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Index
VOLUME ONE
INTRODUCTION by Samuel Scheffler PREFACE SUMMARY
PART ONE REASONS
1   NORMATIVE CONCEPTS 1 Normative Reasons 2 Reason-Involving Goodness 2   OBJECTIVE THEORIES 3 Two Kinds of Theory 4 Responding to Reasons 5 State-Given Reasons 6 Hedonic Reasons 7 Irrational Preferences 3   SUBJECTIVE THEORIES 8 Subjectivism about Reasons 9 Why People Accept Subjective Theories 10 Analytical Subjectivism 11 The Agony Argument 4   FURTHER ARGUMENTS 12 The All or None Argument 13 The Incoherence Argument 14 Reasons, Motives, and Well-Being 15 Arguments for Subjectivism 5   RATIONALITY 16 Practical and Epistemic Rationality 17 Beliefs about Reasons 18 Other Views about Rationality 6   MORALITY 19 Sidgwick’s Dualism 20 The Profoundest Problem 7   MORAL CONCEPTS 21 Acting in Ignorance or with False Beliefs 22 Other Kinds of Wrongness
PART TWO PRINCIPLES
8   POSSIBLE CONSENT 23 Coercion and Deception 24 The Consent Principle 25 Reasons to Give Consent 26 A Superfluous Principle? 27 Actual Consent 28 Deontic Beliefs 29 Extreme Demands 9   MERELY AS A MEANS 30 The Mere Means Principle 31 As a Means and Merely as a Means 32 Harming as a Means 10   RESPECT AND VALUE 33 Respect for Persons 34 Two Kinds of Value 35 Kantian Dignity 36 The Right and the Good 37 Promoting the Good 11   FREE WILL AND DESERT 38 The Freedom that Morality Requires 39 Why We Cannot Deserve to Suffer
PART THREE THEORIES
12   UNIVERSAL LAWS 40 The Impossibility Formula 41 The Law of Nature and Moral Belief Formulas 42 The Agent’s Maxim 13   WHAT IF EVERYONE DID THAT? 43 Each-We Dilemmas 44 The Threshold Objection 45 The Ideal World Objections 14   IMPARTIALITY 46 The Golden Rule 47 The Rarity and High Stakes Objections 48 The Non-Reversibility Objection 49 A Kantian Solution 15   CONTRACTUALISM 50 The Rational Agreement Formula 51 Rawlsian Contractualism 52 Kantian Contractualism 53 Scanlonian Contractualism 54 The Deontic Beliefs Restriction 16   CONSEQUENTIALISM 55 Consequentialist Theories 56 Consequentialist Maxims 57 The Kantian Argument 58 Self-Interested Reasons 59 Altruistic and Deontic Reasons 60 The Wrong-Making Features Objection 61 Decisive Non-Deontic Reasons 62 What Everyone Could Rationally Will 17   CONCLUSIONS 63 Kantian Consequentialism 64 Climbing the Mountain APPENDICES A STATE-GIVEN REASONS B RATIONAL IRRATIONALITY AND GAUTHIER’S THEORY C DEONTIC REASONS Notes to Volume One References Bibliography Index
PREFACE SUMMARY
VOLUME TWO PART FOUR COMMENTARIES HIKING THE RANGE SUSAN WOLF HUMANITY AS END IN ITSELF ALLEN WOOD A MISMATCH OF METHODS BARBARA HERMAN HOW I AM NOT A KANTIAN T. M. SCANLON PART FIVE RESPONSES 18   ON HIKING THE RANGE 65 Actual and Possible Consent 66 Treating Someone Merely as a Means 67 Kantian Rule Consequentialism 68 Three Traditions 19   ON HUMANITY AS AN END IN ITSELF 69 Kant’s Formulas of Autonomy and of Universal Law 70 Rational Nature as the Supreme Value 71 Rational Nature as the Value to be Respected 20   ON A MISMATCH OF METHODS 72 Does Kant’s Formula Need to be Revised? 73 A New Kantian Formula 74 Herman’s Objections to Kantian Contractualism 21   HOW THE NUMBERS COUNT 75 Scanlon’s Individualist Restriction 76 Utilitarianism, Aggregation, and Distributive Principles 22   SCANLONIAN CONTRACTUALISM 77 Scanlon’s Claims about Wrongness and the Impersonalist Restriction 78 The Non-Identity Problem 79 Scanlonian Contractualism and Future People 23   THE TRIPLE THEORY 80 The Convergence Argument 81 The Independence of Scanlon’s Theory PART SIX NORMATIVITY 24   ANALYTICAL NATURALISM AND SUBJECTIVISM 82 Conflicting Theories 83 Analytical Subjectivism about Reasons 84 The Unimportance of Internal Reasons 85 Substantive Subjective Theories 86 Normative Beliefs 25   NON-ANALYTICAL NATURALISM 87 Moral Naturalism 88 Normative Natural Facts 89 Arguments from ‘Is’ to ‘Ought’ 90 Thick-Concept Arguments 91 The Normativity Objection 26   THE TRIVIALITY OBJECTION 92 Normative Concepts and Natural Properties 93 The Analogies with Scientific Discoveries 94 The Fact Stating Argument 95 The Triviality Objection 27   NATURALISM AND NIHILISM 96 Naturalism about Reasons 97 Soft Naturalism 98 Hard Naturalism 28   NON-COGNITIVISM AND QUASI-REALISM 99 Non-Cognitivism 100 Normative Disagreements 101 Can Non-Cognitivists Explain Normative Mistakes? 29   NORMATIVITY AND TRUTH 102 Expressivism 103 Hare on What Matters 104 The Normativity Argument 30   NORMATIVE TRUTHS 105 Disagreements 106 On How We Should Live 107 Misunderstandings 108 Naturalized Normativity 109 Sidgwick’s Intuitions 110 The Voyage Ahead 111 Rediscovering Reasons 31 METAPHYSICS 112 Ontology 113 Non-Metaphysical Cognitivism 32   EPISTEMOLOGY 114 The Causal Objection 115 The Validity Argument 116 Epistemic Beliefs 33   RATIONALISM 117 Epistemic Reasons 118 Practical Reasons 119 Evolutionary Forces 34   AGREEMENT 120 The Argument from Disagreement 121 The Convergence Claim 122 The Double Badness of Suffering 35   NIETZSCHE 123 Revaluing Values 124 Good and Evil 125 The Meaning of Life 36   WHAT MATTERS MOST 126 Has It All Been Worth It? 127 The Future APPENDICES D   WHY ANYTHING? WHY THIS? E   THE FAIR WARNING VIEW F   SOME OF KANT’S ARGUMENTS FOR HIS FORMULA OF UNIVERSAL LAW G   KANT’S CLAIMS ABOUT THE GOOD H   AUTONOMY AND CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVES I   KANT’S MOTIVATIONAL ARGUMENT J   ON WHAT THERE IS Notes to Volume Two References Bibliography Index
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