Objects and Pseudo-Objects · Ontological Deserts and Jungles From Brentano to Carnap by Leclercq, Bruno,Richard, Sebastien,Seron, Denis -- Read -- Imperial Library of Trantor

Index

Philosophische Analyse/ Philosophical Analysis Title Page Copyright Page Preface Dedication Table of Contents Part I: Ontological Parsimony

How to Do Things with Things - Brentano’s Reism and its Limits

1 Introduction 2 There are Things 3 Everything is a Thing 4 Accidents and Qualitative Change 5 Relations 6 Thinkers 7 Space 8 Time 9 Motion 10 Conclusion

The Bounds of Object - The Brentano-Meinong Dispute, A Priori Knowledge, and the Power of Perception

1 Introduction 2 Realism and Analysis 3 Objective Reality or What is Present to the Mind 4 Apprehension of Objects, Apprehension of Concepts 5 The Given as an Object 6 Transcending the Field of Perception: The Foundation 7 Concluding Remarks

Kotarbiński’s Strong Minimalist Ontology

1 Introduction 2 Reism

2.1 Early Notes 2.2 Elementy 2.3 The Development of Reism 2.4 Defenceless Ontology

3 Truth 4 Translational Projects: Brentano and Kotarbiński 5 Conclusion

Objects as Posits from a Phenomenological Point of View

1 Reifications 2 Posits 3 Good and Bad Myths

The Concept and its Object are (not) One and the Same - The Functional View of Higher Order Objects in Carnap’s Work

1 Concepts and Objects 2 Pseudo-Objects of Science 3 Intensions 4 Conclusion

Part II: Objecthood Prodigality

Objects or Intentional Objects? - Twardowski and Husserl on Non-Existent Entities

1 Twardowski: The Object and the Content of Representations Cannot be Confused 2 But What if the Object Does not Exist? 3 Husserl’s Version: What is Wrong with Twardowski’s Intentional Objects 4 Conclusion

Domain Comprehension in Meinongian Object Theory

1 Elements of Object Theory 2 Meinongian Intensional versus Fregean Extensional Reference Domains 3 Comprehension Principle for Meinongian Object Theory 4 Russell’s Problem of the Existent Golden Mountain 5 Meinong’s Watering-Down of the Modal Moment Solution 6 Constitutive versus Extra-Constitutive Properties Solution 7 Converse Intentional Properties as Intensional Identity Conditions 8 Synthesis of Alternative Complementary Solutions to Russell’s Problem 9 Mind-Independent Objectivity of the Meinongian Domain

Meinong and Early Husserl on Objects and States of Affairs

1 Brentano and the Brentanians on the Object of Presentations 2 Meinong: Objects and Objectives

2.1 The Theory of Objects: Beyond Being and Non-Being 2.2 On Objectives

3 Husserl: Objects and States of Affairs

3.1 On Categorial Objects 3.2 On States of Affairs

4 Concluding Remarks

Essential Laws - On Ideal Objects and their Properties in Early Phenomenology

1 A Bit of History 2 Synthetic A priori 3 Metaphysical Realism 4 Grounding and Essences: Logic and the Theory of Object 5 Laws of essence 6 Essences, Ideas, Eide, Morphes 7 Anumericity 8 Final remarks

Denis Seron - Adolf Reinach’s Philosophy of Logic

1 States of affairs 2 Propositions 3 Logic as a theory of states of affairs 4 Reinach’s realism and its difficulties

Husserl’s Way Out of Frege’s Jungle

1 Introduction 2 Husserl’s World of the Purely Logical 3 Entering Frege’s Jungle 4 Russell Strives to Prune Frege’s Jungle 5 Frege’s and Russell’s Problems Live On 6 The Road Not Taken 7 Conclusion

Part III: Modes of Being

Ingarden on Modes of Being

1 Quantification and Existence 2 Equivocality of Being: Meinong, and Aristotle 3 Ingarden’s Place on our Map 4 A Combinatorial Existential Ontology 5 Four Main Dichotomies

5.1 Autonomous and Heteronomous 5.2 Original and Derivative 5.3 Self-Sufficient and Non-Self-Sufficient 5.4 Independent and Dependent 5.5 Possible Combinations

6 Being and Time: Temporal Existential Moments

Nicolai Hartmann’s Theory of Levels of Reality

1 Hartmann’s Ontological Framework 2 Ontological Categories 3 Levels of Reality 4 Categorial Laws 5 The Multiple Realizability Thesis 6 Conclusion

Bibliography Index

← Prev
Back
Next →

← Prev
Back
Next →