Nicholas Warr’s Phase Line Green is a first-person account of the struggle for Hue, one of the defining battles of the Communist 1968 Tet Offensive, and indeed of the entire war. As a relatively new Marine platoon leader, just arrived in Vietnam, then Lieutenant Warr participated in the “liberation” of the former capital of the Vietnamese emperors, an event which would have a life-long searing impact. Twenty-nine years later, in this book, he tells his story from the perspective of the small unit leader in vivid prose that has lost none of its urgency or pungency in the passage of time. In the telling, he spares few, including himself.
On 30–31 January 1968, during the Vietnamese lunar New Year, the Vietnamese Communists mounted a surprise offensive throughout all of South Vietnam. Most of these attacks were by local Viet Cong units. There was one place, however, where the Communists committed first-line North Vietnamese units, and that was in the one-month struggle for Hue.
At the beginning of 1968 (nearly three years after the commitment of large American combat forces to the war), the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, under Army General William C. Westmoreland, had intelligence of a massing of enemy divisions in the northern border region, especially in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) dividing the two Vietnams and in Laos near the isolated Marine base at Khe Sanh. Westmoreland prepared to reinforce the III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF), under Marine Lieutenant General Robert E. Cushman, in the five northern provinces of South Vietnam.
In January 1968, III MAF numbered over one hundred thousand Marines, sailors, and soldiers, including one Army and two Marine infantry divisions. In mid-January, Westmoreland rushed yet another Army division, the 1st Air Cavalry Division, north. Worried about the Marine defenses at Khe Sanh and lacking confidence in the ability of the Marine commanders to control the situation, Westmoreland planned to establish a temporary northern forward headquarters under his deputy, Army General Creighton Abrams.1 Before he could implement this plan, the enemy launched their Tet offensive—everywhere but at Khe Sanh.
As the former imperial capital, Hue was for many Vietnamese the cultural center of the country. It radiated a sense both of its colonial and imperial past. It was, in effect, two cities. North of the Perfume River lay the walled city of the emperors, called the Citadel. (There is some confusion in the term “Citadel,” because it also refers to the Royal Palace grounds, which are also surrounded by a wall.) South of the river was the modern city. The South Vietnamese had dismissed any notion that the enemy had the ability to launch a division-size attack against the city.2
Unknown to the allies, two enemy regiments—the 6th and 4th NVA— were on the move. At 0223 on 31 January a four-man North Vietnamese sapper team opened the western gate of the Citadel to the lead battalions of the 6th NVA. By daylight, most of the Citadel was in the hands of the NVA. At the 1st ARVN Division’s Mang Ca compound, an ad hoc two-hundred-man defensive force managed to stave off the enemy assaults.3
Across the river in southern Hue, the NVA maintained a virtual siege of the MACV advisory compound. While the 4th NVA attack in the new city lacked the cohesion and timing of those in the Citadel, the NVA controlled most of southern Hue.4
The first U.S. Marines to bolster the South Vietnamese in the city were from the newly formed Task Force X-Ray, under Brigadier General Foster C. LaHue, at Phu Bai, about eight miles south of Hue. LaHue had barely enough time to become acquainted with his new sector, let alone the fast-developing Hue situation. LaHue later wrote: “Initial deployment of forces was made with limited information.”5
With this “limited information” Company A, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines received orders to relieve Hue. Although reinforced by four Marine tanks, the Marine company was caught in a murderous crossfire after crossing the An Cuu Bridge into the city. Among the casualties was the company commander.6
The Marines reinforced the embattled company with the command group of the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines (Lieutenant Colonel Marcus J. Gravel) and Company G, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines. Gravel’s relief column reached Company A in the early afternoon. By this time, the enemy attackers had pulled back their forces.7
Leaving Company A behind to secure the MACV compound, Lieutenant Colonel Gravel took Company G and attempted to cross the main bridge over the Perfume River. Two infantry platoons made their way over but immediately came under machine gun fire. Gravel remembered, “We were no match for what was going on. . . . I decided to withdraw.”8
This was easier said than done. The enemy was well dug in and “firing from virtually every building.” Company G lost nearly a third of its men, either wounded or killed.9
