the body and its parts.

80 e.g. at A IV 301.

81 81 Th 570.

82 Detailed practical instructions can be found in Mahasi 1991: pp.9–16. Cf. also Debes 1994: p.113; and Lily de Silva (n.d.): p.13.

83 Vism 622: predominance of earth + water = placing; predominance of fire + air = lifting. Cf. also Sīlananda 1995: p.7.

84 M I 21 relates the four postures to overcoming fear; M III 112 to avoiding desires and discontent; A II 13 and It 116 to not tolerating unwholesome thoughts; and A II 14 and It 118 to overcoming the five hindrances.

85 According to Ehara 1995: p.61, the standing and walking postures are particularly suitable for lustful natured (rāgacarita) personalities, while sitting and reclining are more appropriate for anger natured (dosacarita) personalities. Vism 128 adds that whichever posture is effective for developing concentration is the one to be adopted. According to the satipaṭṭhāna commentary, Ps I 264, clearly knowing in regard to stretching and bending, an aspect of the next body contemplation, implies knowing the right time for performing such action, since the feelings arising from maintaining an uncomfortable posture for too long might obstruct the development of the meditation. Chah 1993: p.40, points out that “some people think that the longer you can sit, the wiser you must be … wisdom comes from being mindful in all postures.” Similarly Vimalaramsi 1997: p.47, suggests “it is far more important to observe what is happening in the mind than to sit with uncomfortable or painful sensations … there is no magic in sitting on the floor. The magic comes from a clear, calm mind.”

86 Dhammiko 1961: p.188. Fryba 1989: p.125, even suggests deliberately assuming the posture of an insecure and anxious person, then changing to express self-confidence in one’s posture, and in this way to experiment with various postures and their relationship to different emotions. Van Zeyst 1989: p.31, instructs: “one observes and is aware of how these movements are the expressions of one’s mental attitude: aggressive in walking, or maybe escaping; defeated in lying down … standing in perplexity or expectation; sitting in satisfaction or in fear … neatness of movement in the desire to please … roughness of movement in anger and defeat … lack of movement in doubt and fear.”

87 Cf. e.g. S III 151, which describes how the worldling’s mistaken notion of a self is intricately bound up with his or her adopting any of the four postures. According to Ñāṇapoṇika 1992: p.64, “mindfulness on postures will bring an initial awareness of the impersonal nature of the body”.

88 Ps I 251, because in this way the notion of an acting self can be overcome. Ps I 252 adds that this is to be applied to any posture.

89 Vism 640 explains that the characteristic of dukkha is concealed by the four postures. Naeb 1993: p.143, explains: “it is pain forcing … to change position at all times … we change in order to cure the pain …it is like nursing a continuous sickness … there is pain in all positions”. Similar suggestions can be found in the Mahāprajñāpāramitāṥāstra (in Lamotte 1970: p.1157); and in Ñāṇārāma 1997: p.29.

90 e.g. at D I 89; M I 229; M I 332; M II 119; M II 158; A V 65; and Ud 7.

91 The Buddha is reported practising walking meditation at D I 105; D III 39; D III 80; S I 107; S I 179; S I 212; Th 480 and Th 1044. His walking meditation took place during the night (at S I 107), and also during the day (at S I 179 and S I 212). S II 155 reports all the senior disciples engaged in walking meditation, each with a group of other monks

92 92 A III 29. Improvement in health and digestion as benefits of walking meditation are also documented at Vin II 119. On the practice of walking meditation cf. also Khantipālo 1981: p.95; Kundalābhivaṃsa 1993: pp.75–8; and Ṭhitavaṇṇo 1988: pp.120–2.

93 Ps I 257 relates the story of a monk who realized arahantship after twenty years of sustained walking meditation. Ps I 258 records the same realization for another monk after sixteen years of walking meditation.

94 M I 273: “while walking and sitting, we will purify our minds of obstructive states.” The expression “obstructive state” is a synonym for the five hindrances (cf. e.g. S V 94).

95 A IV 87.

96 e.g. at M I 273. The recommendation to sleep on one’s right side (in the “lion’s posture”) could arise from the fact that in this way the smooth working of the heart during sleep is less obstructed by the weight of the body than when sleeping on one’s left side (which can cause unpleasant dreams).

97 Ñāṇavīra 1987: p.158.

