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Index
Cover
Frontmatter
1. Agency and Interaction What We Are and What We Do in Formal Epistemology
1. Bayesian Epistemology
2. Introduction
3. Truth and Probability
4. Probable Knowledge
5. Fine-Grained Opinion, Probability, and the Logic of Full Belief
6. A Theory of Higher Order Probabilities
7. On Indeterminate Probabilities
8. Why I am not a Bayesian
9. Discussion: A Mistake in Dynamic Coherence Arguments?
10. Some Problems for Conditionalization and Reflection
11. Stopping to Reflect
2. Belief Change
12. Introduction
13. On the Logic of Theory Change: Partial Meet Contraction and Revision Functions
14. Theory Contraction and Base Contraction Unified
15. How Infallible but Corrigible Full Belief Is Possible
16. Belief Contraction in the Context of the General Theory of Rational Choice
17. A Survey of Ranking Theory
3. Decision Theory
18. Introduction
19. Allais’s Paradox
20. Decision Theory Without “Independence” or Without “Ordering”
21. Ambiguity and the Bayesian Paradigm
22. State-Dependent Utilities
23. Causal Decision Theory
24. Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty
4. Logics of Knowledge and Belief
25. Introduction
26. Epistemology Without Knowledge and Without Belief
27. Epistemic Operators
28. Elusive Knowledge
29. Knowledge and Scepticism
30. On Logics of Knowledge and Belief
31. Sentences, Belief and Logical Omniscience, or What Does Deduction Tell Us?
32. The Logic of Justification
33. Learning Theory and Epistemology
34. Some Computational Constraints in Epistemic Logic
5. Interactive Epistemology
35. Introduction
36. Convention (An Excerpt on Coordination and Higher-Order Expectations)
37. Three Views of Common Knowledge
38. The Logic of Public Announcements, Common Knowledge, and Private Suspicions
39. A Qualitative Theory of Dynamic Interactive Belief Revision
40. Agreeing to Disagree
41. Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium
42. Knowledge, Belief and Counterfactual Reasoning in Games
43. Substantive Rationality and Backward Induction
Backmatter
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