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Index
Foreword
Preface
Conventions Used in This Book
O’Reilly Online Learning
How to Contact Us
Acknowledgments
1. How Did We Get Here?
von Neumann’s Monster
Is Software Killing People?
To Disclose, or Not to Disclose, or to Responsibly Disclose
Sony PlayStation Network
Equifax
Twitter
Problematic Reporting of Exploits and Vulnerabilities
The Exploit Database
A Protection Racket?
Summary
2. Who Did It?
Attribution Is Inferred, Not Deduced
Examining Our Assumptions
The Exclusive Use Assumption
The Working-Hours Assumption
The Criminals Versus Spies Assumption
Valid Concerns
The Need for Independent Fact-Finding
A Proposed International Attribution Mechanism Modeled after the OPCW
Summary
3. Establishing Corporate Accountability
Pay for Protection
It All Comes Down to Cost Calculation
The Railroad
Shipping
Automobiles
Software
The Move to Software Regulation
As Is
Independent Testing
The National Cybersecurity Strategy
Summary
4. The Legal Status of Cyber Warfare
Ukraine’s Call to Arms for Hackers
Rules Related to Cyber Attacks
The International Committee of the Red Cross
The International Criminal Court
Cyber Attacks against Civilians During Wartime
Incitement to Genocide
Legal Review of Cyber Weapons
The Civilian Hacker Targeting Matrix
A Decision Tree for the Legal Targeting of Combatants and Civilians
Case Studies
Junaid Hussain
The Anonymous War on ISIS
The Ukraine Power Grid Attack
Summary
5. The New Enmeshed War Strategy
Cognitive Warfare and Operations in the Information Environment
A Central Figure: Yevgeny Prigozhin
The Wagner Group
The Internet Research Agency
Case Study #1: Ukraine
The Wagner Group’s Campaign
The Internet Research Agency’s Campaign
Case Study #2: Syria
The Wagner Group’s Campaign
The Internet Research Agency’s Campaign
Case Study #3: Mali
The Wagner Group’s Campaign
The Internet Research Agency’s Campaign
Platforms for Disinformation and Misinformation
X
TikTok
Using Social Media for Surveillance
F3EAD
Benign Surveillance (Not) and Real-Time Bidding
Best Practices
Disinformation and Misinformation
Cyber Warfare
Summary
6. Cyber Attacks with Kinetic Effects
We Can Only Measure What’s Been Discovered
Attacking Operational Technology
The Aurora Generator Test
Iran Centrifuge Assembly Center
Underground Fuel Enrichment Plant
Gazprom
Gazprom Sartransneftegaz Pipeline
Gazprom Urengoy Center 2 Pipeline
Gazprom Urengoy Pipeline
Second Central Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation
Khouzestan Steel Company
Evaluating the Effectiveness of Sabotage
Defending Against Cyber/Physical Attacks
Summary
7. AI
Defining Terms
Generative AI
Neural Network
Narrow AI
Foundation Model
Frontier AI
Artificial General Intelligence
Superintelligence
Present Risks
Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities
Indirect prompt injection
Automated vulnerability exploitation
Network attacks
Automated Decision Making
Warfighting
Disinformation (aka cognitive warfare)
AI-guided drone swarms
Speculative Risks
Self-Preservation
The Treacherous Turn
The Sharp Left Turn
Risk Versus Probability
The Zero-Probability High-Impact Risk Model
Regulation
Summary
Risk
Regulation
Influence
Afterword
Reduce Your Attack Surface
Create Redundancies for Your Critical Systems
Diversify Your Risks
Index
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