VI

TREATISE ON THE ART OF LOGIC

The Logic is a short work written in response to a request by a jurist for a concise account of the terms used in logic. It appears to be based to a considerable extent upon the logical works of al-Frb, for whom Maimonides had a high regard.

Logic is relevant to ethics in a number of respects. It contains a discussion of modalities, including those which pertain to ethics (III). It specifies the different kinds of premises used in argumentation, including practical reasoning (VIII). And, since logic is an instrument used in all of the sciences, Maimonides includes a brief account of the areas to which it is applied. Logic, then, also contains a classification of the sciences, including the practical sciences (XIV).

There are fourteen chapters in the Logic. The selections below include part of Chapter Three and all of Chapters Eight and Fourteen.

TREATISE ON THE ART OF LOGIC

CHAPTER THREE

. . . An utterance indicating the way the predicate of a proposition is related to the subject may be joined to the predicate, as when we say: “possible,” “impossible,” “probable,” “by necessity,” “obligatory,” “necessary,” “base,” “noble,” “ought,” “must,” and the like. These utterances and their like may occur in a bipartite or tripartite proposition.1 We call these utterances and their like modalities. For instance, when we say, “It is possible for man to write,” “possible” is a modality. Similarly when we say, “Every man is necessarily an animal,” “necessarily” is a modality. Again, when we say “Zayd must stand,” “It is base for Zayd to insult [others],” “Zayd ought to know,” and “It is probable that Zayd will act like that,” we call all of these modalities. We call the verb a word, and verbs we call words. . . .

CHAPTER EIGHT

There are four kinds of propositions which are known and require no proof of their validity: (1) sense perceptions, such as our knowing that this is black, this is sweet, and this is hot; (2) first intelligibles, such as our knowing that the whole is greater than the part, that two is an even number, and that things equal to the same thing are all equal to each other; (3) generally accepted opinions, such as our knowing that uncovering the genitals is base and that compensating a benefactor generously is noble; and (4) traditions, which include everything received from a sanctioned individual or sanctioned assembly. We seek proof only concerning the general trustworthiness of the individual from whom something is received, not concerning every statement he utters. Rather he is met with complete acceptance, if his general trustworthiness has been validated by everything said about him.

For members of the human species with healthy senses and dispositions,1 there is no controversy about sense perceptions and intelligibles. Nor is there any contention² concerning the certainty to which they attest. However, there is controversy and contention² about generally accepted opinions. Indeed, there are propositions which are generally accepted within one nation, but not within another nation. Moreover, whenever something is generally accepted within many nations, it carries more powerful conviction. The same holds with regard to traditions: that which is received by one people might not be received by another.

Whenever someone perceives something by means of a healthy sense [organ], he is undoubtedly certain of it. Likewise, all of the first and second intelligibles are certain. (By second intelligibles I mean, for example, geometrical forms and astronomical calculations. All of these are certainly intelligibles, because they are explained by premises which ultimately depend on first intelligibles.) So too, whatever experience confirms is certain, like the purgative effect of scammony on the stomach, the constipating effect of gallnut, and similar things. Whenever knowledge is attained by one of these three means,³ the logicians call the resulting proposition apodeictic.⁴

After this introduction, you should know that we call every syllogism both of whose premises are apodeictic a demonstrative syllogism. The use of these syllogisms and knowledge of their conditions we call the art of demonstration. When one or both of the premises of a syllogism is based on what is generally accepted, we call it a dialectical syllogism. The art of dialectic is the use of these syllogisms and knowledge of their conditions. When one or both of the premises of a syllogism is based on tradition,⁵ we call it a rhetorical syllogism. The art of rhetoric is the use of these syllogisms and knowledge of the ways they are used. There is another kind of syllogism, in which deception and distortion are used. Syllogisms are designated as sophistical when their premises—one or both of them—are such as to deceive, lead into error, or distort. The use of these syllogisms and knowledge of the ways by which one deceives and distorts may be called the art of sophistry. Simply by simile and comparison things may be presented in a favorable light or made repugnant. Every syllogism with a premise set down as a simile or comparison we call a poetic syllogism. The art which uses these syllogisms and teaches how to construct the comparison and the analogy which it uses is called the art of poetics.