The American command still had little realization of the situation in Hue. In Saigon, General William C. Westmoreland cabled Washington: “The enemy has approximately three companies in the Hue Citadel and Marines have sent a battalion into the area to clear them out.”10
General LaHue soon realized the enemy strength in Hue was much greater than he had originally estimated. Shortly after noon on 1 February, he called Colonel Stanley S. Hughes of the 1st Marines and gave him tactical control of the forces in the southern city. Hughes reinforced the two Marine companies in Hue with Company F, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines.11
In southern Hue, on 2 February, the Marines made some minor headway and Company H, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines reinforced the Marines in the city. The NVA, however, continued to block any advance to the west toward the province headquarters building.12
At Phu Bai, Colonel Hughes prepared to bring his headquarters and that of the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, under Lieutenant Colonel Ernest C. Cheatham, into Hue. On the morning of the third, Hughes established his command post in the MACV compound and held a hurried conference with his two battalion commanders. While Lieutenant Colonel Cheatham took control of the three companies already in the city, Gravel retained command of Company A.13
Establishing his command post at the University, Lieutenant Colonel Cheatham, like Gravel before him, made no headway against the enemy. On 4 February, Colonel Hughes decided to place the 1st Battalion on Lieutenant Colonel Cheatham’s exposed flank and continue the push against the enemy defensive positions.14
That morning, Company B, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines joined Lieutenant Colonel Gravel’s command. That night, however, North Vietnamese sappers blew the An Cuu bridge, closing the land route into the city. This left the Marine command only two alternatives to resupply the Hue forces—river traffic and helicopters.15
With little room to outflank the enemy, the battalion had to take each building and each block one at a time. According to Cheatham, “We had to pick a point and attempt to break that one strong point.” After a time, Cheatham and his officers noted that the enemy “defended on every other street.” In other words, the battalion would move quickly and then hit a defensive position.16
On the morning of 5 February, both Marine battalions resumed the attack in a southwesterly direction toward the city hospital and provincial headquarters. On the right flank, Company H advanced along the river front. The 1st Battalion, 1st Marines secured the left flank. Lieutenant Colonel Gravel remembered, “The going was slow. . . . We fought for two days over one building.”17
On the afternoon of 6 February, Company H used tear gas to overwhelm the NVA defenders in the provincial headquarters. The capture of the provincial headquarters was more than symbolic; the building had served as the command post for the 4th NVA Regiment. Once the headquarters fell to the Marines, much of the enemy’s organized resistance in southern Hue collapsed.18
By 10 February, despite some occasional resistance, the Marines were in control south of the Perfume River. With the NVA still holding fast in the Citadel, Hue was now indeed two cities.19
In clearing the modern city, the Marines took a heavy toll of the enemy, but at a high cost to themselves. The Americans had accounted for over 1,000 enemy dead and took 6 prisoners. Marine casualties included 38 dead and over 320 wounded.20
While the Marines cleared the new city, a South Vietnamese offensive in the Citadel had faltered. By 8 February, Brigadier General Ngo Quang Truong, the 1st Division commander, had inside the Citadel four airborne battalions and the 3d ARVN Regiment, which were able to hold their own.21
About ten miles to the west of Hue, the U.S. Army’s 3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division was having as little luck as the ARVN forces. Having run into well-entrenched enemy forces, the 3d Brigade could not push the NVA out. During this period, the North Vietnamese command maintained its own support area outside the western wall of the Citadel.22
In the interim, the South Vietnamese Joint General Staff sent reinforcements from Saigon to Phu Bai, the lead elements of a Vietnamese Marine task force. General Truong proposed to have the South Vietnamese Marines replace the battered Vietnamese airborne battalions in the Citadel. Although one company entered the Citadel on the tenth, the Vietnamese Marine commander refused to insert any more troops until the rest of his command arrived from Saigon.23
General Truong also asked for a U.S. Marine battalion. On 11–12 February, the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, under Major Robert H. Thompson, entered the Citadel to take over the southeastern sector. Like the other 5th Marines battalions, the 1st Battalion remained under the operational control of the 1st Marines.24
The 1st Battalion, 5th Marines included Company C, commanded by First Lieutenant Scott A. Nelson, along with Second Lieutenant Nicholas Warr and his platoon of fifty-one Marines.
