The central tenet of the Madhyamaka School of Mahāyāna Buddhist thought is that all phenomena are empty of any essential unchanging nature. The term “emptiness” is said to properly describe the ontological character of all things. One of the classical arguments used by philosophers of the Madhyamaka School to demonstrate this emptiness, this lack of any essence, any intrinsic nature, any enduring fixed identity, or any absolute mode of being in persons or phenomena whatsoever is the “neither-one-nor-many” argument. Though it has been utilized in slightly varying forms by a number of great Madhyamaka thinkers, including Śrigupta, and Atiśa, the quintessential exposition of the neither-one-nor-many argument is found in The Ornament of the Middle Way (Madhyamakālamkāra), a text by the late period Indian Buddhist philosopher Śāntaraksṃita (725–788).
The argument (stanza 1) posits that there can be no ultimate nature or essence in things because nothing has a fundamentally unitary or manifold nature. In other words, since anything that has a nature must have either an ultimately unitary or manifold nature—the two being inclusive of all possible alternatives for things with a nature—and since nothing has a unitary or manifold nature, therefore, phenomena must not have any nature at all. Following this broad-based statement of his argument, Śāntaraksṃita proceeds to apply this reasoning to all instances in which his philosophical rivals, both Buddhist and non-Buddhist, have claimed that some things, such as persons or phenomena, do have a unitary, inherent nature (stanzas 2–60). Śāntaraksṃita then turns (stanza 61) to the question of whether or not entities asserted by his opponents to have a nature can possess a manifold nature. There he argues that since the existence of a manifold nature would depend on the aggregation of true singularities, and there are no true singularities, there must also be no true manifold nature in any entity either. Because singular and manifold natures are inclusive of all possibilities for entities that have a nature, one must conclude that no entity whatsoever has any inherent nature.
Śāntaraksṃita first applies the neither-one-nor-many argument to the non-Buddhist Sāṃkhya system (stanza 2), which asserts the existence of Prakrṃti, a Fundamental Nature or creator God that is claimed to be the singular, permanent, uncaused, and unobstructed absolute cause of all that exists. Śāntaraksṃita argues that if there is a singular, permanent, unobstructed cause of phenomena, then all phenomenal effects should exist at all times. There should be no periodic arising and ceasing of objects, since the cause of their existence would always be present and never change. If the cause of their existence never ceases, it would be illogical for the effects, the existent phenomena of the world, to ever cease, to be impermanent, or to only occasionally arise since the unchanging, unobstructed cause of such effects would always be present. But we know from direct experience that phenomena arise and cease over time. Thus, the existence of such an inherently singular and unchanging absolute cause of the phenomenal world is contradicted by our direct experience.
Śāntaraksṃita then uses the neither-one-nor-many argument to critique the Vaibhāśika assertion of three types of truly singular phenomena: uncom-pounded objects of wisdom known by the knowledge that arises in the meditative equipoise of a yogi, uncompounded space, and uncompounded infinitesimally small partless particles (stanzas 3–15). With regard to the first example, the object of wisdom of the meditative equipoise of a yogi could not be permanent and singular and also related to successive moments of consciousness, as Vaibhāśikas claim, because successive moments of consciousness are changing and distinct. If the object of wisdom were enduring and related to multiple distinct moments of consciousness, then it could not be truly or inherently single since there would be part related to moment number 1 of consciousness, part related to moment number 2 of consciousness, and so on.1
Śāntaraksṃita again uses a related line of reasoning to refute the existence of inherently singular and infinitesimally small partless particles that are asserted by the Vaibhāśika school to be the building blocks of gross phenomena (stanzas 11–15). Śāntaraksṃita’s examination begins by questioning precisely how inherently singular particles can combine with one another. The three exhaustive alternatives for ways of combining, according to Santaraks.ita, are that the first particle has others joining it from various directions, surrounding it and touching, or surrounding it and not touching. Each of these alternatives requires that the central particle have others around it in various directions in order for them to combine into gross objects. Thus, there must be a particle above, one below, one to the east, one to the west, and so on. If they combine from various directions in this way, then the central particle must have a part facing above, a part facing below, a part facing to the east, and so on. And if that were the case, it could not be truly singular, due to the presence of parts. The only way truly singular partless particles could combine is to occupy the exact same inherently singular point in space—they must be directionally partless—and that would undermine the possibility of gross, spatially expansive objects such as books, chairs, land, and water, and so on. Therefore, there must be no inherently existent partless particles, and thus, partless particles must not be the building blocks of the gross phenomenal world.
