The Semantics and Metaphysics of Natural Kinds by Beebee, Helen -- Read -- Imperial Library of Trantor

Index

Routledge Studies in Metaphysics Contents Acknowledgments 1 Introduction

1. CLASSIFYING NATURE: THE METAPHYSICS PERSPECTIVE 2. NATURAL KIND SEMANTICS

2.1 Kripke On Proper Names 2.2 The Extension to Natural Kind Terms

3. KRIPKE, A POSTERIORI NECESSITY, AND THE METAPHYSICS OF NATURAL KINDS 4. PUTNAM, INCOMMENSURABILITY, AND NATURAL KINDS REFERENCES

2 Rigidity, Natural Kind Terms, and Metasemantics

1. INTRODUCTION: INITIAL DIFFICULTIES WITH RIGIDITY AND NATURAL KIND TERMS 2. OBSTINACY AND THE FRAMEWORK OF DIRECT REFERENCE 3. OBSTINACY DE JURE AND OBSTINACY DE FACTO 4. DUBBING AND NATURAL KINDS TERMS 5. CONCLUDING REMARKS APPENDIX NOTES REFERENCES

3 General Terms as Designators

1. INTRODUCTION 2. THE TRIVIALIZATION OF RIGIDITY 3. THE OVERGENERALIZATION OF RIGIDITY 4. RIGIDITY AND THE NECESSITY OF THEORETICAL IDENTIFICATIONS 5. CONCLUSIONS NOTES REFERENCES

4 Are Natural Kind Terms Special?

1. INTRODUCTION 2. WHICH TERMS ARE NATURAL KIND TERMS? 3. THE SEMANTIC CONTENT OF NATURAL KIND TERMS

3.1 Rigidity 3.2 Non-descriptionality

4. EXTERNALISM 5. CONCLUSION NOTES REFERENCES

5 The Commonalities between Proper Names and Natural Kind Terms

1. THE MODAL ARGUMENT AND (FREGEAN) RIGID DESIGNATION 2. PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDES, DEFERENTIAL INTENTIONS, AND FREGE’S PUZZLE 3. TWIN EARTH AND FREGEAN NATURAL KIND TERMS NOTES REFERENCES

6 Theoretical Identity Statements, Their Truth, and Their Discovery

1. MY RESPONSE TO THE TRADITION 2. WORRIES

2.1 Whether Theoretical Identity Statements are Discovered to be True, and Whether it Matters

Whether Theoretical Identity Statements are Discovered to be True Whether it Matters that Theoretical Identity Statements are Discovered to be True

2.2 Whether Theoretical Identity Statements are True and Whether it Matters

Whether Theoretical Identity Statements are True Whether it Matters that Theoretical Identity Statements are True

3. CONCLUSION NOTES REFERENCES

7 Discovering the Essences of Natural Kinds

1. INTRODUCTION 2. CONCEPTUAL CHANGE AND PRECISIFICATION 3. ESSENTIAL TRUTHS WITHOUT ESSENCES 4. DISCOVERING ESSENCES OF THEORETICAL KINDS 5. CONCLUSION NOTES REFERENCES

8 The Elements and Conceptual Change

1. WHAT CHEMICAL KINDS HAVE TO DO 2. LAVOISIER ON THE ELEMENTS 3. ELEMENTS BEFORE AND AFTER LAVOISIER

3.1 Before Lavoisier 3.2. After Lavoisier

4. DISCOVERY? 5. NECESSITY AND ESSENCE? NOTES REFERENCES

9 On the Abuse of the Necessary A Posteriori

1. INTRODUCTION 2. THEORETICAL IDENTITIES AND THE NECESSARY A POSTERIORI 3. ELLIS ON NATURAL KINDS AND LAWS

3.1 Substance Kinds 3.2 Process kinds

4. THE CONSEQUENCES FOR SCIENTIFIC ESSENTIALISM 5. DIAGNOSIS NOTES REFERENCES

10 Crosscutting Natural Kinds and the Hierarchy Thesis

1. INTRODUCTION 2. THE HIERARCHY THESES AND CROSSCUTTING CATEGORIES 3. CROSSCUTTING AND THE METAPHYSICS OF NATURAL KINDS NOTES REFERENCES

11 From Constitutional Necessities to Causal Necessities

1. CONSTITUTIONAL NECESSITY

1.1 Schaffer on Necessities of Identity vs. Causal Necessities 1.2 Constitutional Necessity

2. FROM CONSTITUTIONAL NECESSITIES TO CAUSAL NECESSITIES

2.1 The Non-Humean’s Accounts 2.2 The Humean’s Accounts

3. FROM CONSTITUTIONAL NECESSITIES TO CAUSAL NECESSITIES NOTES REFERENCES

12 Realism, Natural Kinds, and Philosophical Methods

1. INTRODUCTION: TOWARDS A FULLY DEVELOPED PHILOSOPHICAL NATURALISM 2. REALIST PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

2.1 Projectibility and Evidence 2.2 Projectibility and Truth 2.3 Natural Kinds and Reference

The Basic Accommodationist Picture. The Accommodationist Theory: Initial Approximation. Partial Denotation and Other Complications. Homeostatic Property Cluster (HPC) Natural Kinds. A Kind of Relativism. Accommodation, Broadly Understood.

3. IMPLICATIONS: EPISTEMOLOGY

3.1 Cognitive Architecture, Social Structures, and the ‘Context of Invention’ 3.2 Epistemology and the Political Economy of Science 3.3 Anti-foundationalism

4. IMPLICATIONS: THE METAPHYSICS OF NATURAL KINDS

4.1 Natural Kinds are Social Constructions 4.2 Reality and Mind Independence

Natural Kinds as Secondary Qualities (Or Something Like That). Social Constructivism?

4.3 ‘Reality’ One More Time

5. IMPLICATIONS: REFERENCE

5.1 A Picture and Three Problems 5.2 Descriptive, Conceptual, and Intentional Factors are Treated as Causal Factors

Nevertheless, Reference is Not a ‘Causal-Descriptive’ Phenomenon.

5.3 Two-dimensional Conceptions of Reference 5.4 Conceptual Role Semantics

Reference and Inferential Role. Reference, Communication and Conceptual Meanings. Malignant Meanings in Extrapolative Human Sociobiology

6. IMPLICATIONS: METAPHILOSOPHY

6.1 A Priori Methods in Philosophy 6.2 Relevant Related Sciences 6.3 Philosophers, Intuitions, and ‘Conceptual Analysis’ 6.4 Philosophical Naturalism

NOTES REFERENCES

Contributors Index

← Prev
Back
Next →

← Prev
Back
Next →