1. The English translations of these stories are ours. The originals are taken from Charlotte Mutsaers, Paardejam (Amsterdam: Meulenhoff, 1996), 187; and from Gerrit Krol, De oudste jongen (Amsterdam: Querido, 1998), 120–21.
2. “City” is included in Wasco, Het Tuitel complex (Amsterdam: Scratch Books, 2015).
3. “Riding master” (which comes closest to the Dutch word pikeur) is not a gender-neutral term. We will address this problem in our discussion of feminist narratology in chapter 3.
4. See Luc Herman and Bart Vervaeck, “Ideology and Narrative Fiction,” in Handbook of Narratology, ed. Peter Hühn, Jan Christoph Meister, John Pier, and Wolf Schmid, 2nd ed. (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2014), 253–69.
5. Franz Kafka, “Up in the Gallery,” in Kafka: The Complete Stories, ed. Nahum N. Glatzer, trans. Willa Muir and Edwin Muir (New York: Schocken Books, 1946), 401–2.
1. For an interesting historical approach, see Kent Puckett, Narrative Theory: A Critical Introduction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016). A summary history of narratology can be found in Jan Christoph Meister, “Narratology,” in Handbook of Narratology, ed. Hühn et al., 623–45.
2. E. M. Forster, Aspects of the Novel (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1990), 87.
3. Shlomith Rimmon-Kenan, Narrative Fiction: Contemporary Poetics (London: Methuen, 1983), 17.
4. José Angel García Landa and Susana Onega, eds., Narratology: An Introduction (London: Longman, 1996), 3.
5. Gerald Prince, A Dictionary of Narratology (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1987), 53.
6. “I would like to argue that temporal succession is sufficient as a minimal requirement for a group of events to form a story.” Rimmon-Kenan, Narrative Fiction, 18.
7. Rimmon-Kenan, Narrative Fiction, 106–8.
8. As can be derived from James Miller’s edition of Henry James’s writings on poetics, James’s statement “that the scenic method is my absolute, my imperative, my only salvation” did not at all imply that the author’s personality had to be erased. Henry James, Theory of Fiction, ed. James E. Miller Jr. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1972), 180. It remains present in the way it shows reality, and therefore showing is not an objective method. James writes in his essay “The Art of Fiction” that “the deepest quality of a work of art will always be the quality of the mind of the producer” (Theory of Fiction, 43). Narratorial invisibility must not be confused with a neutral representation of social reality.
9. Percy Lubbock, The Craft of Fiction (London: Jonathan Cape, 1968), 110–23.
10. “In order for a text to be an autobiography (or, more generally, an instance of intimate literature), author, narrator, and character have to coincide.” Philippe Lejeune, Le pacte autobiographique (Paris: Seuil, 1975), 15 (our translation).
11. “We might better speak of the ‘inferred’ than of the ‘implied’ author.” Seymour Chatman, Coming to Terms: The Rhetoric of Narrative in Fiction and Film (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), 77.
12. Gérard Genette, Narrative Discourse Revisited, trans. Jane E. Lewin (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1988), 150.
13. Ansgar Nünning, “‘But why will you say that I am mad?’: On the Theory, History, and Signals of Unreliable Narration in British Fiction,” Arbeiten aus Anglistik und Amerikanistik 22, no. 1 (1997): 83–105. We will return to this important article in chapter 3. See also Nünning, “Unreliable, Compared to What? Towards a Cognitive Theory of Unreliable Narration: Prolegomena and Hypotheses,” in Grenzüberschreitungen: Narratologie im Kontext/Transcending Boundaries: Narratology in Context, ed. Walter Grünzweig and Andreas Solbach (Tübingen: Gunter Narr Verlag, 1999), 53–73.
14. Chatman, Coming to Terms, 74.
15. Ansgar Nünning, “Renaissance eines anthropomorphisierten Passepartouts oder Nachruf auf ein literaturkritisches Phantom? Überlegungen und Alternativen zum Konzept des ‘implied author,’” Deutsche Vierteljahresschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte 67, no. 1 (1993): 1–25 (esp. 9–11).
16. Chatman, Coming to Terms, 81.
17. Chatman, Coming to Terms, 87.
18. Genette, Narrative Discourse Revisited, 145. Only in very exceptional circumstances does Genette think it is useful to distinguish between the image the reader has of the author (that is, the implied author) and the real author. These circumstances include forgery (for example, a fake Rimbaud), ghostwriting (where the name on the book cover is not that of the real author), and collective authorship. Genette admits that the reader always develops an image of the author, but he believes it is wrong to turn that image into a narratological concept. For him the image of the author no longer belongs to narratology: “In my opinion, narratology has no need to go beyond the narrative situation and the two agents ‘implied author’ and ‘implied reader’ are clearly situated in that ‘beyond’” (137).
19. P. D. Juhl, Interpretation: An Essay in the Philosophy of Literary Criticism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), 186. The following statement goes in the same direction: “If the work expresses certain beliefs, then the author is committed to those beliefs and to their truth” (178).
20. See Nünning, “Renaissance,” 11–16.
21. For a more elaborate description of this position, see Luc Herman and Bart Vervaeck, “The Implied Author: A Secular Excommunication,” Style 45, no. 1 (2011): 11–28. For a completely different analysis of the problems with the implied author, see Harry E. Shaw, “Why Won’t Our Terms Stay Put? The Narrative Communication Diagram Scrutinized and Historicized,” in A Companion to Narrative Theory, ed. James Phelan and Peter Rabinowitz (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), 299–311 (esp. 300–301). Shaw makes clear that the implied author is a prime example of the fact that the agents in the communication diagram are problematic “because their nature changes according to whether one thinks of them in terms of information or of rhetoric” (300).
22. Edgar Allan Poe, “The Masque of the Red Death,” in Poetry and Tales, ed. Patrick F. Quinn (New York: Literary Classics of the United States, Library of America, 1984), 485.
23. Seymour Chatman, Story and Discourse: Narrative Structure in Fiction and Film (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1978), 145–95. Chatman speaks about absent narrators such as the collector and the stenographer on, for example, pages 169 and 173.
24. Rimmon-Kenan, Narrative Fiction, 88.
25. Wayne C. Booth, The Rhetoric of Fiction (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961), 138.
26. Walker Gibson, “Authors, Speakers, Readers, and Mock Readers,” College English 11, no. 5 (1950): 265–69, cited in W. Booth, Rhetoric of Fiction, 138.
27. Wolfgang Iser, The Implied Reader: Patterns of Communication in Prose Fiction from Bunyan to Beckett (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974). We will return to this in chapter 3.
28. Nünning, “Renaissance,” 8–9.
29. Gerald Prince, “On Readers and Listeners in Narrative,” Neophilologus 55, no. 2 (1971): 117–22. See also his “Notes towards a Categorization of Fictional Narratees,” Genre 4, no. 1 (1971): 100–105; and “Introduction à l’étude du narrataire,” Poétique 14 (1973): 178–96. Prince also discusses the concept in his monograph Narratology: The Form and Functioning of Narrative (The Hague: Mouton, 1982).
30. Charlotte Mutsaers, Zeepijn (Amsterdam: Meulenhoff, 1999), 20–28.
31. Chatman, Story and Discourse, 254.
32. See also Wallace Martin, Recent Theories of Narrative (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1986), 154. Martin further divides the mock reader into a model reader and an authorial reader, so that there are just as many kinds of receivers as there are kinds of senders. Chatman saves the symmetry between producers and consumers in a different way. On the sender side, he lists the author, the implied author, and the narrator (who combines the dramatized author, the dramatized narrator, and the undramatized narrator proposed in our figure). On the receiver side, he mentions the narratee, the implied audience, and the real audience. See Chatman, Story and Discourse, 267.
33. Henrik Skov Nielsen, “Unnatural Narratology, Impersonal Voices, Real Authors, and Non-Communicative Narration,” in Unnatural Narratives—Unnatural Narratology, ed. Jan Alber and Rüdiger Heinze (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2011), 71–88 (72).
34. Henrik Skov Nielsen, “Natural Authors, Unnatural Narration,” in Postclassical Narratology: Approaches and Analyses, ed. Jan Alber and Monika Fludernik (Columbus: Ohio State University Press), 275–301 (299).
35. Sylvie Patron, “Enunciative Narratology: A French Speciality,” in Current Trends in Narratology, ed. Greta Olson (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2011), 312–35 (330).
36. Käte Hamburger, The Logic of Literature, trans. Marylinn J. Rose (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973), 141. Patron discusses her re-evaluation of Hamburger in chapter 7 of Le narrateur: Introduction à la théorie narrative (Paris: Armand Collin, 2009).