98 Vin I 295 and A III 251.

99 Cf. A III 325, according to which awareness of the four postures forms the basis for mindfulness and clear knowledge.

100 M I 57. It is notable that most of the Pãli verb forms in this instruction are past participles, giving a nuance of passivity to the activities under observation. According to Kalupahana 1999: p.283, the Buddha used passive forms as a pedagogical device to highlight the characteristic of not-self. Another point worth considering is that the postures mentioned in the previous exercise recur in the present context. The commentary, Ps I 269, explains that the difference between contemplating walking, standing, and sitting under contemplation of the postures and in the present exercise is that here they are of comparatively shorter duration. The point the commentary is trying to make could be that clear knowledge is particularly relevant to the moment when one assumes a particular posture (in terms of purpose and suitability etc.), whereas postural awareness is more profitably applied to being in a posture.

101 e.g. at D I 70.

102 On the basis of the common characteristics of the gradual path of training, as it is described in various discourses (e.g. at D I 63–84; M I 179–84; M I 271–80; and M I 354–7), this pattern can be subsumed under five main stages: I. initial conviction and going forth; II. foundational training in ethical conduct and contentment; III. sense-restraint and mindfulness and clear knowledge in regard to bodily activities; IV. abandonment of the hindrances and development of absorption; V. realization. These five steps represent, to some extent, the five faculties/powers: I. confidence, II. energy, III. mindfulness, IV. concentration, and V. wisdom; cf. Crangle 1994: p.163. However, it should be added that the five faculties and powers are not to be developed only sequentially, but should be brought into being together. Barnes 1981: p.237, suggests an alternative scheme of six steps by distinguishing between sense-restraint, on the one hand, and mindfulness and clear knowledge, on the other, as two separate stages.

103 Several discourses (e.g. M I 181;M I 269; and M I 346) explicitly mention clearly knowing in regard to activities as a precondition for subsequent formal sitting meditation. This foundational role is echoed at Ps I 290 and Ps-pṭ I 380, which recommend clearly knowing in regard to activities as a basis for developing sati as an awakening factor. Cf. also Bronkhorst 1985: p.311; and Bucknell 1984: p.29.

104 The difference in character between clear knowledge of activities and the later body contemplations has led Schmithausen 1976: pp.253–5, to the conclusion that the contemplations of the anatomical parts, of the elements, and of a corpse could be later additions, because their character is somewhat different from the type of awareness practised during contemplation of bodily postures and clearly knowing in regard to bodily activities. However, several discourses (e.g. D II 94; A V 116; and A V 119) mention clear knowledge in regard to bodily activities separately from the four satipaṭṭhānas, indicating that both existed independently. This suggests that, if there was any later addition, it was clear knowledge in regard to bodily activities that was added to the satipaṭṭhāna scheme.

105 Cf. page 41.

106 At Ps I 253–61.

107 M III 113. This parallels an explanation found in the Satipaṭṭhāna subcommentary, Ps-pṭ I 364, which relates the development of clear knowledge in regard to speech to refraining from topics unsuitable for conversation.

108 At M I 460 and A II 123 as part of an instruction to a monk how to perform these bodily activities properly. At A IV 169 the whole set occurs again as a reference to proper behaviour, where a bad monk is trying to hide behind proper outer behaviour.

109 e.g. at A II 104 and at A V 201; cf. also Th 927 and Pp 44. Th 591 has the same qualification for the four postures. Law 1922: p.81, translates sampajañña in this context as “deliberately.”

110 Minh Chau 1991: p.83.

111 These are in particular the seventy-five sekhiya rules, Vin IV 184–206. The importance of such outward behaviour is noted by Collins 1997: p.198. Holt 1999: p.102, points out that “the sekhiya rules … are much more than mere social etiquette: they are outward reflections of the inner state of a bhikkhu’s mental condition”. A convenient exposition of the sekhiya rules can be found in Ṭhānissaro 1994: pp.489–510.

112 M II 137, giving a detailed account of the Buddha’s way of performing various activities such as walking, looking, sitting down, etc.

113 113 A IV 167.

