CHAPTER 6

Flying the Propagandized Skies

“Remember how it felt to feel safe? Make it a personal challenge. Be smart, be vigilant.” These were the words written on an official poster, displayed at airports, from the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). Accompanying the text is a picture of a young girl standing with her hand over her heart, looking intensely upward at the U.S. flag. On the side of the poster are two additional photos, each containing a pair of children draped in the American flag. In one photo, the children are smiling. In the other, the children look pensive and concerned. The official seal of the TSA is displayed prominently at the top of the poster.1

The message of the poster is clear. First, Americans taking to the skies in the post-9/11 world are less safe than they were before the attacks. Flying is cause for concern, and passengers must remain on constant alert. Second, the TSA is an essential agency, present to protect the flying public and to ensure that those who take to the skies feel safe.

The reality is that the American public is no better off, in terms of reduced risk, for the actions of the TSA. Security experts often refer to TSA programs as “security theater”—measures taken to make individuals feel safer without actually enhancing safety.² As we will discuss, empirical evidence provides strong support for this characterization. The messaging around air travel and TSA “security” provide yet another example of post-9/11 government propaganda. By overinflating the threat to U.S. commercial air passengers and overstating the effectiveness of the agency, government officials aimed to transmit and frame a particular message surrounding air travel—that it is dangerous, that it is fraught with potential terror threats, and that a vast expansion in government is necessary to contain the threat. By disseminating propaganda about air travel and the TSA, officials have effectively normalized and expanded their reach while garnering support for the broader war on terror. The TSA, and the larger Department of Homeland Security (DHS) of which it is a part, has invested significant effort and resources in creating a culture of fear surrounding the use of air transportation. In doing so, they have successfully increased their budgets, personnel numbers, and the scope of their power. The secrecy surrounding many of the actions of the agency and their programs limits or altogether eliminates the ability of the public, officials, or other groups to analyze and critically assess the agency and its activities.

Unlike the tactics employed surrounding the war in Iraq, propaganda surrounding the TSA has not been used to foster support for a particular conflict but instead to cultivate broader support for the overly broad “war on terror” by providing inaccurate, false, or biased information about faceless terror threats and the efficacy of the government’s response to these threats. The primary outcome of this propaganda has been the generation of fear within the American populace, enabling the expansion of the scale and scope of government.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF AIRPORT SECURITY 1958–2001

Before turning to our discussion of post-9/11 air travel, it is helpful to place the creation and expansion of the TSA, as well as the historical safety of flight, in the appropriate context. Many know that the Wright brothers were the first to take flight on the beaches near Kitty Hawk, North Carolina, in 1903. Commercial air travel soon followed. On January 1, 1914, an aircraft escorted the first paying passenger across the bay between Tampa and St. Petersburg, Florida.3 In 1928, what is now Newark International Airport opened, and by 1939 the airport saw more than 481,000 passengers annually—an extraordinary number for the period.⁴

The World Wars sparked rapid development in the realm of aviation, prompting many to make the switch from other means of transportation to air. By 1956 more people traveled between cities by air than by train. By 1958 transatlantic air travel surpassed transport by ocean liners, and the Boeing 707 made its first commercial flight from New York to Paris.⁵

In the early decades of air travel, only the wealthy could afford to fly—primarily for business. This began to change with improvements in technology and large-scale industry deregulation. Prices for air travel began to fall dramatically in the 1970s.⁶ As a result, more and more U.S. adults availed themselves of air travel. In 1970, for example, only 21 percent of U.S. adults had flown the previous year, while just under half had ever set foot on a plane. By 2015, nearly half of all U.S. adults had made a trip by plane in the previous year, and 81 percent had flown at least once in their lives.7 As opposed to traveling mostly for business, nearly 70 percent of contemporary commercial flights are for “personal leisure” or “personal non-leisure purposes.”⁸

According to data from the Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS), passenger enplanements (boarding an aircraft) in the United States reached an all-time high in 2017 of more than 849 billion.⁹ With so many Americans flying in post-9/11 America, many assume the TSA’s security measures to be standard and necessary responses to threats against passengers. While the TSA is a relatively new agency, airport security is not a recent phenomenon. It may be surprising to learn, however, that government was practically uninvolved in commercial aviation security for some thirty years after the opening of airports like Newark in 1928.

It was not until 1958, in fact, that President Eisenhower signed the Federal Aviation Act into law, creating the Federal Aviation Agency (FAA). In 1961, the first aerial hijacking of a U.S. aircraft occurred when Florida resident Antulio Ramirez Ortiz used a steak knife to coerce a National Airlines pilot to divert a flight to Havana in an attempt to warn Cuban president Fidel Castro of a supposed assassination attempt.¹⁰ As a result of the incident, the U.S. government began placing armed guards on commercial airlines when requested by the FBI or airlines.¹¹ That same year, President Kennedy signed an amendment to the Federal Aviation Act, making it a crime to hijack an airplane, interfere with a flight crew, or bring weapons aboard an airliner. In response, FAA safety inspectors began to train for operations aboard U.S. aircraft.¹²

In 1966, the Federal Aviation Agency changed its name to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and became responsible for civil aviation safety.¹³ After a string of hijackings in 1972, the FAA created the Explosives Detection Canine Team Program and required that passengers and carry-on baggage be screened either by hand or metal detector.¹⁴ In 1972, hijackers threatened to fly Southern Airways flight 49 into a nuclear reactor after having the plane diverted to multiple states, Toronto, and Cuba. After this incident, the FAA required all passengers and their carry-on bags to be screened at security checkpoints overseen by the airlines and privately contracted security personnel.15 Congress passed the Air Transportation Security Act in 1974, requiring metal detector and X-ray screening at all U.S. airports. Despite legal challenges on Fourth Amendment grounds, the searches were deemed legal as long as the screening was universal and only used to search for weapons and explosives.¹⁶ In 1988, Pan Am Flight 103 was destroyed by a bomb as it made a typical route from Frankfurt, Germany, to Detroit, Michigan. All 259 people aboard were killed. Following what became known as the Lockerbie bombing, the FAA required that all checked luggage, in addition to carry-on bags, be screened for explosives.¹⁷

Even with these various procedures in place, security protocols through 2001 appear lax relative to the post-9/11 era. For example, passengers could carry blades up to four inches long aboard a plane along with baseball bats, box cutters, knitting needles, and scissors.¹⁸ Family and friends could greet or see off a traveler at their gate as opposed to having to separate at the security checkpoint before the gates.¹⁹ Passengers could take bottles of water and other liquids in their carry-on luggage and use any lock of their choosing on their checked baggage. Outside of airport terminals things were different too. Those coming to retrieve passengers could wait at the airport curbside.

At the time of the terror attacks in September 2001, the FAA was required by federal law to “protect passengers and property on aircraft operating in air transportation or intra-state air transportation against an act of criminal violence or aircraft piracy.”²⁰ The Civil Aviation Security System in place at the time of the 9/11 attacks consisted of seven distinct “layers” of defense—intelligence, prescreening, airport access control, passenger checkpoint screening, passenger checked baggage screening, cargo screening, and onboard security.²¹

On the morning of September 11, 2001, nineteen militants associated with al-Qaeda carried out the deadliest terror attack in the United States in its history. Groups of attackers boarded four domestic U.S. aircraft at three airports on the East Coast of the United States (Boston, MA, Washington, DC, and Newark, NJ). Soon after takeoff, the hijackers took control of the planes, possibly stabbing members of the flight crews with box cutters. At 8:46 a.m., American Airlines flight 11 was flown into the north tower of the World Trade Center in New York City. Seventeen minutes later, United Airlines flight 175 was piloted into the south tower of the World Trade Center.