Śāntaraksṃita then (stanzas 16–21) introduces his analysis of the relationship between subjects, or consciousness, and objects by examining the topic of self-cognizing cognition (svasamvedana, rangrig).2 This analysis of the Sautrāntika manner of accepting self-cognizing cognition begins by defining this self-cognizing or reflexively aware quality as the very nature of consciousness (stanza 16). Śāntaraksṃita then critiques the Sautrāntika view of consciousness as self-cognizing, partless, and inherently singular and also distinct from external objects. Śāntaraksṃita finds both assertions—the inherently unitary quality of the mind, and the externality of objects of consciousness—to be problematic. He argues that, if a consciousness that is self-cognizing is also truly singular, then the knower (i.e. the consciousness), the act of knowing, and the known (i.e. the object of consciousness) must all truly be one. Even the known, the objects of consciousness that are said to be distinct from it, must be indistinct from consciousness, since consciousness is partless and they have a relationship with consciousness. That which is truly singular cannot be related with something from which it is distinct, because then it would be manifold, having parts related to that which is distinct from it. Maintaining such a position would therefore be illogical. It holds something explicitly explained to be three (knower, knowing, and known), and determined to necessarily be manifold on analysis, to be one. And it demands a relationship of identity between that which is distinct from consciousness and consciousness itself. Śāntaraksṃita, thus, is criticizing both the inherent singularity and the tenability of external objects in one sweeping argument.
Śāntaraksṃita goes on (stanzas 22–34) to investigate and criticize the assertions of three different interpretations or subschools of Sautrāntika, which assert the true existence of aspects or representations (akāra, mam pa), 3 described by his commentators as the Non-Pluralists, the Half-Eggists, and the Proponents of an Equal Number of Consciousnesses and Objects. The Sautrāntika Non-Pluralists claim that there is an inherently singular consciousness that cognizes a multiplicity of objects. Śāntaraksṃita argues that this notion is absurd, since the unitary consciousness would have to have multiple parts related to the cognition of multiple real representations or images of objects like colors, shapes, and so on.4
The next opponent, the Sautrāntika Half-Eggists (24–30), are said to claim that they avoid the faults of the Non-Pluralists by asserting that though multiple representations or aspects of objects seem to appear simultaneously with consciousness, we are mistaken in that assumption because they in fact appear one by one in rapid succession. Thus, the singular consciousness actually only cognizes one representation or image at a time. For example, when we see a painting, we do not see all the colors at once, but rather see the blue image, then green, then red, and so on, but in such rapid succession that we think that we see a painting all at once. In response, Śāntarakş ita turns our attention from the visual consciousness to the aural consciousness and asks why aural cognitions do not seem to arise simultaneously as visual images do. He uses the example of two Sanskrit words: latā and tāla. If their aspects or aural representation appeared as rapidly as visual images are claimed to, then the two words would be indistinguishable since the syllables would be heard simultaneously.
Śāntaraksṃita identifies an additional fallacy in stanzas 26 and 27. The opponent claims that consciousness is momentary like the representations it perceives, but also, inconsistently, that consciousness endures for some time. The assumption of duration is necessary in order to explain how consciousness pieces together, however erroneously, the distinct consecutive images or representations, and comes to the incorrect conclusion that they are perceived simultaneously. A momentary singular conceptual consciousness could not piece together such successive images.
The system of Sautrāntika Proponents of an Equal Number of Consciousnesses and Representations, who attempt to avoid these problems by claiming that as many truly singular minds arise as there are images or representations in their objects of perception, is the next view addressed by Śāntaraksṃita (stanzas 31–34). The basic criticism leveled here is quite similar to the critique of partless particles. In order for there to be as many truly singular consciousnesses as there are representations of objects, the representations must be truly singular as well. If we take the example of a painting with multiple representations of various colors, the question arises as to where the truly singular representations are. If the patch of blue is taken to be truly singular, and so analogous to a representation that corresponds to a truly singular consciousness, then the patch of blue must not have parts, such as a part bordered by a red patch and another part bordered by a green patch. If it did, then by analogy, a consciousness apprehending such a representation would also have parts and would not be truly unitary.