114 M III 113.

115 A V 352 and S V 149; cf. also page 56.

116 Detailed descriptions of each part can be found in Ehara 1995: pp.171–7, and Vism 248–65. The Madhyama Āgama list of anatomical parts corresponds quite closely to the Pāli version (in Minh Chau 1991: p.90; and Nhat Hanh 1990: p.157), while the Ekottara Āgama has only twenty-four parts (Nhat Hanh 1990: p.170). According to Hayashima 1967: p.272, the Sanskrit versions of this satipaṭṭhāna contemplation mention altogether thirty-six parts. (Indeed, a passage from the Ratnamegha, quoted in Bendall 1990: p.202, lists thirty-six anatomical parts for body contemplation.) The fact that in the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta the anatomical parts listed are thirty-one could have some additional significance, since in Buddhist cosmology the realms of existence are of the same number. Thus the descriptions of material existence on the microcosmic and the macrocosmic level were moulded on a similar pattern. Some of the anatomical parts listed in the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta can also be found at Maitrī Upaniṣad 1.3.

117 117 M I 57.

118 118 M I 421 and M III 240.

119 Sn 199 mentions the brain. The brain is in fact added to the satipaṭṭhāna list by Paṭis I 7, and is also mentioned in the corresponding Chinese version in the Madhyama Āgama (in Minh Chau 1991: p.90). Vism 240 explains that the brain was not listed in the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta because it was already covered by “bone-marrow”. The male organ is mentioned at D I 106 and Sn 1022. The omission of the male organ from the satipaṭṭhāna list is not surprising, since the instructions have to be practicable for both male and female meditators; van Zeyst 1982: p.80, however, thinks that “with Victorian prudence the thought of sex has been eliminated or by-passed”. Ear-wax occurs at Sn 197.

120 Debes 1994: p.124.

121 Vism 265.

122 These are the first two of four “attainments of vision” presented at D III 104. Cf. also S V 129, which points out that contemplation of the bones has many benefits.

123 Sn 193–201. The progression in this discourse also parallels the progression of the body contemplations listed in the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta, since it commences by directing awareness to the four postures and to stretching and bending, and concludes with a description of a dead body eaten by animals.

124 Sn 206.

125 In Nhat Hanh 1990: p.170.

126 Sn 197 and A IV 386.

127 According to A V 109, contemplation of the anatomical parts is concerned with “unattractiveness” (asubha), which It 80 explains to have the purpose of countering lust.

128 S V 278. A consideration of this passage needs to take into account the traditional Indian respect for higher parts of the body over its lower parts.

129 Thī 471.

130 Cf. also Vibh 193, which clearly indicates that contemplation of the anatomical parts has to be developed on oneself first, before it can be applied to others.

131 This is documented at M I 336, where the former Buddha Kakusandha recommended contemplation of unattractiveness (of the anatomical parts) to his monks in order to counterbalance possible conceit at the excessive honour and veneration they were receiving from householders.

132 A III 323 relates contemplation of the anatomical parts to removal of lust; A IV 47 to developing disgust in regard to sexuality. Bodhi 1984: p.92, explains that “the meditation aims at weakening sexual desire by depriving the sexual urge of its cognitive underpinning, the perception of the body as sensually alluring”. Cf. also Khantipālo 1981: p.98; and Mendis 1985: p.44. An additional external application is described at Vism 306, where the list of bodily parts is used for counteracting anger by reflecting whether one is angry with the other person’s hair, or skin, or bones, etc.

133 Vin III 68 and S V 320. On this passage cf. Mills 1992: p.74.

134 This “double-mouthed” bag (ubhatomukhā mutoḷī) is, according to Schlingloff 1964: p.33 n.10, a piece of cloth used for sowing, with an upper opening for placing the grains inside, while the lower opening is used to sow the grains. This simile might have suggested itself because of the somewhat similar “double-mouthed” nature of the body, with an “upper opening” for placing food in, and a “lower opening” as the outlet for faeces.

135 Thī 33 and Thī 82–6.

136 M I 185; M I 421; and M III 240. According to Vism 348, the detailed expositions on the elements in these discourses are intended for the more slow-witted practitioners, while the comparatively brief instructions in the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta are for those of quick understanding.

137 M I 57.

138 Cf. e.g. A III 340, according to which a tree trunk can be seen as a manifestation of each of the four elements, since each of them is but a quality of the same tree.

139 According to Vism 351, the four element analysis is a refinement of the previous contemplation.

140 M I 188; M I 422; and M III 241 explain the bodily manifestations of the elements fire and air. Practical instructions can be found in Fryba 1989: p.123; or in Pa Auk 1996: p.17; cf. also Ehara 1995: pp.197–205; and Vism 351. In some contexts the scheme of the four elements is extended to cover five or even six elements, e.g. at M III 240, by including space and consciousness. These six elements form part of the satipaṭṭhāna instructions in the Madhyama Āgama version, while the version from the Ekottara Āgama has the same four that occur in the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta (cf. Nhat Hanh 1990: pp.140, 158, 170). The element “space”, according to M III 242, refers to the empty and hollow aspects of the body.

