A Critical Introduction to Knowledge-How by Carter, J. Adam -- Read -- Imperial Library of Trantor

Index

Cover Half-Title Series Title Contents Acknowledgements 1 A brief history of knowledge-how

1.1 Plato and Aristotle on knowledge-how 1.1.1 Plato on knowledge and skill 1.1.2 Aristotle on knowledge and skill 1.1.3 Taking stock 1.2 Ryle’s anti-intellectualism 1.2.1 Ryle’s target 1.2.2 First regress Problems with premise (1) Can The Concept of Mind regress be saved? 1.2.3 Second regress The argument Lines of resistance 1.3 Ryle’s legacy 1.4 Further reading 1.5 Study questions

2 The case for intellectualism

2.1 Introduction 2.2 Linguistic arguments for intellectualism 2.2.1 The development of formal semantics 2.2.2 Stanley’s master argument Defence of 1 Defence of 2 Defence of 3: Karttunen’s semantics 2.3 The non-linguistic case for intellectualism 2.3.1 The negative case Against the anti-intellectualist’s necessity condition Against the anti-intellectualist’s sufficiency condition 2.3.2 The positive case Snowdon’s ‘substantive’ knowledge argument Intellectualist arguments from cognitive science Non-propositional intellectualism Objectualist intellectualism: Further issues 2.4 Hetherington’s reductivism 2.5 Conclusion 2.6 Further reading 2.7 Study questions

3 Knowledge-how and epistemic luck

3.1 Introduction 3.2 Propositional knowledge and epistemic luck 3.3 The argument from intervening epistemic luck 3.4 Stanley’s replies 3.4.1 First reply 3.4.2 Second reply 3.5 Rejoinders to Stanley 3.5.1 In defence of (P2) 3.5.2 In defence of Lucky Light Bulb 3.6 Environmental epistemic luck 3.7 Concluding remarks 3.8 Further reading 3.9 Study questions

4 Knowledge-how and cognitive achievement

4.1 Introduction 4.2 Propositional knowledge as cognitive achievement: The case for 4.3 Propositional knowledge as cognitive achievement: The case against 4.3.1 Knowledge without achievement 4.3.2 Achievement without knowledge 4.3.3 The upshot 4.4 The anti-intellectualist argument from cognitive achievement 4.4.1 Step 1 4.4.2 Step 2 4.5 Objections and replies 4.5.1 Objections to the negative argument Practical modes of presentation Finks Littlejohn’s argument 4.5.2 Objections to the positive argument 4.6 Concluding remarks 4.7 Further reading 4.8 Study questions

5 Knowledge-how and testimony

5.1 Intellectualism 5.1.1 Kinds of knowledge how-to 5.1.2 Intellectualism about practical knowledge 5.2 Knowledge transfer 5.2.1 Testimony and knowledge 5.2.2 The problem Good Bad 5.2.3 Knowledge-wh and testimonial transfer Questionable Questionableʹ Spurious 5.3 De se knowledge 5.3.1 Stanley’s account 5.3.2 Is practical knowledge de se knowledge? Three problems De se knowledge, practical knowledge, and dispositions The impossibility of shared de se knowledge The possibility of group know-how 5.3.3 Summary 5.4 Concluding remarks 5.5 Further reading 5.6 Study questions

6 Knowledge-how and knowledge of language

6.1 What is linguistic competence? 6.2 Is linguistic competence knowledge? 6.2.1 Dummett’s arguments Dummett’s first argument Dummett’s second argument 6.2.2 Heck’s argument 6.3 Linguistic competence and the use theory of meaning 6.3.1 A brief primer on the use theory of meaning 6.3.2 Implicit knowledge 6.3.3 The language faculty 6.3.4 Problems with the use theory The core motivation for the use theory is dubious The notion of implicit knowledge is unclear The use theory does not permit a distinction between competent and incompetent use The use theory doesn’t account for language learning 6.4 Conclusion 6.5 Further reading 6.6 Study questions

7 Knowledge-how: Normativity and epistemic value

7.1 Introduction 7.2 Propositional knowledge, knowledge-how and assertion 7.2.1 KNA-N and knowledge-how Moore-paradoxical assertions Challenged assertion: How do you know (how)? 7.2.2 KNA-S and knowledge-how 7.3 The epistemic value of propositional knowledge 7.3.1 Swamping knowledge-how 7.3.2 Argument from transmission 7.3.3 Argument from achievement 7.4 Conclusion 7.5 Further reading 7.6 Study questions

8 Knowledge-how: Future directions

Introduction 8.1 Knowledge-how, internalism and skill 8.1.1 The Gettier problem and internalism/externalism debate 8.1.2 Internalism and skilful action 8.2 Knowledge-how and active externalism 8.2.1 Knowledge-how and extended cognition The bounds of cognition Extended knowledge-how? 8.2.2 Collective epistemology, distributed cognition and group know-how 8.3 Conclusion 8.4 Further reading 8.5 Study questions

Notes Bibliography Index Copyright