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Index
Half-title Series-title Title Copyright Dedication Contents Acknowledgments Acronyms and Abbreviations I Introduction and Theory
1 Introduction
What is competitive authoritarianism?
Situating the Concept
Elections Civil Liberties An Uneven Playing Field Competition without Democracy: Contestation and Uncertainty in Nondemocracies
Alternative Conceptualizations of Hybrid Regimes: Do We Need a New Subtype?
The rise of competitive authoritarianism Diverging outcomes: competitive authoritarian regime trajectories, 1990–2008 Explaining divergent outcomes: the argument in brief Theoretical implications The distinctive logic of competitive authoritarian politics
Informal Institutions Succession Politics Party Behavior
Case selection and methods Plan of the book
2 Explaining Competitive Authoritarian Regime Trajectories: International Linkage and the Organizational Power of Incumbents
The international dimension: linkage and leverage
Western Leverage Linkage to the West
Shaping Incentives: International Reverberation and the Cost of Government Abuse Shaping Interests: Creating Domestic Constituencies for Democratic Behavior Shaping the Distribution of Power and Resources
Linkage, Leverage, and Democratization
The domestic dimension: organizational power and authoritarian stability
State Coercive Capacity Party Strength State Economic Control as a Substitute for Coercive and Party Organization Combining State and Party Strength The Impact of Opposition Strength
Synthesis of the argument Alternative approaches
Economic Explanations: Modernization, Inequality, and Economic Performance Institutional Design The Role of Leadership
Conclusion: a structuralist argument
II High Linkage and Democratization: Eastern Europe and the Americas
3 Linkage, Leverage, and Democratization in Eastern Europe
Linkage, democratization, and the eu: slovakia and romania
Slovakia
Linkage, Leverage, and Organizational Power Origins and Evolution of the Regime
Romania
Linkage, Leverage, and Organizational Power Origins and Evolution of the Regime
Linkage and democratization amid ethnic civil war: serbia and croatia
Serbia
Linkage, Leverage, and Organizational Power Origins and Evolution of the Regime
Croatia
Linkage, Leverage, and Organizational Power Origins and Evolution of the Regime
Linkage and democratization amidst state collapse: albania and macedonia
Albania
Linkage, Leverage, and Organizational Power Origins and Evolution of the Regime
Macedonia
Linkage, Leverage, and Organizational Power Origins and Evolution of the Regime
Conclusion
4 Linkage, Leverage, and Democratization in the Americas
High linkage, high leverage, and democratization: the dominican republic, nicaragua, and guyana
Dominican Republic
Linkage, Leverage, and Organizational Power Origins and Evolution of the Regime
Nicaragua
Linkage, Leverage, and Organizational Power Origins and Evolution of the Regime
Guyana
Linkage, Leverage, and Organizational Power Origins and Evolution of the Regime
Mexico: linkage without leverage
Linkage, Leverage, and Organizational Power Origins and Evolution of the Regime
Medium linkage and high leverage: peru and haiti
Peru
Linkage, Leverage, and Organizational Power Origins and Evolution of the Regime
Haiti
Linkage, Leverage, and Organizational Power Origins and Evolution of the Regime
Conclusion
III The Dynamics of Competitive Authoritarianism in Low-Linkage Regions: The Former Soviet Union, Africa, and Asia
5 The Evolution of Post-Soviet Competitive Authoritarianism
Leverage, organizational power, and authoritarian stability: russia, belarus, and armenia
Russia
Linkage, Leverage, and Organizational Power Origins and Evolution of the Regime under Yeltsin (1992–1999) Authoritarian Consolidation under Putin: 2000–2008
Belarus
Linkage, Leverage, and Organizational Power Origins and Evolution of the Regime
Armenia
Linkage, Leverage, and Organizational Power Origins and Evolution of the Regime
Organizational weakness and authoritarian instability: ukraine, georgia, and moldova
Ukraine
Linkage, Leverage, and Organizational Power Origins and Evolution of the Regime
Georgia
Linkage, Leverage, and Organizational Power Origins and Evolution of the Regime
Moldova
Linkage, Leverage, and Organizational Power Origins and Evolution of the Regime
Conclusion
6 Africa
Organizational power and authoritarian stability: zimbabwe, mozambique, botswana, and tanzania
Zimbabwe
Linkage, Leverage, and Organizational Power Origins and Evolution of the Regime
Mozambique
Linkage, Leverage, and Organizational Power Origins and Evolution of the Regime
Tanzania Botswana
Black knights and regime survival: cameroon and gabon
Cameroon
Linkage, Leverage, and Organizational Power Origins and Evolution of the Regime
Gabon
Political machines, crisis, and turnover without democratization: kenya and senegal
Kenya
Linkage, Leverage, and Organizational Power Origins and Evolution of the Regime
Senegal
Low organizational power and regime instability
Madagascar
Linkage, Leverage, and Organizational Power Origins and Evolution of the Regime
Malawi
Linkage, Leverage, and Organizational Power Origins and Evolution of the Regime
Zambia Benin
Linkage, Leverage, and Organizational Power Origins and Evolution of the Regime
Mali
Ghana: lessons from an outlier
Linkage, Leverage, and Organizational Power Origins and Evolution of the Regime
Conclusion
7 Diverging Outcomes in Asia
Taiwan
Linkage, Leverage, and Organizational Power Origins and Evolution of the Regime
Malaysia
Linkage, Leverage, and Organizational Power Origins and Evolution of the Regime
Cambodia
Linkage, Leverage, and Organizational Power Origins and Evolution of the Regime
The Transition to Competitive Authoritarianism (1989–1993) Authoritarian Reconsolidation, 1993–2008
Conclusion
8 Conclusion
Evaluating the theory’s performance
Comparison over Time and across Regions Alternative Explanations
Theoretical extensions
Linkage, Leverage, and Democratization Political Parties, Elite Cohesion, and Authoritarian Durability Organizational Power, Regime Transitions, and Democracy: Two Paradoxes Institutional Weakness
Conclusion: understanding authoritarian persistence
Appendix I: Measuring Competitive Authoritarianism and Authoritarian Stability
I. Full authoritarianism II. Competitive authoritarianism
(1) Unfair Elections (2) Violation of Civil Liberties (3) Uneven Playing Field
III. Democracy Coding regime outcomes
Democratization Stable Authoritarianism Unstable Authoritarianism
Regime scores
Appendix II: Measuring Leverage Appendix III: Measuring Linkage Appendix IV: Measuring Organizational Power
State coercive capacity
Scope Cohesion
Party strength
Scope Cohesion
Discretionary state control of the economy
Scoring Organizational Power
References Index
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