141 Ps I 272 and Vism 348. A butcher occurs also at M I 364, where it is precisely his skill in cutting out a bone so that no flesh is left on it for a dog to satisfy its hunger which forms the central aspect of the simile.

142 e.g. M I 186 gives an extensive application of the four element meditation to both oneself and to the external environment; cf. also Debes 1994: p.139; and King 1992: p.39. Ñāṇananda 1993: p.10, aptly brings out the effect of this type of contemplation by speaking of conceit as “a misappropriation of public property (i.e. earth, water, fire, air)”.

143 Sn 937 points out that the world is entirely without essence. Cf. also M III 31, according to which realization of the selfless nature of the four elements is a determining characteristic of full awakening.

144 M I 185 and M I 421 relate contemplation of the four elements to insight into not-self. The same discourses follow this by applying the understanding of not-self to a situation when one is being abused or harassed by others. A II 164 similarly relates contemplation of the four elements to insight into not-self, which in this way can lead to full awakening. Cf. also Vism 640.

145 M I 185. Cf. also Ledi 1986b: p.72, who suggests beginning insight meditation with this particular exercise as a basis, as it will help to rapidly develop an understanding of impermanence.

146 S II 170 points out that against the pleasure and enjoyment arising in dependence on the four elements stands their impermanent and therefore unsatisfactory nature; thus the only way out of this predicament is to develop detachment in regard to them.

147 M I 423.

148 This is exemplified at A IV 374 by Sāriputta who, wrongly accused of an offence, reacted by stating that his mind was free from resentment, just as the earth does not resent refuse being thrown on it.

149 Ñāṇamoli 1995: p.1191 n.150: “seyyathāpi suggests that this meditation … need not be based upon an actual encounter with a corpse … but can be performed as an imaginative exercise”. Vism 180 describes in detail how a meditator can gain the first vision of a decaying corpse in a charnel ground and subsequently develop this vision while meditating in his lodging. According to Ledi (n.d): p.58, this contemplation might similarly be developed based on sick or wounded persons (including oneself), or with dead animals as the object. Cf. also Thate 1997: p.11.

150 M I 58.

151 T.W. Rhys Davids 1997: p.80.

152 M III 91 and A III 323 subsume the same description under four main stages: the bloated body, the body eaten by animals, the skeleton, and the bones. The Madhyama Āgama version describes a contemplation of the same process in five stages, while the Ekottara Āgama version gives altogether eight stages (in Nhat Hanh 1990: pp.158 and 170).

153 Rockhill 1907: p.23.

154 e.g. Dhp-a III 108 reports that the Buddha conducted his disciples to see the rotting corpse of the beautiful courtesan Sirimā as a countermeasure to sensual desires. As 197 recommends the contemplation of a rotting corpse for those whose character disposition is predominantly lustful natured.

155 M I 88.

156 According to A III 323, contemplation of a corpse counters conceit.

157 Ṭhānissaro 1993: p.55.

158 Th 393–5 and Th 315–16. Another instance of a monk meditating in a cemetery can be found at Th 151–2.

159 Ps I 254.

160 In fact Ledi (n.d): p.59, recommends corpses of the opposite sex for vipassanā purposes, while corpses of the same sex are according to him suitable for the development of samatha. On contemplating a corpse as a samatha practice cf. Vism 178–96.

161 Th 267–70.

162 A III 306 and A IV 319.

163 A III 308 and A IV 320 relate recollection of death to stirring up effort to counter evil; A III 304 and A IV 317 relate the same exercise to realization of the deathless.

164 Debes 1994: p.151; and Kor 1993: p.18. A certain degree of de-identification with the body during actual contemplation is in fact directly implied in the instructions for the last three contemplations (anatomical parts, elements, corpse), where one’s own body is referred to as “this same body” (M I 57–8), an expression that seems deliberately to be voiced in an impersonal manner.

165 Cf. e.g. Th 20, where an arahant remarks that he is not afraid of death, ready to let go of the body mindfully. Cf. also A IV 48, which relates absence of attachment to life to having repeatedly recollected death.