37. See Jérôme Meizoz, Postures littéraires: Mises en scène modernes de l’auteur (Genève: Slatkine, 2007); Fotis Jannidis, “Zwischen Autor und Erzähler,” in Autorschaft: Positionen und Revisionen, ed. Heinrich Detering (Stuttgart: Metzler, 2002), 540–56; and Sandra Heinen, “Das Bild des Autors: Überlegungen zum Begriff des ‘impliziten Autors’ und seines Potentials zur kulturwissenschaftlichen Beschreibung von inszenierter Autorschaft,” Sprachkunst 33, no. 2 (2002): 327–43.
38. Mary Louise Pratt, Toward a Speech-Act Theory of Literary Discourse (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977), 3–78. Monika Fludernik, whose work we will focus on in chapter 3, incorporates this concept in her encompassing theory of narrative.
39. “Speaker and Audience are present in the literary speech situation [. . .] they have commitments to one another as they do everywhere else, and those commitments are presupposed by both the creator and the receiver of the work. Far from being autonomous, self-contained, self-motivating, context-free objects which exist independently from the ‘pragmatic’ concerns of ‘everyday’ discourse, literary works take place in a context, and like any other utterance they cannot be described apart from that context.” Pratt, Toward a Speech-Act Theory, 115.
40. In theoretical terms the literary speech act is a performative. This type of utterance does not merely represent a specific situation—in that case it would be a constative; rather, it brings something about. As a performative, literature creates a world. The performative’s success depends on certain felicity conditions that derive from and can only be met thanks to the communicative context. These conditions subject literary communication to a series of conventions (such as genre) shared by sender and receiver. The literary text precisely derives its illocutionary force—that is, its power to make the reader believe in the world it evokes—from these conventions, which it uses and activates. See Sandy Petrey, Speech Acts and Literary Theory (New York: Routledge, 1990), 4–21. According to Susan Sniader Lanser, the world evoked by the literary text is an “alternative world.” Lanser, The Narrative Act: Point of View in Prose Fiction (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), 291. In addition, the literary utterance amounts to a special kind of illocutionary act, which she calls a “hypothetical” (289). Richard Ohmann speaks in this connection of the “imaginative construction of a world.” Ohmann, “Speech Acts and the Definition of Literature,” Philosophy and Rhetoric 4, no. 1 (1971): 1–19 (17). The hypothetical, alternative, and imaginary qualities of the literary world will resurface in chapter 3, during our discussion of possible worlds theory.
41. Some postclassical theorists disagree. The cognitive narratologist Alan Palmer, for instance, rejects the idea that consciousness and speech are represented in the same way. See Alan Palmer, Fictional Minds (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2004), 53–86. We will discuss Palmer’s work extensively in chapter 3.
42. Thomas Mann, Der Tod in Venedig, in Gesammelte Werke (Frankfurt: S. Fischer Verlag, 1960), 8:444–525 (493–94). The translation is taken from Dorrit Cohn, Transparent Minds: Narrative Modes for Presenting Consciousness in Fiction (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), 27.
43. James Joyce, Ulysses, ed. Hans Walter Gabler (New York: Vintage Books, 1986), 132.
44. Gustave Flaubert, Madame Bovary, trans. Geoffrey Wall (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1992), 172.
45. Harry Mulisch, Voer voor psychologen: Zelfportret (Amsterdam: Bezige Bij, 1961), 21.
46. A. F. Th. van der Heijden, Asbestemming: Een requiem (Amsterdam: Querido, 1994), 239.
47. Jeroen Brouwers, Sunken Red, trans. Adrienne Dixon (London: Peter Owen, 1990), 49.
48. Brouwers, Sunken Red, 57.
49. Willem Brakman, Een weekend in Oostende (Amsterdam: Querido, 1982), 39–40.
50. Point of view is an ambiguous concept. Gérard Genette and Mieke Bal, whose work we will deal with extensively in chapter 2, have solved this problem by treating the activities of narration and perception separately. As we will see more immediately, Franz Stanzel’s perspective scale is less ambiguous than Norman Friedman’s point of view but still more ambiguous than the solution proposed by Genette and Bal. For a summary of the tradition, see Jaap Lintvelt, Essai de typologie narrative: Le “point de vue” (Paris: José Corti, 1981), 111–76.
51. In an earlier essay, Friedman distinguished eight points of view. See Norman Friedman, “Point of View in Fiction: The Development of a Critical Concept,” PMLA 70, no. 5 (1955): 1160–84. Our presentation is based on a reworked version, which appeared in Friedman’s book Form and Meaning in Fiction (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1975), 134–65.
52. Hugo Claus, De Geruchten (Amsterdam: Bezige Bij, 1996).
53. “The next step toward the objectification of the story material is the elimination not only of the author, who disappeared with the ‘I’ as witness frame, but also of any narrator whatsoever. Here the reader ostensibly listens to no one; the story comes directly through the minds of the characters as it leaves its mark there.” N. Friedman, Form and Meaning, 152–53.
54. “Having eliminated the author and then the narrator, we are now ready to dispose of mental states altogether.” N. Friedman, Form and Meaning, 155.
55. Stanzel’s two most important books have been translated into English: Narrative Situations in the Novel: “Tom Jones,” “Moby-Dick,” “The Ambassadors,” “Ulysses,” trans. J. Pusack (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1971); and A Theory of Narrative, trans. Charlotte Goedsche (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).
56. Dorrit Cohn, “The Encirclement of Narrative: On Franz Stanzel’s Theorie des Erzählens,” Poetics Today 2, no. 2 (1981): 157–82.
57. Franz K. Stanzel, “A Low-Structuralist at Bay? Further Thoughts on A Theory of Narrative,” Poetics Today 11, no. 4 (1990): 805–16. Stanzel refers (808) to the Ulysses chapter we quote here, but the interpretation of the fragments is our development of Stanzel’s suggestions.
58. Joyce, Ulysses, 150.
1. The issue also appeared as a book: L’analyse structurale du récit (Paris: Seuil, 1981).
2. Tzvetan Todorov, Grammaire du Décaméron (The Hague: Mouton, 1969), 10 (our translation).
3. Vladimir Propp, Morphology of the Folktale, 2nd ed., trans. Laurence Scott, rev. Louis A. Wagner (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1968). The original Russian edition appeared in 1928. Claude Bremond begins his classic study Logique du récit (Paris: Seuil, 1973) with a long chapter entitled “The Propp Legacy” (9–128), in which he shows how Propp has influenced the narrative theories developed by Greimas, Todorov, and of course Bremond himself.
4. Oswald Ducrot, Tzvetan Todorov, Dan Sperber, Moustafa Safouan, and François Wahl, Qu’est-ce que le structuralisme? (Paris: Seuil, 1968), 102.
5. A summary description of the three levels is available in Gérard Genette, Narrative Discourse: An Essay in Method, trans. Jane E. Lewin (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1980), 27.
6. A. J. Greimas, On Meaning: Selected Writings in Semiotic Theory, trans. Paul J. Perron and Frank H. Collins (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 121ff.
7. Rimmon-Kenan criticizes Greimas for reducing the entire literary production by the French authors Georges Bernanos and Guy de Maupassant to such a square. Rimmon-Kenan, Narrative Fiction, 12–13.
8. Jonathan Culler, Structuralist Poetics: Structuralism, Linguistics and the Study of Literature (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1975), 20–24.
9. Roland Barthes, “Introduction to the Structural Analysis of Narratives,” in Image-Music-Text, ed. and trans. Stephen Heath (Glasgow: Fontana/Collins, 1977), 79–124 (81).
10. We will illustrate these reproaches in our discussion of the separate textual levels. A general critique of structuralist spatialization is offered in Andrew Gibson, Towards a Postmodern Theory of Narrative (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1996), 1–8.
11. The most important narratological works by Genette are Narrative Discourse (originally published in French, 1972), Narrative Discourse Revisited (originally published in French, 1983), and Fiction and Diction, trans. C. Porter (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), which originally appeared in French in 1991. Mieke Bal’s Narratology: Introduction to the Theory of Narrative, 3rd ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009), is a newly revised version of the English translation (by Christine Van Boheemen) of her Dutch-language monograph, De theorie van vertellen en verhalen, 2nd ed. (Muiderberg: Coutinho, 1980). Finally, Rimmon-Kenan’s main contribution is Narrative Fiction, a second, slightly extended edition of which came out in 2002. Unless stated otherwise, we use and quote the first edition.
12. See, for example, Boris Tomashevsky, “Thematics,” in Russian Formalist Criticism: Four Essays, ed. Lee T. Lemon and Marion J. Reis (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1965), 61–95. His essay was originally published in Russian in 1925.
13. Tomashevsky, “Thematics,” 66–78.
14. See Barthes, “Introduction to the Structural Analysis of Narratives,” esp. 87ff.
15. Roman Jakobson, “Two Aspects of Language and Two Types of Aphasic Disturbances,” in Fundamentals of Language, by Roman Jakobson and Morris Halle (The Hague: Mouton, 1956), 67–96.