Apparently when the one Vietnamese Marine company came into the Citadel the previous day, the Vietnamese airborne units departed. Unaware of the departure of the Vietnamese airborne, Major Thompson departed the Mang Ca compound on the morning of the thirteenth to take over the new sector: “There was no Airborne unit in the area and Company A was up to their armpits in NVA.” Within minutes the company sustained thirty-five casualties.25
Much of the fighting centered around an archway tower occupied by the NVA along the Citadel’s eastern wall. Finally after committing its reserve and the extensive use of supporting fire including air, the battalion captured the tower on the night of 15–16 February.26
For the next few days the 1st Battalion met the same close-quarter resistance from the enemy. The battalion discovered that the NVA units in the Citadel employed “better city-fighting tactics” than the enemy in southern Hue.27
During this period, on the thirteenth, the Vietnamese Marine task force finally arrived in the Citadel and was assigned the southwest sector. In two days of heavy fighting, however, the Vietnamese Marine task force advanced less than four hundred meters. In other sectors of the Citadel, other ARVN units were also at a standstill.28
By this time, the enemy also had his problems. On the night of 16–17 February, the allies intercepted an enemy radio transmission relating the death of the NVA commander in the city and the assumption of command of a new officer. The new commander recommended withdrawal but the senior headquarters denied the request.29
In the Citadel, General Truong prepared for the final thrust to capture the Imperial Palace. With the Vietnamese Marines on the western flank, he placed the 3d ARVN Regiment in the center. On the left flank, the U.S. Marine battalion renewed its assault. If the NVA in the Citadel were now fighting a rear guard action, they contested nearly every piece of ground.30
Generals Abrams (who had established his new headquarters at Phu Bai) and Cushman shared a concern about progress in the Citadel and the resulting American casualties. The Washington Post quoted a Marine officer: “We don’t have enough men,. . . air support, or enough artillery to do this thing quickly.”31
On 20 February, General Abrams radioed General Cushman that he considered “the measures so far taken to be inadequate.” He also sent a message to General Tolson of the 1st Air Cavalry to clear the approaches to Hue.32
Despite the note of anxiety in Abrams’s messages, the battle for Hue was in its last stages. By 22 February, after stiff resistance, the 1st Cavalry’s 3d Brigade was within sight of the city walls.33 In the eastern sector, the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines had once again taken the initiative. Despite heavy initial resistance, by the morning of the twenty-second the Marines had reached the southeastern wall.34
To the west of the American Marines, however, the North Vietnamese continued to hold out. Venting his anger at what he considered the slow progress of the Vietnamese Marines, General Abrams complained to Westmoreland that the Vietnamese Marines in the last three days “have moved forward less than half a city block,” and even recommended their possible dissolution.35
Notwithstanding Abrams’s frustrations, the Vietnamese forces were on the offensive. At 0500 on the twenty-fourth, ARVN soldiers raised their flag over the Citadel; by late afternoon, South Vietnamese troops had recaptured the palace with its surrounding grounds and walls. Except for mopping up operations, the fight for the Citadel was over. On 26 February, ARVN forces relieved the Marine battalion.36
On the twenty-ninth, the 1st and 2d Battalions, 5th Marines conducted a sweep east and north of the city, but the search for significant North Vietnamese forces proved fruitless. Lieutenant Colonel Cheatham observed, “We couldn’t close the loop around the enemy. To be honest, we didn’t have enough people to close it.” On 2 March 1968, the Marines closed out the operation.37
