Seeing Things as They Are · A Theory of Perception by Searle, John Rogers -- Read -- Imperial Library of Trantor

Index

Cover page Halftitle page Title page Copyright page Dedication page Contents Acknowledgments Halftitle page Introduction Chapter 1 The Bad Argument One of the Biggest Mistakes in Philosophy in the Past Several Centuries

I. A Small Fallacy and a Large Mistake II. Digression about Intentionality and Phenomenology III. Direct Realism IV. Objectivity and Subjectivity V. Diagrams of Visual Perception VI. The Argument for the Rejection of Naïve, Direct Realism VII. The Fallacy in the Argument VIII. Historical Consequences of the Bad Argument

Appendix A to Chapter 1: Summary of the Theory of Intentionality

1. Content and Object 2. Intentional Objects 3. Propositional Attitudes 4. Propositions as Abstract Entities 5. The Ambiguity in “Condition” 6. Representation and Presentation 7. Observer Independent and Observer Relative Intentionality 8. Intentionality Is Part of Our Biology 9. Intentional Causation 10. Network and Background

Appendix B to Chapter 1: Consciousness

1. The Definition of Consciousness 2. Features of Consciousness 3. Some Mistaken Accounts of Consciousness in Perception

Chapter 2: The Intentionality of Perceptual Experiences

I. Skepticism about the Intentionality of Perception II. Special Features of Perceptual Intentionality III. Vision and the Background: You Have to Learn How to See IV. What Happened to Sense Data? V. The Brain in a Vat VI. Conclusion

Chapter 3: Further Developments of the Argument Against the Bad Argument

I. Analytic Philosophy and the Backward Road II. The Boundaries of the Visual III. The Objective and Subjective Perceptual Fields IV. The Structure of the Subjective Visual Field V. The Hierarchical Structure of Visual Perception VI. How Do the Phenomenological Features of the Subjective Visual Field Determine the Conditions of Satisfaction of the Visual Experience? VII. My Current View VIII. The Role of Presentational Intentional Causation IX. The Primary Qualities X. The Backward Road XI. A Possible Objection XII. Summary of the Results So Far

I. From Bottom to Top of Visual Perception II. Three-Dimensional Perceptions III. Temporal Relations IV. Extending the Analysis Upward V. Recognition and the Problem of Particularity VI. Solution of Some Outstanding Questions about Perception VII. The Brain in the Vat VIII. Conclusion

Chapter 6: Disjunctivism

I. What Exactly is Disjunctivism? II. Arguments in Favor of Disjunctivism and Replies to Them III. Consciousness and Perception: Campbell’s Account IV. The Real Source of the Disagreement V. Disjunctivism and Visual Imagination

Chapter 7: Unconscious Perception

I. A Brief History of the Unconscious II. Suspicions about Consciousness III. Does Consciousness Matter?

Chapter 8: Classical Theories of Perception

Name Index Subject Index