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Index
Copyright
Table of Contents
Foreword by Jacob G. Hornberger
Introduction
Early 1961: The Bay of Pigs Provides a Rocky Beginning for the Kennedy Administration, and a Tough Lesson — Be Careful About Whom You Trust
The Inaugural Address
The Bay of Pigs Fiasco and the “Lessons Learned”
1961: Laos and Berlin Dominate the Foreign Policy Stage Following the Bay of Pigs
JFK Receives Bad Advice on Laos from the Joint Chiefs of Staff
JFK Lectures the Joint Chiefs of Staff About Their Poor Performance
The Berlin Crisis Tests JFK’s Resolve as “Leader of the Free World” and JFK’s Response Reveals That He Was No Appeaser, and No Weakling — Nor Was He Reckless or Foolhardy
1961: President Kennedy Rejects Both Nuclear War, and Combat Troops in Vietnam
Air Force Chief of Staff Curtis LeMay Expresses Disloyalty to President Kennedy and Publicly Proclaims His Belief in the Inevitability of Nuclear War Before the End of 1961
The Joint Chiefs Lecture President Kennedy on the Favorable Opportunity for a Pre-Emptive First Strike — “Preventive War” — Against the Soviet Union; In Disgust, JFK Walks Out of the Meeting
JFK Rejects Three Attempts by the National Security Establishment to Introduce Combat Troops to Vietnam During 1961
JFK Shakes Things Up in the Executive Branch with the “Thanksgiving Day Massacre”
Summary of 1961: A Very Stressful Year for the 35th President
Early 1962: Cuba — To Invade, or Not To Invade?
The Situation at Year’s End, 1961
General Lansdale (Operations Officer for “Mongoose”) Conspires with the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Invent Pretexts for a U.S. Invasion of Cuba
The “Northwoods” File Is Discovered and Released by the ARRB’s Military Records Team
Timeline of Key “Northwoods” Activity
So, What Is the Significance of the Northwoods Documents?
1962: An Overview of the Cuban Missile Crisis
Khrushchev’s Risky and Dangerous Gamble: Operation Anadyr
The Cuban Missile Crisis: An Overview of the “Thirteen Days”
Dangerous Miscalculations During the Cuban Missile Crisis
1962: An Unbridgeable Gulf Opens Up Between JFK and the Pentagon Over His Resolution to the Cuban Missile Crisis
JFK’s Meeting With the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Friday, November 19th, 1962
President Kennedy Meets With the Joint Chiefs of Staff After the Cuban Missile Crisis to Thank Them for Their Support, and Instead of an Exchange of Mutual Respect, He Is Harshly Rebuffed, and Insulted
JFK Reads Seven Days in May in 1962 Before the Missile Crisis, and Says “It Could Happen — But It Won’t Happen on My Watch”
The National Security Establishment Needed Lyndon B. Johnson and J. Edgar Hoover on Its Side to Succeed with the Coup; LBJ and Hoover Enthusiastically Cooperated with the Regime Change Operation in 1963, and Were Its Principal Beneficiaries
“Seven Days in May:” the Document
“Seven Days in May:” The Emissary
Jackie Kennedy Confirms the National Security Coup (Indirectly) to Anastas Mikoyan at JFK’s Funeral
1963: JFK’s Quest for Peace
Operation Mongoose Is Disestablished, and JFK Forms an Ad Hoc Committee to Determine a New Policy Toward Cuba, in the Wake of the Missile Crisis
JFK’s Decision to Disengage from Vietnam Is Announced to the Pentagon and the CIA in May of 1963
The “Peace Speech” at American University
The Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
JFK Again Rejects the Concept of a Nuclear First Strike on the Soviet Union
President Kennedy Proposes Abandoning the Race to the Moon, and Going There Together with the Soviet Union
President Kennedy’s Secret Attempt at a Rapprochement with Castro’s Cuba
Three Powerful Films Are Made in 1963: One of Them Embodies JFK’s Critical and Skeptical Attitudes Toward the Military Leadership in the Pentagon; and the Other Two Mirror His Overriding Concern with the Dangers of Nuclear War (Either by Miscalculation, or Design)
Conclusion — An Overview of What Happened in November of 1963
Epilogue
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