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Cover Title Page Copyright Contents Descartes (1596–1650)

Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason and Seeking Truth in the Sciences (1637)

Meditations on the First Philosophy: (1641)

Dedication Preface Synopsis of the Meditations

I. Of the Things of which we may Doubt II. Of the Nature of the Human Mind; and that it is more easily known than the Body III. Of God: that he exists IV. Of Truth and Error V. Of the Essence of Material Things; and, again, of God: that he exists VI. Of the Existence of Material Things, and of the Real Distinction between the Mind and Body of Man

Spinoza (1632–1677)

The Ethics (1677)

Part I. Concerning God

Definitions Axioms Prop. I. Substance is by nature prior to its modifications Prop. II. Two substances, whose attributes are different, have nothing in common Prop. III. Things which have nothing in common cannot be one the cause of the other Prop. IV. Two or more distinct things are distinguished one from the other either by the difference of the attributes of the substances, or by the difference of their modifications Prop. V. There cannot exist in the universe two or more substances having the same nature or attribute Prop. VI. One substance cannot be produced by another substance Prop. VII. Existence belongs to the nature of substance Prop. VIII. Every substance is necessarily infinite Prop. IX. The more reality or being a thing has, the greater the number of its attributes Prop. X. Each particular attribute of the one substance must be conceived through itself Prop. XI. God, or substance, consisting of infinite attributes, of which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality, necessarily exists Prop. XII. No attribute of substance can be conceived from which it would follow that substance Prop. XIII. Substance absolutely infinite is indivisible Prop. XIV. Besides God no substance can be granted or conceived Prop. XV. Whatsoever is, is in God, and without God nothing can be, or be conceived Prop. XVI. From the necessity of the divine nature must follow an infinite number of things in infinite ways–that is, all things which can fall within the sphere of infinite intellect Prop. XVII. God acts solely by the laws of his own nature, and is not constrained by anyone Prop. XVIII. God is the indwelling and not the transient cause of all things Prop. XIX. God, and all the attributes of God, are eternal Prop. XX. The existence of God and his essence are one and the same Prop. XXI. All things which follow from the absolute nature of any attribute of God must always exist and be infinite, or, in other words, are eternal and infinite through the said attribute Prop. XXII. Whatever follows from any attribute of God, in so far as it is modified by a modification, which exists necessarily and as infinite, through the said attribute, must also exist necessarily and as infinite Prop. XXIII. Every mode which exists both necessarily and as infinite must necessarily follow either from the absolute nature of some attribute of God, or from an attribute modified by a modification which exists necessarily and as infinite Prop. XXIV. The essence of things produced by God does not involve existence Prop. XXV. God is the efficient cause not only of the existence of things, but also of their essence Prop. XXVI. A thing which is conditioned to act in a particular manner has necessarily been thus conditioned by God; and that which has not been conditioned by God cannot condition itself to act Prop. XXVII. A thing, which has been conditioned by God to act in a particular way, cannot render itself unconditioned Prop. XXVIII. Every individual thing, or everything which is finite and has a conditioned existence, cannot exist or be conditioned to act, unless it be conditioned for existence and action by a cause other than itself, which also is finite and has a conditioned existence; and likewise this cause cannot in its turn exist or be conditioned to act, unless it be conditioned for existence and action by another cause, which also is finite and has a conditioned existence, and so on to infinity Prop. XXIX. Nothing in the universe is contingent, but all things are conditioned to exist and operate in a particular manner by the necessity of the divine nature Prop. XXX. Intellect, in function finite, or in function infinite, must comprehend the attributes of God and the modifications of God, and nothing else Prop. XXXI. The intellect in function, whether finite or infinite, as will, desire, love, &c., should be referred to passive nature and not to active nature Prop. XXXII. Will cannot be called a free cause, but only a necessary cause Prop. XXXIII. Things could not have been brought into being by God in any manner or in any order different from that which has in fact obtained Prop. XXXIV. God’s power is identical with his essence Prop. XXXV. Whatsoever we conceive to be in the power of God, necessarily exists Prop. XXXVI. There is no cause from whose nature some effect does not follow Appendix