16. Ian Fleming, “From a View to a Kill,” in For Your Eyes Only (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1989), 7–37.
17. Fleming, “From a View to a Kill,” 7, 9.
18. Propp, Morphology of the Folktale, 25–83.
19. Umberto Eco, “Narrative Structure in Fleming,” in The Poetics of Murder: Detective Fiction and Literary Theory, ed. Glenn Most and William W. Stowe (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanich, 1983), 93–117.
20. Tzvetan Todorov, The Poetics of Prose, trans. Richard Howard (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1977), 111.
21. Joseph Courtés, Analyse sémiotique du discours: De l’énoncé à l’énonciation (Paris: Hachette, 1991), 100. See also Dirk De Geest, “La sémiotique narrative de A. J. Greimas,” Image and Narrative 5 (2003), http://www.imageandnarrative.be/inarchive/uncanny/dirkdegeest.htm.
22. Bremond, Logique du récit, 33.
23. Emma Kafalenos, Narrative Causalities (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2006), 7. Just like Todorov and Propp, Kafalenos sees functions as interactions between actants and events. Her schema starts with a “destabilizing event,” continues with a “request that someone alleviate” this event (7), and finally, after various actions, leads to success or failure of the attempted alleviation.
24. Kafalenos, Narrative Causalities, ix.
25. Bremond, Logique du récit, 135.
26. A. J. Greimas, Structural Semantics: An Attempt at Method, trans. D. McDowell, R. Schlefier, and A. Velie (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983).
27. Cok van der Voort, “De analyse van verhalend proza,” in Literatuur en context: Een inleiding in de literatuurwetenschap, ed. Peter Zeeman (Nijmegen: Sun, 1991), 24–58 (41). Mieke Bal translates destinateur as “power” (Narratology, 204), but we prefer Van der Voort’s more neutral term.
28. Ruth Amossy and Anne Herschberg Pierrot, Stéréotypes et clichés: Langue, discours, société (Paris: Armand Colin, 2014), 4–29. We have dealt with the narrative processing of these cultural stereotypes in Luc Herman and Bart Vervaeck “A Theory of Narrative in Culture,” Poetics Today 38, no. 4 (2017): 605–34. See also the section on cultural narratology in chapter 3.
29. See, for example, Martin, Recent Theories of Narrative, 117.
30. Forster, Aspects of the Novel, 73.
31. Rimmon-Kenan, Narrative Fiction, 41.
32. Chatman, Story and Discourse, 126 ff.
33. M. M. Bakhtin, “Forms of Time and of the Chronotope in the Novel,” in The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays, ed. Michael Holquist, trans. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981), 84–258.
34. Bakhtin, “Forms of Time,” 99.
35. “Thus the chronotope, functioning as the primary means for materializing time in space, emerges as a center for concretizing representation, as a force giving body to the entire novel. All the novel’s abstract elements—philosophical and social generalizations, ideas, analyses of cause and effect—gravitate toward the chronotope and through it take on flesh and blood, permitting the imaging power of art to do its work.” Bakhtin, “Forms of Time,” 250.
36. “The chronotope in literature has an intrinsic generic signficance. It can even be said that it is precisely the chronotope that defines genre and generic distinctions.” Bakhtin, “Forms of Time,” 84–85. After an overview of historical developments in the novel and its concomitant chronotopes, Bakhtin concludes, “The chronotopes we have discussed provide the basis for distinguishing generic types; they lie at the heart of specific varieties of the novel genre, formed and developed over the course of many centuries” (250–51).
37. Bakhtin, “Forms of Time,” 165, 225.
38. Fleming, “From a View to a Kill,” 37.
39. Chatman, Story and Discourse, 26.
40. Ruth Ronen, “Space in Fiction,” Poetics Today 7, no. 3 (1986): 421–38 (423).
41. Gabriel Zoran, “Toward a Theory of Space in Narrative,” Poetics Today 5, no. 2 (1984): 309–34 (310).
42. Zoran, “Toward a Theory of Space,” 315.
43. See also Katrin Dennerlein, Narratologie des Raumes (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2009), 23–37. We will return to Dennerlein in chapter 3 when we discuss possible worlds and storyworlds.
44. See A. J. Greimas, Maupassant: The Semiotics of Text; Practical Exercises, trans. Paul Perron (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 1988), 76–100.
45. Bal, Narratology, 219–21.
46. See Christel van Boheemen-Saaf, “Deconstructivisme,” in Vormen van literatuurwetenschap: Moderne richtingen en hun mogelijkheden voor tekstinterpretatie, ed. R. T. Segers (Groningen: Wolters-Noordhoff, 1985), 229–47 (243–44).
47. See esp. Juri Lotman, Analysis of the Poetic Text, trans. D. Barton Johnson (Ann Arbor MI: Ardis, 1976).
48. Genette, Narrative Discourse, 33–160.
49. Günther Müller’s article, “Erzählzeit und erzählte Zeit,” appeared for the first time in Festschrift Paul Kluckhohn und Hermann Schneider (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1948), 195–212. It was also incorporated into Günther Müller, Morphologische Poetik: Gesammelte Aufsätze (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1968), 269–86.
50. Bal, Narratology, 100.
51. Gerard Reve, Het boek van violet en dood (Amsterdam: Veen, 1996), 7.
52. Multatuli, Max Havelaar, or the Coffee Auctions of the Dutch Trading Company, trans. Roy Edwards (London: Penguin Books, 1987), 64.
53. Multatuli, Max Havelaar, 133.
54. Bal, Narratology, 99.
55. Gérard Genette, “Discours du récit: Essai de méthode,” in Figures III (Paris: Seuil, 1972), 90. The Lewin translation (Genette, Narrative Discourse, 48ff) uses “first narrative,” which creates the wrong impression of enumeration.
56. See, for example, Meir Sternberg, Expositional Modes and Temporal Ordering in Fiction (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978).
57. Eberhard Lämmert, Bauformen des Erzählens (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1955).
58. Marcel Proust, Remembrance of Things Past: Swann’s Way, trans. Scott Moncrieff (New York: Knopf, 1982), 3.
59. Fleming, “From a View to a Kill,” 10–11.
60. Gijs IJlander, Een fabelachtig uitzicht (Utrecht: Veen, 1990), 167–73, 212–13.
61. Roland Barthes, S/Z: An Essay, trans. Richard Miller (New York: Hill and Wang, 1974), 67.
62. Barthes, S/Z, 191.
63. Philippe Hamon, “Pour un statut sémiologique du personnage,” Littérature 6, no. 2 (1972): 86–110. We will cite the updated version printed in Roland Barthes, Wolfgang Kayser, Wayne Booth, and Philippe Hamon, Poétique du récit (Paris: Seuil, 1977), 115–80.
64. Hamon, “Pour un statut,” 125–36.
65. Rimmon-Kenan, Narrative Fiction, 59–70. See note 71 below for our departure from Rimmon-Kenan.
66. Bal calls this type “explicit” characterization. Bal, Narratology, 131–32.
67. Gerard Reve, Het hijgend hert (Amsterdam: Veen, 1998), 32.
68. William Faulkner, “A Rose for Emily,” Selected Short Stories of William Faulkner (New York: Modern Library, 1961), 49–61. Pierre Bourdieu connects the misleading characterization in this story with the socially constructed expectations of the reader. See Bourdieu, The Rules of Art: Genesis and Structure of the Literary Field, trans. Susan Emanuel (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), 322–30.
69. Bal calls this type “implicit” characterization. Bal, Narratology, 131–32.
70. Willem Brakman, Ansichten uit Amerika (Amsterdam: Querido, 1981), 25, 21, 74.
71. Here we depart from Rimmon-Kenan. She considers characterizations on the basis of name and environment to be a form of analogy, whereas we see name and environment as elements contiguous to the character. For us, these descriptions therefore belong to metonymic characterization.
72. Theodor W. Adorno, “Notes on Kafka,” in Prisms, trans. Samuel Weber and Shierry Weber (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1981), 243ff.
73. Rimmon-Kenan, Narrative Fiction, 68–69.
74. Uri Margolin, “Individuals in Narrative Worlds: An Ontological Perspective,” Poetics Today 11, no. 4 (1990): 843–71 (862).
75. Margolin, “Individuals in Narrative Worlds,” 857–64.
76. Bal, Narratology, 133.
77. Hamon, “Pour un statut,” 154–65.
78. For an extensive formulation of this criticism, see Gibson, Towards a Postmodern Theory, 69–104, 236–44.
79. Bal, Narratology, 149.
80. He writes, “Mieke Bal seems to have—and sometimes to attribute to me [ . . . ]—the idea that every narrative statement includes a focalizer (character) and a focalized (character). [ . . . ] For me, there is no focalizing or focalized character.” Genette, Narrative Discourse Revisited, 72–73.