VII FEELINGS

1   Hamilton 1996: p.45; and C.A.F. Rhys Davids 1978: p.299.

2   Cf. e.g. M I 302 or S IV 231; cf. also C.A.F. Rhys Davids 1978: p.300.

3   Bodhi 1993: p.80; Padmasiri de Silva 1992b: p.33; Dhīravaṃsa 1989: p.109; and Ñāṇapoṇika 1983: p.7.

4   M I 59.

5   A V 51. Cf. also S II 99.

6   According to S V 189, for a penetrative understanding of the three types of feelings the four satipaṭṭhānas are to be developed. It is remarkable that according to this passage all four satipaṭṭhānas are required for fully understanding feelings.

7   The Chinese version of this contemplation in the Madhyama Āgama additionally lists feelings connected with desire (and those which are not), and feelings related to food, while the Ekottara Āgama version directs awareness to the fact that the presence of one type of feeling excludes the presence of the other two (in Minh Chau 1991: p.93; and Nhat Hanh 1990: pp.161 and 173). The latter suggestion has its Pāli parallel at D II 66. Additional categories can also be found at Paṭis II 233, which includes feelings differentiated according to the six senses under contemplation of feelings. In fact, according to M I 398 the sixfold classification in the above satipaṭṭhāna instructions can be further expanded not only by bringing in the six senses, but also by distinguishing occurrences in past, future, and present times, thereby totalling one-hundred-and-eight types of feeling altogether. An alternative threefold scheme for contemplation of feelings has been developed by Mogok Sayadaw (in Than Daing 1970: p.90) by distinguishing between five sense door feelings as “external visitors”, mental feelings as “internal visitors”, and feelings related to in- and out-breathing as “host visitors”.

8   A III 412.

9   Ps I 279 explains that worldly pleasant feelings are those related to the five sense-pleasures, whereas their unworldly counterparts are those related to renunciation. Cf. also S IV 235, which distinguishes between joy or happiness that is worldly (sensuality), unworldly (absorption), and completely unworldly (realization). The qualification āmisa is often used in the discourses in the sense of “materialistic” as opposed to “dhamma”, e.g. monks honouring “material” things more than the Dhamma at M I 12 and A I 73 (cf. also A I 91–4); or a “material” gift at It 98. According to Goenka 1999: p.53, and Soni 1980: p.6, the same two terms are used in present-day India to distinguish between vegetarian and non-vegetarian food. Nhat Hanh 1990: p.71, understands the two terms to represent the distinction between physiological and psychological causes of feelings (e.g. a bad feeling resulting from having gone to bed late the night before would be “worldly”). Maurice Walshe 1987: p.591 n.658 and n.659 suggests “carnal” and “spiritual” as renderings.

10 Cf. M I 303; M III 285; and S IV 205. The relation of the three types of feeling to their respective latent tendencies has inspired a variation of contemplation of feelings in the Ratnacūḍa Sūtra (quoted in Bendall 1990: p.219), where the instructions are that if one experiences a pleasant feeling, one should develop compassion towards beings indulging in passion, while in the case of unpleasant feeling compassion is to be directed towards beings indulging in hatred, and with neutral feeling towards beings subject to delusion.

11 M I 303.

12 Described in detail at D II 58.

13 According to Ps I 277, feelings are a clearer object for satipaṭṭhāna than consciousness or contact, because the arising of pleasant or unpleasant feelings is easily noticed.

14 This is exemplified at A IV 88, where the Buddha elaborated the injunction “nothing is worth clinging to” by teaching contemplation of the impermanent nature of feelings, a contemplation he then showed to be capable of leading to realization.

15 M III 244 describes the arahant’s detached attitude to feelings owing to his or her understanding of their impermanent nature.

16 M III 242.

17 S IV 218.

18 Debes 1994: p.227.

19 Ps I 275. The commentary explains that the purpose of this form of inquiry is to overcome the notion of a self that feels. Cf. also D II 68, which points out two prominent identification patterns for feelings: “feeling is my self” and “my self feels”. These come, together with the view “my self is without feeling”, as three ways of construing a sense of self in regard to feeling. Their removal then leads to realization. On this passage cf. Bodhi 1995: pp.34–6. The importance of dissociating feeling from any notion of “I” or “mine” is also stressed by Ñāṇapoṇika 1983: p.4.