Śāntaraksṃita then continues his analysis of subjects, or consciousness, and their relation to objects of consciousness by briefly examining seven classical non-Buddhist Indian philosophical schools: Vaiśesṃika, Naiyāyika, Jain, Mīmāṃsaka, Lokāyata, Sāṃkhya, and Vedānta (stanzas 35–40).5 Faults are found with each of the first six because each asserts, in varying ways, a truly singular consciousness that perceives objects that are manifold. Such an assertion is incoherent: if the objects of perception have parts, then the consciousness cognizing them also must have parts, since it is related to all the parts of its objects. A unitary consciousness is incompatible with a manifold object. Vedāntas argue that they avoid this difficulty because they deny the existence of external objects. Śāntaraksṃita, however, still finds their claim of a conventional multiplicity of objects in the world that appear to consciousness contradicts their assertion of a nondual unitary consciousness.
The final third of the neither-one-nor-many argument addresses the claims of several subschools of Yogācāra/Cittamātra thought. The subschools are divided into Proponents of True Representations and Proponents of False Representations. The Proponents of True Representations are further divided into three subschools, corresponding to the three Sautrāntika subschools: the Non-Pluralists, the Half-Eggists, and the Proponents of an Equal Number of Consciousnesses and Objects. The primary difference between these schools and their Sautrāntika corollaries is that while Sautrāntikas assert that objects are external to consciousness, the Yogācārins claim that they are not truly distinct from the consciousness perceiving them. Śāntaraksṃita begins (stanza 46) with a general critique of Yogācāra tenets before addressing specific subschools in the following stanzas. He raises the question of how consciousness could be truly singular if, as Yogācārins claim, it exists in a nondual relationship with a multiplicity of objects and aspects of those objects. Either the consciousness does not have a truly unitary nature, due to its relationship with multiple aspects of objects, or those aspects are all identical, which contradicts direct perception.
Many of his criticisms of the three subschools of Yogācāra Proponents of True Representations are quite similar to those he leveled against the Sautrāntika Proponents of True Representations. In both cases, they hold that representations, like colors and shapes, do truly exist. According to Śāntaraksṃita, if the Yogācāras hold these representations to truly exist, even if not separately from consciousness, the same kind of reasoning that refutes the Sautrāntikas would also apply to the Yogācāra Proponents of True Representations.
The refutation of Yogācāra Proponents of False Representations (stanzas 52–60) consists of eight reductio ad absurdum arguments. Śāntaraksṃita begins by presenting their position (stanza 52) before moving into his eight reductios. According to Śāntaraksṃita, the Proponents of False Representations claim to avoid the faults of their Yogācāra counterparts, who accept truly existent representations, because they say the singular consciousness does not actually apprehend a multiplicity of representations, since such representations are actually false.
An assortment of criticisms of this view arises in the eight reductios. In the first, Śāntaraksṃita questions how one could have a clear experience of the representations of an object if those representations do not actually exist. Moreover, the second reductio relies on the claim that if representations of objects are false, and thus the red representation of a red mug does not exist, one could not correctly perceive that mug itself, which is absurd. It would not even be correct to call our perceived information “knowledge,” since it would merely correspond to things that do not exist. Furthermore, consciousness could not perceive representations at all if they were nonexistent, since nonexistent phenomena could not cause one to perceive. For these reasons, among others, Śāntaraksṃita finds the views and positions of the Yogācāra Proponents of False Representations to be irreparably incoherent.
Since thorough analysis of his Buddhist and non-Buddhist opponents has revealed that no singular or unitary nature actually exists, and since a manifold nature would depend upon the aggregation of unitary natures, Śāntaraksṃita concludes that there is no inherent nature in anything at all, since single and manifold natures are inclusive of all possibilities of inherent natures in phenomena.6
[Statement of the Neither-One-Nor-Many Argument]
(1) These entities, as asserted by our own [Buddhist schools] and other [non-Buddhist schools], have no inherent nature at all because in reality they have neither a singular nor manifold nature, like a reflected image.