Part II. Of the Nature and Origin of the Mind

Part III. On the Origin and Nature of the Emotions

Definitions Postulates Prop. I. Our mind is in certain cases active, and in certain cases passive. In so far as it has adequate ideas, it is necessarily active, and in so far as it has inadequate ideas, it is necessarily passive Prop. II. Body cannot determine mind to think, neither can mind determine body to motion or rest or any state different from these, if such there be Prop. III. The activities of the mind arise solely from adequate ideas; the passive states of the mind depend solely on inadequate ideas Prop. IV. Nothing can be destroyed, except by a cause external to itself Prop. V. Things are naturally contrary, that is, cannot exist in the same object, in so far as one is capable of destroying the other Prop. VI. Everything, in so far as it is in itself, endeavours to persist in its own being Prop. VII. The endeavour, wherewith everything endeavours to persist in its own being, is nothing else but the actual essence of the thing in question Prop. VIII. The endeavour, whereby a thing endeavours to persist in its being, involves no finite time, but an indefinite time Prop. IX. The mind, both in so far as it has clear and distinct ideas, and also in so far as it has confused ideas, endeavours to persist in its being for an indefinite period, and of this endeavour it is conscious Prop. X. An idea which excludes the existence of our body cannot be postulated in our mind, but is contrary thereto Prop. XI. Whatsoever increases or diminishes, helps or hinders the power of activity in our body, the idea thereof increases or diminishes, helps or hinders the power of thought in our mind Prop. XII. The mind, as far as it can, endeavours to conceive those things, which increase or help the power of activity in the body Prop. XIII. When the mind conceives things which diminish or hinder the body’s power of activity, it endeavours, as far as possible, to remember things which exclude the existence of the first-named things Prop. XIV. If the mind has once been affected by two emotions at the same time, it will, whenever it is afterwards affected by one of the two, be also affected by the other Prop. XV. Anything can, accidentally, be the cause of pleasure, pain, or desire Prop. XVI. Simply from the fact that we conceive that a given object has some point of resemblance with another object which is wont to affect the mind pleasurably or painfully, although the point of resemblance be not the efficient cause of the said emotions, we shall still regard the first-named object with love or hate Prop. XVII. If we conceive that a thing which is wont to affect us painfully has any point of resemblance with another thing which is wont to affect us with an equally strong emotion of pleasure, we shall hate the first-named thing, and at the same time we shall love it Prop. XVIII. A man is as much affected pleasurably or painfully by the image of a thing past or future as by the image of a thing present Prop. XIX. He who conceives that the object of his love is destroyed will feel pain; if he conceives that it is preserved, he will feel pleasure Prop. XX. He who conceives that the object of his hate is destroyed will feel pleasure Prop. XXI. He who conceives that the object of his love is affected pleasurably or painfully, will himself be affected pleasurably or painfully; and the one or the other emotion will be greater or less in the lover according as it is greater or less in the thing loved Prop. XXII. If we conceive that anything pleasurably affects some object of our love, we shall be affected with love towards that thing. Contrariwise, if we conceive that it affects an object of our love painfully, we shall be affected with hatred towards it Prop. XXIII. He who conceives that an object of his hatred is painfully affected, will feel pleasure. Contrariwise, if he thinks that the said object is pleasurably affected, he will feel pain. Each of these emotions will be greater or less, according as its contrary is greater or less in the object of hatred Prop. XXIV. If we conceive that anyone pleasurably affects an object of our hate, we shall feel hatred towards him also. If we conceive that he painfully affects the said object, we shall feel love towards him Prop. XXV. We endeavour to affirm, concerning ourselves and concerning what we love, everything that we conceive to affect pleasurably ourselves or the loved object. Contrariwise, we endeavour to negative everything, which we conceive to affect painfully ourselves or the loved object Prop. XXVI. We endeavour to affirm, concerning that which we hate, everything which we conceive to affect it painfully; and, contrariwise, we endeavour to deny, concerning it, everything which we conceive to affect it pleasurably Prop. XXVII. By the very fact that we conceive a thing, which is like ourselves, and which we have not regarded with any emotion, to be affected with any emotion, we are ourselves affected with a like emotion Prop. XXVIII. We endeavour to bring about whatsoever we conceive to conduce to pleasure; but we endeavour to remove or destroy whatsoever we conceive to be truly repugnant thereto, or to conduce to pain Prop. XXIX. We shall also endeavour to do whatsoever we conceive men to regard with pleasure, and contrariwise we shall shrink from doing that which we conceive men to shrink from Prop. XXX. If any one has done something which he conceives as affecting other men pleasurably, he will be affected by pleasure, accompanied