A third aircraft, American Airlines flight 77, leaving from Dulles International Airport in Virginia, crashed into the Pentagon just outside of Washington, DC, at 9:37 a.m. The fourth plane, United Airlines flight 93, crashed in a field in Pennsylvania. Passengers, told of the other attacks via cell phone, attempted to thwart the hijacking.22 At 9:59 a.m., the south tower of the World Trade Center collapsed, followed by the north tower 29 minutes later. Other buildings suffered serious damage and collapsed because of compromised structural integrity. The subsequent fires at the site of the World Trade Center burned for more than three months.

The attack resulted in substantial civilian losses. Some 2,750 people died in New York City, including more than four hundred first responders who had gone to the scene as a part of rescue efforts. Outside of Washington, DC, 184 were killed as a result of the attack on the Pentagon. The 40 people aboard United Flight 93 also died.²³

As a result of the attacks on September 11, 2001, security procedures at U.S. airports were dramatically altered. The attack, according to officials, illustrated a glaring weakness in U.S. security. In the years that followed, TSA officials and other policymakers would point to the attacks and other threats as the impetus behind expanding government reach not only into flight but into a variety of forms of travel.

While undeniably tragic, the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon represent extreme outliers when it comes to terrorism in the United States. In actuality, Americans—including those taking to the skies—have been, and continue to be, remarkably safe. Despite these known statistical realities, government officials continually misrepresent the threat of terrorism to the American public.

THE REALITIES OF THE “TERROR THREAT”

While the government’s rhetoric surrounding the risk of terrorism in commercial air travel is that of a clear and imminent danger, the actual threat posed by terrorism is much smaller than officials publicly admit. While the war on terror moved the issue to center stage, concerns over terrorism are not new, and the topic has been studied for decades. In fact, a large body of literature on terrorism—including airplane hijacking—dates back to the mid-1970s.24 Writing in 1976, for example, the political scientist Chalmers Johnson wrote of a state department conference in which participants discussed and addressed concerns regarding terrorism in the United States. Among other things, Johnson noted that one of the participants explicitly discussed the small risk posed by terrorism. “Loss of life [from terrorism seems] relatively minor compared to the three quarters of a million people who lost their lives in all forms of civil strife during the 1960s,” Johnson wrote of the discussion, “or in light of the city of Chicago’s annual murder rate of nearly one thousand per annum.”²⁵

In more contemporary writing on the risks, costs, and efficacy of counterterrorism policy, political scientist and national security expert John Mueller and civil engineer Mark Stewart have examined the overall risk posed by terrorism in detail. Analyzing the period between 1968 and 2006, they found a yearly worldwide probability of being killed in a terror attack to be about 1 in 14 million—some 420 deaths per year.²⁶ In other work, Mueller and Stewart find that if another 9/11 attack were to happen every three months for the next five years, the chances of an American being killed in an attack would come to approximately 0.02 percent.²⁷ The lifetime probability of being murdered in an act of international terrorism—for any one person on the planet—is 1 in 80,000 and even less for a U.S. citizen. For perspective, this is the same probability as being killed by an asteroid or comet.²⁸ More Americans are killed every year from parachuting accidents than by jihadist-inspired terrorists. In fact, more Americans are killed by lightning strikes, drowning in bathtubs, and choking.²⁹ More people in the United States are killed by dog bites than by terrorists.³⁰

Between 1975 and 2000, terror attacks on U.S. soil were responsible for 322 deaths. Between 2001 and 2017, 3,246 people were killed by acts of terror in the United States.³¹ It would be incorrect to assume from these numbers that terrorism is a greater threat, however. Though tragic, the 9/11 attacks represent an outlier when it comes to terror fatalities and heavily skews many statistical analyses of the true threat posed by terrorism. When the September 11 attacks are excluded from multiyear analyses, the period before 2001 and the period after 2001 are practically indistinguishable with respect to the risk posed by terrorism.32 When examining the number of deaths related to terrorism in the United States in 2001—the deadliest year on record—more individuals died from diarrheal diseases, drowning, and nutritional deficiencies. Terrorism accounted for 0.31 percent of all deaths that year.³³ As a particularly rare type of terrorism, the risk of being killed or injured in a terror attack involving air travel is necessarily smaller than the general risk of terrorism. This was true before 9/11 and remains true today.

As highlighted earlier, air travel has expanded exponentially since the early 1970s. In 2015, more than half of all U.S. adults had flown in the previous year, and some 81 percent had flown at least once in their lives. Between 1970 and 2017, U.S. commercial air carried more than 24 billion passengers.³⁴ Despite this remarkable increase in air travel, the number of hijackings and terror incidents involving airplanes or airports has not increased. In fact, there is no clear pattern to the number of attacks other than to say that they occur rarely—very rarely.

Utilizing data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) on the number of “terror incidents” in the United States between 1970 and 2017, fifty-seven may be classified as targeting an airport, aircraft, or airline. This includes unsuccessful attacks, attacks that occurred at airline offices (not necessarily located at an airport), ambiguous cases (where the incident may or may not have actually been an act of terror), cases where the perpetrator group remains unknown, cases where fatalities and casualties are unknown, and cases (fifteen) where the intended target was not the United States or its citizens but a foreign entity.³⁵ Restricted to hijackings, the number of incidents falls to fourteen (including the 9/11 hijackings). The year 2001 saw the highest number of hijackings (four)—all related to the 9/11 attacks. No hijackings were recorded in thirty-eight of forty-seven years for which data is available. At the time of 9/11, there hadn’t been a hijacking on a commercial U.S. flight in sixteen years.

Taking all incidents involving airplanes, airports, or airlines into account, a total of 3,028 deaths occurred over a period of forty-seven years according to the GTD. If 9/11 is excluded as an outlier, the number of fatalities resulting from terror incidents involving airplanes, aircraft, or airlines falls to twenty-seven—an average of 0.57 fatalities per year. If the 9/11 fatalities are included, this number increases to 64.42 fatalities per year. (While this may sound substantial, consider that, in 2017 alone, some 17,284 people in the United States were murdered—an average of 47.35 people per day.36) As opposed to being carried out by jihadists, only six of these attacks are attributable to jihadists or “jihadi-inspired” groups. According to the GTD data, black (e.g., the Black Panthers and the Black Liberation Army) and Jewish (e.g., the Jewish Defense League [JDL]) groups carried out more aviation-related attacks (and attacks overall) than Islamic groups over the period, as did anti-Castro groups.

Numerous scholars have highlighted that the risk of another 9/11-style attack is remarkably remote. This is not because of any efforts by the TSA or officials, but because terrorists have lost the element of surprise with respect to suicide hijackings and terrorism aboard aircraft. The overall attitude of passengers has changed as well. Recall that one of the hijacked aircraft on 9/11—United 93—crashed in a field in Pennsylvania and failed to strike its intended target. This is because passengers, notified of the other hijackings via cell phone, thwarted the plans of the hijackers and tried to regain control of the plane.

