The Quest for Strategic Understanding
RICHARD J. BAILEY JR.
Our knowledge of circumstances has increased, but our uncertainty, instead of having diminished, has only increased. The reason of this is that we do not gain all our experience at once, but by degrees; so our determinations continue to be assailed incessantly by fresh experience; and the mind, if we may use the expression, must always be under arms.
—Carl von Clausewitz, On War (1832)
As Dennis Drew mentioned in the foreword, every author contributing to Strategy is a current or former faculty member at the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. SAASS is often touted as the premier strategy school in the U.S. Department of Defense (if not the country at large). And yet, as will be evident throughout the pages that follow, each of us defines strategy slightly (and sometimes not-so-slightly) differently. Herein lies the central challenge of teaching and learning strategy: the journey is never complete—the best we can hope for is to continue the quest. For over two millennia, serious thinkers have tried to define timeless strategic principles. But as Clausewitz notes above, our human experience sheds light on knowledge only in piecemeal. And while that knowledge grows, our own understanding of what is unknown grows as well. This is not meant to sound pessimistic or defeatist. On the contrary, awareness of our own shortcomings is one of the cornerstones of strategic thinking. Thus, strategy is not just about amassing knowledge; it is also about recognizing our imperfect understanding of the environment and respecting the complex nature of adaptation to the unforeseen or unexpected. In essence, the quest continues ad infinitum.
With that thought in mind, we, as the editors of this new book on strategy, decided to take a unique approach. Rather than providing a rigid framework for each contributing author, we purposely took off the shackles and encouraged complete freedom of thought and expression. As stated above, each contributing author to this work has his own definition of strategy. But all of us agree that strategy is dependent, in one way or another, on context and adaptation. Therefore, to explore the strategic application of national power, we need both a foundation of understanding and an intellectual flexibility. By that, I mean that we should understand the salient frameworks inherent in air- and spacepower, for example, but that we should also understand temporal and historical frameworks, theoretical underpinnings, and social dynamics. To put it another way, we should attempt to understand the tools of national power but also gain an appreciation that the use of these tools must be adaptive and sensitive to a dynamic environment.
Therefore, we hope that what results in the following pages is twofold. First, the book offers a way of thinking strategically about each particular subject matter, from classical history to cyberpower. As practitioners in the profession of arms, we must think strategically about the application of power on land, at sea, and in the air, space and cyberspace. In the following chapters, the authors present their own perspectives on fields related to the strategic application of power. In doing so, each presents his view of the relevant and important topics within a particular subdiscipline. Every exploration of strategy must begin with an understanding of context and environment, so the following chapters provide key concepts in each area worth contemplation. Secondly, and more importantly, this work illuminates different approaches to thinking about strategy, choices that have implications beyond the profession of arms. For example, in chapter 3, James Forsyth relies on theoretical underpinnings to explore the world through a realist lens of strategy in international relations. In chapter 6, Richard Muller uses a historical narrative (and pedagogical approach) to highlight the development of strategic airpower thinking and teaching; in chapter 9, Richard Bailey focuses on the social aspects of cyberspace and cyberpower. Thus, we hope that this book not only contributes to a greater understanding of the strategic aspects of the employment of power but also widens the aperture in recognizing different ways to explore new concepts. It is our contention that only through a willingness to explore different intellectual approaches do budding strategists make the most of their journeys.
John Warden, widely considered the architect of the airpower strategy that contributed to U.S.-coalition success in the first Gulf War, once stated that while tactics are necessarily tailored to specific ventures, strategic principles have much broader applications. He now serves as a strategic adviser to corporations and civilian agencies, where he uses many of the same skill sets he honed while on active duty in the military.1 If Warden’s contention is true, the concepts revealed in this book have applications well beyond the military arena. Without question, the various approaches to strategic thinking presented here can serve as a guide to approaching complex problems from different angles, thereby offering a greater understanding of their contextual parameters.
While our intention as editors was to encourage creativity among our contributors, we nevertheless painstakingly deliberated over the optimal arc for the book as a whole. We hope that the result is an intentional full circle academic journey. In the opening chapter, Everett Carl Dolman presents a thoughtful exploration of strategy itself, focusing on the complexities inherent in defining it as a concept and the perils of equating strategy with tactics. In chapter 2, “An Imperfect Jewel,” Harold Winton provides both an appreciation for the utility of military theory and a cautionary tale as to its misapplication. In chapter 3, James Forsyth explores the geopolitical big picture and looks at how one of the major schools of international relations—realism—interprets strategic thought. In addition, he explores the role that morality plays (or should play) for the grand strategist. Following that, in a dramatic twist, James Tucci presents a Socratic dialogue in chapter 4. In it, he presents a hypothetical discussion about classical strategy and the development of strategic thought. (Perhaps more importantly, he uses that dialogue to reveal options for how one might go about learning and teaching strategy.)
Stephen Chiabotti then provides a chapter on the symbiosis of technology and strategy. He demonstrates how successful strategists adapt to technological advances through a keen knowledge of environments and systems. In doing so, Chiabotti provides a foundation for the four chapters that follow it. In chapter 6, as mentioned above, Richard Muller gives a historical pedagogical review of the development of airpower thinking and elucidates its importance to the study of strategy. Next, Jeffrey Smith in chapter 7 builds on Muller’s work with an explanation of the relationship between airpower theory and airpower strategy, followed by contemporary thoughts on airpower and prescriptions for its future use. In chapter 8, M. V. Smith tackles the conundrum of spacepower and the challenges of articulating strategy in an environment devoid of clearly defined military objectives. And in chapter 9, Richard Bailey completes the technology discussion by exploring the social dynamics largely missing from the current literature on cyberspace and cyberpower.
In chapter 10, Mark Yeisley brings us back full circle to the present dilemmas facing the military strategist, namely the ubiquity of irregular warfare and the increasing complexities of preparing for the unexpected. Finally, in our concluding chapter, Stephen Wright tackles the seemingly impossible task of operationalizing strategy. His personal experience fuels a conversational narrative to explore the difficulties in translating strategy into definable (and measurable) actions. As Andrew Jackson once said, “Always take all the time to reflect as circumstances permit, but when the time for action has come, stop thinking.”2
Economist Peter Drucker once stated, “Strategic management is not a box of tricks or a bundle of techniques. It is analytical thinking and commitment of resources to action. But quantification alone is not planning. Some of the most important issues in strategic management cannot be quantified at all.”3 The essence of strategy, ultimately, comes from the facilitation (and encouragement) of strategic thought. Today’s strategists must approach complex problems with an intellectual curiosity, an appreciation for the unknown, a willingness to battle their own biases, and (perhaps most importantly) respect for a multitude of perspectives, all in order to widen the aperture and better understand the context of their environment. In the pages that follow, we offer you a sample of these differing perspectives. As the book’s title suggests, the journey of the strategist is not an easy one. But that does not relieve the strategist of his or her duty to continue on the quest for contextual understanding. Ultimately, success or failure of the strategic endeavor hangs in the balance.
NOTES
1. Col. John Warden, USAF (Ret.), interview by the author, 13 March 2013.
2. Jon Meacham, American Lion: Andrew Jackson in the White House (New York: Random House, 2009), 262.
3. Fred R. David, Strategic Management Concepts: A Competitive Advantage Approach (Upper Saddle, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 2013), 173.