by the idea of himself as a cause; in other words, he will regard himself with pleasure. On the other hand, if he has done anything which he regards as affecting others painfully, he will regard himself with pain Prop. XXXI. If we conceive that anyone loves, desires, or hates anything which we love, desire, or hate, we shall thereupon regard the thing in question with more steadfast love, &c. On the contrary, if we think that anyone shrinks from something that we love, we shall undergo vacillation of soul Prop. XXXII. If we conceive that anyone takes delight in something which only one person can possess we shall endeavour to bring it about that the man in question shall not gain possession thereof Prop. XXXIII. When we love a thing similar to ourselves, we endeavour, as far as we can, to bring it about that it should love us in return Prop. XXXIV. The greater the emotion with which we conceive a loved object to be affected towards us, the greater will be our complacency Prop. XXXV. If anyone conceives, that an object of his love joins itself to another with closer bonds of friendship than he himself has attained to, he will be affected with hatred towards the loved object and with envy towards his rival Prop. XXXVI. He who remembers a thing, in which he has once taken delight, desires to possess it under the same circumstances as when he first took delight therein Prop. XXXVII. Desire arising through pain or pleasure, hatred or love, is greater in proportion as the emotion is greater Prop. XXXVIII. If a man has begun to hate an object of his love, so that love is thoroughly destroyed, he will, causes being equal, regard it with more hatred than if he had never loved it, and his hatred will be in proportion to the strength of his former love Prop. XXXIX. He who hates anyone will endeavour to do him an injury, unless he fears that a greater injury will thereby accrue to himself; on the other hand, he who loves anyone will, by the same law, seek to benefit him Prop. XL. He, who conceives himself to be hated by another, and believes that he has given him no cause for hatred, will hate that other in return Prop. XLI. If anyone conceives that he is loved by another, and believes that he has given no cause for such love, he will love that other in return Prop. XLII. He who has conferred a benefit on anyone from motives of love or honour will feel pain, if he sees that the benefit is received without gratitude Prop. XLIII. Hatred is increased by being reciprocated, and can on the other hand be destroyed by love Prop. XLIV. Hatred which is completely vanquished by love passes into love: and love is thereupon greater than if hatred had not preceded it Prop. XLV. If a man conceives, that anyone similar to himself hates anything also similar to himself, which he loves, he will hate that person Prop. XLVI. If a man has been affected pleasurably or painfully by anyone of a class or nation different from his own, and if the pleasure or pain has been accompanied by the idea of the said stranger as cause, under the general category of the class or nation: the man will feel love or hatred not only to the individual stranger, but also to the whole class or nation whereto he belongs Prop. XLVII. Joy arising from the fact that anything we hate is destroyed or suffers other injury is never unaccompanied by a certain pain in us Prop. XLVIII. Love or hatred towards, for instance, Peter is destroyed, if the pleasure involved in the former, or the pain involved in the latter emotion, be associated with the idea of another cause; and will be diminished in proportion as we conceive Peter not to have been the sole cause of either emotion Prop. XLIX. Love or hatred towards a thing which we conceive to be free must, other conditions being similar, be greater than if it were felt towards a thing acting by necessity Prop. L. Anything whatever can be, accidentally, a cause of hope or fear Prop. LI. Different men may be differently affected by the same object, and the same man may be differently affected at different times by the same object Prop. LII. An object which we have formerly seen in conjunction with others, and do not conceive to have any property that is not common to many, will not be regarded by us for so long as an object which we conceive to have some property peculiar to itself Prop. LIII. When the mind regards itself and its own power of activity, it feels pleasure; and that pleasure is greater in proportion to the distinctness wherewith it conceives itself and its own power of activity Prop. LIV. The mind endeavours to conceive only such things as assert its power of activity Prop. LV. When the mind contemplates its own weakness, it feels pain thereat Prop. LVI. There are as many kinds of pleasure, of pain, of desire, and of every emotion compounded of these, such as vacillations of spirit, or derived from these, such as love, hatred, hope, fear, &c., as there are kinds of objects whereby we are affected Prop. LVII. Any emotion of a given individual differs from the emotion of another individual, only in so far as the essence of the one individual differs from the essence of the other Prop. LVIII. Besides pleasure and desire, which are passivities or passions, there are other emotions derived from pleasure and desire which are attributable to us in so far as we are active Prop. LIX. Among all the emotions attributable to the mind as active, there are none which cannot be referred to pleasure or pain Definitions of the Emotions General Definition of the Emotions

