On the Resurrection of the Dead by Turner-Jr., James T. -- Read -- Imperial Library of Trantor

Index

Cover Title Copyright Dedication Contents Foreword Acknowledgments Introduction

I Setting the scene II Theological affirmations

III Chapter breakdown

1 On the horns of a dilemma

A theological problem I How did we get here?

2 Physicalism and resurrection hope

Introduction

A very brief excursus on Locke’s Axiom (LA)

I The Simulacrum Thesis II The Falling Elevator Model III Anti-criterialism IV Wrapping up

3 Lynne Baker’s constitution metaphysics

Introduction I Primary kinds and constitution II Numerical identity and a false analogy III No working definition (CP1) IV Too many persons or no human persons at all (CP2) V There are no essential differences between divine and human persons (CP3) VI Baker and resurrection Conclusion

4 Hylemorphism and disembodied souls

Introduction I Hylemorphism II A word about the human soul as form III Material substantial forms and immaterial substantial forms IV Addressing the trilemma: horns (a), (b), and (c)

IV.1 Horn (c): human souls are not “metaphysical amphibians” IV.2 Horns (a) and (b)

V Concluding thoughts

5 Eschatological Presentism: A model of immediate eschatological resurrection

Introduction I A quick summary: theories of time II Theology and temporal topology: a new theory

II.1 Why not four-dimensionalism or presentism? II.2 Compound presentism II.3 Eschatological Presentism (EP) II.4 A theological problem?

III Summary

6 Hylemorphism and Eschatological Presentism: on the resurrection of the dead

Introduction I Body Identity Physicalism (BIP) and Eschatological Presentism II Hylemorphism and Eschatological Presentism III Conclusion

Bibliography Index