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Index
Cover Page Disjunctivism New Problems of Philosophy Title Copyright Contents Acknowledgements Introduction 1 Sense-Datum Theories and the Argument from Hallucination
1.1 The Relational Assumption 1.2 Arguments from Hallucination 1.3 Chapter Summary Notes Further Reading References
2 Representational Content, the Science of Perception, and Disjunctivism About Conscious Character
2.1 Representational Content and the Science of Perception 2.2 Disjunctivism about Conscious Character 2.3 Hinton’s Disjunctivist Commitments 2.4 Chapter Summary Notes Further Reading References
3 Does Introspective Reflection Support Naïve Realism?
3.1 Relationalist and Representationalist Accounts of the Phenomenology of Perceptual Experience 3.2 Martin’s Phenomenological Argument for Naïve Realism 3.3 Objections to Martin’s Argument 3.4 Chapter Summary Notes Further Reading References
4 Naïve Realism, Perceptual Acquaintance, and Perceptually Based Thought
4.1 The Explanatory Role of the Phenomenal Character of Perception 4.2 Qualia and Phenomenal Concepts 4.3 Campbell on the Explanatory Role of Conscious Perception 4.4 Objections to Campbell’s Proposal 4.5 Chapter Summary Notes Further Reading References
5 Epistemological Disjunctivism
5.1 Epistemic Asymmetries Between ‘Good’ and ‘Bad’ cases 5.2 Mcdowell’s Epistemological Disjunctivism 5.3 Objections to McDowell’s Epistemological Disjunctivism 5.4 Epistemological Disjunctivism and Scepticism 5.5 Chapter Summary Notes Further Reading References
6 Disjunctivist Accounts of Hallucination and Illusion
6.1 A Causal Argument Against Naïve Realism 6.2 Martin’s Negative Epistemic Account of Causally Matching Hallucination 6.3 Perceptual Illusion 6.4 Chapter Summary Notes Further Reading References
7 Varieties of Disjunctivism
7.1 Fundamental Kinds and Psychological Difference 7.2 Disjunctivism and Common Element Claims 7.3 Epistemological Disjunctivism and its Metaphysical Commitments 7.4 Disjunctivism in Snowdon’s Argument Against the Causal Theory of Perception 7.5 Conclusion 7.6 Chapter Summary Notes Further Reading References
Glossary Index
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