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Index
Cover
Half Title
Title Page
Copyright Page
Dedication
Table of Contents
Acknowledgements
Abbreviations
Prolegomenon: Husserl’s turn to history and pure phenomenology
I. Plato’s and Aristotle’s theory of eidē
1. Plato’s Socratic theory of eidē: the first pillar of the ancient precedent to pure phenomenology
2. Plato’s arithmological theory of eidē: the second pillar of the ancient precedent to pure phenomenology
3. Aristotle’s criticism of Plato’s theory of eidē: the third (and final) pillar of the ancient precedent to pure phenomenology
II. From descriptive psychology to transcendentally pure phenomenology
4. Origin of the task of pure phenomenology
5. Pure phenomenology and Platonism
6. Pure phenomenology as the transcendental-phenomenological investigation of absolute consciousness
7. Transcendental phenomenology of absolute consciousness and phenomenological philosophy
8. Limits of the transcendental-phenomenological investigation of pure consciousness
III. From the phenomenology of transcendental consciousness to that of monadological intersubjectivity
9. Phenomenological philosophy as transcendental idealism
10. The intersubjective foundation of transcendental idealism: the immanent transcendency of the world’s objectivity
IV. From monadological intersubjectivity to the historical a priori constitutive of all meaning
11. The pure phenomenological motivation of Husserl’s turn to history
12. The essential connection between intentional history and actual history
13. The historicity of both the intelligibility of ideal meanings and the possibility of actual history
14. Desedimentation and the link between intentional history and the constitution of a historical tradition
15. Transcendental phenomenology as the only true explanation of objectivity and all meaningful problems in previous philosophy
V. The unwarranted historical presuppositions guiding the fundamental ontological and deconstructive criticisms of transcendental philosophy
16. The methodological presupposition of the ontico-ontological critique of intentionality: Plato’s Socratic seeing of the eidē
17. The mereological presupposition of fundamental ontology: that Being as a whole has a meaning overall
18. The presupposition behind the proto-deconstructive critique of intentional historicity: the conflation of intrasubjective and intersubjective idealities
19. The presupposition behind the deconstruction of phenomenology: the subordination of being to speech
Epilogue: Transcendental-phenomenological criticism of the criticism of phenomenological cognition
Coda: Phenomenological self-responsibility and the singularity of transcendental philosophy
Notes
Bibliography
Index
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