[Application of the Argument: Analysis of Objects]
Refutation of Unitary Objects Asserted by Non-Buddhists
(2) Permanent [causal] entities are not themselves singular because they contribute to [the production of] successive effects. If each successive effect is distinct, then [the argument in favor of] permanent [causal] entities [that are truly singular] degenerates.
[Application of the Argument: Analysis of Objects]
Refutation of Unitary Objects Asserted by Buddhists
(3) Even those uncompounded objects known by the knowledge which arises in the meditation [of an ārya], according to the [Vaibhāśika] system, are not unitary because they are related to successive moments of knowledge.
(4) If the nature of the object known by a previous consciousness continues to exist subsequently, then the previous cognition would still exist in the latter and, similarly, the latter would exist in the former.
(5) If the nature of the [latter object] does not arise in the earlier time and the [earlier object] does not arise at the latter time, then uncompounded phenomena like consciousness must be objects known to arise only for a moment.
(6) If the previous [uncompounded object] arises from the power of [the causes and conditions of the uncompounded object of] an earlier moment, then it would not actually be uncompounded, like minds and mental states.
(7) If you accept that these momentary objects arise independently because there is no dependence on others, then they must either exist permanently or not exist at all.
(8) What is the purpose of investigating objects that have no meaningful ability to act? What is the purpose of lustful people inquiring whether a eunuch is attractive or not?7
[Application of the Argument: Analysis of Objects]
Refutation of Unitary Persons
(9) It is clearly understood that a person [of the type asserted by Vātsīputrīyans] has neither a single nor a manifold nature, since such a person cannot be explained as momentary or nonmomentary.
[Application of the Argument: Analysis of Objects]
Refutation of Unitary Pervasive Space
(10) How can pervasive entities [such as space] be unitary given that they are related with various directions?8
[Application of the Argument: Analysis of Objects]
Refutation of Unitary Gross Objects
(10 [cont.]) Gross objects are also not unitary since [some parts of] such entities can be visible [while other parts] are not visible.
[Application of the Argument: Analysis of Objects]
Refutation of Unitary Partless Particles
(11) What is the nature of the central [partless] particle which faces singly towards [another] particle yet abides [with other partless particles in various directions], either around and joining with it, or around it with space between [the particles], or around it without space between them?
(12) If it were asserted that the [central] particle also faces entirely toward another such [unitary, partless] particle, then if that were so, wouldn’t it be the case that [gross objects such as] earth and water and the like would not be spatially expansive?
(13) If you accept [partless particles with sides] which face other such particles [in different directions], then if that is the case, how could even the most minute particles be singular and partless?
(14) Particles have thus been established to have no inherent nature. Therefore, it is evident that eyes and other gross substantial entities, etc., which are asserted [to be real] by many of our own [Buddhist] schools and other [non-Buddhist] schools, are directly known to have no inherent nature.
(15) The nature of these [entities] is said to be comprised of those [particles]. The qualities of these [entities], their actions, and even their universals (sāmānya, spyi) and particularities are said to be made up of those [particles and therefore must not inherently exist].
[Application of the Argument: Analysis of Subjects in Relation to Objects]
The Mind, its Objects, and Its Means of
Perception: Self-cognizing Cognition (svasaṃ
vedana, rang rig), as Asserted by Buddhists
(16) Consciousness is produced in the utterly opposite way from that which is of an inanimate nature. That which is not the nature of being inanimate is the self-knowledge of this [consciousness].
(17) Self-cognizing cognition is not an entity that exists [with its object] as agent and action because it would be incorrect for consciousness, which is of a single, partless nature, to be three (i.e., knower, knowing, and known).
(18) Therefore, since this is the nature of consciousness, it is capable of self-consciousness (bdag shes). How, though, could that cognize the nature of objects from which it is distinct?
(19) Since its nature does not exist in external objects, given that you assert that objects of consciousness and consciousness are different, how could consciousness know objects other than consciousness?
[Application of the Argument: Analysis of
Subjects: Refutations of Inherently Singular
Consciousness]
Critique of an Epistemology Asserting Valid
Cognition of True Representations (Satyākarā)
That Are External to Consciousness
Statement of the Sautrāntika Reasoning
(20) According to some, consciousness knows representations (akāra, mam pa) directly, in spite of the fact that the two (i.e., consciousness and representations)9 are actually distinct. Since the representations appear just like a mirror reflection, they claim it is suitable to consider the experience by mere imputation [to be accurate].