Know that the demonstrative syllogisms have conditions which need not be mentioned in this discussion. However, analogy is not used at all in the demonstrative syllogisms, and induction is used only under certain conditions. It is the art of dialectic which uses induction without restriction, and the art of rhetoric uses an analogical syllogism. Likewise, one premise of the rhetorical syllogism is disclosed and the other hidden for certain reasons. This is what we call an enthymeme.⁶

The total number of terms whose meanings I have explained in this chapter is seventeen. They are: sense perceptions, first intelligibles, second intelligibles, generally accepted opinions, traditions, apodeictic⁷ proposition, demonstrative syllogism, art of demonstration, dialectical syllogism, art of dialectic, rhetorical syllogism, art of rhetoric, sophistical syllogism, art of sophistry, poetic syllogism, art of poetics, enthymeme.⁸

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

According to the technical usage of the ancient learned men of past communities,1 “logic”² is an equivocal³ term having three meanings. The first is the power peculiar⁴ to man by which he intellectually apprehends the intelligibles, masters⁵ the arts, and distinguishes between the base and the noble. They call this meaning the rational⁶ power. The second meaning is the intelligible itself which man has intellectually apprehended. They call this⁷ meaning “internal reason.”⁸ The third meaning is the expression in language of the notions impressed upon the soul. They call this meaning “external reason.”⁹

Aristotle set down this art and perfected its parts in eight books. It gives the rational power rules concerning the intelligibles, i.e., internal reason, so that it will be guarded from error and shown the way to what is correct. In this way it will acquire certainty concerning everything which¹⁰ it is in man’s power to acquire certainty about. This art also gives rules which are common to all languages, by which external reason is shown the way to what is correct and is guarded from error. In this way what is expressed by the tongue conforms to what is in the mind and is identical with it; the expression neither surpasses, nor is inadequate to, the notion which is in the soul. Because of the concepts which this art provides, they [the ancients] called it the art of logic. They said that the rank of the art of logic with respect to the intellect is the same as that of the art of grammar with respect to language.

According to the ancients, the term “art” is equivocal. They apply it to every speculative science as well as to the practices employed in crafts. Thus they call each of the philosophic sciences a speculative art; carpentry, rope-making, sewing, and the like, they call practical arts.

This term “philosophy” is also equivocal. Sometimes they use it to denote the art of demonstration and sometimes they use it to denote the sciences. According to them, this term applies to two sciences in particular. One of the two sciences, they call practical philosophy. They also call it human philosophy as well as political science. Theoretical philosophy is divided into three parts: the first is the science of mathematics, the second is natural science, and the third is divine science.

The science of mathematics does not investigate bodies as such, but rather ideas¹¹ abstracted from their matter—even if those ideas¹¹ are found only in matter. The parts of this science, which are its roots, are four. They are: the science of arithmetic; the science of geometry; the science of the stars, by which I mean astronomy; and the science of the composition of melodies, which is music. They call all of these parts the mathematical sciences.

Natural science investigates the bodies existing by nature, not by the will of man—such as the species of minerals, plants, and animals. Natural science investigates all of these bodies; whatever is found in them, I mean, all of their accidents, properties, and causes;¹² and everything in which these bodies are necessarily found—such as time, place, and motion.

Divine science is divided into two parts. One [part] is the investigation of every being which is neither a body nor a power in a body. It is the discourse about what pertains to the deity, may His name be magnified. According to the opinion [of the ancients] it is also a discourse about the angels, for they do not believe the angels to be corporeal. Rather, they call them separate intellects, meaning thereby that the angels are separate from matter. The second part of divine science investigates the very remote causes for everything which all the other sciences encompass. They call this part both divine science and metaphysics.¹³ These, in sum, are the sciences of the first things.

According to the ancients, the art of logic is not one of the sciences. Rather, it is a tool for the sciences. They said that instruction or study proceeds in an orderly manner only through the art of logic. It is therefore a tool for everything, and the tool for something is not part of the thing.

Political science is divided into four parts. The first is the individual’s governance of himself; the second is the governance of the household; the third is the governance of the city; and the fourth is the governance of the large nation or of the nations.

Man’s governance of himself consists in making his soul acquire the virtuous moral habits and cease to have the vicious moral habits, if any have been formed. The moral habits are the settled states which form in the soul in such a way that they become fixed dispositions from which actions stem. The philosophers speak of moral habits in terms of virtue and vice. They call the noble moral habits, moral virtues, and they call the base moral habits, moral vices. The actions stemming from the virtuous moral habits they call good, and the actions stemming from the vicious moral habits they call bad. Likewise, they speak of reason—that is, conceiving the intelligibles—in terms of virtue and vice. Hence they speak of rational virtues and rational vices. The philosophers have many books about the moral habits. Every governance by which one man governs another, they call a regime.