81. Genette’s and Bal’s views on focalization are discussed in Pierre Vitoux, “Le jeu de la focalisation,” Poétique 51 (1982): 359–68. Vitoux rightly mentions “the double necessity” (362) not only of distinguishing between the subject and object of focalization for the sake of analysis but also of studying them together to see how they interrelate.
82. Apart from internal and external focalization, Genette also conceives of “zero focalization”; see Genette, Narrative Discourse, 189. In this respect, we prefer to follow Bal and Rimmon-Kenan, who show that such a triad confuses the focalizer with the focalized. External focalization in Genette is in fact the perception that limits itself to the outside of things, and according to Bal and Rimmon-Kenan, this is a matter of the focalized rather than of the focalizer. The latter can be internal in the case of Genette’s external focalization since a character too can limit his or her perception to the outside of things; see Rimmon-Kenan, Narrative Fiction, 74; and Bal, Narratology, 145–64. In order to avoid the confusion between external focalizer and externally focalized object, Vitoux proposes to describe the external focalizer as the “non-delegated” agent of perception (who is situated on the highest level in the narrative) and the internal focalizer as the “delegated” one (perception is delegated to a “lower” agent, a character); see Vitoux, “Le jeu de la focalisation,” 360. For a lucid presentation of the various views and problems in connection with focalization, see Manfred Jahn, “Windows of Focalization: Deconstructing and Reconstructing a Narratological Concept,” Style 30, no. 2 (1996): 241–67.
83. Edgar Allan Poe, “Metzengerstein,” in The Complete Works of Edgar Allan Poe: Volume II, Tales 1, ed. James Harrison (New York: AMS Press, 1965), 185–96 (188).
84. Brakman, Een weekend in Oostende, 39.
85. Brakman, Een weekend in Oostende, 44.
86. Brakman, Een weekend in Oostende, 46.
87. Huub Beurskens, “Suikerpruimen” gevolgd door “Het lam” (Amsterdam: Meulenhoff, 1997), 9–10.
88. See William Edmiston, “Focalization and the First-Person Narrator: A Revision of the Theory,” Poetics Today 10, no. 4 (1989): 729–44. This article contains an excellent summary of the views developed by Genette, Bal, Cohn, and Rimmon-Kenan in connection with focalization. In his book Hindsight and Insight: Focalization in Four Eighteenth-Century French Novels (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1991), Edmiston develops his suggestions and provides an interesting overview in “The Evolution of the Concept of Focalization” (147–69).
89. Beurskens, “Suikerpruimen,” 45.
90. Genette, Narrative Discourse, 189–90.
91. Beurskens, “Suikerpruimen,” 49.
92. Beurskens, “Suikerpruimen,” 70–71.
93. Rimmon-Kenan, Narrative Fiction, 77–82.
94. Malcolm Lowry, Under the Volcano (London: Picador, 1990), 3.
95. Louis Paul Boon, Minuet, trans. Adrienne Dixon (New York: Persea Books, 1979), 9.
96. Rimmon-Kenan, Narrative Fiction, 77–78. Vitoux submits that an internal focalizer may well speculate about the thoughts and feelings of others but that such a speculation in fact amounts to a transgression of the norm since it is normally reserved for the nondelegated focalizer, that is, the one who perceives from the highest level of the narrative. Vitoux, “Le jeu de la focalisation,” 363. He is followed in this suggestion by Edmiston, who uses Genette’s term “paralepsis” (Narrative Discourse, 207–11) “for this type of infraction, in which the narrating self says more than he could possibly know.” Edmiston, “Focalization and the First-Person Narrator,” 741. Note that Edmiston describes this special case of focalization in terms of narration. As we will see, the distinction between narrating self and experiencing self is not as rigorous as the structuralists would wish.
97. Brouwers, Sunken Red, 54–55.
98. Rimmon-Kenan (Narrative Fiction, 81–82) does not connect the ideological and psychological aspects. Since we conceive of the psychological aspect in its broadest sense, we incorporate the cognitive, emotional, and ideological aspects into this category. In all three cases perceptions reflect the inner world of the focalizer, while in the case of the spatiotemporal aspects, the emphasis was on the outside world.
99. Paul Dawson unravels the intricacies of this combination of voice with focalization and critically discusses various views on the topic in his article “The Return of Omniscience in Contemporary Fiction,” Narrative 17, no. 2 (2009): 143–61 (esp. 144–49). In his “Real Authors and Real Readers: Omniscient Narration and a Discursive Approach to the Narrative Communication Model,” Journal of Narrative Theory 42, no. 1 (2012): 91–116, Dawson claims that omniscience cannot be captured by separating focalization from narration. It requires a combination of these two into a rhetorical strategy that must be traced to the author: “I will make the claim that focalization or perspective in the broadest sense should be assimilated into the category of voice and approached as a rhetorical strategy of the narrator” (98–99). The narrator’s authority (including his supposed omniscience) is linked to the author’s: “we must investigate the rhetorical strategies that authors employ as public figures, not just those employed by narrators” (105). So, like many recent narrative theories, Dawson’s “discursive narratology” (108) reintroduces the author as a central participant in narrative communication. His monograph The Return of the Omniscient Narrator: Authorship and Authority in Twenty-First Century Fiction (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2013) elaborates this view and links it to the resurrection of the omniscient and highly visible narrator in the wake of postmodernism. To Dawson, omniscient narration is “a legacy in mainstream fiction of postmodern experiments with narrative voice” (Return of the Omniscient Narrator, 247).
100. Louis Ferron, De Walsenkoning: Een duik in het autobiografische diepe (Amsterdam: Bezige Bij, 1993), 83.
101. Umberto Eco, in “Narrative Structure in Fleming,” connects this Manichean ideology to the Cold War.
102. Hamburger, Logic of Literature, 64–81.
103. Mulisch, Voer voor psychologen, 104.
104. See Vitoux, “Le jeu de la focalisation,” 365. Gérard Cordesse, in “Narration et focalisation,” Poétique 76 (1988): 487–98, systematizes the “articulation of narration and focalization” (489) by distinguishing between focalization under a heterodiegetic regime and focalization under a homodiegetic regime; these terms will be defined in the following section, on narration. As a result, focalizer types are usefully connected with narrator types.
105. For the term “narrating instance,” see, for example, Genette, Narrative Discourse, 212.
106. See, for example, Gibson, Towards a Postmodern Theory, 143–78. Jonathan Culler too has criticized the anthropomorphism of such theories and especially of speech-act narratology. See Culler, “Problems in the Theory of Fiction,” Diacritics 14, no. 1 (1984): 2–11.
107. Ivan Turgenev, “Asya,” in First Love, and Other Stories, trans. with introduction and notes by Richard Freeborn (Oxford: Oxford Paperbacks, 1999), 100–143 (100).
108. Edgar Allan Poe, “The Cask of Amontillado,” in Selected Tales, ed. Julian Symons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 278–83 (278).
109. Louis Paul Boon, Chapel Road, trans. Adrienne Dixon (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1972), 257–58.
110. I. L. Pfeijffer, Het ware leven, een roman (Amsterdam: Arbeiderspers, 2006), 291.
111. Genette, Narrative Discourse, 234–37.
112. Rimmon-Kenan, Narrative Fiction, 92; Genette, Narrative Discourse, 227–34.
113. Lucien Dällenbach, The Mirror in the Text, trans. Jeremy Whiteley with Emma Hughes (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989), 35.
114. Brakman, Een weekend in Oostende, 52.
115. Genette, Narrative Discourse, 245.
116. Van der Voort, “De analyse van verhalend proza,” 44.
117. Cohn, “Encirclement of Narrative,” 159–60.
118. Brakman, Een weekend in Oostende, 50.
119. Genette, Narrative Discourse, 216–23.
120. Mulisch, Voer voor psychologen, 89–231.
121. Rimmon-Kenan, Narrative Fiction, 96.
122. Luc Herman and Bart Vervaeck, “Didn’t Know Any Better: Race and Unreliable Narration in ‘Low-Lands’ by Thomas Pynchon,” in Narrative Unreliability in the Twentieth-Century First-Person Novel, ed. Elke D’hoker and Gunther Martens (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2008), 231–47. In an early article Ansgar Nünning defined unreliability as “the discrepancy between the intentions and value system of the narrator and the fore-knowledge and norms of the reader.” Nünning, “‘But why will you say that I am mad?,’” 87. In a later contribution he reinstated the central role of the author as the “constructive agent who builds into the text explicit signals and tacit assumptions for the authorial or hypothetical ideal audience.” Nünning, “Reconceptualizing Unreliable Narration: Synthesizing Cognitive and Rhetorical Approaches,” in A Companion to Narrative Theory, ed. James Phelan and Peter J. Rabinowitz (London: Blackwell, 2005), 89–107 (100). In our view, neither the author nor the text can force the reader to accept the (un)reliability of a narrator.