Roger Roots, a sociologist, writes that because “of the future impossibility of replicating the blind-sided, unprepared human cargo of September 11, suicide terrorist attacks using commercial airliners are unlikely to succeed again. Any future attempts to take over an airliner probably will be met by intense physical resistance from both passengers and crew.”³⁷ Aviation security expert Brian Jenkins shares similar sentiments: “today,” he said, “the assumption by passengers—if they feel threatened by hijacking—is not one of compliance.”³⁸ The cases of the “underwear bomber” and the “shoe bomber,” discussed in more detail below, illustrate that this is indeed the case.

THE DISCONNECT BETWEEN RISK PORTRAYALS AND REALITY

Despite these remarkably low risks, popular rhetoric emanating from U.S. government sources suggests that terrorism presents a greater threat today than it did before the 9/11 attacks and that air travel is particularly dangerous. Although President George W. Bush made the war on terror a top priority of his administration, his successors have done little to quell fears of terrorism or calm public fears as they relate to flying. This matters because the public’s fear of terrorism is, at least partially, endogenous to the government’s rhetoric and actions. By overstating the risk of terrorism, the government contributes to the negative psychological effects of potential terrorist acts. Government officials then use this fear, which they help to create and perpetuate, to justify their actions to combat the threat of terrorism. Propaganda plays a central role in this process.

Examples of propaganda with respect to threat inflation and the supposed solutions offered by the TSA abound. Officials within and outside of the TSA have worked diligently to present the agency as both necessary and effective despite the known statistical realities related to the risks to flying (and terrorism in general). The agency has withheld information regarding its policies and their efficacy from both the general public and lawmakers, making it difficult if not impossible for citizens and legislators to effectively monitor and assess the agency. Since its inception, the TSA and other officials have consistently inflated the true risk of terrorism and have presented specific instances of “terror activity” in a manner that is at best hyperbolic and alarmist and at worst intentionally deceptive.

President Bush signed the Aviation and Transportation Security Act into law on November 19, 2001, marking the official creation of the TSA. Though originally part of the Department of Transportation, the agency became part of the Department of Homeland Security upon its creation in 2003.39 The TSA spent $1.3 billion in 2002 and $4.8 billion in 2003 on security measures.⁴⁰ The enacted budget for FY 2018 was more than $7.4 billion.⁴¹ The TSA requested a budget of $7.79 billion for FY 2020.⁴² As of late 2019, the TSA maintains security at some four hundred airports, employs more than forty-three thousand transportation security officers (TSOs), and boasts that nearly 50 percent of TSA officers have five or more years of experience as “counterterrorism professionals.” The agency screens more than 750 million passengers every year.43

From its inception, officials portrayed the TSA itself (and the federalization of air travel as a whole) as the solution to the threat of terrorism in aviation. Flying was, and continues to be, framed by officials as a risky activity, an arena in which terrorists are bound to strike. These sentiments are reflected clearly in the statements of President George W. Bush in the moments just before signing the Aviation and Transportation Security Act in 2001.

Today, we take permanent and aggressive steps to improve the security of our airways. . . . The law I will sign should give all Americans greater confidence when they fly. . . . Congress worked closely with my administration to develop a bipartisan conclusion that will help protect American air travelers. . . . We have our political differences, but we’re united to defend our country, and we’re united to protect our people. For our airways, there is one supreme priority: security. Since September the 11th, the federal government has taken action to raise safety standards. . . . For the first time, airport security will become a direct federal responsibility, overseen by [a] new undersecretary of transportation for security. Additional funds will be provided for federal air marshals, and a new team of federal security managers, supervisors, law enforcement officers and screeners will ensure all passengers and carry-on bags are inspected thoroughly and effectively. The new security force will be well trained, made up of U.S. citizens. And if any of its members do not perform, the new undersecretary will have full authority to discipline or remove them. Security comes first. The federal government will set high standards, and we will enforce them.⁴⁴

The use of similar rhetoric continues. Speaking before members of Congress in 2017, for example, former TSA administrator Huban Gowadia stated that “[The TSA] faces a persistent and evolving threat from terrorist groups around the world, exacerbated by homegrown violent extremists.”⁴⁵ Administrator David Pekoske, in his agency’s budget request for 2019, boasted that since the inception of the TSA, no successful terror attacks have occurred in the United States.

Since September 11, 2001, there have been no successful attacks on the U.S. aviation system. Our motto, “not on my watch,” speaks to our commitment to defeat terrorist attempts to attack our transportation systems. Every day we are reminded anew that we face ambitious adversaries who are watching us, studying our vulnerabilities and working hard to develop new attack strategies to replace those that have failed. . . . Since 9/11 we have taken bold and unprecedented steps to ensure the security of aviation.46

The TSA works to cultivate a clear and powerful presence at airports utilizing a variety of propaganda techniques. Perhaps the most obvious of these is the “appeal to authority.” Although they are not official law enforcement agents, TSA agents, uniformed with official government patches and badges, man checkpoints throughout the country. From the moment they arrive at the airport, ubiquitous announcements instruct passengers to keep their bags within their possession at all times to prevent the introduction of articles “without their knowledge.” This is despite the fact that there have been no reports of a bomb or other nefarious articles being slipped into a passenger’s carry-on bag. Passengers are repeatedly encouraged to be on the lookout for suspicious behavior. “It is important to remain vigilant and recognize when a threat may be present,” the TSA website says of the now common (and trademarked) DHS slogan—“See Something, Say Something.”⁴⁷ The ever-present TSA personnel and announcements reinforce and perpetuate the overinflated terror threat to passengers, suggesting that the threat of terror is not only real but omnipresent. Citizens, therefore, must remain ever vigilant in order to maintain their own safety as well as the safety of others. Terrorists are hiding in plain sight and around every corner.

Owing to the nature of bureaucratic growth (discussed in chap. 2), the TSA has expanded its operations beyond airports and now operates in some capacity in freight rail, highway security, mass transit and passenger rail, maritime security, and pipeline security. Just as the TSA’s presence and actions continuously remind passengers of supposed security threats at airports, so, too, does the agency—with its partners—work to bring awareness of potential threats like “rail sabotage” by providing posters and brochures, offering training courses and “pocket counterterrorism guides” aimed at “identifying security vulnerabilities” and “reducing threats” aboard school buses, in trucking, and highway infrastructure. The TSA works with the U.S. Coast Guard to provide training courses in crowd control, screening procedures, and maritime terrorism, and it provides training and brochures on pipeline security.48

The TSA also promotes its brand and activities through social media. The agency has operated a blog since 2008 and an Instagram account since 2013 with one million followers as of 2020. The account posts photos of everything from explosives detection canines to bug collections, coffee mugs shaped like grenades, bowling balls, and pecan pies brought through security checkpoints. The account also boasts about the number of weapons confiscated at checkpoints—mostly guns and knives. As opposed to being wielded by terrorists with malicious intent, most of the weapons confiscated were taken from passengers who neglected to remove the items from their carry-on luggage.

Criticisms of the TSA have been met with swift rebuttals, and officials are quick to point to the seriousness of the threat to the traveling public. Writing in 2010, former TSA administrator Jeff Sural, for instance, argued that those criticizing TSA pat downs and body scanners (discussed in detail below) were behaving as “adolescents” and that such “immaturity [on the part of those criticizing the TSA] is fitting for the sophomoric event that triggered the visceral outrage.”⁴⁹ He further stated that the TSA security protocols at checkpoints are “justified in the context of our unfortunate reality . . . [that] bad people persist in trying to kill Americans en masse and in a way that captures global attention.”⁵⁰ Sural went on to argue that “reasonable passengers don’t put up much of a fuss about complying with safety and security requests. . . . A little extra scrutiny at the checkpoint is a small price to pay to keep our larger society uninhibited.”⁵¹ This type of grandiloquent language, utilized frequently by officials associated with the TSA and DHS to discuss the threats posed by potential terrorists to air travel, is at the foundation of post-9/11 propaganda that overemphasizes ever-present threats to American safety and the central role of government as the solution while dismissing concerns about concomitant losses of liberty due to expansions in state power.

