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Index
Coverpage
Half title
Title page
Imprints page
Dedication
Contents
Contributors
Acknowledgments
Abbreviations
Introduction
Overview of the Volume
Part I Spontaneity: Pure Concepts of the Understanding, Imagination, and Judgment
Part II The Inner Value of the World: Freedom as the Keystone of Kant’s Moral Philosophy
Part III Freedom as Autonomous Willing: Kant’s Sensible Agent
Part IV Freedom on a Bounded Sphere: Kant’s Political Philosophy
Postscript: Freedom and Nature
Part I Spontaneity: Pure Concepts of the Understanding, Imagination, and Judgment
Chapter 1 Kant on Imagination and Object Constitution
Chapter 2 Pure Understanding, the Categories, and Kant’s Critique of Wolff
1 The Wolffian Account of the Understanding
2 Kant’s Rejection of the Wolffian Account
3 Wolffian Understanding and the Critique
4 Conclusion
Chapter 3 Transcendental Idealism in the B-Deduction
1 Kant’s Method of Argument
2 The Structure of the B-Deduction
3 Formal Intuitions as a Condition of Time-Determination
Chapter 4 Kant’s A priori Principle of Judgments of Taste
1 A New Candidate Hidden in Plain Sight
2 Henry Allison
3 Rachel Zuckert
4 Paul Guyer
5 Possible Objections
6 Implications
Part II The Inner Value of the World: Freedom as the Keystone of Kant’s Moral Philosophy
Chapter 5 Guyer on the Value of Freedom
1 Guyer’s View
2 Humanity as the Source of Value
3 God’s Justice
Chapter 6 Kant, Guyer, and Tomasello on the Capacity to Recognize the Humanity of Others
A Few Remarks about Terminology
1 Introduction
2 Recognizing Humanity
3 The Capacity to Recognize Humanity and Recent Research in Developmental Psychology
Chapter 7 Does Kantian Constructivism Rest on a Mistake?
1 A Distinction in Kind: The Morally Good vs. the Pragmatically Good
2 Does Constructivism Rest on a Mistake?
Chapter 8 Moral Realism and the Inner Value of the World
1 Realism and Value
2 Moral Value Cannot be an Intrinsic Property
3 Moral Value Is Only a Formal Ordering by Reason
4 Conclusion
Part III Freedom as Autonomous Willing: Kant’s Sensible Agent
Chapter 9 On the Many Senses of “Self-Determination”
1 Preliminary Overview
2 Vindicating Kantian Self-Determination
2.1 On “Determination” and Bestimmung
2.2 On the “Self” of Selbstbestimmung
3 Groundwork, Section III, de capo
3.1 Preconditions
3.2 How to Undercut What Can Seem to be Kant’s Self-Undercutting
4 Section III and Freedom
4.1 A New Ambiguity: Heteronomous Principles and “Heteronomy” in Causes
4.2 Section III in Context
5 Conclusion
Chapter 10 Inclination, Need, and Moral Misery
1 Introduction
2 Inclination and Neediness
3 Kant’s Conception of Neediness
4 Independence and Beatitude
5 Living with Inclination
6 Conclusion
Chapter 11 Religion and the Highest Good: Speaking to the Heart of Even the Best of Us
Part IV Freedom on a Bounded Sphere: Kant’s Political Philosophy
Chapter 12 Right and Ethics: A Critical Tribute to Paul Guyer
Chapter 13 From Justice to Fairness: Does Kant’s Doctrine of Right Imply a Theory of Distributive Justice?
1 Introduction
2 Guyer’s Reading: From the Universal Principle of Right to the Difference Principle
From the Universal Principle of Right to Kant’s Theory of Property
From Kant’s Theory of Property to Contractualism
From Contractualism to Fairness
From Fairness to the Difference Principle
3 From Conventionalism to Contractualism?
4 From Contractualism to Fairness?
5 From Fairness to the Difference Principle
6 Conclusion: Liberty and Distributive Justice
Postscript
1 Bridging the Gulf
2 Setting and Pursuing Ends
3 Noumenal and Phenomenal Freedom
4 The Highest Good
Bibliography
Index
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