123. Lanser, Narrative Act, 86.
124. Lanser, Narrative Act, 166.
125. Lanser admits this: “I expect that other theorists will be able to supplement these ‘status symbols,’ and I would caution against any premature closure of the system.” Lanser, Narrative Act, 173. She also believes status does not suffice to characterize the narrator and therefore adds two other categories: contact (the type and form of the relationship between narrator and narratee) and stance (the type and form of the relationship between the narrator, his or her characters, and the narrated world).
126. We borrow the term “visual narrator” from Peter Verstraten, Film Narratology, trans. Stefan van der Lecq (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009), 96–124. In film, there is also an auditive narrator (125–45), but this narrative agent is obviously not present in comic books.
127. Rimmon-Kenan, Narrative Fiction, 106–16.
128. Beurskens, “Suikerpruimen,” 76.
129. Beurskens, “Suikerpruimen,” 78.
130. Brian McHale, “Free Indirect Discourse: A Survey of Recent Accounts,” PTL: A Journal for Descriptive Poetics and Theory of Literature 3, no. 2 (1978): 249–87.
131. Joyce, Ulysses, 197.
132. Meir Sternberg uses the term “direct-speech fallacy” to describe the mistaken prejudice that direct speech would be a faithful and exact representation of words and thoughts: “From the premise that direct speech (unlike the indirect and other kinds of quotation, let alone the narrative of events) can reproduce the original speaker’s words, it neither follows that it must perforce do so nor that it ought to do so nor, of course, that it actually does so.” Sternberg, “Point of View and the Indirections of Direct Speech,” Language and Style 15, no. 2 (1982): 67–117 (68).
133. Monika Fludernik, The Fictions of Language and the Languages of Fiction: The Linguistic Representation of Speech and Consciousness (London: Routledge, 1993), 17, 19.
134. Fludernik, Fictions of Language, 389–433.
135. Fludernik, Fictions of Language, 446–53.
136. Beurskens, “Suikerpruimen,” 10
137. Beurskens, “Suikerpruimen,” 70.
138. The term is somewhat misleading since “the original” does not refer to a reality that exists prior to representation but to the created impression that we are dealing with the representation of an original reality. Originality is the effect of a strategy instead of its point of departure.
139. The term was coined by Roy Pascal in The Dual Voice: Free Indirect Speech and Its Functioning in the Nineteenth-Century European Novel (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1977). A fine summary of the dual-voice approaches is available in Fludernik, Fictions of Language, 322–56.
140. See M. M. Bakhtin, “Discourse in the Novel,” The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays, ed. Michael Holquist, trans. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981), 259–422.
141. Ann Banfield, Unspeakable Sentences: Narration and Representation in the Language of Fiction (Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982).
142. This view derives from the idea that every form of personal expression inevitably includes impersonal patterns: “One can even go on to consider the linguistic expression of emotionality, or of consciousness itself, to be of an intrinsically pre-patterned nature. It then becomes possible to identify both lexical and syntactic expressivity as a strategy of typification or symbolization, employed to symbolize the non-linguistic ([free] indirect) discourse of emotion within the boundaries of linguistic consciousness.” Fludernik, Fictions of Language, 426.
143. Genette uses Hunger, by Knut Hamsun, as his example of quoted monologue. After a critical discussion of the position such a monologue occupies for Cohn and Stanzel, he develops a diagram in which this form of consciousness representation appears as extradiegetic, homodiegetic, and internally focalized. See Genette, Narrative Discourse Revisited, 128.
144. Genette, Narrative Discourse, 174.
145. The letter and the answer to it were published as Dorrit Cohn and Gérard Genette, “A Narratological Exchange,” in Neverending Stories: Toward a Critical Narratology, ed. Ann Fehn, Ingeborg Hoesterey, and Maria Tatar (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 258–66.
146. Genette writes, “My point is not that it belongs to hetero- rather than to homodiegesis; I simply refuse to ‘assign’ it to either, i.e. to say that it belongs to one form rather than to another.” Cohn and Genette, “Narratological Exchange,” 264.
147. “In the ‘Penelope’ section of Ulysses, for example, the ruminations are totally those of Molly Bloom, in her own words (or sounds). She is not functioning as narrator, not telling anyone a story after the fact, but simply carrying on normal thinking processes in the present story moment. The thought stream is simply quoted by a totally effaced narrator.” Chatman, Coming to Terms, 147.
148. For an example of a second-degree narrative with an intradiegetic narrator, Genette mentions “any kind of recollection that a character has (in a dream or not).” Genette, Narrative Discourse, 231.
1. Jan Baetens, “Nouvelle narratologie, nouveau récit/New Narratology, New Story,” Questions de Communication 31 (2017): 231–43.
2. For an overview, see Martin Kreiswirth, “Narrative Turn in the Humanities,” in Routledge Encyclopedia of Narrative Theory, ed. David Herman, Manfred Jahn, and Marie-Laure Ryan (London: Routledge, 2005), 377–82. An early mention can be found in Christopher Norris, Contest of Faculties: Philosophy and Theory after Deconstruction (London: Methuen, 1985), 20–22. A recent contribution that pays attention to the paradoxes between theory and context (including the French nouveau roman) is Hanna Meretoja, The Narrative Turn in Fiction and Theory: The Crisis and Return of Storytelling from Robbe-Grillet to Tournier (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).
3. See, for instance, Hayden White, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973); and Jerome Bruner, “The Narrative Construction of Reality,” Critical Inquiry 18, no. 1 (1991): 1–21.
4. Raphaël Baroni, “L’empire de la narratologie, ses défis et ses faiblesses,” Questions de Communication 29 (2016): 1–20.
5. Roy Sommer, “The Merger of Classical and Postclassical Narratologies and the Consolidated Future of Narrative Theory,” DIEGESIS 1, no. 1 (2012): 143–57 (esp. 144).
6. Baroni, “L’empire de la narratologie,” 1. Interestingly, Sommer talks about narratology’s “near-death experience of a predominantly poststructuralist fin-de-siècle.” Sommer, “Merger of Classical and Postclassical Narratologies,” 144.
7. Sommer, “Merger of Classical and Postclassical Narratologies,” 154.
8. David Herman, “Introduction: Narratologies,” in Narratologies: New Perspectives on Narrative Analysis, ed. David Herman (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1999), 1–30.
9. See Sommer, “Merger of Classical and Postclassical Narratologies.”
10. Sommer, “Merger of Classical and Postclassical Narratologies,” 153.
11. A prime example of anthropological narratology can be found in Northrop Frye, The Great Code: The Bible and Literature (London: Ark, 1981), in which the author considers biblical metaphors and narrative procedures as the starting points for (literary) narratives.
12. See René Girard’s works Deceit, Desire, and the Novel: Self and Other in Literary Structure, trans. Yvonne Freccero (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1965); The Scapegoat, trans. Yvonne Freccero (London: Athlone Press, 1986); and Things Hidden since the Foundation of the World, trans. Stephen Bann and Michael Metteer (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987).
13. Albrecht Koschorke, Wahrheit und Erfindung: Grundzüge einer Allgemeinen Erzähltheorie (Frankfurt: S. Fischer Verlag, 2012).
14. Koschorke, Wahrheit und Erfindung, 21 (our translation).
15. Koschorke, Wahrheit und Erfindung, 351 (our translation).
16. For Freudian narratology, see Peter Brooks’s Reading for the Plot: Design and Intention in Narrative (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984); and his Psychoanalysis and Storytelling (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994). For Lacanian narratology, see, for example, Robert Con Davis, ed., Lacan and Narration: The Psychoanalytic Difference in Narrative Theory (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983). Since the 1990s trauma theory has become dominant in this field; see Irene Kacandes, “Trauma Theory,” in Routledge Encyclopedia of Narrative Theory, ed. David Herman, Manfred Jahn, and Marie-Laure Ryan (London: Routledge, 2005), 615–19.
17. See, for example, the research reported on in the journals Journal of Memory and Language, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition, and Poetics.
18. Gordon H. Bower and Daniel G. Morrow, “Mental Models in Narrative Comprehension,” Science 247, no. 4938 (1990): 44–48; Richard Gerrig, Experiencing Narrative Worlds: On the Psychological Activities of Reading (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993).
19. Anthony J. Sanford and Catherine Emmott, Mind, Brain and Narrative (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
20. Sanford and Emmott, Mind, Brain and Narrative, 19.
21. The path-breaking article in this respect is William Labov and Joshua Waletzky, “Narrative Analysis: Oral Versions of Personal Experience,” in Essays on the Verbal and the Visual, ed. June Helm (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1967), 354–96.
