Philosophy of Action, An Anthology by Dancy, Jonathan -- Read -- Imperial Library of Trantor

Index

Cover Blackwell Philosophy Anthologies Title page Copyright page Dedication Preface Source Acknowledgments 1 Philosophical Investigations §§611–628 Part I: Action and Agency

Introduction to Part I

1. 2. 3. References Further Reading

2 Agency 3 Shooting, Killing and Dying

I II III IV V VI VII

4 The Problem of Action

I II III IV V

5 Agents and their Actions

1. Agent Causation 2. Actions and Events 3. Bodily Movements 4. What Actions Are 5. Basic Actions 6. Actions and Locations

6 Agency and Actions

1 2 3 4 5

Part II: Willing and Trying

Introduction to Part II

1. 2. References Further Reading

7 Acting, Willing, Desiring 8 The Will

1. Foreword 2. The Myth of Volitions 3. The Distinction between Voluntary and Involuntary

9 Acting and Trying to Act

1 2 3 4 References

10 Action and Volition

1. Agents and Actions 2. Bodily Movements and Bodily Motions 3. Voluntary Actions and Volitions 4. Basic and Non-basic Voluntary Actions 5. In Defence of Volitions

Part III: Intention and Intentional Action

Introduction to Part III

1. 2. 3. 4. References Further Reading

11 Intention §§1–9 12 Knowing What I Am Doing

I II III IV V VI VII

13 Intending 14 Two Faces of Intention

1. Consistency of Intention and the Simple View 2. Objections and Replies 3. Intention and Volition 4. Intention and Motivational Potential 5. Motivational Potential Extended 6. Motivational Potential and the Distinctiveness of Intention 7. Two Faces of Intention

15 Acting As One Intends 16 Intentional Action and Side Effects in Ordinary Language

1. First Experiment 2. Second Experiment 3. Explaining the Results References

17 The Toxin Puzzle 18 The Ontology of Social Agency

0. Introduction 1. Social Agents 2. Social Actions 3. Social Attitudes 4. Ascribing Attitudes to Social Agents 5. Social Agents’ Knowledge of What They are Doing 6. Bodily Movements and Action 7. Individuating Agents References

Part IV: Acting for a Reason

Introduction to Part IV

1. 2. Reference Further Reading

19 Actions, Reasons, and Causes

I II III IV

20 How to Act for a Good Reason

1. Psychologism: The Three-Part Story and the Normative Story 2. Against the Three-Part Story 3. Because He Believes That p 4. The Role of Belief in the Psychologising Restatement of a Reason 5. Factive and Non-Factive Explanations References

21 Acting for a Reason

1. Introduction: Reason and Reasons 2. Three Questions about Reasons 3. Mental States and Good-making Properties 4. The Goodness of Action 5. Motivation: The Relation between Reasons and Actions References

22 Arational Actions 23 Agency, Reason, and the Good

1. Reason and the Good 2. Expressive Action 3. How Strong are These Arguments?

24 Skepticism About Weakness of Will

Two Kinds of Skepticism Socrates and Davidson Self-Control and the Socratic Theory of Virtue Weakness and Compulsion Preliminary Difficulties Strength and Resistibility The Proposed Account versus the Common Account Conclusion

Part V: The Explanation of Action

Introduction to Part V

1. 2. Reference Further Reading

25 Explanation in Science and in History §§1–3

1. Introduction 2. Two Basic Types of Scientific Explanation 3. Elliptic and Partial Explanations: Explanation Sketches

26 The Rationale of Actions

1. Historical Understanding as ‘Empathetic’ 2. Explaining and Justifying Actions 3. The Point of the ‘Identification’ Metaphor 4. Generalizations and Principles of Action

27 Explanation in Science and in History §§4–7

1. Genetic Explanation in History 2. Explanation by Motivating Reasons 3. Concluding Remarks

28 The Explanatory Role of Being Rational

1. Hempel vs Davidson on the Explanation of Action 2. Are There Any Distinctive Non-constitutive Explanations of Action? References

29 The Conceivability of Mechanism 30 Action, Causality, and Teleological Explanation

Introduction 1. The Standard View of Ends, Ends-in-View, and Causality 2. Teleology and Compensation 3. Compensation and Causality 4. Teleology and Behaviorism 5. Theology and Evolution 6. Teleology and Action 7. Action as Compensation 8. Pro Attitudes and Causality

31 Psychological vs. Biological Explanations of Behavior

Triggering and Structuring Causes External Structuring Causes Internal Structuring Causes References

Part VI: Free Agency and Responsibility

Introduction to Part VI

1. 2. 3. References Further Reading

32 Human Freedom and the Self 33 Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility

I II III IV v

34 Responsibility, Control, and Omissions

I. Omissions and Alternative Possibilities II. Omissions and Frankfurt-type Cases III. Some Tools to Solve the Puzzle IV. The Symmetric Principle of Moral Responsibility V. An Objection VI. Conclusion

35 The Impossibility of Ultimate Responsibility?

1. The Basic Argument 2. Ultimate Moral Responsibility 3. Restatement of the Basic Argument 4. Response to the Basic Argument References

36 Moral Responsibility and the Concept of Agency

1. Frankfurt and the Principle of Alternate Possibilities 2. Agency and Determinism 3. Causality, Determinism and the ‘Beginnings’ of Chains 4. The Relevant Power of Refrainment 5. The Objection from Ignorance References

37 Free Will and Science

Libet’s Work: Introduction Some Conceptual Background Type II RPs, Conscious Decisions, and Actions Vetoing and Free Will Wegner’s Work: Introduction Conscious Will and Scientific Epiphenomenalism Wegner on Free Will References

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