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Index
Cover Title Page Copyright Contents Acknowledgements Introduction Part I
Chapter 1 - Corporate Governance
1.1 Introduction: The Separation of Ownership and Control 1.2 Managerial Incentives: An Overview 1.3 The Board of Directors 1.4 Investor Activism 1.5 Takeovers and Leveraged Buyouts 1.6 Debt as a Governance Mechanism 1.7 International Comparisons of the Policy Environment 1.8 Shareholder Value or Stakeholder Society? Supplementary Section 1.9 The Stakeholder Society: Incentives and Control Issues Appendixes 1.10 Cadbury Report 1.11 Notes to Tables References
Chapter 2 - Corporate Financing Some Stylized Facts
2.1 Introduction 2.2 Modigliani-Miller and the Financial Structure Puzzle 2.3 Debt Instruments 2.4 Equity Instruments 2.5 Financing Patterns 2.6 Conclusion Appendixes 2.7 The Five Cs of Credit Analysis 2.8 Loan Covenants References
Part II
Chapter 3 - Outside Financing Capacity
3.1 Introduction 3.2 The Role of Net Worth: A Simple Model of Credit Rationing 3.3 Debt Overhang 3.4 Borrowing Capacity: The Equity Multiplier Supplementary Sections 3.5 Related Models of Credit Rationing: Inside Equity and Outside Debt 3.6 Verifiable Income 3.7 Semiverifiable Income 3.8 Nonverifiable Income 3.9 Exercises References
Chapter 4 - Some Determinants of Borrowing Capacity
4.1 Introduction: The Quest for Pledgeable Income 4.2 Boosting the Ability to Borrow: Diversification and Its Limits 4.3 Boosting the Ability to Borrow: The Costs and Benefits of Collateralization 4.4 The Liquidity-Accountability Tradeoff 4.5 Restraining the Ability to Borrow: Inalienability of Human Capital Supplementary Sections 4.6 Group Lending and Microfinance 4.7 Sequential Projects 4.8 Exercises References
Chapter 5 - Liquidity and Risk Management, Free Cash Flow, and Long-Term Finance
5.1 Introduction 5.2 The Maturity of Liabilities 5.3 The Liquidity-Scale Tradeoff 5.4 Corporate Risk Management 5.5 Endogenous Liquidity Needs, the Sensitivity of Investment to Cash Flow, and the Soft Budget Constraint 5.6 Free Cash Flow 5.7 Exercises References
Chapter 6 - Corporate Financing under Asymmetric Information
6.1 Introduction 6.2 Implications of the Lemons Problem and of Market Breakdown 6.3 Dissipative Signals 6.4 Contract Design by an Informed Party: An Introduction Appendixes 6.5 Optimal Contracting in the Privately-Known-Prospects Model 6.6 The Debt Bias with a Continuum of Possible Incomes 6.7 Signaling through Costly Collateral 6.8 Short Maturities as a Signaling Device 6.9 Formal Analysis of the Underpricing Problem 6.10 Exercises References
Chapter 7 - Topics Product Markets and Earnings Manipulations
7.1 Corporate Finance and Product Markets 7.2 Creative Accounting and Other Earnings Manipulations 7.3 Brander and Lewis’s Cournot Analysis 7.4 Exercises References
Part III
Chapter 8 - Investors of Passage Entry, Exit, and Speculation
8.1 General Introduction to Monitoring in Corporate Finance 8.2 Performance Measurement and the Value of Speculative Information 8.3 Market Monitoring 8.4 Monitoring on the Debt Side: Liquidity-Draining versus Liquidity-Neutral Runs 8.5 Exercises References
Chapter 9 - Lending Relationships and Investor Activism
9.1 Introduction 9.2 Basics of Investor Activism 9.3 The Emergence of Share Concentration 9.4 Learning by Lending 9.5 Liquidity Needs of Large Investors and Short-Termism 9.6 Exercises References
Part IV
Chapter 10 - Control Rights and Corporate Governance
10.1 Introduction 10.2 Pledgeable Income and the Allocation of Control Rights between Insiders and Outsiders 10.3 Corporate Governance and Real Control 10.4 Allocation of Control Rights among Securityholders Supplementary Sections 10.5 Internal Capital Markets 10.6 Active Monitoring and Initiative 10.7 Exercises References
Chapter 11 - Takeovers
11.1 Introduction 11.2 The Pure Theory of Takeovers: A Framework 11.3 Extracting the Raider’s Surplus: Takeover Defenses as Monopoly Pricing 11.4 Takeovers and Managerial Incentives 11.5 Positive Theory of Takeovers: Single-Bidder Case 11.6 Value-Decreasing Raider and the One-Share-One-Vote Result 11.7 Positive Theory of Takeovers: Multiple Bidders 11.8 Managerial Resistance 11.9 Exercise References
Part V
Chapter 12 - Consumer Liquidity Demand
12.1 Introduction 12.2 Consumer Liquidity Demand: The Diamond-Dybvig Model and the Term Structure of Interest Rates 12.3 Runs 12.4 Heterogenous Consumer Horizons and the Diversity of Securities Supplementary Sections 12.5 Aggregate Uncertainty and Risk Sharing 12.6 Private Signals and Uniqueness in Bank Run Models 12.7 Exercises References
Part VI
Chapter 13 - Credit Rationing and Economic Activity
13.1 Introduction 13.2 Capital Squeezes and Economic Activity: The Balance-Sheet Channel 13.3 Loanable Funds and the Credit Crunch: The Lending Channel 13.4 Dynamic Complementarities: Net Worth Effects, Poverty Traps, and the Financial Accelerator 13.5 Dynamic Substitutabilities: The Deflationary Impact of Past Investment 13.6 Exercises References
Chapter 14 - Mergers and Acquisitions, and the Equilibrium Determination of Asset Values
14.1 Introduction 14.2 Valuing Specialized Assets 14.3 General Equilibrium Determination of Asset Values, Borrowing Capacities, and Economic Activity: The Kiyotaki-Moore Model 14.4 Exercises References
Chapter 15 - Aggregate Liquidity Shortages and Liquidity Asset Pricing
15.1 Introduction 15.2 Moving Wealth across States of Nature: When is Inside Liquidity Sufficient? 15.3 Aggregate Liquidity Shortages and Liquidity Asset Pricing 15.4 Moving Wealth across Time: The Case of the Corporate Sector as a Net Lender 15.5 Exercises References
Chapter 16 - Institutions, Public Policy, and the Political Economy of Finance
16.1 Introduction 16.2 Contracting Institutions 16.3 Property Rights Institutions 16.4 Political Alliances Supplementary Sections 16.5 Contracting Institutions, Financial Structure, and Attitudes toward Reform 16.6 Property Rights Institutions: Are Privately Optimal Maturity Structures Socially Optimal? 16.7 Exercises References
Part VII
Answers to Selected Exercises Review Problems Answers to Selected Review Problems
Index
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