22. See Franco Moretti’s Maps, Graphs, Trees (New York: Verso, 2005); and his Distant Reading (New York: Verso: 2013). Moretti often visualizes the results of his investigations (e.g., through graphs, to illustrate genre change in the historical novel), which enhances the positivist outlook of his inquiries.
23. Inderjeet Mani, “Computational Narratology,” in Handbook of Narratology, ed. Hühn et al., 84–92 (84).
24. Jan Christoph Meister, Computing Action: A Narratological Approach (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2003).
25. Meister, Computing Action, 211.
26. Annelen Brunner, Automatische Erkennung von Redewiedergabe: Ein Beitrag zur quantitativen Narratologie (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2015).
27. Brunner, Automatische Erkennung von Redewiedergabe, 305 (our translation).
28. Brunner, Automatische Erkennung von Redewiedergabe, 310 (our translation).
29. Jonathan Gottschall, The Storytelling Animal: How Stories Make Us Human (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2012).
30. Marie-Laure Ryan, “Narration in Various Media,” in Handbook of Narratology, ed. Hühn et al., 468–88 (475).
31. Werner Wolf, “Towards a Functional Analysis of Intermediality: The Case of Twentieth-Century Musicalized Fiction,” in Cultural Functions of Intermedial Exploration, ed. Erik Hedling and Ulla-Britte Lagerroth (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2002), 15–34 (15).
32. Ryan, “Narration in Various Media,” 471.
33. This means, for instance, that we will not cover film narratology (see Verstraten, Film Narratology) or audionarratology (see Jarmila Mildorf and Till Kinzel, eds., Audionarratology: Interfaces of Sound and Narrative [Berlin: De Gruyter, 2016]).
34. Marie-Laure Ryan, ed., Narrative across Media: The Languages of Storytelling (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2004), 17–18. See also Marie-Laure Ryan, “Story/Worlds/Media: Tuning the Instruments of a Media-Conscious Narratology,” in Storyworlds across Media: Toward a Media-Conscious Narratology, ed. Marie-Laure Ryan and Jan-Noël Thon (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2014), 25–49 (29–31).
35. The final component is described as “die Medienangebote, deren Produktion, Distribution, Rezeption und Verarbeitung eindeutig von den drei anderen Komponenten geprägt ist.” Siegfried J. Schmidt, Kalte Faszination: Medien, Kultur, Wissenschaft in der Mediengesellschaft (Weilerswist: Velbrück Wissenschaft, 2000), 95. See also Jan-Noël Thon, “Mediality,” in The Johns Hopkins Guide to Digital Media, ed. Marie-Laure Ryan, Lori Emerson, and Benjamin J. Robertson (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014), 334–37 (334).
36. Marie-Laure Ryan discusses media as “Semiotic Phenomena,” as “Technologies,” and as “Cultural Practices” in those three chapters of her book Avatars of Story (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2006), 16–25.
37. Irina O. Rajewsky, “Intermediality, Intertextuality, and Remediation: A Literary Perspective on Intermediality,” Intermédialités/Intermedialities 6 (2005): 43–64 (46).
38. Werner Wolf, “Intermediality,” in Routledge Encyclopedia of Narrative Theory, ed. David Herman, Manfred Jahn, and Marie-Laure Ryan (London: Routledge, 2005), 252–56 (254).
39. Günther Kress and Theo van Leeuwen, Multimodal Discourse: The Modes and Media of Contemporary Communication (London: Arnold, 2001).
40. Lars Ellerström proposes a sophisticated view of modality and mediality in “The Modalities of Media: A Model for Understanding Intermedial Relations,” in Media Borders, Multimodality and Intermediality, ed. Lars Ellerström (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 11–48 (esp. 17–24). See also Ruth Page, ed., New Perspectives on Narrative and Multimodality (New York: Routledge, 2010).
41. Page, New Perspectives on Narrative and Multimodality, 5.
42. Wolf, “Intermediality,” 254.
43. Wolf, “Intermediality,” 254.
44. Ryan criticizes the term “multimedia media” for this kind of intermediality. See Ryan, “Story/Worlds/Media,” 26–27.
45. Wolf, “Intermediality,” 253. See also Rajewsky, “Intermediality, Intertextuality, and Remediation,” 46.
46. Irina O. Rajewsky, “Border Talks: The Problematic Status of Media Borders in the Current Debate about Intermediality,” in Media Borders, ed. Ellerström, 51–68 (esp. 63–64).
47. Ryan, “Narration in Various Media,” 470.
48. Van Leavenworth, “The Developing Storyworld of H. P. Lovecraft,” in Storyworlds across Media, ed. Ryan and Thon, 332–50 (345).
49. Marie-Laure Ryan and Jan-Noël Thon, “Storyworlds across Media: Introduction,” in Storyworlds across Media, ed. Ryan and Thon, 1–21 (4).
50. Eero Tarasti, “Music as a Narrative Art,” in Narrative across Media, ed. Ryan, 283–304. The same volume contains the excellent “Overview of the Music and Narrative Field,” by Emma Kafalenos (275–82). See also Byron Almén, A Theory of Musical Narrative (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008).
51. See the chapter “Narrators across Media,” in Jan-Noël Thon, Transmedial Narratology and Contemporary Media Culture (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2016), 123–220.
52. Rajewsky, “Intermediality, Intertextuality, and Remediation,” 54–64.
53. From the viewpoint of cognitive studies, David Ciccoricco presents a detailed analysis of novels, digital fiction, and video games in his Refiguring Minds in Narrative Media (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2015).
54. Espen J. Aarseth, Cybertext: Perspectives on Ergodic Literature (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 1.
55. N. Katherine Hayles, in Electronic Literature: New Horizons for the Literary (Notre Dame IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2008), modifies the five characteristics proposed by Lev Manovich for the new media (numerical representation, modularity, automation, variability, and cultural transcoding); see Manovich, The Language of New Media (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2001), 27–49. Hayles lists “four major characteristics of digital text”: layeredness, multimodality, difference between storage and performance, and fractured temporality (Electronic Literature, 163–65). Aarseth (Cybertext, 58–67) uses seven variables as the basis of a classification system that leaves room for both traditional and digital texts (and many other text types and media). These variables include how dynamic a text is (as opposed to static texts, as on a printed page, which remain unchanged), personal perspective (requiring the reader-player to become a character in the story), and user functions (stretching beyond the interpretive role of the traditional reader). They are elaborated and modified by Markku Eskelinen in Cybertext Poetics: The Critical Landscape of New Media Literary Theory (London: Continuum, 2012), 20–23, 74–79.
56. Gérard Genette, Palimpsests: Literature in the Second Degree, trans. Channa Newman and Claude Doubinsky (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1998). For a study of postmodern rewriting, see Christian Moraru, Rewriting: Postmodern Narrative and Cultural Critique in the Age of Cloning (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001). Moraru makes the link with cybernarratology in the chapter entitled “The Pleasure of the Hypertext” (117–23).
57. George Landow’s most influential publication is Hypertext: The Convergence of Contemporary Critical Theory and Technology (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992).
58. Jaron Lanier and Frank Biocca, “An Insider’s View of the Future of Virtual Reality,” Journal of Communications 42, no. 4 (1992): 150–72. Marie-Laure Ryan writes that “though virtual reality is the term that has captured the imagination of the general public, arguably because of the poetic appeal of its built-in oxymoron, the scientific community prefers terms such as artificial reality (the physico-spatial equivalent of artificial intelligence) or virtual environments. The official technical journal of the field, Presence, is subtitled Teleoperators and Virtual Environments.” Ryan, Narrative as Virtual Reality, 358.
59. Marie-Laure Ryan, Narrative as Virtual Reality 2: Revisiting Immersion and Interactivity in Literature and Electronic Media (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2015), ix. Two further changes that induced Ryan to update her book are the fact that cybertext is no longer the central mode of ergodic literature and also the success of narrative theories that went beyond the realm of the text, into reference, reality, emotion, cognition, and so on. In the new edition Ryan makes extensive use of cognitive studies and finds room (in a new chapter, 137–59) for video games that seem to be non-narrative. Because we will deal with cognitive narratology later and since we will illustrate the tension between narrative and game through the work of Markku Eskelinen, we will mostly stick to the first edition of Ryan’s Narrative as Virtual Reality.
60. See Marie-Laure Ryan, “Cyberage Narratology: Computers, Metaphor, and Narrative,” in Narratologies, ed. D. Herman, 113–41; and Ryan’s “Cyberspace, Virtuality, and the Text,” in Cyberspace Textuality: Computer Technology and Literary Theory, ed. Marie-Laure Ryan (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), 78–107.
