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Imperial Library
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Index
Contents
Title Page
Copyright
Why is it called “game theory”?
Working with models
“It’s a draw.”
Dealing with complexity: art and science
Rationality
Keynes’ Beauty Contest
Thaler’s Guessing Game
Problems with rationality and common knowledge of rationality
Booms and crashes: applying rationality to financial markets
Simultaneous-move games
Strategic form of the game
Payoffs
Nash equilibrium
Prisoners’ Dilemma
Pareto efficiency
Network engineering
The tragedy of the commons
Nuclear build-up
Cooperation
Education
Environmental policy and cooperation
Multiplicity of equilibria
Multiplicity of equilibria: Battle of the Sexes
Social norms
Coordination devices
Banking and expectations: bank runs
Mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium
The Currency Speculation Game
The Chicken Game
The Exit Game
Criticism and defence of mixed strategies
Tax evasion
Repeated interaction
At the end of the game
What if there is no definite last stage?
Prisoners’ Dilemma experiment
Evolutionary game theory
Hawk-Dove Game
The Hawk-Dove Game with small cost of conflict
The Hawk-Dove Game with large cost of conflict
Evolutionary stability as an equilibrium refinement
Sequential-move games
A dynamic Battle of Sexes Game
The extensive form of the game
Subgame perfection
Non-credible threats
Credit markets
Microcredit
Nuclear deterrence
Information problems
Asymmetric information
Asymmetric information and unemployment
More on asymmetric information
Signalling product quality
Warranties as a signalling device
Advertising as a signalling device
Religious ritual as a signalling device
Decision making in groups
Where we’ve come from …
… and where to go from here
About the Authors
Index
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