Order within Anarchy · The Laws of War as an International Institution by Morrow, James D. -- Read -- Imperial Library of Trantor

Index

Half title page Title page Copyright page Contents List of Tables List of Figures Acknowledgments 1 Introduction

Law Fosters Strategic Expectations Self-Enforcing Institutions and International Law Institutions and Norms in International Relations Theory and International Law

The Game-Theoretic Critique of Realism and Constructivism

Realism, Idealism, and International Law Law as an Institutional Equilibrium The Essential Social Nature of Game Theory The Plan of the Book

2 Common Conjectures, Norms, and Identities

Strategic Expectations and Common Conjectures Social Facts: Norms, Identities, and Justifications Common Conjectures in Iterated Prisoners’ Dilemma

Elaborations of Iterated Prisoners’ Dilemma Reciprocity, Common Conjectures, and Norms

Identities and Common Conjectures Communication and Common Conjectures Identities and Interests versus Preferences Common Conjectures and Law

3 The Laws of War in Their Strategic Context

The Laws of War Problems Facing the Laws of War at the State Level

Deliberation Violation as State Policy Opportunistic Defection Self-Interested Interpretation of the Rules

Problems Facing the Laws of War at the Individual Level: Agency and Noise

Violations by Individuals Inadvertent Violations Perfidy

Three Strategic Problems Facing an Effective System of Law of War

On the Battlefield Military Discipline State-to-State Compliance Fusing the Models into One Screening through Ratification Firewalls Elements of the Laws of War Not in the Model: Drawing “Bright Lines”

Issues in the Laws of War from the Perspective of the Model Summary of Testable Hypotheses from the Model

3′ Modeling Minutia

The Three Models

On the Battlefield Military Discipline State-to-State Deterrence

Violations and Compliance across the Three Models

Screening through Ratification

4 Patterns of Compliance with the Laws of War during the Twentieth Century

Factors that Might Affect Compliance and Reciprocity

Legal Obligation Regime Type Different Issues Relative Power

A Brief Description of the Data The Correlation of Compliance

Ratification Status and Regime Type State versus Individual Violations Legal Clarity Differences across Issues Other Variables Comparisons across Variables

Explaining the Patterns

Analysis of Outlying and Discordant Cases

Searching for Firewalls Timing of First Violations

Cases of First Use Late in a War Cases of Early First Use

Conclusion

4′ Statistical Gore

The Data Collection

Clarifications of What Acts Are Violations Coding Decisions for Specific Issue Areas

Measuring Compliance Measures of Independent Variables

Treaty Status of Both States in Question Power Relationship Other Independent Variables

Estimation Issues When Do States Comply?

Declaration of War The Main Analyses

Multivariate Analysis of Reciprocity and Total Compliance Searching for Firewalls with Numbers Duration Analysis of First Violations Dry Holes

5 Spoilt Darlings? Treatment of Prisoners of War during the World Wars

The POW Treaties and the Obligations They Impose The Strategic Logic of Prisoners of War

The Logic of the Battlefield After Capture and before Imprisonment Treatment while a Prisoner

POWs in World War I

Death Rates and Treatment in POW Camps On the Battlefield

POWs in World War II

Death Rates in Camps

The War between Germany and the Western Allies

At the State Level and in the Camps On the Battlefield

The Eastern Front

Between Totalitarian Governments In the Camps On the Battlefield

The War in the Pacific: No Game of Cricket

Between the Warring Parties On the Battlefield

After the Shooting Stopped An Alternative Explanation: Culture Testing the Conclusions of the Model with the Cases

6 Assessing Variation across Issues: Aerial Bombing, Chemical Weapons, Treatment of Civilians, and Conduct on the High Seas

Chemical Weapons Aerial Bombing Conduct on the High Seas Treatment of Civilians Other Explanations Conclusion

7 Dynamics of Common Conjectures: The Rational Evolution of Norms

The Sources and Ways of Change in Norms According to Constructivists The Sources of Common Conjectures What Is Evolutionary Game Theory? The Dynamics of Conventions Rational Evolution of Political Institutions The Evolution of How Prisoners of War Should Be Treated

8 Conclusion: Current Issues and Policy Insights

Does the Present Look Like the Past? Challenges for the Laws of War in the Twenty-First Century Terrorism and the Control of Violence: The Criminal Model versus the Combat Model

The Criminal Model The Combat Model Terrorism: The Gray Space between Criminality and Combat

The Perils of Universalism and Unilateralism The Limits of International Law Power and Legitimacy

References Index

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