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Index
Coverpage
Half title
Series page
Title page
Imprints page
Contents
Tables
Figures
Acknowledgments
1 Introduction
Part I State of the Debate
2 An Economic Case for Free Immigration
2.1 The Case Based on Comparative Advantage
2.2 The Case from Location-Specific Productivity
2.3 The Size of the Global Income Gains from Free Immigration
2.4 Negative Economic Consequences in Destination Countries?
2.5 Conclusion: The Challenge and Research Agenda
3 The New Economic Case for Immigration Restrictions
3.1 Theories
3.2 Immigrant Self-selection Could Exaggerate the Negative Effect on Growth Institutions
3.3 Immigration Could Undermine the Deep Roots of Economic Development
3.4 Reservations about the New Case for Immigration Restrictions
3.5 Conclusion
4 Immigration’s Impact on Productivity
4.1 How Immigration Affects Productivity
4.1.1 Immigration’s Impact on Productivity and Economic Growth
4.1.2 Highly Skilled Immigrants
4.1.3 Low-Skilled Immigrants
4.1.4 Immigrants from Many Different Countries Increase Productivity
4.1.5 Historical Evidence of Immigrants Increasing Productivity
4.1.6 Immigrants Have a Net-Positive Effect on Productivity: Addressing the Counterarguments
4.2 How Immigrants Affect Productivity: Testing the Epidemiological Model
4.3 Quasi-Natural Experimental Evidence from Poland
4.4 Conclusion
Part II Cross-country Evidence
5 Immigration’s Impact on Economic Institutions
5.1 Cross-country Data and Methodology
5.2 Cross-country Results
5.3 Immigration to the United States and State-Level Economic Freedom
5.4 Conclusion
6 Immigration’s Impact on Corruption
6.1 Data and Methodology
6.2.1 Immigration and Corruption: Basic Results
6.2.2 Are Destinations with Relatively “Good” Institutions Harmed the Most?
6.2.3 Do Immigrants from Poorer Countries Transmit More Corruption?
6.3 Robustness Checks
6.4 The Mariel Boatlift and Corruption: A Case Study
6.5 Conclusion
7 Immigration’s Impact on Terrorism
7.1 Introduction
7.1.1 Measuring Terrorism’s Impact
7.1.2 The Threat of Terrorism Globally and in the Developed World
7.2 The Threat of Terrorism in the United States
7.2.1 Costs of Terrorism in the United States
7.3 Immigration and Terrorism
7.3.1 Correlates of Terrorism
7.3.2 Does Immigration Spread Terrorism?
7.3.3 Terrorism Data and Methods
7.3.4 Baseline Empirical Strategy
7.3.5 Instrumenting Immigration
7.3.6 Identification
7.3.7 Empirical Results
7.3.8 Discussion
7.4 Conclusion
8 Immigration’s Impact on Culture
8.1 Introduction
8.1.1 Trust, Its Theoretical Foundations, and Empirical Evidence
8.1.2 Trust and Growth: Evaluating the Evidence
8.1.3 Trust and Immigration: Evaluating the Evidence
8.2 Trust as a Substitute for Formal Institutions
8.3 The Relevance of Social Trust for Immigration Policy
8.4 The Deep Roots of Economic Development
8.5 Conclusion
Part III Case Studies in Mass Immigration
9 United States
9.1 A Short History of American Immigration Policy
9.2 Historical Size of the Government and Immigration
9.3 Diversity and Fractionalization Undermined Support for Big Government
9.4 Immigrants Assimilated into American Political Norms, Cultures, and Institutions
9.5 Constitutional Constraints on Immigrant Influence
9.6 Immigrant Impact on Public Policy
9.7 Conclusion
10 Israel
10.1 Mass Immigration and Economic Freedom
10.2 Synthetic Control Analysis of Economic Freedom and Corruption
10.3 Qualitative Mechanism: How Immigration Changed Institutions
10.4 Conclusion
11 Jordan
11.1 Jordanian History, Institutions, and the Surge of Kuwaiti Palestinian Refugees
11.2 Refugees in Jordan
11.3 Jordan as a Quasi-Natural Experiment
11.4 Data
11.5 Methodology
11.6 Economic Institutions: Empirical Results
11.7 Political Institutions and Corruption: Empirical Results
11.8 Qualitative Mechanism: How Immigration Changed Institutions
11.9 Conclusion
Part IV Assessing the New Economic Case for Immigration Restrictions
12 Conclusion
12.1 An Empirical Assessment of the New Economic Case against Immigration
12.2 Immigration Policy in the Presence of Negative Institutional Externalities
12.3 Conclusion
Bibliography
Index
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