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Index
Cover
Half title
Title
Copyright
Epigraph
Contents
Acknowledgments
Introduction
“Neural Buddhism”: Cognitive Science and the Philosophy of Dharmakīrti
Intentionality, the Status of Universals, and the Problems with Cognitivism
Plan of the Book
1. Dharmakīrti’s Proof of Rebirth: A Dualist Account of the Causes of Cognition
Introduction: Dharmakīrti as Empiricist
Causation and Subjectivity: Dharmakīrti’s Representationalism
“Compassion Is the Proof”: Dharmakīrti’s Arguments for Dualism
What Kind of Argument Is This? On the Causes of Cognition, and the Rest of This Book
2. The Cognitive-Scientific Revolution: Computationalism and the Problem of Mental Causation
The “Amazingly Hard Problem”: Mental Causation and Philosophy of Mind
Enter Computationalism
Narrow Content and Methodological Solipsism: Fodor’s Brief for Interiority
The “Language of Thought”: An Account of Language Itself as Causally Describable
Conclusion: Does Dennett’s Approach Represent an Alternative?
3. Responsiveness to Reasons as Such: A Kantian Account of Intentionality
Introduction: From Brentano’s “Reference to a Content” to Propositional Attitudes
The “Transcendental Unity of Apperception” and the Nature of Judgment
On Conceptual Capacities as “Spontaneous”
First Part of a Case Against Physicalism: McDowell’s Reconstruction of the “Sellarsian Transcendental Argument”
“Second Nature”: On Reading McDowell as a Critic of Physicalism
A Necessary Complement to McDowell’s Argument: What Kant’s Second
Conclusion: Rationality and the First-Person Perspective
4. The Apoha Doctrine: Dharmakīrti’s Account of Mental Content
Introduction: Apoha Theory as a Nonintentional Account of Mental Content
Dignāga’s Account of Apoha: Conceptual Content as Defined by Inferential Relations
On Learning Conventions: Dignāga’s “Augustinian” Presuppositions
Dharmakīrti’s Account of Apoha: Causally Linking Percepts and Concepts
Problems with the Focus on Inwardness: Dharmakīrti on “Speaker’s Intention”
Dharmakīrti on Conceptual Thought as Essentially Mnemonic
Conclusion: Samketakāla as “Meaning-Conferring Experience”
5. The Svasamvitti Doctrine: Dharmakīrti’s “Methodological Solipsism”
Introduction: Perceptual and Constitutive Understandings of Self-awareness
Dignāga on Pramānaphala as Svasamvitti
Dharmakīrti’s Culminating Argument for Svasamvitti: “Sahopalambhaniyama”
Svasamvitti and Causal Explanation
On What Dharmakīrti’s Argument Gets Us: Rāmakantha on the Phenomenology of Time-Consciousness and the Limits of Causal Explanation
Conclusion: Dharmakīrti’s Cognitivism
6. Indian Arguments from Practical Reason: Mīmāmsakas and Mādhyamikas Contra Cognitivism
Introduction: Dharmakīrti on Practical Reason
Mīmāmsā: Practical Reason as Linguistic, Language as Timeless
Is Language Mind-Independent?
Dharmakīrti’s Concession: Practical Reason, Causal Explanation, and the Madhyamaka Impulse
The “Conventional” as the “Intentional”: Madhyamaka Arguments for the Ineliminable Character of These
Conclusion: How to Think It Really True That the Logical Space of Reasons Is Ineliminable
Concluding Reflections: Religious Studies and Philosophy of Mind
Notes
References
Index
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