20 D I 16.

21 In fact, the Brahmajāla Sutta discusses sixty-two “grounds” for formulating views (D I 39: dvāsaṭṭhiyā vatthūhi), not sixty-two “views”. The actual number of views is much less, as e.g. the first four “grounds” make up the one “view” of eternalism, formulated in each instance in exactly the same terms. This shows that the Buddha’s analysis was mainly concerned with the epistemological grounds for formulating views, much less with the individual content of any of these views. When S IV 287 speaks of sixty-two “views” (dvāsaṭṭhi diṭṭhigatāni Brahmajāle bhaṇitāni) or Sn 538 of “heresies” (osaraṇāni), this does not really correspond to the terminology employed in the Brahmajāla Sutta itself.

22 At D I 39 the Buddha pointed out that all these different views arose for lack of knowledge and vision on the part of those who propounded them, who were simply under the influence of feelings and craving. The commentary Sv-pṭ I 180 explains the genesis of such views to be the outcome of not understanding the arising of feelings and therefore reacting to feelings with craving. Katz 1989: p.150, fittingly speaks of a “psychoanalysis of metaphysical claims”.

23 At D I 45 the Buddha explained that one who has understood the arising and disappearance of contact (contact being the necessary condition for the arising of feelings and therewith of craving), has thereby realized what goes beyond all these views.

24 D III 141.

25 Cf. e.g. M I 111, which describes how one’s thoughts and reactions depend on the decisive first input provided by feeling and cognition.

26 Khantipālo 1981: p.35.

27 Premasiri 1972: p.20.

28 Burns 1994: p.33.

29 Brown 1986a: p.271.

30 Padmasiri de Silva 1981: p.22; and Dwivedi 1977: p.255.

31 This is a recurrent theme throughout the Aṭṭhakavagga; see especially Sn 781; Sn 785; Sn 824; Sn 878; Sn 892; and Sn 910 on the dogmatic grasp engendered through views, and Sn 832; Sn 883; Sn 888–9; Sn 894; and Sn 904 on how this dogmatic grasp leads to deprecating others and to endless quarrelling. Cf. also Premasiri 1989: p.655, who aptly relates “view” to the concept of dogmatism.

32 Cf. also Bodhi 1992a: p.9; Burford 1994: p.47; Collins 1982: p.119; Gethin 1997b: p.222; and Gomez 1976: p.141.

33 The standard formulation of right view in the discourses is in fact directly concerned with attachment and clinging, formulated by way of the four noble truths (cf. e.g. D II 312). This scheme of the four noble truths is then applied to views themselves at A IV 68.

34 At M I 108 the Buddha, on being challenged to proclaim his view, answered that his view was such that it led to the absence of quarrelling with anyone. Cf. also M I 500, which relates understanding the impermanent nature of the three types of feeling to freedom from disputation. At S III 138 the Buddha summed up his non-contentious attitude with: “I do not dispute with the world, it is the world that disputes with me.”

35 A pragmatic attitude towards one’s own view is recommended at M I 323 and at A III 290, both instances specifying that the purpose of one’s view should be to bring about inner tranquillity and lead to freedom from dukkha.

36 Neither highly refined degrees of concentration, nor the pursuit of various ascetic practices, had been able to lead him to full awakening, so (at M I 246) he questioned himself: “Could there be another way to realization?” His unremitting effort to continue his quest even after exhausting all known approaches to realization might underlie M I 219 and also A I 50, both instances presenting his awakening as the outcome of undaunted striving. His departure from all hitherto known ways of approaching realization is indicated by the expression “things unheard of before” (e.g. at M II 211 and S V 422).

37 M I 246. On this passage cf. also Horsch 1964: p.107. The discourse does not give his exact age, though judging from the context it must have been at some point during his childhood. Mil 289 makes the rather improbable suggestion that he was only one month old and attained not just the first but all four jhānas. The Tibetan sources (Rockhill 1907: p.23) place this episode on the eve of his going forth, which also seems improbable.

38 M I 246 reports him as reflecting: “Why am I afraid of a happiness that has nothing to do with sensuality and unwholesome states? I am not afraid of such a happiness!” Based on this insight he realized awakening. Such understanding of the importance of an ethical evaluation of mental events is also reflected at M I 114 with his preawakening division of thoughts into wholesome and unwholesome ones.

39 A I 136; cf. also Dhp 200.

40 D I 196; cf. also D II 215. According to Ps I 297 with full awakening, joy (as an awakening factor) also reaches perfection.