61. “I wish to challenge the recurrent practice of applying the theories of literary criticism to a new empirical field, seemingly without any reassessment of the terms and concepts involved. This lack of self-reflection places the research in direct danger of turning the vocabulary of literary theory into a set of unfocused metaphors.” Aarseth, Cybertext, 14.
62. “I refer to the idea of a narrative text as a labyrinth, a game, or an imaginary world [ . . . ]. The problem with these powerful metaphors, when they begin to affect the critic’s perspective and judgment, is that they enable a systematic misrepresentation [ . . . ] a spatiodynamic fallacy where the narrative is not perceived as a presentation of a world but rather as that world itself [ . . . ]. The study of cybertext reveals the misprision of the spaciodynamic [sic] metaphors of narrative theory [ . . . ]. It seems to me that the cybertexts fit the game-world-labyrinth terminology in a way that exposes its deficiencies when used on narrative texts.” Aarseth, Cybertext, 3–5.
63. Ryan, Narrative as Virtual Reality, 347–55. “Literary texts can thus be either self-reflexive or immersive, or they can alternate between these two stances through a game of in and out [ . . . ] but they cannot offer both experiences at the same time” (284). Roland Barthes introduces the term “writerly” text in S/Z, 4.
64. “The critical discourse that will secure the place of interactive texts in literary history may still remain to be invented, but it is not too early to derive from the hypertext some cognitive lessons about the nuts and bolts of the reading process.” Ryan, Narrative as Virtual Reality, 226.
65. Janet Murray, Hamlet on the Holodeck: The Future of Narrative in Cyberspace (New York: Free Press, 1997).
66. Eskelinen, Cybertext Poetics, 235.
67. See Britta Neitzel, “Narrativity of Computer Games,” in Handbook of Narratology, ed. Hühn et al., 608–22. For a primer on narratological and ludological approaches to ergodic literature, see Alice Bell, Astrid Ensslin, and Hans Kristian Rustad, eds., Analyzing Digital Fiction (New York: Routledge, 2014), 21–140.
68. Eskelinen, Cybertext Poetics, 135.
69. Eskelinen, Cybertext Poetics, 137.
70. Eskelinen, Cybertext Poetics, 169.
71. Eskelinen, Cybertext Poetics, 178.
72. Eskelinen, Cybertext Poetics, 184.
73. Eskelinen, Cybertext Poetics, 194.
74. Marie-Laure Ryan uses the term “dysfunctionality” to indicate cybertexts that do away with the narrative construction of a world in which the reader-player is to be immersed. Some computer games are then labeled as examples of “ludic dysfunctionality.” Ryan, Narrative as Virtual Reality 2, 154. Dysfunctional cybertexts “reject world aesthetics in favor of game aesthetics, thereby ostentatiously preventing immersion” (11). Ryan devotes a chapter (137–59) to such texts, which “are all dysfunctional with respect to standard narrativity and fictional world-creation” (138). Eskelinen’s Cybertext Poetics dates from 2012, so it does not deal with the revised edition of Narrative as Virtual Reality, but it is safe to say that Eskelinen is critical of Ryan’s approach to games. In her revised Narrative as Virtual Reality 2 (2015), Ryan mentions Eskelinen only once.
75. The term “comics” has some misleading connotations (e.g., that they are comical or just for entertainment) and is sometimes replaced with the more serious-sounding label “graphic novel.” However, the name “comics” is so widely used that we will stick to it. For a well-informed, nonpolemical discussion of the various labels and for a clear definition of the graphic novel, see Jan Baetens and Hugo Frey, The Graphic Novel: An Introduction (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), esp. 7–23.
76. Jared Gardner, Projections: Comics and the History of Twenty-First-Century Storytelling (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012), xi.
77. For excellent contextualized studies of the evolution of comics and of the theories surrounding that medium, see the already mentioned Baetens and Frey, Graphic Novel; Gardner, Projections; and Charles Hatfield, Alternative Comics: An Emerging Literature (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2005). Baetens and Frey in chapters 2–4 of Graphic Novel (27–100) deal with the evolution of the postwar graphic novel, including the interactions between the French, the English, and the American variants; in chapter 8 (191–216) they reveal the manifold interactions between comics and literary fiction. Gardner traces the changing relations between film and comics, and he unravels the transformations in their reception, both by the public and by the academic world. Hatfield discusses the development of “underground” experimental comics from the 1960s until the beginning of the twenty-first century. He too analyzes the various forms of reception (more detailed and theoretical in his concern with the reader’s experience of the comics’ form) and studies the genre in its relation to the literary domain.
78. “Comics, however, are first of all telling a story,” claims Karin Kukkonen in her Contemporary Comics Storytelling (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2013), 24. There are of course many “experimental” forms of comics, which go against classic narrativity. An interesting study of the seeming lack of narrativity and tellability in recent and canonized comics (including works by Lewis Trondheim, Chris Ware, and Adrian Tomine) is Greice Schneider, What Happens When Nothing Happens: Boredom and Everyday Life in Contemporary Comics (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2016). Thierry Groensteen discusses “abstract comics,” which “jettison narrative art,” in Comics and Narration, trans. Ann Miller (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2011), 9–20 (10). However, as Baetens and Frey demonstrate, many of these graphic experiments are not really “antinarrative or nonnarrative” but show “a greater awareness of the storytelling capacities of works that are no longer based on the representation of human or humanized characters and action-driven plots.” Baetens and Frey, Graphic Novel, 182.
79. Thierry Groensteen, The System of Comics, trans. Bart Beaty and Nick Nguyen (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2007), 160.
80. Groensteen, Comics and Narration, 80. Instead of the “narrator,” Groensteen proposes to talk about the “monstrator” (responsible for the visual presentation) and “reciter” (responsible for the linguistic part) as the two delegates of the ultimate or “fundamental narrator” (79–120, esp. 94–95).
81. Groensteen, System of Comics, 2.
82. Groensteen, System of Comics, 5.
83. Hannah Miodrag, Comics and Language: Reimagining Critical Discourse on the Form (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2013), esp. 3–58.
84. Groensteen, System of Comics, 2. However, in the final chapter of Comics and Narration (159–76), Groensteen does enter “the terrain of sociology of art, art history, and cultural history” (159) by looking at the links between comics and contemporary art.
85. Miodrag, who is generally very appreciative of Groensteen’s views, shows that language is central to many comics and that the workings of the medium cannot be understood without a theoretically sound analysis of its linguistic features. She distances herself from the metaphorical use of the word “language” in many comics studies, which tend to regard the visual system as “a language.” Instead she focuses on the multiplicity of relations between visual and linguistic systems by proposing different approaches for the different systems. For the linguistic track of comics she starts from Saussurean linguistics, while for the visual track she combines views taken mainly from visual art theory and film theory. Miodrag, Comics and Language, 169–245.
86. Groensteen, System of Comics, 161.
87. Groensteen, System of Comics, 12.
88. Groensteen, System of Comics, 6.
89. Groensteen, System of Comics, 128.
90. Gardner, Projections, 5.
91. Groensteen, System of Comics, 28–31.
92. Groensteen, Comics and Narration, 136.
93. Groensteen, Comics and Narration, 138.
94. Groensteen, Comics and Narration, 143, 149.
95. Eric S. Rabkin, “Reading Time in Graphic Narrative,” in Teaching the Graphic Novel, ed. Stephen E. Tabachnik (New York: Modern Language Association of America, 2009), 36–43.
96. Groensteen, System of Comics, 18; Groensteen, Comics and Narration, 33–35.
97. Groensteen, System of Comics, 24–35.
98. Groensteen, System of Comics, 21–23.
99. Groensteen, System of Comics, 103–21.
100. Groensteen, System of Comics, 110.
101. Hatfield, Alternative Comics, 48.
102. Miodrag, Comics and Language, 163.
103. Groensteen, System of Comics, 156–58.
104. Kai Mikkonen, The Narratology of Comic Art (New York: Routledge, 2017), 73–89, 153.
105. Achim Hescher, Reading Graphic Novels: Genre and Narration (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2016), 121.
106. Hescher, Reading Graphic Novels, 201.
107. François Jost, L’œuil-caméra: Entre film et roman (Lyon: Presses Universitaires de Lyon, 1987). Hescher discusses and adapts Jost’s system; see Hescher, Reading Graphic Novels, 122–43, 171–81.
108. Hescher, Reading Graphic Novels, 141. Kai Mikkonen discusses five techniques that make it clear to the reader that he or she is seeing things through the eyes of the character. See Mikkonen, Narratology of Comic Art, 166–68.
109. Ann Miller distinguishes five types of text; Hescher adds “tags.” See Ann Miller, Reading bande dessinée: Critical Approaches to French-Language Comic Strip (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 97–99. The narratologically and semiotically inspired analysis is just a small part of Miller’s approach, which also includes a history, a cultural studies approach, and an overview of subjectivity in comics (ranging from psychoanalysis to gender studies). See also Ann Miller and Bart Beaty, eds., The French Comics Theory Reader (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2014).