SPECIFIC INCIDENTS—OFFICIAL STATEMENTS VS. REALITIES

While the general disconnect between the stated threat of terrorism and the true threat is of interest, it is also useful to examine the few specific cases of terrorism (realized or unsuccessful) involving aviation that have taken place since 9/11. These cases highlight in greater detail the separation between the official representation of the TSA and counterterrorism policy and known realities regarding the incidents themselves.

Looking at post-9/11 terror plots (through 2018), John Mueller has detailed and cataloged 127 cases—both domestically and abroad—in which individual Islamic extremists and extremist groups have sought to target or actually have targeted the United States. While such a number may sound alarming, consider that this number includes those cases where “an Islamic extremist conspiracy or connection . . . might eventually develop into a plot to commit violence against the United States.”52 It likewise includes plots that were disrupted, “but not by infiltrating a police operative into the plot” (this accounts for 21 percent, or 27 of the 127 cases).⁵³ Furthermore, his quantification of terror plots also includes schemes that are “essentially created or facilitated in a major way by the authorities by infiltrating a police operative into the plot.”⁵⁴ (Sixty-nine cases or 54 percent of all listed plots over the period fall into this category.) Of the cases in which Islamic terrorists actually committed (or attempted to commit) acts of violence, only ten led to fatalities, with the total number of deaths amounting to one hundred over a ten-year period.⁵⁵

Of the 127 cases Mueller identifies, seven involve aviation in some capacity. A brief overview of these instances is presented in Table 1.

These cases each provided fodder for government-produced propaganda surrounding the TSA and air travel. Regardless of the true nature of the threat, the narrative offered by officials was one intended to cultivate fear among the populace and to instill the idea that government would provide protection against an ever-present terror threat. Some of these cases resulted in immediate action on the part of officials, including the TSA, and the implementation of additional security measures. Others did not. In the cases where new procedures were adopted, we discuss their efficacy to the extent data is available.

TABLE 1 Islamic terror aviation incidents in the United States, October 2001–2018

Source: Table created by the authors with the data provided by Mueller (2019).

We exclude two of the cases from the discussion that follows. We omit the case of Zachary Zaerr at the Los Angeles International Airport for two reasons. First, evidence indicates that “his anger was only aimed at Israel and their relations with their neighboring countries” and not at the United States.56 Second, although authorities eventually classified the shooting as a terror attack—it was originally categorized as a hate crime—controversy remains as to whether or not Zaerr’s actions meet the official definition of terrorism.⁵⁷ We also exclude the case of parcel bombs on cargo planes in 2010. This plot, though involving planes, did not explicitly involve commercial aircraft. The parcels in question were not placed aboard, nor were they ever a threat to, commercial planes. Civilians aboard commercial planes or in U.S. airports were not the intended casualties. We examine the remaining five cases in turn, discussing briefly the events that took place, the official response, and the realities of the threat.

Richard Reid, The “Shoe Bomber” (2001)

A few months after 9/11, British citizen Richard Reid boarded an American Airlines flight from Paris to Miami. In flight, he attempted to ignite explosives packed into his shoes. He hoped that his actions would cause the public to “lose confidence in airline security and stop traveling . . . [and] hurt the American economy.”⁵⁸ As he attempted to ignite his shoes, passengers and flight crew quickly subdued Reid and two doctors aboard injected him with sedatives. The flight was diverted to Boston and no one was injured. Reid was subsequently sentenced to life in prison for attempting to use a weapon of mass destruction aboard an aircraft. He received an additional fifty-year sentence for other charges related to the incident and was fined $2 million.⁵⁹

The disconnect between official statements and the reality of the attempted bombing was immediate. Officials stated that Reid’s explosive device was “highly unstable” and “powerful enough to have blown a hole in the plane.”⁶⁰ Both characterizations of Reid’s plot, however, are tenuous at best. As opposed to using a “highly unstable” material, Reid attempted to use pentaerythritol tetranitrate (PETN) in his bomb plot. Officials point out that PETN is difficult to detect as it is nonmetallic and will not appear on an X-ray. The compound, however, would be difficult (as illustrated by both Reid as well as the case of the “underwear bomber” discussed below) to use as a bomb on one’s person. This is because PETN as a compound is relatively stable and difficult to ignite with a naked flame. In order to reliably detonate PETN, one needs a blasting cap—most likely made from metal. A metal blasting cap, of course, would be easily detected by existing security measures—namely metal detectors.

The assertion that Reid’s bomb would have brought down the plane is questionable. Although government tests utilizing fifty grams of PETN (the amount carried by Reid) illustrated that such an explosion could blow a hole in the side of a plane, it is far from a certain outcome. Mueller, for instance, notes that “explosions do not necessarily breach the fuselage, and airplanes with breached fuselages may still be able to land safely. . . . A similar bomb [to Reid’s] with 100 grams of [PETN] . . . detonated in 2009 in the presence of [the bomber’s] intended victim . . . killed the bomber but only slightly wounded his target a few feet away.”61

The immediate response by officials was to “enhance security” by implementing screening of passengers’ shoes. In 2006, the TSA mandated that all shoes must be removed and scanned in the name of combatting future attacks.⁶² Despite the supposed enhanced security provided by such measures, the TSA has to date provided no evidence that the measure of screening shoes enhances safety. Security expert Bruce Schneier points out that the TSA’s shoe-removal policy is practically useless. “It’s like saying, last time the terrorists wore red shirts, so now we’re going to ban red shirts. Focusing on specific threats like shoe bombs . . . simply induces the bad guys to detonate something else. You end up spending a lot on the screening and you haven’t reduced the total threat.”⁶³

Nearly two decades later, similar language is still used in discussing Reid’s attempted attack, and the event is utilized as a justification for removing shoes at airports. In a display at Raleigh-Durham International Airport in 2017, TSA explosives expert Tony Aguilera showed a reporter a shoe rigged with fake plastic explosives. “Like Richard Reid, all that’s necessary to get this [explosive] to function is to take a lighter and light the fuse.”64 The TSA and other officials continue to use the incident to reinforce the narrative that flying is dangerous and as an opportunity to expand security measures without having to provide any data related to the policy’s usefulness. The effectiveness of these messages is observable even today. In the aforementioned television report from 2017, journalist Julie Wilson noted, “They [passengers] don’t mind being barefoot in public as long as it’s in the name of safety.” “Happy to comply and happy to be safe when we’re traveling,” said one passenger in the story. “It’s a pain. But if it keeps us safe, I’m willing to do it,” says another passenger interviewed in the segment.⁶⁵ The problem is, of course, that there is no evidence the TSA’s policy actually enhances safety or reduces the risk of terrorism.

Transatlantic Bombing Plot (2006)

In 2006, twenty-four British citizens were arrested in a plot to blow up transatlantic flights with liquid chemical bombs smuggled in beverage containers.⁶⁶ Targeting five U.S. cities, the number of casualties, had the plotters been successful, may have rivaled or possibly surpassed 9/11.⁶⁷ Of the twenty-four arrested, only eight were ultimately tried and convicted on various charges.⁶⁸

Officials reacted strongly to the foiled plot. Speaking the day after the arrests in the United Kingdom, U.S. Department of Homeland Security secretary Michael Chertoff’s comments reinforced the sentiment that the government is the solution to the imminent and ever-present threat of terrorism.

