The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics · Making Sense of Things by Moore, A.W. -- Read -- Imperial Library of Trantor

Index

Preface

Introduction 1. The Definition of Metaphysics 2. ‘The Most General …’ 3. ‘… Attempt …’ 4. ‘… to Make Sense of Things’ 5. Metaphysics and Self-Conscious Reflection 6. Three Questions

(a) The Transcendence Question (b) The Novelty Question (c) The Creativity Question (d) The Significance of the Three Questions

7. The Importance of Metaphysics 8. Prospectus Part One The Early Modern Period 1. Descartes: Metaphysics in the Service of Science

1. Introduction 2. The Nature of the Project: Metaphysics as Providing Science with Foundations 3. The Execution of the Project 4. The Shape of Descartes’ System. Its Epistemology 5. Analogues of Descartes’ Argument for the Existence of God in Contemporary Analytic Philosophy 6. ‘The Disenchantment of the World’

2. Spinoza: Metaphysics in the Service of Ethics

1. Introduction 2. Substance 3. Nature, Human Nature, and the Model of Human Nature 4. Making Sense of Things as an Ethical Achievement 5. The Three Kinds of Knowledge 6. Metaphysical Knowledge as Knowledge of the Second Kind

3. Leibniz: Metaphysics in the Service of Theodicy

1. The Apotheosis of Making Sense of Things 2. The Problem of Theodicy 3. Leibniz’ System 4. Leibniz’ Various Modal Distinctions 5. Leibniz’ Solution to the Problem of Theodicy. Its Unsatisfactoriness

4. Hume: Metaphysics Committed to the Flames?

1. Empiricism and Scepticism in Hume 2. The Semantic Element in Hume’s Empiricism and the Epistemic Element in Hume’s Empiricism 3. Relations of Ideas and Matters of Fact 4. Metaphysics as an Experimental Science of Human Nature 5. Metaphysics as More Than an Experimental Science of Human Nature Appendix: Scepticism About Human Reasoning

5. Kant: The Possibility, Scope, and Limits of Metaphysics

1. Introduction 2. Bad Metaphysics and Good Metaphysics 3. Synthetic A Priori Knowledge 4. How Synthetic A Priori Knowledge Is Possible: Transcendental Idealism 5. Good Metaphysics: The ‘Transcendental Analytic’ 6. Bad Metaphysics: The ‘Transcendental Dialectic’ 7. The Regulative Use of Concepts 8. Thick Sense-Making and Thin Sense-Making 9. Sense-Making That Is Neither Straightforwardly Thin nor Straightforwardly Thick 10. The Unsatisfactoriness of Kant’s Metaphysics Appendix: Transcendental Idealism Broadly Construed

6. Fichte: Transcendentalism versus Naturalism

1. German Philosophy in the Immediate Aftermath of Kant 2. The Choice Between Transcendentalism and Naturalism 3. Fichte’s System I: The Subject’s Intuition of Itself 4. Fichte’s System II: Conditions of the Subject’s Intuition of Itself. The System’s Self-Vindication Appendix: Shades of Fichte in Kant

7. Hegel: Transcendentalism-cum-Naturalism; or, Absolute Idealism

1. Preliminaries 2. Hegel’s Recoil from Kant’s Transcendental Idealism 3. ‘What is rational is actual, and what is actual is rational’ 4. Hegel’s Logic and the Absolute Idea 5. Three Concerns 6. Shades of Spinoza in Hegel? 7. Contradiction, Reason, and Understanding 8. Hegel Contra Kant Again. Absolute Idealism 9. The Implications for Metaphysics

Part Two The Late Modern Period I: The Analytic Tradition 8. Frege: Sense Under Scrutiny

1. What Is Frege Doing Here? 2. The Project: Arithmetic as a Branch of Logic 3. The Execution of the Project 4. Sense and Bedeutung 5. The Admissibility of Definitions 6. The Objectivity of Sense. The Domain of Logic 7. Two Problems

(a) The Set of Sets That Do Not Belong to Themselves (b) The Property of Being a Horse

8. The Implications for Metaphysics

9. The Early Wittgenstein: The Possibility, Scope, and Limits of Sense; or, Sense, Senselessness, and Nonsense

1. Why Two Wittgensteins? 2. Wittgenstein’s Conception of Philosophy 3. The Vision of the Tractatus 4. Logic. Wittgenstein Contra Frege and Kant 5. ‘Anyone who understands me eventually recognizes my propositions as nonsensical’ 6. Two Approaches to the Tractatus . A Rapprochement? 7. Transcendental Idealism in the Tractatus 8. Metaphysics in the Service of Ethics

10. The Later Wittgenstein: Bringing Words Back from Their Metaphysical to Their Everyday Use

1. Wittgenstein’s Conception of Philosophy: A Reprise 2. Differences Between the Early Work and the Later Work 3. Metaphysics, Necessity, and Grammar 4. Transcendental Idealism in the Later Work? 5. Distinguishing Between the ‘Everyday’ and the ‘Metaphysical’ 6. Taking Words Away from Their Everyday to a Metaphysical Use?