Part IV. Of Human Bondage or the Strength of the Emotions

Preface Definitions Axiom Prop. I. No positive quality possessed by a false idea is removed by the presence of what is true in virtue of its being true Prop. II. We are only passive in so far as we are a part of Nature, which cannot be conceived by itself without other parts Prop. III. The force whereby a man persists in existing is limited, and is infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes Prop. IV. It is impossible, that man should not be a part of Nature, or that he should be capable of undergoing no changes, save such as can be understood through his nature only as their adequate cause Prop. V. The power and increase of every passion, and its persistence in existing are not defined by the power, whereby we ourselves endeavour to persist in existing, but by the power of an external cause compared with our own Prop. VI. The force of any passion or emotion can overcome the rest of a man’s activities or power, so that the emotion becomes obstinately fixed to him Prop. VII. An emotion can only be controlled or destroyed by another emotion contrary thereto, and with more power for controlling emotion Prop. VIII. The knowledge of good and evil is nothing else but the emotions of pleasure or pain in so far as we are conscious thereof Prop. IX. An emotion, whereof we conceive the cause to be with us at the present time, is stronger than if we did not conceive the cause to be with us Prop. X. Towards something future, which we conceive as close at hand, we are affected more intensely, than if we conceive that its time for existence is separated from the present by a longer interval; so too by the remembrance of what we conceive to have not long passed away we are affected more intensely, than if we conceive that it has long passed away Prop. XI. An emotion towards that which we conceive as necessary is, when other conditions are equal, more intense than an emotion towards that which is possible, or contingent, or non-necessary Prop. XII. An emotion towards a thing, which we know not to exist at the present time, and which we conceive as possible, is more intense, other things being equal, than an emotion towards a thing contingent Prop. XIII. Emotion towards a thing contingent, which we know not to exist in the present, is, other conditions being equal, fainter than an emotion towards a thing past Prop. XIV. A true knowledge of good and evil cannot check any emotion by virtue of being true, but only in so far as it is considered as an emotion Prop. XV. Desire arising from the knowledge of good and evil can be quenched or checked by many other desires arising from the emotions whereby we are assailed Prop. XVI. Desire arising from the knowledge of good and evil, in so far as such knowledge regards what is future, may be more easily controlled or quenched, than the desire for what is agreeable at the present moment Prop. XVII. Desire arising from the true knowledge of good and evil, in so far as such knowledge is concerned with what is contingent, can be controlled far more easily still, than desire for things that are at present Prop. XVIII. Desire arising from pleasure is, other things being equal, stronger than desire arising from pain Prop. XIX. Every man, by the laws of his nature, necessarily desires or shrinks from that which he deems to be good or bad Prop. XX. The more every man endeavours and is able to seek what is useful to him–in other words, to preserve his own being–the more is he endowed with virtue; on the contrary, in proportion as a man neglects to seek what is useful to him, that is, to preserve his own being, he is wanting in power Prop. XXI. No one can rightly desire to be blessed, to act rightly, and to live rightly, without at the same time wishing to be, to act, and to live, in other words, to actually exist Prop. XXII. No virtue can be conceived as prior to this endeavour to preserve one’s own being Prop. XXIII. Man, in so far as he is determined to a particular action because he has inadequate ideas, cannot be absolutely said to act in obedience to virtue; he can only be so described in so far as he is determined for the action because he understands Prop. XXIV. To act absolutely in obedience to virtue is in us the same thing as to act, to live, or to preserve one’s being (these three terms are identical in meaning) in accordance with the dictate of reason on the basis of seeking what is useful to one’s self Prop. XXV. No one wishes to preserve his being for the sake of anything else Prop. XXVI. Whatsoever we endeavour in obedience to reason is nothing further than to understand; neither does the mind, in so far as it makes use of reason, judge anything to be useful to it, save such things as are conducive to understanding Prop. XXVII. We know nothing to be certainly good or evil, save such things as really conduce to understanding, or such as are able to hinder us from understanding Prop. XXVIII. The mind’s highest good is the knowledge of God, and the mind’s highest virtue is to know God Prop. XXIX. No individual thing, which is entirely different from our own nature, can help or check our power of activity, and absolutely nothing can do us good or harm, unless it has something in common with our nature Prop. XXX. A thing cannot be bad for us through