The governance of the household consists in knowing how some [members of the household] help others and what they must be restricted to, so that their condition will be well ordered as far as the requirements of that time and place permit.

The governance of the city is a science which provides its inhabitants with the knowledge of true happiness along with the way of striving to attain it; the knowledge of true misery along with the way of striving to keep it away; and the way of training their moral habits to reject the presumed kinds of happiness so that they do not take delight in them or covet them. It explains the presumed kinds of misery to them so that they do not suffer from them or dread them. Similarly, it prescribes laws of justice for them by which they can order their communities. The learned men of past communities,¹⁴ each according to his perfection, used to fashion regimes¹⁵ and laws by which their kings would govern the subjects. They called them nomoi,¹⁶ and the nations used to be governed by those nomoi. The philosophers have many books about all of these things which have already been translated into Arabic. Those that have not been translated are perhaps even more numerous. In these times all that—I mean, the regimes and the nomoi—has been dispensed with, and people are governed by divine commands.

All of the terms whose meanings I have explained in this chapter total twenty-five. They are: rational power, internal reason, external reason, art of logic, speculative arts, practical arts, philosophy, theoretical philosophy, practical philosophy, human philosophy, political science, mathematics, mathematical sciences, natural science, divine science, metaphysics, moral habits, moral virtues, moral vices, rational virtues, rational vices, good,¹⁷ bad,¹⁷ regime, nomoi.

NOTES

CHAPTER THREE

Bipartite propositions consist of a subject and a verbal predicate, or of a subject, verbal predicate, and its object. Examples of such propositions given by Maimonides are: “Zayd stood,” “Zayd killed Ab Bakr,” “Zayd did not stand,” and “Zayd did not kill Ab Bakr.” Propositions of this sort are called bipartite because no additional word is needed to connect the predicate with the subject. However, when the predicate is a gerund, an additional word is needed to connect the predicate with the subject, and the proposition is therefore called tripartite. Examples of such propositions given by Maimonides are: “Zayd is standing now,” “Zayd was standing,” and “Zayd will be standing.”

CHAPTER EIGHT

The Arabic word is fiar; in C.M., Eight Chapters, VIII, it is translated as “inborn dispositions.”

Reading taful; see Efros, p. 157, note 1.

Reading al-thalth at-uruq instead of al-uruq (Efros), and instead of al-thulth uruq (Türker).

This is the same word which was previously translated as “certain.”

Reading maqblah (Türker), instead of maqblah (Efros).

Reading al-am’ir; see Efros, p. 157, note 3. The Arabic word is in the plural.

Cf. note four.

Cf. note six.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

Milal has the primary meaning of “religious communities,” but Maimonides apparently meant to use it here in the secondary sense of “national communities.”

The Arabic word for logic (maniq) is derived from a verb which can either mean to reason or to speak.

In Chapter Thirteen of the Treatise on the Art of Logic, Maimonides explained that an equivocal noun has several meanings. An example in English would be “ball,” which refers to a spherical object or to a particular kind of festive party.

Reading yukhta, instead of tukhta (Efros).

Reading yaz instead of Efros’ suggested emendation to yaghd (p. 159, note 16) and instead of Türker’s yajr. See D. M. Dunlop, “al-Frb’s Introductory Rislah on Logic,” in Islamic Quarterly, III (1957), p. 228, line 2 and p. 233, lines 2—3. The language and the arguments are sufficiently similar to suppose that Maimonides used the same verb as al-Frb. This emendation requires simply changing the diacritical points, not substituting a different letter.

Or: speaking (niq).

Reading hdh (Türker), instead of hdhh (Efros).

Or: “inner speech (al-nuq al-dkhil).”

Or: “external speech (al-nuq al-khrij).”

Reading bi kullim with Ibn Tibbon, Aitub, and Vivas (bekhol mah).

nia‘n. The term has many meanings and is very difficult to render in English. In this section, it has also been translated as meaning, notion, and concept.

Reading wa asbbih with Ibn Tibbon and Vivas (wesibotam) and Ahitub (wesiboteihem); Efros omits wa.

Reading wa m ba‘d al-ab‘ah with Ibn Tibbon, Ahitub, and Vivas (umah she-’aer ha-eva‘). If the omission of wa (“and”) in the Efros edition were accepted, the sentence would have to be translated: “They also call this divine metaphysical science.” Maimonides never refers to metaphysics in that way.

See note one.

Or: ways of governing.

The Arabic nawms is almost a direct transliteration from the Greek nomoi, meaning laws or conventions.

The text has the plural.