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Index
Cover Wiley Global Finance Series Page Copyright Dedication Acknowledgments Introduction
Our Damaged Economy Congress's Role in Wealth Destruction Summary Notes
Chapter 1: What is the Congressional Effect?
How Was the Congressional Effect Discovered? Early Returns Showing the Congressional Effect The Smoot-Hawley Act: The Mother of All Congressional Effects The Congressional Effect Data and Launching a Mutual Fund Summary Notes
Chapter 2: The Congressional Effect and the Limits of Modern Portfolio Theory
How MPT Has Been Used by Financial Advisers Formulas Distort Valuation if Inputs are not Free Market Inputs What Caused the Crash of 1987? The Magnitude of the Crash of 1987 Refutes MPT MPT Assumes All Daily Pricing Is Random, but the Congressional Effect Shows it is not Summary Notes
Chapter 3: Congressmen as Issues Entrepreneurs
The Time-Money-Vote Continuum: Congress as a Business Congressmen as Traders and Real Estate Entrepreneurs: Making Money Outside Their Day Gig Summary Notes
Chapter 4: Behavioral Finance, the Stock Market, and Congressional Dysfunction
Overview of Behavioral Finance Concepts Survey of Behavioral Finance Concepts Congress's Approach to Behavioral Finance Summary Notes
Chapter 5: If Congress is Malfunction Junction, What's its Function?
Economic Lifeblood: Investment Capital Formation, the Stock Market, and Congress Dodd-Frank Overview Health Care Reform Burning Coal and Other Energy Investors Summary Notes
Chapter 6: Where Will Washington Strike Next?
Where You Can Find Information How to Leverage This Glut of Information Summary Notes
Chapter 7: Sidestepping Congress's Wealth Destruction with a Macro Approach
11,832 Data Points Support the Congressional Effect Theory Congress and the Tragedy of the Commons Adam Smith, Call Your Office! Summary Notes
Chapter 8: Are Democrats or Republicans Better for Your Portfolio?
Who Gets the Credit for the Bull Market in 1980? Unified Government Favors Nominal Returns Split Government Favors Real Returns Republican Congress vs. Democratic Congress Filibuster-Proof Majorities Hurt Returns Summary Notes
Chapter 9: Leverging the Election Cycle
The Presidential Cycle and Real Returns The 2012 Election and Beyond Notes
Chapter 10: Are Lame Ducks, Impeachments, Resignations, Vetoes, and Litigated Elections Good for the Market?
President Bill Clinton President Andrew Johnson Resignations Lame Duck Sessions Litigated Elections Vetoes Summary Note
Chapter 11: More Ways to Dodge Congress's Stray Bullets
Value Funds: Longer Time Horizons than Congress or the Somali Pirates Gold Funds: Avoiding Congressional Debasement Beyond Congress: International Funds Reducing Global Security Risk Summary Notes
Chapter 12: “ThatGovernment Is Best that Governs Least”
Prognosis: Increasingly Partisan Politics Is Not Good for the Market Conflicting Government Mandates Promote Market Instability The Cumulative Effect of Unintended Consequences is Congressional Wealth Destruction Congress's Dysfunctionality and the 2012 Election What Happens When Congress Does Not Know the Price? Congress Needs to Attract the Best Talent In Conclusion Notes
About the Author Index
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