This plot appears to have been well planned and well advanced, with a significant number of operatives. . . . We believe that the arrests in Britain have significantly disrupted this major threat. But we cannot assume that the threat has been completely thwarted. . . . There is currently no indication of any plotting within the United States; nevertheless, as a precaution, the federal government is taking immediate steps to increase security measures with respect to aviation. . . . In light of the nature of the liquid explosive devices which were designed by the plotters, we are temporarily banning all liquids in carry-ons in aircraft cabins. That means no liquids or gels will be allowed in carry-on baggage. Any liquids or gels have to be checked as part of baggage to go into the hold. . . . Additionally, the Transportation Security Administration will be implementing a series of additional security measures, some of them visible and some of them not visible, to ensure the security of the traveling public and the nation’s transportation system. TSA is immediately implementing these changes to airport screening, including the prohibition against liquids and gels of any kind in carry-on baggage. . . . We recognize these measures are going to be inconvenient. But they are proportionate to the very real threat to the lives of innocent people that was posed by this plot. And what is important here is that we are taking every prudent step to thwart new tactics of terror. Today, air traffic is safe. And air traffic will remain safe precisely because of the measures we are adopting today.69

Attorney General Alberto Gonzales echoed these sentiments while reinforcing the idea that government agencies must withhold information from the public for their own safety and security. He said, “We want to be very, very careful . . . about saying too much [to the public] that might, in any way, jeopardize [the investigation]. . . . Since 9/11, the threat reporting has consistently shown that there is a vicious and determined enemy that is intent on harming American lives. Every day is September 12th for those of us tasked with protecting America.”⁷⁰ From this perspective a faceless and nameless enemy poses a constant and ubiquitous threat, but the government is unable to offer specifics in the name of “protecting America.”

The reality, however, was much different from the official narrative. While researchers have noted that officials at the time may have been alarmed by intelligence that those involved had been experimenting with explosives, making martyrdom tapes, and may have had a connection to al-Qaeda, authorities “also knew that air tickets had not been purchased, that some members did not have passports, and that there had not been a “dry run” by the conspirators. They also knew that they [the authorities] were capable of preventing the plotters from getting anywhere near an airplane.”⁷¹

Writing on the incident, John Mueller counters the narrative offered by Chertoff and others that the plot was remarkably sophisticated and well advanced. “This widely-held proposition [that the plot nearly succeeded] is simply preposterous.” Noting a variety of disconnects between officials’ statements and the realities known at the time the plot was shut down by authorities, Mueller states,

It is not clear that . . . the conspirators had anything like sufficient materials or effective bombs. . . . Bomb-making was in the hands of a 28 year old dropout who is described by analyst Bruce Hoffman as “a loser with little ambition and few prospects.”. . . . In addition, the plot required two terrorist bombers per plane. . . . The “inner circle” of the plot contained only three people. . . . As this suggests, there was nothing imminent about the plot.

He continues,

The notion that none of the bombs, created by a “loser,” would [fail to work properly] is, to say at least questionable, as is the notion that all of the amateurs . . . would be successful in detonating them. . . . There is also the almost impossible problem of simultaneity. If one bomb were to go off in an airliner restroom . . . all other airlines aloft and on the ground would likely be immediately alerted. . . . This would render replications nearly impossible.72

Just as officials utilized the “shoe bomber” plot to immediately expand security programs, this incident likewise led to further expansions of TSA activities at security checkpoints. As noted in Chertoff’s statement following the arrests, the TSA placed an immediate ban on liquids in carry-on luggage, as the plotters had sought to shepherd liquid explosives in beverage containers. As of this writing, the liquid ban largely remains in effect.⁷³ Passengers are only allowed a quart-sized bag containing liquids, gels, and aerosols. Containers are limited to 3.4 ounces (100 mL) or less per container.⁷⁴

Just as the TSA has produced no evidence that requiring passengers to remove their shoes has provided any enhanced security, they have likewise failed to offer any data on the supposed benefit of banning liquids for reducing the risk of terrorism. Counterintuitively, the TSA’s liquid ban may actually be counterproductive to increasing security. After implementing the ban on liquids, airports observed a 20 percent increase in checked luggage. This meant more volume for baggage screeners and a greater likelihood that bags may not have been properly screened for explosives or other dangerous articles.⁷⁵ Despite these possible unintended consequences and the general lack of evidence that liquid bans or restrictions improve safety, the TSA continues to emphasize the importance of these measures for maintaining safety and national security.

JFK Airport Plot (2007)

In 2007, a group of Guyanese conspirators led by former cargo handler Russell Defreitas sought to blow up fuel pipelines serving John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK). An FBI informant infiltrated the group, which lead to the arrest and subsequent conviction of those involved.

As in the case of the transatlantic plot the year before, the depiction of the attack has “been viewed in many cases to be alarmist.”76 Speaking at a press conference, U.S. attorney Roslynn Mauskopf referred to the scheme as “one of the most chilling plots imaginable” and said that “the devastation that would be caused had this plot succeeded is just unthinkable.”⁷⁷ Senator Arlen Specter (D-PA) said the conspiracy “had the potential to be another 9/11.”⁷⁸ Former assistant attorney general for national security Kenneth Wainstein noted that “The defendants sought to combine an insider’s knowledge of JFK airport with the assistance of Islamic radicals . . . to produce an attack they boasted would be so devastating to the airport that ‘even the Twin Towers can’t touch it.’”⁷⁹

Despite the sensationalist depiction by officials, the idea that the group posed an actual threat is highly questionable.⁸⁰ At the time of their arrests, none of the conspirators had weapons in their possession, and they lacked any true practical knowledge of how to carry out their proposed attack.⁸¹ Contrary to Wainstein’s claim that a larger group assisted the plotters, the men had no connection to organized terrorism.

Far from “chilling,” the plot was simply unfeasible—a point made by multiple security experts. Writing on the plot, Mueller notes the plan’s “daffy infeasibility” and points out that those involved had no practical knowledge of their target. He further discusses the conspirators’ “apparent incomprehension about its [the plot’s] essential absurdity.”⁸² As opposed to “another 9/11,” those involved had expressly intended to avoid casualties and, as a result, stated they should carry out the attack on Christmas Eve or in the early morning, when few people would be in the area.⁸³ Had they somehow managed to attack the fuel tanks, experts noted that the pipelines would not have exploded. Safety features built into the fuel system would have contained any fire and prevented it from spreading. An industry spokesperson, speaking soon after the incident, put it succinctly, “To say that the pipeline would blow up is just not possible.”84

While the plot did not generate any additional (publicized) security measures, it did contribute to generating fear among the public. “Led by the government,” writes one commentator, “would-be terrorists seem to be imagined, created, poked, and prodded into convictions that can be sold to rationalize the public’s continued fear. . . . Never mind that the majority of these so-called homegrown terrorists turn out to be idiots . . . who would have no means to attack the United States, let alone in spectacular fashion. . . . The continued insistence by the government . . . that terrorism poses an existential threat to the United States generates unnecessary alarm.”⁸⁵

Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the “Underwear Bomber” (2009)

