On Evidence in Philosophy by Lycan, William G. -- Read -- Imperial Library of Trantor

Index

Cover page Halftitle page Title page Copyright page Dedication page Contents Acknowledgments Introduction 1. A Version of Moore’s Method

The Successful Argument Applications Virtues of this Version One of Moore’s Own Reservations Appendix on the Very Strong Position

2. Moore against the New Skeptics

The Skeptics and their Charges A Reminder, and the Second of Moore’s Own Reservations Depth and Being Philosophical What are “Common-Sense” Propositions? Taking Epistemological Stock

3. A Novel Refutation of Eliminative Materialism

Arguments Pro Arguments Con My Refutation Empirical Evidence for Entailment? Have We Proved Too Much?

4. Free Will and the Burden of Proof

My Position The Nature of Compatibility More Broadly Logical Incompatibility? Vs. (3) Vs. (4) My Argument against Metaphysical Incompatibilism A Dialectical Issue The “Consequence Argument”

5. The Poverty of Philosophical Method: A Case Study

Another Weakness of Deduction Dualism and Materialism Arguments for Materialism Objections to Cartesian Dualism The Interaction Problem Objections (2)–(4) Churchland’s Added Objections

6. Philosophical Knowledge

Successes? Being Skeptical Gutting’s Candidates Progress

7. The Evidential Status of Intuitions

What is an “Intuition”? Intuitions as Evidence Anti-intuitionism Intuitions and Reliability Intuitions and Reflective Equilibrium Metaphysical Note

8. Intuitions and Coherentism

The Data Base Stich’s Complaint(s) Reflective Equilibrium as Explanatory Coherence A Quick Look Back at Skepticism Appendix on the External World

Conclusion Bibliography Index