A Companion to the Philosophy of Language by Hale, Bob -- Read -- Imperial Library of Trantor

Index

Cover Table of Contents Volume I

Title Page List of Contributors Preface to the Second Edition Preface to the First Edition PART I: Meaning and Theories of Meaning

1 Metaphysics, Philosophy, and the Philosophy of Language

1 Two Positions 2 Dummett and Thought 3 Wittgenstein, Early and Late 4 Carnap and Quine 5 Ordinary Language Philosophy 6 The Turn Back 7 The Larger Picture References

2 Meaning and Truth‐Conditions

References Further Reading

3 Intention and Convention in the Theory of Meaning

1 Lewis on the Public‐Language Relation 2 Intention‐Based Semantics 3 An Almost‐Gricean Semantics 4 What Endures? References

4 Meaning, Use, Verification

1 Meaning as Use 2 Verificationism 3 Rules and Norms References Postscript BERNHARD WEISS Meaning Is Use Use and Assertion A First Response: Specialized Assertion Conditions A Second Response: Adding to Assertion Conditions Fitch’s Paradox or the Paradox of Knowability References

5 Semantics and Pragmatics

1 Pragmatics and Semantics 2 Austin on Locutionary, Illocutionary, and Perlocutionary Acts 3 Grice on Illocutionary Acts 4 Grice on Basic and Derivative Illocutionary Acts 5 The Orthodox View 6 Occasion‐Sensitivity 7 Basic and Derivative Illocutionary Acts 8 Conclusion References

6 Pragmatics

1 Semantic Properties 2 The Pragmatic View 3 Domestications 4 Implicature 5 Metaphysics 6 Perspective 7 Thoughts 8 Concluding Remarks References Further Reading Postscript CHARLES TRAVIS In Retrospect References Further Reading

7 On the Linguistic Status of Context Sensitivity

1 Introduction 2 Terms of Debate 3 Overt Context Sensitivity 4 Covert Context Sensitivity 5 Whither Context? 6 Concluding Remarks References Further Reading

8 A Guide to Naturalizing Semantics

The Crude Causal Theory Dretske’s Information‐Theoretic Account Optimal Conditions Accounts Teleological Theories Fodor’s Asymmetric Dependence Theory Causal‐Role Semantics Conclusion References Further Reading Postscript PETER SCHULTE Teleological Theories: Basic Distinctions The Content Question: Input‐Oriented Theories The Content Question: Output‐Oriented and Mixed Theories The Status Question Conclusion References

9 Inferentialism

1 Varieties of Inferentialism 2 Logical Inferentialism 3 Brandom’s Inferentialism 4 Objections and Replies References Further Reading

10 Against Harmony

1 The Inversion Principle 2 An Argument for the Inversion Principle 3 Problems with the Argument 4 Arguments from the ‘Innocence’ of Logic 5 Tennant’s Argument for Harmony 6 Harmony and Inferential Role Semantics References

11 Meaning and Privacy

1 Introduction: The Two Questions and their Consequences 2 Private States and Public Language: The Possibility 3 Private States and Public Language: The Effects 4 The Possibility of a Private Language References Further Reading Postscript GUY LONGWORTH References

12 Tacit Knowledge

1 Introduction 2 Tacit Knowledge and Propositional Attitudes 3 Tacit Knowledge and Dispositional States 4 Wright’s Attack on Evans 5 The Mirror Constraint and Understanding Novel Utterances 6 Wright’s Proposal 7 Tacit Knowledge and Rule‐Following References Further Reading

13 Radical Interpretation

1 A Bird’s‐Eye View of Some Options 2 From “Truth and Meaning” to “Radical Interpretation” 3 The Basis for Radical Interpretation 4 Interpretation, Charity, Holism, and Norms 5 Indeterminacy of Meaning, Holism, and Molecularity References Postscript ALEXANDER MILLER References

14 Propositional Attitudes

Propositional Attitudes and Philosophy of Language Questions about Propositions Semantics and Structure (Neo‐)Russellianism and Fregeanism Attitudes, Utterances, and Sentences Semantic versus Psychological Sententialism Attitudes and Context Alternatives to Relational Accounts Appendix: De Dicto, De Re, and De Se References Further Reading

15 Holism

1 What Is Meaning Holism? 2 Does the Duhem–Quine Thesis Provide a Ground for Meaning Holism? 3 Does Revisability Support Meaning Holism? 4 Do Interpretational and Compositional Considerations Support Meaning Holism? 5 Global Holism, Justification, and Semantic Value 6 Local Holisms and Their Source References