On Christmas Day, 2009, twenty-three-year-old Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab boarded a flight from Amsterdam, Netherlands, to Detroit, Michigan. As the flight approached its destination, Abdulmutallab attempted to ignite explosives sewn into his underwear. Nearby passengers quickly noticed the fire. One passenger tackled him while the flight crew extinguished the flames. He was taken into custody upon arrival and subsequently charged, tried, and convicted on multiple counts. He is currently serving a life sentence in a U.S. prison.⁸⁶ Unlike the other incidents mentioned here, there is strong evidence that the attacker was directly connected to a larger terror group, namely al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Abdulmutallab was known to authorities, who failed to revoke his visa, before the incident.⁸⁷ His father had alerted U.S. officials to his son’s ties to Islamic extremist groups before the attack.⁸⁸

The authorities’ immediate reaction to the plot was different from the other cases. Neither President Obama nor Vice President Joe Biden spoke about the incident in the days immediately following. Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano initially praised aviation security, saying that “the system worked. Once the incident occurred the system worked.”⁸⁹ After swift backlash to her comments, given that Abdulmutallab had boarded the aircraft and attempted to ignite the explosives, she shifted course the following day, saying she had been “taken out of context” and that “no one is happy or satisfied [with how the system worked].”90

Like the “shoe bomber” several years earlier, Abdulmutallab’s explosive of choice was PETN. He faced similar difficulties in its attempted use. Despite reports that Abdulmutallab could have “blown a hole” in the plane, this remains open for debate.⁹¹ A test conducted by the BBC and a UN explosives expert, for example, found that successful detonation would not have breached the fuselage but would probably have killed Abdulmutallab and the person sitting next to him.⁹² Regardless of whether or not a successful detonation would have brought down the plane, the incident prompted swift action on the part of the Obama administration and the DHS. Calling it a “race against time,” President Obama ordered a “surge” of federal air marshals to be placed on commercial aircraft by February 1, 2010.⁹³ The TSA also pushed forward with the implementation of full-body scanners at airports. Both of these elements are worth discussing in more detail. At the time of their implementation (and currently), the narrative surrounding the air marshal and body scanner programs was categorically at odds with existing data.

President Obama touted the “surge” in air marshals as one of several “concrete steps” to enhance aviation security.⁹⁴ Despite these statements, clear evidence existed at the time that the Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) was ineffective. In 2008, John Mueller and Mark Stewart conducted an extensive cost-benefit analysis of aviation security measures and found that FAMS failed, and failed miserably, when using the government’s own standards for success. While the regulatory goal of “cost per life saved” is $1–$10 million per life saved, the FAMS costs $180 million per life saved. And this assumes, unrealistically, the best-case scenario in which marshals are always successful in stopping terrorist attacks.⁹⁵

In discussing the program, terrorism expert David Schanzer notes that in order for an air marshal to prevent an attack—say a bombing—on a plane, he or she must (1) determine that an attempted detonation is occurring, (2) ascertain the location of the bomber, (3) move to the bomber’s location from his or her seat, (4) discern who is a terrorist and who is an innocent passenger, and then (5) act to disarm or kill the terrorist(s) in question. This must all occur in a matter of seconds within the cramped confines of an airplane.96

These issues were not unnoticed by some officials. At the same time President Obama called for an increase in the FAMS budget, members of Congress sought to investigate the program, with some stating pointedly, “They [FAMS] haven’t done anything,” and “we need to get a ready broom and sweep.”⁹⁷ These calls have fallen on deaf ears. Reporting in 2017, some eight years after the surge took place, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) wrote that the TSA admitted they didn’t have any evidence on the program’s efficacy. The report states, “TSA officials explained that it is very difficult to empirically measure the effectiveness of [FAMS,] and the program has no efforts underway to collect such data.”⁹⁸

In addition to being highly criticized for being, as put by John Duncan (R-TN), “a total waste of money,” other concerns about the program have also been raised.⁹⁹ Highlighting how secrecy has worked to obscure or prevent oversight by elected officials, citizens, and the media, journalist Michael Grabell worked for years to obtain data regarding misconduct, in the FAMS program. He eventually uncovered dozens of instances where marshals had been arrested for a variety of crimes, including human trafficking, drug smuggling, sexual abuse of minor children, prostitution, and fraud.¹⁰⁰ Some 250 air marshals have been fired for misconduct while another four hundred resigned in the face of being investigated. He recorded more than nine hundred suspensions (amounting to 4,600 lost workdays).¹⁰¹ Grabell notes how the secrecy surrounding the FAMS program allowed the TSA to shield itself from criticism.

When the TSA finally responded to my seven-year-old request, it included its own analysis of the data along with an unsolicited statement. . . . The statement also said the agency saw a “significant reduction” in misconduct cases in 2015 as a result of its initiatives. But notably, the agency only provided data through February 2012, even though in my last email exchange with the office . . . I requested the entire database. This has become standard practice for many agencies. By delaying FOIA [Freedom of Information Act] requests for years, the TSA gets to claim the data it releases is old news. (The agency made the same claim back in 2008, which—because of the data we received recently—we now know isn’t true.)102

In addition to evidence of marshals’ malfeasance, the FAMS has come under fire for actively spying on innocent civilians as part of its Quiet Skies program. Under Quiet Skies, federal air marshals track unknowing citizens as they make their way through airports. Any citizen entering the United States after traveling internationally is automatically assessed for actions that would allow them to be surveyed under this program—though the exact criteria for being added to the watch list are unclear. Once added, however, marshals watch to see if a citizen is “abnormally aware,” displays “excess fidgeting,” has a “cold penetrating stare,” or sleeps while aboard their flight—all apparent potential signs of danger. Passengers may remain on the Quiet Skies watch list for up to ninety days and are never informed of this fact.¹⁰³

Once news broke about the program, a public backlash ensued, prompting the TSA to defend the program. The agency’s website states that unflattering portrayals of the program are “inaccurate” and that Quiet Skies is an “important program” that has “defused dozens of situations that had the potential to escalate, placing the aircraft, crew, and passengers in further danger.” They further claim, “These rules have strict oversight by the Department of Homeland Security, including the privacy, civil rights and liberties, and general counsel offices.”¹⁰⁴

No publicly available information about the program, however, has shown it to be effective. David Schanzer describes the “notion that would-be terrorists exhibit a set of uniform behaviors” as “discredited.”¹⁰⁵ Of the approximately five thousand passengers monitored under the program, none have posed a serious terror threat or merited additional scrutiny.¹⁰⁶ When asked to further elaborate on the program’s effectiveness, the TSA—appealing to “security”—stated that releasing such information would “make passengers less safe.”¹⁰⁷ In 2017, Representative Jody Hice (R-GA) sought to introduce legislation that would require the FAMS to provide detailed information on their programs. Without this information, he wrote, oversight agencies are “not able to effectively conduct oversight.”¹⁰⁸

Perhaps no other aspect of the TSA’s expanded security checkpoint procedures has come under more intensive scrutiny than the use of Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) or “body scanners”—equipment that continues to be extensively utilized by the TSA in screening. While metal detectors have been in use at airports for decades, they have the obvious limitation of being unable to detect nonmetallic objects. After the attempts by the “shoe bomber” and the “underwear bomber,” the TSA pressed forward with the implementation of two distinct types of body scanners to detect a greater range of potential threats. The first of these, called a millimeter-wave scanner, utilizes radio waves to search for “anomalies” on a person’s body. The second type, “backscatter” X-ray scanners, utilize X-rays to examine passengers’ bodies.109

U.S. officials were quick to publicly advocate the need for these scanners, pointing again to the threat posed by terrorists on commercial aircraft. Unlike the other policies and programs mentioned above, however, the implementation of scanners in airports received intense and immediate criticism—particularly with respect to privacy. Despite these concerns, the TSA rolled out the scanners in airports across the country all the while downplaying or dismissing privacy concerns completely. Speaking about the scanners, former TSA chief John Pistole said, “the reason we are doing these types of pat-downs and using the advanced imagery technology is trying to take the latest intelligence and how we know al Qaeda and affiliates want to hurt us.”¹¹⁰ Officials also argued that the scanners were (and are) the most effective means to detect hidden weapons—particularly those utilized by the “shoe” and “underwear bomber.”