Refutation of the Vaibhāśika Proponents of No
Representations
(21) However, there cannot be externally cognized representations for those who do not assert a consciousness that reflects representations of objects.
Refutation of Three Subschools of Sautrāntika
Proponents of True Representations
(22) Since they are not distinct from the unitary consciousness, there cannot be a multiplicity of representations. Therefore knowledge of the object could not be established by the force of the representation.
(23) Consciousness cannot be unitary since it is not separate from representations. If that were not the case, how would you explain the two (i.e., consciousness and a multiplicity of representations) to be unitary?
(24) [Colors such as] white and the like arise in succession to the consciousness, yet because they arise quite rapidly, the foolish conceive of them as arising simultaneously.
(25) When the mind which hears the sounds of such words as latā [and tāla] 10 arise very rapidly, why does it not hear [the two syllables] as if they were arising simultaneously [thus rendering the two words indistinguishable]?
(26) Even if we were to consider only conceptual minds, [the representations] would still not be known in succession. Since they do not remain for a long time, all minds are similar [to representations/aspects] in the rapidity with which they arise.
(27) Therefore, all objects appear to be apprehended simultaneously as distinct representations, not successively.
(28) Even with regard to [the example of] a burning torch, the arising of the mistaken instantaneous appearance of a wheel of fire [due to rapidly twirling the torch] would not be [a result of] joining the boundaries between [memories of distinct] perceptions because it appears very clearly.
(29) This joining of boundaries is done by the memory [of the mental consciousness], not by the seeing [of an eye consciousness], because an [eye consciousness] cannot apprehend past objects.
(30) Since the object of that [memory] has perished, it is not clear. Therefore the appearance of the wheel of fire is not clear.11
(31) If one were to claim that when someone sees the base of the representations of a painting, as many minds will arise simultaneously as there are representations in that [painting,] then,
(32) If that were the case, even when cognition is of a single representation type such as the color white, etc., since there is a distinct beginning, middle, and end to that, there will be a variety of objects of observation [within that cognition of a single representation].
(33) I honestly do not feel that [a representation] such as the color white, etc, which is like the nature of a particle that is a partless singularity, has ever appeared to any consciousness.
(34) [According to our opponent,] the sources of the five [sense] consciousnesses are representations of objects made of accumulated [partless parts]. Minds (citta, sems) and mental states (caitta, sems byung) are objects established in the sixth [source of perception].
[Application of the Argument: Analysis of Subjects
and Its Relation to Objects]
The Mind, Its Objects, and Its Means of
Perception as Asserted by Non-Buddhists
Five Refutations of Views Maintaining a Unitary
Consciousness as Asserted by Non-Buddhist Schools
(35) Even according to the scriptures of non-Buddhists [such as the Vaiśesṃ ikas and Sāṃkhyas 12], the appearance [of gross objects] as singular to consciousness would not occur because its objects are substances which have qualities (gun.a, yon tan), etc.
(36) [According to the views of the Jains and Mīmām. sakas,] all entities are [manifold] like the nature of a gem emitting [colorful] rays. It would be irrational for the mind that apprehends those entities to appear in the nature of singularity.
(37) Even for proponents of the [Lokāyata] system which accepts the establishment of all sense faculties and objects as compounds of [the four elements such as] earth and the like, it is still impossible [for consciousness] to engage with unitary entities.
(38) Even according to the position [of the Sāṃkhyas,] who claim that [the five subtle elements such as] sound, etc. are [the nature of the three qualities such as] excellence and the like, a consciousness of the appearance of a unitary object is illogical because objects appear in the nature of the three [qualities].
(39) Regarding the tri-fold nature of entities, if the appearance of that [type of entity] is incompatible with a consciousness that is of a truly unitary nature, then how could one claim that [consciousness] apprehends that object?
(40) [Since] they do not even assert the existence of external objects,
[Vedāntas ask] why the suitability of maintaining a consciousness that is permanent and to which arises various appearances, either simultaneously or successively, is so difficult to accept.
Refutation of the Sautrāntika Proponents of Falsea
Representations
(41) Cognitions of [uncompounded phenomena such as] space, and the like, illu minate a variety of appearances because of the appearance of many [conceptual representations of] letters for the appearance of the mere word (i.e., s-p-a-c-e).