The suddenness and the extent of the enemy offensive in Hue caught both the South Vietnamese and American commands off stride. At first underestimating the strength of the enemy in Hue, the allies sent too few troops. Command, control, and coordination remained a problem until the last weeks. The activation of the MACV Phu Bai Headquarters added an additional, unneeded layer of command from above. Task Force X-Ray, the 1st ARVN Division, and the 3d Brigade all fought their own battles in isolation. Aside from General Cushman of III MAF and General Abrams, there was no overall American, let alone single, commander of the Hue campaign. Both Cushman and Abrams were at too high a level to focus much of their attention on the Hue situation. Even General Truong controlled the South Vietnamese effort from his headquarters. As a Marine officer observed, the lack of an overall commander resulted in competition for support and no general battle plan. By the time a U.S. Army general became the Hue coordinator, “He didn’t have anything to coordinate.”38
The battle cost all sides dearly. Allied unit casualties totaled more than 600 dead and nearly 3,800 wounded and missing. Allied estimates of NVA and VC dead ranged from 2,500 to 5,000 troops.39
Just as speculative were the size and number of enemy units participating in the one-month battle. Allied intelligence officers initially identified at least three North Vietnamese regimental headquarters. Later they confirmed battalions from at least four more NVA regiments. Allied intelligence estimated that from sixteen to eighteen enemy battalions took part in the battle. Some of these battalions were supposed to have been at Khe Sanh. From 8,000 to 11,000 enemy troops participated in the fighting for Hue in the city itself or its approaches. American intelligence officers believed that a forward headquarters of the Tri-Thien-Hue front under a North Vietnamese general officer directed the Hue offensive.40
Given both the resources that the North Vietnamese put into the battle and the tenacity with which they fought, it was obvious they placed a high premium on Hue. The North Vietnamese planners viewed Hue as the weak link in the allied defenses in the north.
Once in Hue, the Communists established their own civil government, and their cadres rounded up known government officials, sympathizers, and foreigners. After the recapture of Hue, South Vietnamese authorities exhumed some three thousand bodies thrown into hastily dug graves. The North Vietnamese admitted tracking down and punishing “hoodlum ringleaders” but denied killing innocent civilians.41
Only the failure of the North Vietnamese to overrun the Mang Ca and MACV compounds permitted the allies to retain a toehold in both the Citadel and the new city. This enabled the allies to bring in reinforcements, albeit piecemeal. If the enemy had blown the An Cuu Bridge on the first day, the Marines would not have been able to bring their initial battalions and supplies into the city.42
General Truong told the 1st Cavalry commander that if “I could ever get the Cav to the walls of Hue, the enemy would ‘bug out.’” The 1st Air Cavalry Division eventually positioned itself to commit a four-battalion brigade to the battle. The problem was that it took twenty-two days for the 3d Brigade to fight its way there.43
Although the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese harassed ship traffic in the Perfume River, they made no serious attempt to close the waterways. Even with the An Cuu Bridge closed for over a week, the Marines had stockpiled and brought in enough supplies by boat to support operations in both the Citadel and southern Hue. If the enemy cut both the water and land lines of communication, the outcome of the struggle for Hue would have been less predictable.44
Although desiring a general uprising during Tet, the Communists may realistically have had a more limited and attainable goal in mind. Perhaps they hoped that the capture of Hue would result in the defection of the South Vietnamese forces and the loss of other population centers in the two northern provinces of South Vietnam. Such a result would have cut the allied lines of communication and left the 3d Marine Division isolated in fixed positions bordering the DMZ and Laos. This would have left the Communists in a strong position for obtaining their own terms.
In any event, Tet served as a benchmark for both sides, forcing them to reassess their strategies. The United States determined the extent of its commitment to Vietnam and began turning more of the war over to the South Vietnamese. After August 1968, the Communists scaled down their large unit war, probably out of both weakness and the expectation that the Americans would eventually withdraw. Tet taught both sides that there was to be no quick fix.