41 Th 35; Th 526; Th 545; Th 888; and Thī 24.

42 e.g. at M I 212, where the beauty of the moon-lit Gosiṅga forest became the occasion for several senior disciples to extol various qualities of a monk; or the descriptions of natural beauty in the verses of awakened monks at Th 13; Th 22; Th 113; Th 307–10; Th 523; Th 527–8; Th 601; Th 1062; Th 1064; Th 1065; Th 1068–70; and Th 1136. At D II 267, the Buddha even expressed his appreciation for a slightly sensuous piece of music performed by the gandhabba Pañcasikha, whose song drew comparisons between the beauty of his beloved and the beauty of the life of arahants; on this passage cf. Gnanarama 1998: pp.119–21. On the appreciation of natural beauty by the Buddha and his monks cf. also Gokhale 1976: p.106; Kariyawasam 1984: p.359; and Nhat Hanh 1990: p.62.

43 M II 121; cf. also Rahula 1997: p.52. In fact, according to A V 122, one who delights in the Buddha’s teaching will experience happiness, whether walking, standing, sitting, or lying down.

44 M I 476 and M I 454. The same understanding is also reflected at Th 742, which recommends those type of pleasure that are related to the Dhamma; and in the expression “auspicious joy” (kalyāṇapīti) at Sn 969. Cf. also Premasiri 1981: p.69.

45 S II 30. Same sequence at Vin I 294, D I 73; D I 182; D I 207; D I 214; D I 232; D I 250; D III 241; D III 279; D III 288; M I 37; M I 283; S IV 78; S IV 351–8; S V 156; S V 398; A I 243; A III 21; A III 285; A V 1–6; A V 312; A V 315; A V 317; A V 329; and A V 333 (cf. also Paṭis I 85; and Vism 144). The supportive role of delight for realization is documented at Dhp 376; Dhp 381; and Th 11. According to Ayya Khema 1991: p.105, “inner joy is an absolute necessity for successful meditation”. Buddhadāsa 1956: p.109, speaks of the need to develop “perpetual spiritual joy”. The importance of pīti is also noted by Cousins 1973: p.120; Debes 1997: p.497; Gruber 1999: p.231; Ñāṇapoṇika 1988: p.20 n.9; and Sekhera 1995: p.104.

46 A V 2.

47 A III 435; the commentary Mp III 413 explains this as referring particularly to the need to avoid mental dullness. The importance of developing joy in the context of satipaṭṭhāna practice is also mentioned at S V 156.

48 M III 230.

49 M III 233; cf. also M I 398.

50 M III 217 relates the experience of mental joy to gaining insight into the impermanent nature of all sense experience; according to Th 398 and Th 1071 the pleasure of insight surpasses that of fivefold music; Th 519 points out that meditating free from craving yields the highest possible form of pleasure; Dhp 373 speaks of the divine pleasure of insight; and according to Dhp 374 insight into the arising and passing away of the aggregates leads to joy and delight.

51 M I 346 speaks of the happiness gained through maintaining pure ethical conduct (anavajjasukhaṃ), followed by the happiness derived from restraint of the senses (abyāsekasukhaṃ), which in turn leads to the progressive degrees of happiness experienced during the first absorption (vivekajaṃ pītisukhaṃ), the second absorption (samādhijaṃ pītisukhaṃ), and the third absorption (sukhavihārī), and culminates in the happiness of realization (nibbuto sītibhūto sukhapaṭisaṃvedī). Cf. also Th 63 and Th 220, who speak of gaining happiness through happiness. Govinda 1991: p.61 explains: “cessation of suffering is supreme happiness and …every step towards that aim is accompanied by ever-increasing joy”. Warder 1956: p.57, even goes so far as to compare the Buddha’s emphasis on the importance of joy with Epicureanism.

52 Abhidh-s 1–7 presents a scheme consisting of sixty-three states of mind accompanied by mental joy (somanassa), three accompanied by mental displeasure (domanassa), and fifty-five accompanied by equanimity (upekkhā); cf. also Govinda 1991: p.63.

53 A similar emphasis can be found at Kv 209, which lists a total of twenty-eight types of happiness. Cf. also Vism 143, which reports that non-sensual joy can occur at five different levels, and details eleven factors conducive to its development (at Vism 132). Various types of happiness are also listed in the Vimuttimagga (cf. Ehara 1995: p.5).