This is captured clearly in the statements of TSA spokesman Nicholas Kimball in 2010 when he stated, “the bottom line is that we are now able to detect all types of the most dangerous weapons—nonmetallic explosive devices.”¹¹¹ Referring specifically to the Christmas Day bomber and his use of PETN, former homeland security secretary Michael Chertoff said the use of AIT, had it “been deployed . . . would pick up this kind of device.”¹¹² Officials boasted of the machines’ capabilities. Speaking less than a year after the failed Christmas Day bombing, TSA spokesman Greg Soule said, “This year alone, the use of advanced imaging technology has led to the detection of over 130 prohibited, illegal, or dangerous items,” though he offered no context as to whether any of these were linked to attempted acts of terror.113

Whether these machines are actually effective, however, is far from clear. The TSA routinely fails to apprehend bomb-making materials and other hazardous items during inspections of passengers. In 2017, the DHS ran undercover tests of multiple airport security checkpoints and reported a remarkable failure rate. When asked by ABC News whether the failure rate was 80 percent (as had been reported), they were told such an estimate was “in the ballpark.”¹¹⁴ During similar tests in 2017, teams with the DHS were able to smuggle banned materials through TSA checkpoints in 67 of the 70 drills conducted.¹¹⁵

There are other issues with the capabilities of the scanners. Body scanners are unable to see inside an individual’s body (though backscatter scanners can penetrate skin), making them unable to detect objects hidden inside body cavities. Just months after the attempted Christmas Day attack, a GAO report raised questions regarding the machines’ efficacy—even in their ability to prevent the precise type of attack that spawned their increased use. The report states that “it is unclear whether the [body scanners] would have detected the weapon used in the December 2009 incident.”¹¹⁶

Once again illustrating the use of secrecy in matters of “security” to prevent public scrutiny, the Obama administration denied a request made by Iowa Senator Chuck Grassley to release a GAO report on the efficacy of the scanners, stating that the results of GAO tests were “classified.” The unclassified summary of the report states that after evaluating the TSA’s use of AIT, liquid screening, and TSO performance, “we identified vulnerabilities in the screening process . . . at the eight domestic airports where we conducted testing. . . . The number of tests conducted, the names of the airports tested, and the quantitative and qualitative results of our testing are classified.”¹¹⁷ Speaking on the report and the administration’s unwillingness to release the results, Grassley (R-IA) said, “Keeping the results secret will accomplish one thing . . . it will ensure the public has no idea how effective our airport screening strategy is.”¹¹⁸

Soon after the body scanners began being utilized at more airports, a coalition of twenty-four privacy organizations, including the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), began to challenge their use. In a letter to homeland security secretary Janet Napolitano, the coalition pointed out that “your agency will be capturing the naked photographs of millions of American air travelers suspected of no wrongdoing.”119 Officials quickly dismissed such concerns and criticized those concerned for passengers’ privacy. “I do think privacy groups have some explaining to do” for pushing back against the TSA’s use of body scanners, said Stewart Baker, a former homeland security official.¹²⁰

When a “national opt-out day” was organized in November 2010 (the event encouraged passengers to opt for a full-body pat down as opposed to being scanned), then TSA administrator John Pistole referred to such an action as “irresponsible” and worked to place individuals into clear “in groups” and “out groups.” Those who acquiesced to the scanners were helping to combat and defeat terrorism while those who objected were actively undermining public safety. He pointed to the machines’ purported efficacy and the attempted bombing the year before. “It is irresponsible for a group to suggest travelers opt out of the very screening that could prevent an attack using non-metallic explosives. . . . I understand the serious threats our nation faces and the security measures we must implement to thwart potential attacks. This technology . . . is vital to aviation security and a critical measure to thwart potential terrorist attacks.”¹²¹

Officials were keen to point out that images of passengers would not be stored and that anonymity would be protected. Before the expanded use of the scanners, a TSA press release in 2008 stated that “passenger privacy is ensured through the anonymity of the image. . . . The image won’t be stored, transmitted or printed, and deleted immediately once viewed. In fact, the machines have zero storage capability.”¹²² Despite these and other assurances, it was quickly revealed that the machines did in fact have storage capabilities. As of 2010, a known thirty-five thousand images were stored in a courthouse in Florida.¹²³ Owing again to the lack of information made available to citizens, media, and other officials, it is unknown whether these images are still being stored, whether additional images were warehoused, and, if so, when and where.

Despite legal challenges for the government to release the images for scrutiny, a judge ruled that officials could withhold the images in the name of national security. According to court documents, releasing the images would expose “TSA’s processes, routines, vulnerabilities . . . and the limitations on TSA’s capabilities.”124 The TSA further argued that the images were stored solely for “training purposes.” Writing on the issue, journalist Chris Mellor summarized the implications as follows. “So that leaves us with full body scanners that can capture strip search scanned images of people . . . and export them. . . . That leaves privacy campaigners salivating at the mouth with the possibilities of abuse, and the TSA with much egg on its face for issuing misleading statements.”¹²⁵

Issues of privacy are often dismissed in the name of security from terrorist threats. But this neglects the fact that there are multiple margins of security. Threats from terrorism are one margin on which safety can be compromised. But personal violations against individuals by government are another threat to personal safety. This became evident when the TSA discontinued the use of backscatter X-ray machines in 2015 and shifted to millimeter-wave technology.¹²⁶ As mentioned earlier, this technology detects anomalies on an individual’s body. While seemingly less intrusive than the detailed images produced by backscatter technology, privacy advocates have questioned their use. In an amicus brief filed in 2016, the Competitive Enterprise Institute documented that “anomalies” that could cause a scanner to alarm included things like multiple layers of clothes, excess body fat, and sweat.”¹²⁷ Passengers with cysts or hernias may also be flagged.¹²⁸ They argue that, as a result of these inefficiencies, “for many Americans, pat-downs are in effect a primary form of screening,” as their bodies will seem an “anomaly” to the technology.¹²⁹

The brief further describes a variety of abuses and injuries that occurred (and continue to occur) as a direct result of the scanners and the pat downs they spawn. Female, male, and transgender passengers have all reported sexual harassment. The brief likewise outlines a number of cases in which the security procedures of the TSA—particularly the use of pat downs triggered as a result of “anomalies” on scanners—have led to the humiliation of seniors and the disabled and possibly compromised the health and safety of passengers. In 2011, for example, retired special education teacher Thomas Sawyer went to the Detroit Metropolitan Airport to catch a flight to Orlando. Sawyer, a survivor of bladder cancer, was wearing a urostomy bag—a device that collects urine from an opening in his abdomen. Speaking of the bag, he said, “I have to wear special clothes and in order to mount the bag I have to seal a wafer to my stomach and then attach the bag. If the seal is broken, the urine can leak all over my body and clothes.” When Sawyer went through the TSA’s security scanner, the device alerted TSA agents to something unusual and he was selected for additional screening. In the course of a subsequent pat down, TSA agents broke the seal on his medical device and “urine started dribbling down my shirt and my leg and into my pants.”130 Less than a year later, Sawyer would suffer a similar humiliation at the same airport when screeners again broke the seal on his urostomy bag, once again leaving him covered in urine.¹³¹