(42) Although there are some who assert consciousness to which manifold [representations] do not appear, still it is not suitable to establish their existence from the perspective of the ultimate because it has already been seen that there is a logical fallacy in asserting the existence of such, with these characteristics.
(43) Therefore it is established from all perspectives that consciousness occurs with the appearance of manifold representations, and thus like the [many] distinct representations, cannot logically be of a single nature.
[Application of the Argument: Analysis of
Subjects]
Refutation of Various Proponents of Yogācāra/
Cittamātra: Proponents of True Representations
(44) However, [according to the Yogācāra,] representations are manifest due to the ripening of latent potentialities of a beginningless personal continuum. Although they appear, since it is the result of a mistake, they are like the nature of an illusion.
(45) Although their [view is virtuous], we should think about whether such things [as the representations known by consciousness] according to [the Yogācāra proponents] actually exist or if they are something contentedly accepted only when left unanalyzed.
(46) Since contradictions would ensue with regard to those unitary [representations] even if the actual consciousness were manifold, [consciousness and representations] are undoubtedly distinct.
(47) If representations are not distinct [from the singular consciousness], then it would be difficult to respond to the following logical consequence with regard to moving and rest, etc.; due to the movement of one, all would move.
(48) Even according to the system of those maintaining external objects, if representations are not separate [from each other], then they would all also certainly be engaged as a single phenomena and not other than that.
(49) If you accept an equal number of consciousnesses and representations, then it would be difficult to overcome the same type of analysis as is made regarding particles.
(50) If one [consciousness experiences] a variety [of representations], wouldn’t that be like the system of the [Jain] Sky Clad (Digambara)? A variety [of representations] are not the nature of singularity just as manifold precious gems and the like [are not the nature of singularity].
(51) If the variety [of representations] exists in a single nature, how could they appear in a variegated nature and how could parts such as those which are obstructed and those which are unobstructed, etc. be distinguished?
Refutation of Yogācāra/Cittamātra: Proponents of
False Representations
(52) Some say that [consciousness] does not naturally possess representations of these [objects]. In reality, representations do not exist but appear to consciousness by virtue of a mistake.
(53) If [representations] do not exist, there will likewise be no [consciousness] clearly experiencing them. That [clear, non-dual consciousness] is not like a consciousness [asserted by the Sautrāntikas] which is distinct from entities.
(54) Likewise, the [representation of this entity] will not be known as that [representation] to anyone [because] entities are representationless. In the same way bliss is not experienced in non-bliss and color is not seen in whiteness.
(55) With regard to representations, “object of knowledge” (shes pa’i don) is not actually the correct term because [the representation] is distinct from the knowledge itself (shes pa’i bdag), like flowers growing in the sky and the like.
(56) [Consciousness] is incapable of experiencing [representations] even when they are examined because non-existent things have no functional abilities, like the horn of a horse. To claim that a non-existent [representation] has the ability to generate a conscious self-appearance is irrational.
(57) What reason is there that would account for a relationship between those [representations] that are definitely experienced, and consciousness? It is not one of identity and not a relationship of one arising from the other.
(58) If there is not cause [for representations], how is it suitable that they arise only on occasion? If they have a cause, how could they not have an other-dependent [nature] (paratantra-[svabhāva], gzhan gi dbang [gi ngo bo])?
(59) If [representations] do not exist, then consciousness [with representations] also would not exist due to the non-existence of the representations. Being like a clear, round crystal, consciousness would not really experience [objects].
(60) If this is only known due to a mistake, then why does it rely upon mistakes? If it arises due to the power of a mistake, it is still other-dependent.
[Wrapping Up the Neither-One-Nor-Many
Argument]
Demonstrating That Phenomena Lack a Manifold
Nature
(61) We have found with analysis that no entity whatsoever has an [inherently] single nature. Those that have no single nature must also not have a manifold nature.
[Establishing the Pervasion of the Argument]
Entities Have No Nature at All
(62) The existence of an entity belonging to a class other than that which has a single or manifold [nature] does not make sense because the two are exhaustive of all possible alternatives.
(63) Therefore, these entities are characterized only by conventionality. If someone accepts them as ultimate, what can I do for that person?
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