Jack Shulimson
Notes
While I am employed by the Marine Corps Historical Center, the opinions expressed above are my own and in no way represent the views of the U.S. Marine Corps or the U.S. government. — J.S.
1. For Westmoreland’s doubts about the Marine command, see Historical Summary, General Entry, 27 Dec 67— 31 Jan 68, v. 28, pp. 19–21, History File, William C. Westmoreland Papers, CMH. See also Diary entry, 26–27 Jan 68, LtGen John R. Chaisson Papers (Hoover Institution on War, Peace and Revolution, Stanford University).
2. MACV ComdHist, 1968, pp. 881–83.
3. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan 68, pp. 18–20 and Feb 68, pp. 8–10; Truong Sinh, “The Fight to Liberate the City of Hue,” pp. 90, 93–95, 97; Lung, The General Offensives, p. 79; Pham Van Son, Tet Offensive, p. 249; Waldron and Beaver, “Operation Hue City,” pp. 7–8; “The Battle of Hue,” (3dMarDiv ComdC), pp. 2–3.
4. Nolan, Battle for Hue, pp. 6–8; Truong Sinh, “The Fight to Liberate the City of Hue,” p. 101; 1st Mar AAR Hue City; People’s Liberation Army Forces List of Military Objectives in Hue, Jan 68, trans (Hue Folder, Tet Box, A&S Files, Indochina Archives).
5. 1/1 ComdC, Jan 68; 1st Mar Div Sit Rep No. 1, Hue City, dated 3 Feb 68, Hue City Jnl & Msg File; TF X-Ray ComdC, Jan 68; TF X-Ray AAR Hue City; 1st Mar AAR Hue City; LaHue debriefing; “History of Task Force X-Ray,” n.d., Attachment to Col A. J. Poillon, Comments on draft ms, dated 30 Oct 69, Donnelly and Shore, “Ho Chi Minh’s Gamble,” (Comment File). TF X-Ray AAR, pp. 9–10; III MAF Jnl and Msg File, passim., 30–31 Jan 68.
6. Ibid.; Nolan, Battle for Hue, pp. 12–13; Gravel interview; Medal of Honor Recommendations, dated 25 May 68, in Sgt Alfredo Gonzalez Biographical File (RefSec, MCHC); Paul Drew Stevens, editor, The Navy Cross, Vietnam, Citations of Awards to Men of the United States Navy and the United States Marine Corps, 1964–1973, (Forest Ranch, CA: Sharp & Dunnigan, 1987), pp. 27–28, 54.
7. Gravel interview pp. 5–6; 1st Mar AAR Hue City; 1st MarDiv AAR, Tet, p. 56; 1st MarDiv COC Notes, 31 Jan 68 (III MAF Msg & Jnl File); LaHue debriefing.
8. Gravel interview, pp. 5–6; Nolan, Battle for Hue, p. 20.
9. 1st Mar AAR Hue City; Gravel interview, pp. 7–8; Cheatham et al., presentation, p. 23; 1st Mar Div COC Notes, 0001-0900, 1 Feb 68, III MAF Msg & Jnl File.
10. LaHue debriefing; Westmoreland message to Wheeler, 31 Jan 68, Westmoreland Messages, Westmoreland Papers, CMH.
11. 1st Mar AAR Hue City, p. 11.
12. 1st Mar AAR Hue City, p. 13; Cpl George E. Minor interview in Cheatham et al. interview Tape 2511; 1st MarDiv SitRep No. 1, 3 Feb 68 (Hue City Jnl & Msg File).
13. Cheatham et al. presentation, p. 24; 1st Mar AAR Hue City, p. 14; 2/5 AAR Hue City.
14. Ill MAF SitRep No. 5, Hue City, 4 Feb 68 (Hue City Jnl & Msg File) and 1st Mar AAR Hue, p. 15; Gravel interview, pp. 18–19.