16 Metaphor

1 Figurative and Non‐figurative: Metaphor, Idiom, and Ambiguity 2 Metaphorical Meaning 3 Davidson and the Case against Metaphorical Meaning 4 Paraphrase and Propositional Status 5 Metaphor and Communication 6 Pragmatics and Speaker’s Meaning 7 Metaphor, Rhetoric, and Relevance References Further Reading Postscript ANDREW MCGONIGAL 1 Metaphor, Meaning, and Language: Positive Developments 2 Distinctiveness and Dispensability: For and Against References Further Reading

17 Conditionals

1 Introduction: Conditional Information 2 Preliminaries 3 Strict Conditionals 4 Variably Strict Conditionals 5 Counterfactual Dynamics 6 Indicative Conditionals and Collapse 7 Antecedents as Restrictors 8 Dynamics and Indicative Conditionals 9 Other Surveys References

18 Generics

1 Generics 2 Genericity 3 Separating the Semantics of Generics from Theories of Genericity 4 Connecting the Semantics of Generics with Theories of Genericity 5 Ascriptions of Dispositions, Habits, and Capacities 6 Some Theories of Genericity 7 Two Ways of Doing Away with Genericity 8 Closing References

19 Deflationist Theories of Truth, Meaning, and Content

I A. Radical Inflationism B. Radical Deflationism II References

Volume II

Title Page PART I: Language, Truth, and Reality

20 Realism and its Oppositions

1 Dummett’s General Account of R/AR Disputes 2 Arguments against Semantic Realism 3 The Adequacy of Dummett’s Characterization of R/AR Disputes 4 Error Theories, Projectivism, and Quasi‐realism 5 Realism and Objective Truth References Further Reading Postscript BERNHARD WEISS Relativizing Truth Realism and Grounds The Variety of Conceptions of Realism References

21 Theories of Truth

1 Introduction: Problems with Correspondence 2 The Coherence Theory and the Pragmatic Theory 3 Coherence and Correspondence 4 Why Pragmatic and Coherence Theories are Attractive 5 Why the Coherence Theory Fails 6 Frege on Defining Truth 7 The Correspondence Theory 8 The Redundancy Theory 9 The Semantic Theory References Further Reading Postscript: Pluralism about Truth MICHAEL P. LYNCH References Further Reading

22 Truthmaker Semantics

I Theory II Applications References

23 Analyticity

I Belief, Apriority, and Indeterminacy Analyticity: Metaphysical or Epistemological? The Metaphysical Concept The Epistemological Concept II “Two Dogmas” and the Rejection of Frege‐Analyticity Skeptical Theses about Analyticity Non‐factualism about Frege‐Analyticity The Error Thesis about Frege‐Analyticity III The Analyticity of Logic The Classical View and Implicit Definition Implicit Definition and Non‐Factualism Implicit Definition and Conventionalism Quine against Implicit Definition: Regress Quine against Implicit Definition: Constitutive Truth Implicit Definition, Justification, and Entitlement Conclusion Appendix: A Priori Knowledge of the Second Premise References Further Reading Postscript: Further Thoughts about Analyticity: 20 Years Later PAUL ARTIN BOGHOSSIAN Introduction Can Epistemic Analyticity Explain All A Priori Justification? Is Uniformity a Requirement? Can Epistemic Analyticity Explain Even Some Cases of A Priori Justification? The Constitutive View The Basis View Conclusion References

24 Rule‐Following, Objectivity, and Meaning

1 Wittgenstein on Meaning, Understanding, and Rules 2 Kripke on Rules 3 Is Semantic Irrealism Incoherent? 4 Wright on the Rule‐Following Considerations 5 Concluding Remarks References Further Reading Postscript: Factualism and New Problems for Rule‐Following DANIEL WEE 1 Factualist Readings of Kripke’s Wittgenstein 2 Wright’s and Boghossian’s Problems from“Blind” Rule‐Following References

25 The Normativity of Meaning

1 Introduction 2 Meaning and Normative Judgment 3 Meaning as a Source of Normativity 4 The Normative Determination of Meaning 5 The Normativity of Semantic Concepts 6 Conclusion References

26 Indeterminacy of Translation

1 What Does the Indeterminacy of Translation Involve? 2 Could One Live with the Indeterminacy of Translation? 3 Quine’s Arguments for the Indeterminacy Thesis 4 Evans’s Appraisal of the Argument from Below 5 Are Evans’s Objections Compelling? 6 The Argument from Above: Preliminary Clarifications 7 The Argument from Above: Appraisal References Further Reading Postscript ALEXANDER MILLER 1 The Argument from Below I: Simplicity in Semantic Theory 2 The Argument from Below II: Simplicity in Psychological Theory 3 The Argument from Above I: The Underdetermination Thesis 4 The Argument from Above II: Tightness and Indeterminacy References Further Reading