the quality which it has in common with our nature, but it is bad for us in so far as it is contrary to our nature Prop. XXXI. In so far as a thing is in harmony with our nature, it is necessarily good Prop. XXXII. In so far as men are a prey to passion, they cannot, in that respect, be said to be naturally in harmony Prop. XXXIII. Men can differ in nature, in so far as they are assailed by those emotions which are passions or passive states; and to this extent one and the same man is variable and inconstant Prop. XXXIV. In so far as men are assailed by emotions which are passions, they can be contrary one to another Prop. XXXV. In so far only as men live in obedience to reason, do they always necessarily agree in nature Prop. XXXVI. The highest good of those who follow virtue is common to all, and therefore all can equally rejoice therein Prop. XXXVII. The good which every man who follows after virtue desires for himself, he will also desire for other men, and so much the more, in proportion as he has a greater knowledge of God Prop. XXXVIII. Whatsoever disposes the human body, so as to render it capable of being affected in an increased number of ways, or of affecting external bodies in an increased number of ways, is useful to man; and is so, in proportion as the body is thereby rendered more capable of being affected or of affecting other bodies in an increased number of ways; contrariwise, whatsoever renders the body less capable in this respect is hurtful to man Prop. XXXIX. Whatsoever brings about the preservation of the proportion of motion and rest, which the parts of the human body mutually possess, is good; contrariwise, whatsoever causes a change in such proportion is bad Prop. XL. Whatsoever conduces to man’s social life, or causes men to live together in harmony, is useful, whereas whatsoever brings discord into a State is bad Prop. XLI. Pleasure in itself is not bad but good; contrariwise, pain in itself is bad Prop. XLII. Mirth cannot be excessive, but is always good; contrariwise, Melancholy is always bad Prop. XLIII. Stimulation may be excessive and bad; on the other hand, grief may be good, in so far as stimulation or pleasure is bad Prop. XLIV. Love and desire may be excessive Prop. XLV. Hatred can never be good Prop. XLVI. He, who lives under the guidance of reason, endeavours, as far as possible, to render back love, or kindness, for other men’s hatred, anger, contempt, etc., towards him Prop. XLVII. Emotions of hope and fear cannot be in themselves good Prop. XLVIII. The emotions of over-esteem and disparagement are always bad Prop. XLIX. Over-esteem is apt to render its object proud Prop. L. Pity, in a man who lives under the guidance of reason, is in itself bad and useless Prop. LI. Approval is not repugnant to reason, but can agree therewith and arise therefrom Prop. LII. Self-approval may arise from reason, and that which arises from reason is the highest possible Prop. LIII. Humility is not a virtue, or does not arise from reason Prop. LIV. Repentance is not a virtue, or does not arise from reason; but he who repents of an action is doubly wretched or infirm Prop. LV. Extreme pride or dejection indicates extreme ignorance of self Prop. LVI. Extreme pride or dejection indicates extreme infirmity of spirit Prop. LVII. The proud man delights in the company of flatterers and parasites, but hates the company of the high-minded Prop. LVIII. Honour (gloria) is not repugnant to reason, but may arise therefrom Prop. LIX. To all the actions, whereto we are determined by emotions, wherein the mind is passive, we can be determined without emotion by reason Prop. LX. Desire arising from a pleasure or pain, that is, not attributable to the whole body, but only to one or certain parts thereof, is without utility in respect to man as a whole Prop. LXI. Desire which springs from reason cannot be excessive Prop. LXII. In so far as the mind conceives a thing under the dictate of reason, it is affected equally, whether the idea be of a thing present, past, or future Prop. LXIII. He who is led by fear, and does good in order to escape evil, is not led by reason Prop. LXIV. The knowledge of evil is an inadequate knowledge Prop. LXV. Under the guidance of reason we should pursue the greater of two goods and the lesser of two evils Prop. LXVI. We may, under the guidance of reason, seek a greater good in the future in preference to a lesser good in the present, and we may seek a lesser evil in the present in preference to a greater evil in the future Prop. LXVII. A free man thinks of nothing less than of death; and his wisdom is a meditation not of death, but of life Prop. LXVIII. If men were born free, they would, so long as they remained free, form no conception of good or evil Prop. LXIX. The virtue of a free man is seen to be as great, when it declines dangers, as when it overcomes them Prop. LXX. The free man, who lives among the ignorant, strives, as far as he can, to avoid receiving favours from them Prop. LXXI. Only free men are thoroughly grateful, one to another Prop. LXXII. The free man never acts fraudulently, but always in good faith Prop. LXXIII. The man, who is guided by reason, is more free in a State, where he lives under a general system of law, than in solitude, where he is independent Appendix on the Right Way of Life

