Cambridge Military Histories: Hitler’s Fatal Miscalculation by Schmider, Klaus H. -- Read -- Imperial Library of Trantor

Index

Coverpage Half title Series page Title page Imprints page Epigraph Contents Figures Maps Preface Acknowledgements Abbreviations and German and Russian Terms Introduction 1 Hitler’s Pre-War Assessment of the United States and Japan

1.1 United States

1.1.1 First Impressions (1918–1923) 1.1.2 Reading Matter 1.1.3 Public and Private Statements, Mein Kampf and the Second Book, 1924–1933 1.1.4 Input from Individuals with Access to Hitler

1.2 Japan

1.2.1 First Impressions (1904–1920) 1.2.2 Reading Matter 1.2.3 Public and Private Statements, Mein Kampf and the Second Book 1.2.4 Input from Individuals with Access to Hitler173

1.3 Conclusion

2 Hitler’s Physical Health in Autumn 1941

2.1 General Health 2.2 Heart Condition 2.3 Parkinson’s Disease

3 ‘All Measures Short of War’: the German Assessment of American Strategy, 1940–1941

3.1 Introduction 3.2 The Deterioration and Collapse of Pre-War Relations 3.3 From Cash-and-Carry to Lend-Lease (September 1939–March 1941) 3.4 Inching towards War: April–December 1941 3.5 Conclusion

4 Forging an Unlikely Alliance: Germany and Japan, 1933–1941

4.1 Introduction 4.2 From Hitler’s Rise to Power to the Tripartite Pact

4.2.1 The Japanese System of Government in the Run-up to Pearl Harbor

4.3 The Inscrutable Allies: Early Problems of the German–Japanese Alliance (October 1940–June 1941) 4.4 The Road to War (July–December 1941) 4.5 Conclusion

5 Facing the Same Dilemma: the US and German Quest for Rubber

5.1 Introduction 5.2 The Role of Rubber in the Second Industrial Revolution and the Role of the Plantation System 5.3 The German Quest for Autarky 5.4 The US Quest for Autarky 5.5 The American Attempts to Close the Rubber Gap as Seen through German Eyes: A Window of Opportunity? 5.6 Southeast Asia as Seen from the Berghof 5.7 Beyond Pearl Harbor 5.8 Conclusion

6 The Crisis of the German War Economy, 1940–1941

6.1 Introduction 6.2 The Burden of Shifting Priorities: September 1939–June 1941 6.3 The Growing Gap between Means and Ends: May 1941–January 1942 6.4 Conclusion

7 The End of Blitzkrieg? Barbarossa and the Impact of Lend-Lease

7.1 Introduction 7.2 Winning Oneself to Death: the Progress of Barbarossa, June–October 1941 7.3 ‘By Mid-December, Winter Calm Will Have Descended on the East’: the Final Phase of Barbarossa, November–December 1941

7.3.1 Heeresgruppe Nord: Sealing off Leningrad 7.3.2 Crisis at Rostov: Heeresgruppe Süd, November–December 1941 7.3.3 Heresgruppe Mitte: the Continuation of Taifun 7.3.4 Conclusion: Operation Barbarossa

7.4 The German Assessment of Lend-Lease Aid

7.4.1 Conclusion: Lend-Lease

8 The Battle of the Atlantic

8.1 Introduction 8.2 The Kriegsmarine’s War on British Commerce until July 1941 8.3 Between a Rock and a Hard Place: the Decline in Sinkings, July–December 1941 8.4 A Time for Reflection? The Late Autumn Impasse 8.5 Conclusion

9 The Luftwaffe on the Eve of Global War

9.1 Introduction 9.2 The Early Luftwaffe: Perception and Reality 9.3 Home Defence 9.4 The Shift to the South 9.5 New Aircraft Designs 9.6 Conclusion

10 The Holocaust

10.1 Introduction 10.2 Early Attempts at Demographic Engineering, 1939–1940 10.3 The Evolution of Genocide: the War in Russia, June–September 1941 10.4 Sketching Out Plans for Genocide, September–December 1941 10.5 Conclusion

Conclusion Bibliography

Archival sources Published primary sources Secondary sources Internet sources

Index

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