The Metaphysics of Identity by Gallois, André -- Read -- Imperial Library of Trantor

Index

Cover Title Copyright Contents 1 Introduction

1.1. Topic of the book: Problems of persistence 1.2. Three views about persistence 1.3. Conventionalism about identity 1.4. Relative identity 1.5. Leibniz’s Law (the indiscernibility of identicals) 1.6. A perdurantist solution to identity puzzles 1.7. Criteria of identity 1.8. Outline of book Further reading

2 Historical background

2.1. The Ancient Greeks on the problems of change and persistence, from the Presocratics to Aristotle 2.2. The Stoics and Academic skeptics 2.3. The medievals 2.4. Early modern philosophers 2.5. Locke on material object and personal identity 2.6. Locke’s critics: Butler and Reid 2.7. Hume on our belief in persistence Summary Further reading

3 The puzzles of persistence

3.1. Leibniz’s Law

3.1.1. Leibniz’s Law, the identity of indescernibles, and substitutivity

3.2. Restricting Leibniz’s Law

3.2.1. To time-restricted properties 3.2.2. To world-restricted (modal) properties

3.3. Leibniz’s Law arguments 3.4. A common pattern

3.4.1. The temporal version 3.4.2. The modal version

3.5. The 1001 cats 3.6. An alternative diagnosis 3.7. Options for solving the puzzle cases 3.8. Personal identity Summary Further reading

4 Endurantist solutions to the puzzle cases: Part 1

4.1. Constitution and identity 4.2. Defining constitution

4.2.1. Baker’s definition 4.2.2. An objection to Baker

4.3. Alternative definitions of constitution

4.3.1. Simons and Doepke 4.3.2. Judith Jarvis Thomson

4.4. Does constitution help? 4.5. Objections to constitution

4.5.1. Too many minds 4.5.2. Objections from grounding and causation

4.6. Shared parts 4.7. One thinger views

4.7.1. Burke on dominant sortals 4.7.2. Van Inwagen on arbitrary undetached parts 4.7.3. Chisholm on identity strict and loose

Summary Further reading

5 Endurantist solutions to the puzzle cases: Part 2

5.1. Relative identity

5.1.1. What it is 5.1.2. How much does it help with the puzzle cases? 5.1.3. Relative identity and Leibniz’s Law

5.2. Indeterminate identity

5.2.1. Appealing to indeterminacy 5.2.2. Evans’ argument

5.3. Closest continuer theory

5.3.1. The closest continuer theory and the necessity of identity 5.3.2. The modal argument: How cogent is it?

5.4. Temporary and contingent identity

5.4.1. Gibbard’s view 5.4.2. An alternative account 5.4.3. Mereological nihilism

Summary Further reading

6 A four-dimensional world

6.1. Four-dimensionalism

6.1.1. Four-dimensionalism and some theses about time 6.1.2. The perdurantist solution

6.2. Three arguments for four-dimensionalism

6.2.1. Temporary intrinsics 6.2.2. Constructing perdurants: Humean supervenience 6.2.3. Vagueness: Sider’s argument 6.2.4. Exotica 6.2.5. Della Rocca’s objection to endurantism

6.3. Arguments against four-dimensionalism

6.3.1. Geach and Thomson 6.3.2. The no real change objection 6.3.3. Could a perdurer have lasted for a different time? 6.3.4. Supervenience revisited 6.3.5. Sattig’s argument

6.4. The stage view 6.5. Are perdurantism and endurantism equivalent? 6.6. Is the dispute ill defined? Summary Further reading

7 Identity criteria, conventionalism, and the problem of change

7.1. Identity criteria

7.1.1. Identity criteria: What they are and what they are not 7.1.2. Are there any?

7.2. Conventionalism

7.2.1. Why conventionalism? 7.2.2. Conventionalism and four-dimensionalism

7.3. Hirsch’s view 7.4. Heller’s conventionalism 7.5. Restricting Leibniz’s Law

7.5.1. Myro’s proposal 7.5.2. Baxter’s proposal

7.6. Is there a problem of change? Summary Further reading

Glossary Bibliography Index

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