15. TF X-Ray, AAR Hue City, p. 11; 1st Mar AAR Hue City, pp. 15 and 18; 1st MarDiv Sit Rep, Hue, No. 7, 4 Feb 68 (Hue City Jnl & Msg File).
16. Cheatham et al. presentation, p. 17.
17. Gravel interview, pp. 15, 19; 1st Mar AAR Hue City, p. 18.
18. Cheatham et al. presentation, p. 56.
19. 2/5 AAR Hue City; 1st Mar AAR Hue City, pp. 24–34.
20. IstMarDiv Sit Rep No. 33, 11 Feb 68 (Hue City Jnl & Msg File); Bedford et al. interview, Tape 2673.
21. 1st ARVN Adv Det, “The Battle of Hue;” 1st Mar AAR, Opn Hue City.
22. U.S. Army, 14th Mil Hist Det, 1st Cav Div (AM), “The Battle of Hue, 2–26 February 1968,” dated 10 Mar 68 (copy in Nolan Papers), hereafter 14th MHD, The Battle of Hue,” Mar 68; 1st Mar AAR, Opn Hue City; Braestrup, Big Story, vol. I, pp. 316–17.
23. 1st Infantry Division Advisory Detachment, Advisory Team 3, CAAR, Opn NVA/VC Tet Offensive: Hue, dated 30 Mar 68 (copy in Nolan Papers), hereafter 1st InfDiv, Adv Tm 3, CAAR, Hue; TF X-Ray AAR, Opn Hue City; Maj Talman C. Budd II, MAU, NAG, CAAR, Hue City, dated 25 Jul 68; Pham Van Son et al., The Viet Cong Tet Offensive, pp. 256–59.
24. 1st Mar AAR, Opn Hue City; 1/5 AAR, Opn Hue City; Col Robert H. Thompson letter to Keith B. Nolan, 16 Sep 80 with attached copy of briefing map (Nolan Papers), hereafter Thompson letter, 16 Sep 80; 1/5 Frag O 6–68, 9 Feb 68, End 1,1/5 AAR Hue City, 15 Mar 68; 1/5 AAR, Hue City.
25. 1/5 AAR, Opn Hue City; Thompson letter, 16 Sep 80.
26. 1/5 AAR, Hue City.
27. Ibid.
28. Budd, AAR and Pham Van Son, Tet Offensive, 257–59; Pham Van Son, Tet Offensive, pp. 262–66; 1st ARVN Adv Det, The Battle of Hue,” p. 8; Waldron and Beavers, “Operation Hue City,” p. 38.
29. Ill MAF COC message to MACV(J2), 17 Feb 68 (III MAF Jnl & Msg File). See also Hallmark 62 message to Hallmark 6, Hue City SitRep, 17 Feb 68, App 5, Tab C, 1st FAG ComdC, Feb 68 and Alexander W. Wells, Jr., “Synopsis From Combat Report: February 1968—Vietnam,” in Alexander W. Wells, Jr. Papers, MCHC.
30. Waldron and Beavers, “Operation Hue City,” pp. 42–43; Pham Van Son, The Viet Cong Tet Offensive, p. 267; Maj Talman C. Budd II, MAU, NAG, CAAR, Hue City, dated 25 Jul 68; Lung, The General Offensives, p. 83.
31. Clark Dougan, Stephen Weiss, and the editors of Boston Publishing Company, The Vietnam Experience: Nineteen Sixty-Eight (Boston, Ma: Boston Publishing Company, 1983), p. 30; Clipping, Lee Lescaze, “Shortage of Men, Air Support Slows Marine Drive in Hue,” Washington Post, 19 Feb 68, Braestrup Papers. The 1st Marine Division responded to obvious concern by higher headquarters. Although not disputing the accuracy of Lescaze’s article, a division message explained that weather permitted fixed-wing support only on three days, 14–16 February 68. Because of the need for accuracy, the division stated it used only 8-inch howitzer and naval gunfire in support of the battalion. It admitted that “1/5 casualties have been high. During past week, priority of personnel replacement has been given to the 5th Marines.” (1st MarDiv message to CGFMFPac, 21 Feb 68, End 14, 1st MarDiv ComdC, Feb 68).