27 Putnam’s Model‐Theoretic Argument against Metaphysical Realism

I II III IV V VI VII VIII Appendix: Permutation Results Further Reading Postscript: Recent Work on Putnam’s Model‐Theoretic Argument JUSSI HAUKIOJA 1 Reconsidering the ‘Just More Theory’ Maneuver 2 Reference Magnetism References

28 Sorites

1 The Early History 2 Recent Approaches References Further Reading Postscript AIDAN MCGLYNN 1 Supervaluationism, Degree Theory, and Epistemicism Revisited 2 Quandaries and Intuitionism 3 Dialetheism as a Unified Solution 4 Contextualism and Interest‐Relativity References Further Reading

29 Time and Tense

1 Introduction 2 Temporalism versus Eternalism 3 The Quantifier View versus the Operator View 4 From Philosophy of Language to Metaphysics 5 Conclusion References Further Reading

30 Relativism

1 Varieties of Relativism 2 Index, Context, and Content 3 Retraction and Disagreement 4 Control and Syntax References

PART II: Reference, Identity, and Necessity

31 Modality

1 Preliminary Considerations: Philosophical Issues 2 Quine’s Skepticism and Reactions to It 3 Modal Realism 1: Realism about Possible Worlds 4 Modal Realism 2: The Non‐cognitivist Challenge References Postscript BOB HALE The Source of Necessity and Possibility Essence and Essentialist Theories of Modality Modal Knowledge Necessary and Contingent Existence, Actualism, and Possibilism References

32 Relativism about Epistemic Modals

1 Introduction 2 Contextualism 3 Contextualism about Epistemic Modals 4 Relativist Proposals 5 Relativists’ Arguments against Contextualism Conclusion References

33 Internalism and Externalism

1 Introduction: Internal Duplicates and Supervenience 2 Origins of Semantic Externalism 3 Which Semantic Feature Is Externally Determined? 4 How Should the Supervenience Base Be Extended? 5 Why Should We Accept Externalism? References

34 Essentialism

1 Concepts 2 Essentialist Theses and Arguments for Them 3 Slippery Slopes and Primitive Thisnesses 4 The Grounds of Metaphysical Necessity References Further Reading Postscript PENELOPE MACKIE The Essentiality of Origin and Individual Essences The Essentiality of Kind Membership Essential Properties and What a Thing Is References Further Reading

35 Reference and Necessity

1 Questions and Theses 2 The Possible‐Worlds Framework 3 What Are the Semantic Values of Names? 4 How Do Names Get Their Semantic Values? 5 Names and Essences References

36 Names and Rigid Designation

1 Rigidity 2 Rigid Designation and Quantified Modal Logic 3 The Descriptive Picture 4 Kripke’s Argument and the Rigidity Thesis 5 The ‘Actualized’ Description Theory 6 Names and Wide‐Scope 7 Assertoric Content and Ingredient Sense Conclusion References

37 Two‐Dimensional Semantics

1 2D Semantics: Ideas, Interpretations, and Issues 2 The 2D Apparatus of Worlds‐cum‐Intensions 3 Essential Background: Orthodox Kripkeanism 4 Kaplan’s 2D Semantics for Indexicals 5 Robert Stalnaker, or 2D Pragmatics 6 Enter the 2D Fregeans: Jackson, Chalmers, and the Primacy of A‐Intensions 7 Jackson, or Why Communication Requires a 2D Semantics 8 Chalmers’s Epistemic Two‐Dimensionalism 9 An Upshot, or the State of the Debate References

38 The Semantics and Pragmatics of Indexicals

1 Introduction 2 Approaches 3 The Semantics of Indexicals 4 Cognitive Significance and Pragmatics 5 Two Distinctions 6 Indexical and Undexical Uses 7 Tokens and Technology 8 Demonstratives 9 Direct Reference 10 A Problem about ‘I’ and ‘Now’ 11 Conclusion References

39 Objects and Criteria of Identity

1 Introduction 2 Sortals and Counting 3 What Is an Object? 4 Frege on Concepts and Objects 5 Two Forms of Identity Criterion 6 The Logical Status and Role of Identity Criteria 7 One‐Level versus Two‐Level Identity Criteria 8 On the Identity of Cardinal Numbers 9 Cardinal Numbers and Counting 10 Abstract and Concrete Objects 11 The Paradoxes of Identity over Time Appendix: Informal Proof of (N2) References Postscript HAROLD NOONAN References

40 Relative Identity

Introduction The Non‐existence of Absolute Identity The Sortal Relativity of Identity The Derelativization Thesis The Counting Thesis The Irreducibility of Restricted Quantification The ‘Name for an A’/‘Name of an A’ Distinction Geach versus Quine: A Baroque Meinongian Ontology Cats, Rivers, and Heralds Substantival Terms and the Derelativization Thesis References Further Reading

41 De Jure Codesignation

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 References

Glossary Index End User License Agreement

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