Part V. Of the Power of the Understanding, or of Human Freedom

Preface Axioms Prop. I. Even as thoughts and the ideas of things are arranged and associated in the mind, so are the modifications of the body or the images of things precisely in the same way arranged and associated in the body Prop. II. If we remove a disturbance of the spirit, or emotion, from the thought of an external cause, and unite it to other thoughts, then will the love or hatred towards that external cause, and also the vacillations of spirit, which arise from these emotions, be destroyed Prop. III. An emotion, which is a passion, ceases to be a passion, as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea thereof Prop. IV. There is no modification of the body, whereof we cannot form some clear and distinct conception Prop. V. An emotion towards a thing which we conceive simply, and not as necessary, or as contingent, or as possible, is, other conditions being equal, greater than any other emotion Prop. VI. The mind has greater power over the emotions and is less subject thereto, in so far as it understands all things as necessary Prop. VII. Emotions which are aroused or spring from reason, if we take account of time, are stronger than those which are attributable to particular objects that we regard as absent Prop. VIII. An emotion is stronger in proportion to the number of simultaneous concurrent causes whereby it is aroused Prop. IX. An emotion which is attributable to many and diverse causes which the mind regards as simultaneous with the emotion itself is less hurtful, and we are less subject thereto and less affected towards each of its causes, than if it were a different and equally powerful emotion attributable to fewer causes or to a single cause Prop. X. So long as we are not assailed by emotions contrary to our nature, we have the power of arranging and associating the modifications of our body according to the intellectual order Prop. XI. In proportion as a mental image is referred to more objects, so is it more frequent, or more often vivid, and affects the mind more Prop. XII. The mental images of things are more easily associated with the images referred to things which we clearly and distinctly understand, than with others Prop. XIII. A mental image is more often vivid, in proportion as it is associated with a greater number of other images Prop. XIV. The mind can bring it about, that all bodily modifications or images of things may be referred to the idea of God Prop. XV. He who clearly and distinctly understands himself and his emotions loves God, and so much the more in proportion as he more understands himself and his emotions Prop. XVI. This love towards God must hold the chief place in the mind Prop. XVII. God is without passions, neither is he affected by any emotion of pleasure or pain Prop. XVIII. No one can hate God Prop. XIX. He who loves God cannot endeavour that God should love him in return Prop. XX. This love towards God cannot be stained by the emotion of envy or jealousy; contrariwise, it is the more fostered in proportion as we conceive a greater number of men to be joined to God by the same bond of love Prop. XXI. The mind can only imagine anything, or remember what is past, while the body endures Prop. XXII. Nevertheless