32. Abrams message to Cushman, info: Westmoreland, 20 Feb 68 and Abrams message to Tolson, 20 Feb 68 (Abrams Papers, CMH).
33. 14th MHD, “The Battle of Hue,” Mar 68, pp. 5–6; Waldron and Beavers, “Operation Hue City,” pp. 43–47.
34. Thompson letter, 16 Sep 80; AP dispatch, 22 Feb 68, Clipping in Polk Folder (Nolan Papers, MCHC); 1/5 AAR Hue City.
35. Budd, AAR; Abrams message to Westmoreland, 23 Feb 68 (Abrams Papers, CMH).
36. Budd, AAR; 1st InfDiv, Adv Tm 3, CAAR, Hue; 1/5 AAR Hue City; Thompson letter, 16 Sep 80.
37. 1st Marines AAR Hue City; 2/5 AAR Hue City; 1/5 AAR Hue City; Cheatham et al. presentation, pp. 11–12, 28–29.
38. Budd, AAR and LtCol Joseph W. Malcolm, Jr., debriefing at FMFPac, 28 Oct 68, Tape 3453 (Oral HistColl, MCHC).
39. TF X-Ray AAR Hue City; 1st InfDiv, Adv Tm 3, CAAR, Hue; Budd, AAR; 14th MHD, “The Battle of Hue,” Mar 68; 1st Bde, 101st Airborne Div, CAAR, Opn Hue City, 23 Mar 68, end 5, TF X-Ray AAR Hue City; Pham Van Son, The Tet Offensive, p. 271. The breakdown of casualties among the Marine infantry battalions are as follows: The 1st Battalion, 5th Marines sustained 67 dead and 403 wounded. The incomplete 2d Battalion, 5th Marines after-action report does not show total Marine casualties but the battalion’s command chronology for February shows 65 Marines killed and 421 wounded. It can be assumed that over 90 percent of these casualties occurred during the Hue City fighting. The 1st Battalion, 1st Marines did not submit an afteraction report for Hue, but its command chronology for February reflects 17 dead and 154 wounded. Again it can be assumed that the bulk of the casualties occurred in the Hue City fighting. 1/5 AAR Hue City; 2/5 ComdC, Feb 68; 1/1 ComdC, Feb 68.
40. Ibid.; 1st Lt John R. Morse, USA, Thua Thien Sector, S-2 Order of Battle Advisor in Hue, RVN, interview, 8 Mar 68 (U.S. Army, 45th Military History Detachment, Interview Enclosures Folder, Nolan Papers, MCHC); I Corps, Tactical Opns Center to III MAF, Resume of Telecon, 6 Feb 68 (Hue City III MAF Msg & Jnl File); Rand Interview No. 28 in Interviews concerning the NLF, May 68, Folder 2, Tet Box, A&S Files, Indochina Archives.
41. Truong Sinh, “The Fight to Liberate the City of Hue,” pp. 105–107; and Pham Van Son, The Tet Offensive, pp. 271–84; Westmoreland and Sharp, Report on the War, p. 160; Lung, The General Offensives, p. 85; Oberdorfer, Tet.’, pp. 232–33; Braestrup, Big Story, vol. I, pp. 201–16. For contrasting views of the Hue “massacres,” see Douglas Pike, “Viet Cong Strategy, New Face of Terror,” and D. Gareth Porter, “The 1968 Hue Massacre” in Hue Tet Folder, A&S Files, Indochina Archives.
42. Gravel interview, pp. 2–3.
43. 14th MHD, “The Battle of Hue,” Mar 68; Tolson interview, p. 5.
44. 1/5 AAR Hue City; Thompson letter, 16 Sep 80.