Contemporary Epistemology, 1, An Anthology by Ernest Sosa -- Read -- Imperial Library of Trantor

Index

Cover Table of Contents Preface Part I: The Ethics of Belief

1 Deontological Desiderata

i. Preliminaries ii. Basic Voluntary Control of Believing iii. Other Modes of Voluntary Control of Believing iv. Indirect Voluntary Influence on Believing References

2 Voluntary Belief and Epistemic Evaluation

I. Introduction II. Voluntarism About Belief III. Ought and Can IV. Is This Epistemic Deontologism?

Part II: Practical Reasons for Belief?

3 The Wrong Kind of Reason

Reasons as Considerations in Relation Counting in Favor of Attitudes An Alternative Account Sorting Reasons: Content‐ and Attitude‐related Sorting Reasons: Constitutive and Extrinsic The Scope of the Constitutive/Extrinsic Distinction Constitutive Reasons and Justification The Current Discussion Conclusion

4 No Exception for Belief

Introduction 1. Equal Treatment 2. Comparing Equal Treatment and Evidentialism 3. Comparing Equal Treatment and Different Sense 4. Doxastic Involuntarism and Equal Treatment 5. Taking the Agent’s Perspective into Account 6. Other Objections and Replies 7. The Argument from the Basis of Belief 8. The Argument from Transparency 9. Equal Treatment and Skepticism 10. Conclusion References

5 Promising Against the Evidence

I The Evidentialist View II Sincerity, Rationality, and Responsibility III Epistemic Evasion IV Rational Belief Against the Evidence V Rational Trust Against the Evidence VI The Case of Professor Procrastinate VII Conclusion

Part III: Reliance

6 Evidentialism and Pragmatic Constraints on Outright Belief

1 Introduction 2 Arguments Against Evidentialism 3 The Bayesian Evidentialist Reply 4 Pragmatic Constraints on Outright Belief 5 The Renewed Case Against Conventional Evidentialism References

7 Alief and Belief

I Introducing Alief II Alief and Other Attitudes III Automaticity IV Alief, Persuasion, and Habit

8 Can It Be Rational to Have Faith?1

I. Introduction II. Preliminaries III. Going Beyond the Evidence: Three Views IV. Faith and Examining Further Evidence V. Epistemic and Practical Rationality VI. Practical Rationality and Evidence‐gathering VII. Commitment and Interpersonal Cost VIII. The Costs of Postponement IX. Risk Aversion and the Possibility of Misleading Evidence X. Conclusion Works Cited

9 Assertion and Practical Reasoning

1. Introduction 2. Epistemic Norms for Assertion and Practical Reasoning 3. Aims and Constraints 4. The Instance Argument 5. The Inheritance Argument 6. The Function of Assertion in Licensing Action 7. Conclusion References

Part IV: Epistemic Dysfunctions

10 Testimonial Injustice

2.2 Testimonial Injustice Without Prejudice? 2.3 The Wrong of Testimonial Injustice

11 Cognitive Penetrability and Perceptual Justification

1. What Is Cognitive Penetrability? 2. Dogmatism 3. Some Cases of Cognitively Penetrated Experiences 4. The Challenge for Dogmatism 4.2 Is There a Defeater? 4.3 Other Potential Evidential Defeaters in the Problematic Cases 5. How the Challenge Generalizes

Part V: Virtue Epistemology

12 The Search for the Source of Epistemic Good

1. What Makes Knowledge Better Than True Belief? 2. The Value of True Belief 3. Knowledge, Motives, and Eudaimonia 4. Conclusion References

13 Why We Don’t Deserve Credit for Everything We Know

1 Introductory Remarks 2 Credit 3 Knowing Without Deserving Credit 4 Diagnosis References

14 A (Different) Virtue Epistemology

1. The Genus‐Species Claim 2. A Theory of Knowledge? 3. Some Options for Understanding the Attribution Relation 4. A Different Proposal: The Attribution Relation Is Pragmatic 5. What Sort of Ability Is Required for Knowledge? 6. Barn Façades and Lottery Propositions 7. A Neo‐Moorean Response to Skepticism

15 Knowledge and Justification

A. Knowledge B. Justification: The Thinker With an Envatted Brain C. Skepticism Further Reading

Part VI: Disagreement

16 Epistemology of Disagreement:The Good News

1. Why Not Live and Let Live? 2. Some Simple Cases 3. Explaining Disagreements and Adjusting Beliefs 4. Some Tests and Clarifications 5. Disagreement and Asymmetries of Justification 6. Relaxing the Conditions 7. Qualitative Belief and the Threat of Skepticism References

17 The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement

1. Introduction 2. Some Preliminary Distinctions 3. No Agreeing to Disagree? 4. The Appeal to Symmetry 5. Rationality and Merely Possible Disagreement 6. The Views of One’s Peers as Higher‐order Evidence 7. Actual Disagreement Reconsidered 8. Conclusion: Epistemic Egoism Without Apology References

Part VII: Permissivism About Belief ?

18 Epistemic Permissiveness

1. Examples and Motivations for Permissive Epistemology 2. Objections to Extreme Permissivism 3. Alternative Permissible Standards? 4. Moderate Permissivism and Practical Deliberation 5. Responsiveness to New Evidence 6. Rationality and First‐person Deliberation 7. Conclusion References

19 Permission to Believe: Why Permissivism Is True and What It Tells Us About Irrelevant Influences on Belief

1. Introduction 2. Permissivism (Defense of P1) 3. How Permissivism Bears on Irrelevant Factor Cases (Defense of P2) 4. A Problem 5. Disagreement 6. Conclusion References

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