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Index
Cover Frontmatter 1. Agency and Interaction What We Are and What We Do in Formal Epistemology 1. Bayesian Epistemology
2. Introduction 3. Truth and Probability 4. Probable Knowledge 5. Fine-Grained Opinion, Probability, and the Logic of Full Belief 6. A Theory of Higher Order Probabilities 7. On Indeterminate Probabilities 8. Why I am not a Bayesian 9. Discussion: A Mistake in Dynamic Coherence Arguments? 10. Some Problems for Conditionalization and Reflection 11. Stopping to Reflect
2. Belief Change
12. Introduction 13. On the Logic of Theory Change: Partial Meet Contraction and Revision Functions 14. Theory Contraction and Base Contraction Unified 15. How Infallible but Corrigible Full Belief Is Possible 16. Belief Contraction in the Context of the General Theory of Rational Choice 17. A Survey of Ranking Theory
3. Decision Theory
18. Introduction 19. Allais’s Paradox 20. Decision Theory Without “Independence” or Without “Ordering” 21. Ambiguity and the Bayesian Paradigm 22. State-Dependent Utilities 23. Causal Decision Theory 24. Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty
4. Logics of Knowledge and Belief
25. Introduction 26. Epistemology Without Knowledge and Without Belief 27. Epistemic Operators 28. Elusive Knowledge 29. Knowledge and Scepticism 30. On Logics of Knowledge and Belief 31. Sentences, Belief and Logical Omniscience, or What Does Deduction Tell Us? 32. The Logic of Justification 33. Learning Theory and Epistemology 34. Some Computational Constraints in Epistemic Logic
5. Interactive Epistemology
35. Introduction 36. Convention (An Excerpt on Coordination and Higher-Order Expectations) 37. Three Views of Common Knowledge 38. The Logic of Public Announcements, Common Knowledge, and Private Suspicions 39. A Qualitative Theory of Dynamic Interactive Belief Revision 40. Agreeing to Disagree 41. Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium 42. Knowledge, Belief and Counterfactual Reasoning in Games 43. Substantive Rationality and Backward Induction
Backmatter
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