in God there is necessarily an idea, which expresses the essence of this or that human body under the form of eternity Prop. XXIII. The human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed with the body, but there remains of it something which is eternal Prop. XXIV. The more we understand particular things, the more do we understand God Prop. XXV. The highest endeavour of the mind, and the highest virtue, is to understand things by intuition Prop. XXVI. In proportion as the mind is more capable of understanding things by intuition, it desires more so to understand things Prop. XXVII. From intuition arises the highest possible mental acquiescence Prop. XXVIII. The endeavour or desire to know things by intuition cannot arise from opinion, but from reason Prop. XXIX. Whatsoever the mind understands under the form of eternity, it does not understand by virtue of conceiving the present actual existence of the body, but by virtue of conceiving the essence of the body under the form of eternity Prop. XXX. Our mind, in so far as it knows itself and the body under the form of eternity, has to that extent necessarily a knowledge of God, and knows that it is in God, and is conceived through God Prop. XXXI. Intuition depends on the mind, as its formal cause, in so far as the mind itself is eternal Prop. XXXII. Whatsoever we understand by intuition, we take delight in, and our delight is accompanied by the idea of God as cause Prop. XXXIII. The intellectual love of God, which arises from intuition, is eternal Prop. XXXIV. The mind is, only while the body endures, subject to those emotions which are attributable to passions Prop. XXXV. God loves himself with an infinite intellectual love Prop. XXXVI. The intellectual love of the mind towards God is that very love of God whereby God loves himself, not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as he can be explained through the essence of the human mind regarded under the form of eternity; in other words, the intellectual love of the mind towards God is part of the infinite love wherewith God loves himself Prop. XXXVII. There is nothing in nature, which is contrary to this intellectual love, or which can take it away Prop. XXXVIII. In proportion as the mind understands more things by reason and intuition, it is less subject to those emotions which are evil, and stands in less fear of death Prop. XXXIX. He, who possesses a body capable of the greatest number of activities, possesses a mind whereof the greatest part is eternal Prop. XL. In proportion as each thing possesses more of perfection, so is it more active, and less passive; and, vice versâ, in proportion as it is more active, so is it more perfect Prop. XLI. Even if we did not know that our mind is eternal, we should still consider as of primary importance piety and religion, and generally all things, which in Part IV., we showed to be attributable to courage and high-mindedness Prop. XLII. Blessedness is not the reward of virtue, but virtue itself; neither do we rejoice therein, because we control our lusts, but, contrariwise, because we rejoice therein, we are able to control our lusts

Leibniz (1646–1716)

Discourse On Metaphysics (1710) The Monadology (1714)

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