54 The “smile-producing state of mind, accompanied by mental joy” mentioned at Abhidh-s 2 among the rootless states of mind; cf. also Bodhi 1993: p.45. The arahant’s smile is documented in several discourses for the Buddha and for Moggallāna, e.g. at Vin III 105–8; M II 45; M II 74; S I 24; S II 254–8; and A III 214.

55 e.g. M II 214, cf. also Jayawardhana 1988: p.409. Additional reasons for these practices might have been the prevalence of the idea that self-inflicted pain builds up spiritual power (iddhi), which can then be used to attain supernormal powers or attain liberation; or the idea that the body is the source of craving and thus, in order to eliminate craving, the body is to be mortified.

56 S II 178; S III 149; and A V 113. Goldstein 1994: p.131, rightly points out: “the idea that enlightenment comes when we clear up our karma …is a mistaken view, because we are all trailing an infinite amount of past karma … enlightenment does not happen because we have gotten rid of a certain amount of karmic activity. It happens when our mind cuts through delusion.”

57 At S IV 230 the Buddha mentioned feelings originating from disorders of bile, phlegm, wind, imbalance of the bodily humours, change of climate, careless behaviour, or violence as alternatives to feelings resulting from karmical retribution. These alternatives are also enumerated at A II 87; A III 131; and A V 110; cf. also Ledi 1999d: p.66. In fact, according to A I 173 and A I 249 karma conceived as sole and absolute cause would imply a form of determinism and thereby logically exclude the possibility of living a life devoted to purification.

58 A V 292; A V 297; and A V 299 emphasize the impossibility of completely avoiding karmic retribution. Dhp 127 points out that there is no spot in the whole world where one could escape the retribution of one’s evil deeds. Cf. also Ud 21, which reports a monk, seated in meditation, experiencing pain because of former deeds. However, as A I 249 points out, the intensity of karmic retribution depends to a great extent on the present moral and mental condition of the person in question, in the sense that a particularly unwholesome deed might lead an immoral person to hell, but will not have the same consequences in the case of an otherwise moral person.

59 A IV 382 clearly denies that the holy life under the Buddha is lived for the purpose of altering or eradicating karmic results that have not yet ripened, clarifying that the purpose is rather to develop knowledge and wisdom. To attempt to eradicate the results of past karma was a Jain position, which the Buddha criticized at M II 216 and M II 222.

60 The simple logic behind this it that the karmic results bound to ripen in future lives will no longer have an opportunity to produce results (cf. e.g. Th 81). In the case of the arahant Aṅgulimāla, for example, retribution for his former crimes could only take place within the limited scope of that same lifetime (cf. M II 104).

61 M II 93.

62 M I 95.

63 M I 241.

64 Cf. Padmasiri de Silva 1991: p.71.

65 S IV 208. The Buddha then illustrated the unawakened worldling’s predicament in the case of pain with being shot by two darts, since over and above the “dart” of physical pain, the mental reaction leads to more dukkha, viz. another dart. Cf. also Lily de Silva 1987: p.19; Kor 1991: p.6, and 1995: p.18.

66 S III 1 instructs: “you should train like this: my body may be sick, yet my mind will not be afflicted.” The discourse explains that the point is to avoid identification with any of the five aggregates (and thereby with the pain). This suggests a sense of dissociation from the experience of pain, as if the affected part of the body did not belong to one. Although one continues to be aware of the pain as an objective phenomenon, this act of dissociation or de-identification diminishes or even removes the affective impact of the pain on the mind.

67 According to S V 302, painful bodily feelings cannot overpower a mind well established in satipaṭṭhāna. The Buddha himself, by remaining mindful and clearly knowing, was able to endure unperturbed the intense pain of a serious injury to his foot (at S I 27 and S I 110).

68 M I 303.

69 M III 285.

70 Ps I 277. The commentary illustrates this using the example of a hunter seeing tracks before and after a rock, thereby inferring the path an animal had taken.

71 Dhs 139–45; more explicitly at Abhidh-s 2; cf. also C.A.F. Rhys Davids 1922: p.171 n.2. The discourses offer a somewhat different perspective, since they speak of pleasant and unpleasant sights, sounds, smells, and tastes, these in turn providing the conditions for the arising of corresponding feelings of pleasure or displeasure; cf. e.g. S IV 115; S IV 119; S IV 125; and S IV 126.

72 It 47.

73 M III 219.

74 M III 220.

75 M I 59: “he abides independent, not clinging to anything in the world. That is how in regard to feelings he abides contemplating feelings.”