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Index
Title Copyright Contents Preface 1. Definition of a Game
1.1. General Notions 1.2. Games in Extensive Form 1.3. Strategies: The Normal Form 1.4. Equilibrium n-Tuples 1.5. The Monty Hall Game Problems
2. Two-Person Zero-Sum Games
2.1. Zero-Sum Games 2.2. The Normal Form 2.3. Mixed Strategies 2.4. The Minimax Theorem 2.5. Computation of Optimal Strategies 2.6. Symmetric Games Problems
3. Linear Programming
3.1. Introduction 3.2. Duality 3.3. Solution of Linear Programs 3.4. The Simplex Algorithm 3.5. The Simplex Algorithm (Continued)
3.5.1. Rules for Choosing a Pivot
3.6. Examples 3.7. Constrained Games Problems
4. Infinite Games
4.1. Games with Countably many Strategies 4.2. Games on the Square 4.3. Games with Continuous Kernel 4.4. Concave–Convex Games 4.5. Games of Timing 4.6. Higher Dimensions Problems
5. Multistage Games
5.1. Behavioral Strategies 5.2. Games of Exhaustion 5.3. Stochastic Games 5.4. Recursive Games 5.5. Differential Games Problems
6. Games with Incomplete Information
6.1. Introduction: The One-Stage Signaling Model 6.2. The Multistage Model Problems
7. Utility Theory
7.1. Ordinal Utility 7.2. Lotteries 7.3. Commodity Bundles 7.4. Absolute Utility Problems
8. Two-Person General-Sum Games
8.1. Bimatrix Games (Noncooperative) 8.2. Perfect Equilibrium Points
Subgame-Perfect Equilibria
8.3. Evolutionary Stable Systems
and Larger Systems
8.4. Correlated Equilibria Problems
9. Two-Person Cooperative Games
9.1. The Bargaining Problem 9.2. Threats 9.3. Time-Restricted Bargaining Problems
10. n-Person Games
10.1. Noncooperative Games 10.2. Cooperative Games 10.3. Domination, Strategic Equivalence, and Normalization 10.4. The Core 10.5. Balanced Collections Problems
11. Stable Sets
11.1. Introduction 11.2. Properties of Stable Sets 11.3. Edgeworth Market Games—An Example 11.4. A Game with No Solutions Problems
12. Indices of Power
12.1. The Shapley Value 12.2. Multilinear Extensions 12.3. The Banzhaf–Coleman Index of Power 12.4. The Presidential Election “Game” 12.5. The Coalition Value Problems
13. The Bargaining Set and Related Concepts
13.1. The Bargaining Set 13.2. The Kernel 13.3. The Nucleolus 13.4. The Airport Game Problems
14. Nonatomic Games
14.1. Games with a Continuum of Players 14.2. Values of Nonatomic Games 14.3. Internal Telephone Billing Rates — An Example Problems
15. Games without Side Payments
15.1. Introduction 15.2. The Core 15.3. Market Games 15.4. Approaches to the Value 15.5. The Bargaining Sets Problems
16. Spatial Games
16.1. The Core and Near-Core Solution Concepts 16.2. The Modified Power Index Problems
17. Other Applications
17.1. Introduction 17.2. Single-Item Auctions
17.2.1. First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions 17.2.4. Second-Price Auctions
17.3. Mechanisms
17.3.1. Description of Mechanisms
17.4. Public Goods 17.5. Two-sided Matching Problems
Appendix
A.1. Convexity A.2. Fixed Point Theorems
Bibliography Index
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