11. Carnap: The Elimination of Metaphysics?

1. Logical Positivism 2. Carnap’s Version of Logical Positivism. Linguistic Frameworks 3. A First (Themed) Retrospective

(a) Hume (b) Kant (c) Frege (d) The Early Wittgenstein (e) The Later Wittgenstein

4. Glances Ahead

(a) Quine (b) Heidegger

5. The Implications for Metaphysics

(a) The Implications for Metaphysics on Carnap’s Own Conception of Metaphysics (b) The Implications for Metaphysics on My Conception of Metaphysics (c) Carnap on Alternative Conceptions of Metaphysics

6. Tu Quoque ?

12. Quine: The Ne Plus Ultra of Naturalism

1. Introduction 2. Quine: Empiricist, Naturalist, Physicalist

(a) Quine’s Empiricism (b) Quine’s Naturalism (c) Quine’s Physicalism

3. Relations Between Quine’s Empiricism, Naturalism, and Physicalism 4. Some Distinctions Rejected … 5. … and a New One Introduced 6. Quinean Metaphysics I: An Overview 7. Quinean Metaphysics II: Ontology 8. Objections to Quine’s Naturalism Appendix: Can Quine Consistently Reject the Distinctions He Rejects and Espouse the Indeterminacy/Underdetermination Distinction?

13. Lewis: Metaphysics in the Service of Philosophy

1. Analytic Philosophy in the Immediate Aftermath of Quine 2. Lewis’ Quinean Credentials; or, Lewis: Empiricist, Naturalist, Physicalist 3. Modal Realism 4. Concerns About Modal Realism. The Concerns Removed, but the Shortcomings of Lewis’ Metaphysics Thereby Revealed

14. Dummett: The Logical Basis of Metaphysics

1. In Retrospect and in Prospect 2. Realism and Anti-Realism 3. Three Replies to Dummett’s Anti-Realist Challenge

(a) First Reply (b) Second Reply (c) Third Reply

4. Is Anti-Realism a Form of Transcendental Idealism? 5. In Further Retrospect and in Further Prospect

Part Three The Late Modern Period II: Non-Analytic Traditions 15. Nietzsche: Sense Under Scrutiny Again

1. Introduction 2. Truth, the Pursuit of Truth, and the Will to Truth 3. Prospects for Metaphysics I: Perspectivism 4. Prospects for Metaphysics II: Grammar 5. Prospects for Metaphysics III: Transcendence 6. Nietzsche’s Vision. Truth Again 7. Nietzsche Pro Spinoza and Contra Hegel

(a) Nietzsche Pro Spinoza (b) Nietzsche Contra Hegel

8. Eternal Return

16. Bergson: Metaphysics as Pure Creativity

1. Introduction 2. Analysis (or Intelligence) versus Intuition 3. Space versus Duration. The Actual versus the Virtual. The Real versus the Possible 4. Identity versus Difference 5. Bergson Compared with Some of His Predecessors

(a) Bergson Compared with Fichte (b) Bergson Compared with Spinoza and Nietzsche

6. The Implications for Metaphysics

(a) The Implications for Metaphysics on Bergson’s Own Conception of Metaphysics (b) The Implications for Metaphysics on the Analytic Conception of Metaphysics (c) The Implications for Metaphysics on the Intuitive Conception of Metaphysics

17. Husserl: Making Sense of Making Sense; or, The Ne Plus Ultra of Transcendentalism

1. Husserl Vis-à-Vis the Analytic Tradition 2. The Phenomenological Reduction 3. Why Husserl Is Unlike Descartes (But Not Unlike Wittgenstein) 4. The Execution of the Project 5. The Eidetic Reduction 6. Idealism in Husserl 7. Husserl as Metaphysician

18. Heidegger: Letting Being Be

1. Introduction 2. Heidegger as Phenomenologist, Pro Husserl and Contra Husserl; or, Three Characterizations of Phenomenology

(a) First Characterization (b) Second Characterization (c) Third Characterization

3. The Execution of the Project. Dasein 4. Overcoming the Tradition 5. Heidegger as Metaphysician 6. Metaphysics as Poetry 7. Idealism in Heidegger?

19. Collingwood: Metaphysics as History

1. Introduction 2. Absolute Presuppositions and Metaphysics as the Study of Them 3. A Second (Themed) Retrospective

(a) Hume (b) Kant (c) Hegel (and Bergson) (d) The Later Wittgenstein (e) Carnap and the Logical Positivists (f) The Phenomenologists (g) Coda

4. Collingwood’s Conservatism. The Possibilities Afforded by Non-Propositional Sense-Making

20. Derrida: Metaphysics Deconstructed?

1. A Foretaste 2. Derrida Vis-à-Vis Phenomenology; or, Derrida Pro Heidegger and Contra Husserl

(a) Derrida Pro Heidegger (b) Derrida Contra Husserl

3. Speech and Writing 4. Deconstruction 5. Différance 6. How to Do Things with Words 7. Whither Metaphysics? Appendix: The Distinction Between Using an Expression and Mentioning It

21. Deleuze: Something Completely Different

1. Introduction 2. A Third (Themed) Retrospective

(a) Deleuze’s Three Great Heroes: Bergson, Nietzsche, Spinoza (b) Hegel (c) Leibniz (d) Hume (e) Kant (f) Heidegger

3. Difference 4. The Execution of the Project. Sense 5. The Dogmatic Image of Thought

(a) Representation (b) Common Sense and Good Sense (c) Clarity and Distinctness (d) Four Assumptions

6. The Nature of Problems, The Nature of Concepts, and the Nature of Philosophy; or, Metaphysics as the Creation of Concepts 7. Three Answers

(a) The Transcendence Question (b) The Creativity Question (c) The Novelty Question

Conclusion 1. Varieties of Sense-Making 2. History 3. The Wittgenstein Question

(a) Consent (b) Dissent

An Interlude on Vagueness

4. Creation and Innovation in Metaphysics 5. Metaphysics as a Humanistic Discipline

Bibliography Index

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