Other cases are plentiful. Breast cancer survivor and flight attendant Cathy Bossi was forced to remove her prosthetic breast at the behest of a TSA agent in Charlotte Douglas International Airport. She’d undergone surgery as a result of her cancer.¹³² When three-year-old Mandy Simmons was reluctant to relinquish her stuffed teddy bear to be scanned in 2008, she was flagged for additional screening. In a video taken of the incident, the child can be seen sobbing and screaming at agents to “stop touching me!”¹³³ A California mother was awarded a $75,000 settlement after TSA agents in Arizona detained her for carrying breast milk for her seven-month-old son despite the fact she had printed the TSA rules on the matter (passengers are allowed to carry larger quantities of breast milk) and had them in her bag.¹³⁴

In addition to the utter mortification experienced by individuals with prosthetic breasts, colostomy bags, and other medical devices, the TSA scanners have proven to be dangerous to some individuals. In another incident, diabetic teenager Savannah Berry was forced to go through a body scanner despite carrying a letter from her physician saying she could not be scanned for medical reasons. After being scanned, she quickly noticed her $10,000 insulin pump, on which she relies to maintain appropriate blood sugar levels, was not working properly. She in turn called her mother who, in consulting with the manufacturer, said the scanner could damage the pump’s software, causing it to malfunction.135 In response to questions from the Huffington Post about the incident, the TSA seemed to place blame on the passenger, saying, “Signage posted at security checkpoints informs passengers that advanced imaging technology screening is optional for all passengers, including those traveling with medical devices.”¹³⁶ Speaking of the incident, a staff attorney for the American Diabetes Association stated cases like Berry’s “aren’t isolated incidences.”¹³⁷

The specific people involved in these and similar situations probably do not feel more secure because of TSA procedures, at least not in their person. Even if they are safer from the threat of terrorism—a questionable assumption given the data available—the price they pay in terms of reduced security on other margins lowers the overall benefit of TSA security operations. Security is not limited to one arena. Attempts to enhance security on some margins (e.g., the threat of potential terrorist acts) may reduce security on other margins (e.g., reductions in security over one’s personal privacy and health). This trade-off is even more relevant when one appreciates that the benefit of TSA procedures involves potential security from potential terrorists, while the costs in terms of reduced security in one’s person are actual and concrete regardless of whether those dual potentialities are realized.

Wichita Airport Plot (2013)

The final case involves Terry Lee Loewen, an avionic technician at the Wichita Airport. As in the other cases, there is a clear disconnect between the nature of the threat as portrayed by officials and the reality of the planned attack. While the plot involved an airport, this was not the result of careful calculation on Loewen’s part. Instead, the airport appears to have been a target of convenience.¹³⁸

At age fifty-three, Loewen converted to Islam and later began to frequent radical websites.¹³⁹ On one site he connected with an FBI investigator, pretending to be a fellow radical Muslim. Over the course of several months, Loewen and the FBI investigator (and later a second investigator) would plot to blow up planes parked at the airport terminal with the intention of inflicting economic and psychological damage. As he and one of the FBI employees drove to the airport to carry out the attack—utilizing a car bomb he had assisted one of the undercover agents in constructing with inert materials—Loewen was arrested and charged with several counts, including attempting to use a weapon of mass destruction. In exchange for a plea of “guilty” Loewen was sentenced to twenty years in prison, lifetime supervised release, and a mandatory special assessment of $100.140

Unlike some of the other cases, this incident does not appear to have spawned any known additions to checkpoint screening, as the plot did not involve posing as a passenger. This is not to imply, however, that officials failed to use the Loewen plot as a means of reinforcing the official narrative regarding the imminent terror threat. Officials treated the incident as “an outright terrorist attack” and sought to highlight the supposed threat posed not only by terror groups, but also “lone-wolf terrorists” (individuals who devise and perpetuate terror attacks alone and without any connection to a formal terror group).¹⁴¹ Assistant attorney general John Carlin, for example, said that Loewen “utilized his privileged airport access to attempt a terrorist attack in Wichita.”¹⁴² Speaking on the issue of lone-wolf terrorism after the incident, special agent in charge Michael Kaste stated that Loewen and other lone wolves pose “a very serious threat to our nation’s security.”¹⁴³

The problem with this narrative is twofold. As mentioned earlier, the threat from terrorism as a whole is incredibly small. The threat from lone-wolf terrorism is even less. A report from the FBI, for example, examined fifty-two cases of lone-offender terror attacks between 1972 and 2015. These offenders engaged in thirty-three acts of terrorism over the forty-three-year period, killing 258 and injuring 982.¹⁴⁴ Although Loewen identified as a Muslim and officials raised concerns about Islamic extremists, only nine of the twenty-six lone offenders who identified as religious claimed to be Muslim, and only 13 percent were Middle Eastern—the vast majority (65 percent) were white.¹⁴⁵ Second, the official narrative that Loewen acted as lone-wolf terrorist was patently false. Though Kaste referred to Loewen explicitly as a “lone wolf,” he had substantial help from the two aforementioned FBI agents and, therefore, fails to meet the definition of a lone-wolf terrorist.

Despite this pointed language and the portrayal of Loewen as a dangerous lone wolf, there’s a serious question as to whether he would have been capable of conducting any sort of attack without the assistance of the two undercover FBI agents. His lawyers, in fact, argued that the FBI’s actions were equivalent to entrapment, though the judge dismissed a motion to throw out the case on such grounds.146 Like the transatlantic terror plot uncovered in 2006, there was no possibility that Loewen’s attack would have succeeded, as the FBI was carefully tracking him and working with him throughout his planning.

CONCLUSION

Citizens’ fear of some external threat—whether real or perceived—sets the stage for state actors to expand their power over citizens.¹⁴⁷ As a result, governments may actively work to nurture and exploit fear among the broader population in order to serve their own narrow interests. The creation and expansion of the TSA in response to the 9/11 terror attacks is a prime example of this dynamic. From 9/11 onward, officials have used their privileged position and monopoly control over information to inflate the true threat posed by terrorism overall and the threat posed to passengers as they travel by air. By overstating the nature of the threat posed by a handful of terror plots and through the continued withholding of information regarding the efficacy of their programs, the TSA, DHS, and other agencies have effectively utilized a variety of propaganda to cultivate fear and, ultimately, support for their operations.

As the cases above illustrate, safety from terrorism is but one margin on which individuals may be made safer (even if the relative risk is already very small). In taking steps to provide this security, however, government makes people less secure on other margins (e.g., health and privacy of person and information). Through the control of information and the continued expansion of a number of questionable safety programs, officials may reduce the perceived threat of terrorism but probably decrease safety for some people on other margins.

The trade-off between margins of security is rarely, if ever, considered. Instead, government agencies narrowly focus on procedures that purport to stop the supposed existential threat from terrorists while dismissing, if not outright ignoring, the costs in terms of reduced security on other margins. Without the ability to obtain or critically assess the programs implemented and maintained by the TSA and other agencies, citizens are unable to determine whether these trade-offs are ones that they find beneficial or desirable.