110. Hescher, Reading Graphic Novels, 144–45.
111. Hescher, Reading Graphic Novels, 198.
112. Mikkonen, Narratology of Comic Art, 137.
113. Mikkonen, Narratology of Comic Art, 220–32.
114. Mikkonen, Narratology of Comic Art, 155–57. The importance of space, both in the world shown by the comic and in the page layout, is also discussed in Baetens and Frey, Graphic Novel, 164–74.
115. Quoted in Mikkonen, Narratology of Comic Art, 103.
116. Mikkonen, Narratology of Comic Art, 204–9.
117. Kukkonen, Contemporary Comics Storytelling, 6.
118. Kukkonen, Contemporary Comics Storytelling, 7, 20.
119. Kukkonen, Contemporary Comics Storytelling, 51.
120. Kukkonen, Contemporary Comics Storytelling, 12, 132.
121. Kukkonen, Contemporary Comics Storytelling, 145.
122. Kukkonen, Contemporary Comics Storytelling, 33.
123. Kukkonen, Contemporary Comics Storytelling, 36.
124. There are no page numbers in Wasco, Het Tuitel complex.
125. Kukkonen, Contemporary Comics Storytelling, 3.
126. Propp, Morphology of the Folktale; Todorov, Grammaire du Décaméron.
127. Bakhtin, “Forms of Time and of the Chronotope in the Novel.”
128. Erich Auerbach, Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western Literature, trans. Willard R. Trask (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953; originally published in German, 1946).
129. Erich Kahler, The Inward Turn of Narrative, trans. Richard Winston and Clara Winston (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973).
130. Cohn, Transparent Minds. See the section on consciousness representation in chapter 1 of this handbook.
131. Paul Zumthor, Toward a Medieval Poetics, trans. Philip Bennett (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992; originally published in French, 1972); Evelyn Birge Vitz, Medieval Narrative and Modern Narratology: Subjects and Objects of Desire (New York: New York University Press, 1989).
132. Monika Fludernik, “The Diachronization of Narratology,” Narrative 11, no. 3 (2003): 331–48.
133. See the section on feminist and queer narratology in this chapter. For an illustration of the links between feminist and diachronic narratology, see Susan Sniader Lanser, “Sapphic Dialogics: Historical Narratology and the Sexuality of Form,” in Postclassical Narratology: Approaches and Analyses, ed. Jan Alber and Monika Fludernik (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2010), 186–205.
134. Michael McKeon, The Origins of the English Novel, 1600–1740 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987).
135. White, Metahistory.
136. Fludernik, “Diachronization of Narratology,” 331–32.
137. Monika Fludernik, Towards a “Natural” Narratology (London: Routledge, 1996). We will return to this major monograph in our section on natural narratology toward the end of this chapter.
138. Fludernik, “Diachronization of Narratology,” 334–35.
139. Fludernik, “Diachronization of Narratology,” 336.
140. Fludernik, “Diachronization of Narratology,” 338.
141. Irene J. F. de Jong, “Diachronic Narratology (The Example of Ancient Greek Narrative),” in Handbook of Narratology, ed. Hühn et al., 115–22 (117).
142. De Jong, “Diachronic Narratology,” 119.
143. Irene J. F. de Jong, Narrators and Focalizers: The Presentation of the Story in the “Iliad,” 2nd ed. (London: Bristol Classical Press, 2004), 221.
144. De Jong, Narrators and Focalizers, 102.
145. Irene J. F. de Jong, A Narratological Commentary on the “Odyssey” (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 119, 192.
146. Vitz, Medieval Narrative and Modern Narratology, 8–9.
147. Eva von Contzen, “Why We Need a Medieval Narratology: A Manifesto,” DIEGESIS 3, no. 2 (2014): 1–21 (2).
148. Von Contzen, “Why We Need a Medieval Narratology,” 2.
149. Von Contzen, “Why We Need a Medieval Narratology,” 8.
150. Armin Schulz, Erzähltheorie in mediävistischer Perspektive, ed. Manuel Braun, Alexandra Dunkel, and Jan-Dirk Müller (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2012), 1–2 (our translation).
151. Harald Haferland, “‘Motivation von hinten’: Durchschaubarkeit des Erzählens und Finalität in der Geschichte des Erzählens,” DIEGESIS 3, no. 2 (2014): 66–95. The notion was originally proposed by Clemens Lugowski in his 1932 dissertation, later published as Die Form der Individualität im Roman (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1976), 66–81. Haferland’s own translation in the English abstract of the essay is “motivation from behind,” but we prefer to highlight the temporal aspect of the notion.
152. Friedrich von Blanckenburg, Versuch über den Roman, ed. Eberhard Lämmert (1774; Stuttgart: Metzler, 1965).
153. David Herman, ed., The Emergence of Mind: Representations of Consciousness in Narrative Discourse in English (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2010), 1–2.
154. D. Herman, Emergence of Mind, 9.
155. Leslie Lockett, “700–1050: Embodiment, Metaphor, and the Mind in Old English Narrative,” in Emergence of Mind, ed. D. Herman, 43–68 (63).
156. Elizabeth Hart, “1500–1620: Reading, Consciousness, and Romance in the Sixteenth Century,” in Emergence of Mind, ed. D. Herman, 103–31 (104).
157. David Olson, The World on Paper: The Conceptual and Cognitive Implications of Writing and Reading (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 282, quoted in Hart, “1500–1620,” 111.
158. Hart, “1500–1620,” 119.
159. Sir Philip Sidney, The Countess of Pembroke’s Arcadia, ed. Maurice Evans (1577/1590; London: Penguin Books, 1987), 117, quoted in Hart, “1500–1620,” 122.
160. David Herman, “1880–1945: Re-Minding Modernism,” in Emergence of Mind, ed. D. Herman, 243–72 (243).
161. D. Herman, “1880–1945,” 249–50.
162. D. Herman, “1880–1945,” 260.
163. The term “action loops” is borrowed from Andy Clark, Being There: Putting Brain, Body, and World Together Again (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1997).
164. Ruth Ronen, Possible Worlds in Literary Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
165. Thomas Pavel’s most important work in this area is Fictional Worlds (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1986).
166. See, for example, Lubomir Doležel’s “Narrative Modalities,” Journal of Literary Semantics 5, no. 1 (1976): 5–15; and his “Extensional and Intensional Narrative Worlds,” Poetics 8, no. 1 (1979): 193–212. A more recent and encompassing treatment is his Heterocosmica: Fiction and Possible Worlds (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998).
167. See especially Marie-Laure Ryan, Possible Worlds, Artificial Intelligence, and Narrative Theory (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992).
168. Marie-Laure Ryan, Narrative as Virtual Reality: Immersion and Interactivity in Literature and Electronic Media (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 99–100. A slightly modified formulation can be found in Marie-Laure Ryan, “Possible Worlds,” in Handbook of Narratology, ed. Hühn et al., 726–42.
169. See, for example, the chapter entitled “Lector in Fabula,” in Umberto Eco, The Role of the Reader: Explorations in the Semiotics of Texts (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1979), 200–60.
170. Atte Jongstra, Het huis M.: Memoires van een spreker (Amsterdam: Contact, 1993).
171. Louis Ferron, De keisnijder van Fichtenwald (Amsterdam: Bezige Bij, 1976).
172. David Herman, “Hypothetical Focalization,” Narrative 2, no. 3 (1994): 230–53 (234–35).
173. For a discussion of these three meanings of virtual reality, see Ryan, Narrative as Virtual Reality, 25–74. For an example of a theory connecting cybernarratology and modal logic, she presents the views of Pierre Lévy, who sees the transformation of modal operators (for example, from “possibility” to “actuality”) as a process of virtualization and/or actualization (35–39). Ryan discusses possible worlds theory in Narrative as Virtual Reality, 99–105.
174. For a discussion of referential speech acts, see John Searle, Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 72–96. Susan Lanser deals with this view in “Appendix: Speech Theory and the Status of Fictional Discourse” in her Narrative Act, 283–94.
175. Ronen, Possible Worlds in Literary Theory, 77–82.
176. Ronen, Possible Worlds in Literary Theory, 82–83.
177. Willem Brakman, De sloop der dingen (Amsterdam: Querido, 2000), 118.
178. Brakman, De sloop der dingen, 85.
179. Doležel, Heterocosmica, 113–32.
180. Doležel, Heterocosmica, 121.
181. Claude Bremond already devoted attention to these aspects in the early stages of narratology, but according to Ronen, he still overemphasized the actually selected possibilities in a specific narrative development. See Bremond, Logique du récit; and his “The Logic of Narrative Possibilities,” New Literary History 11, no. 3 (1980): 387–411.
182. Uri Margolin, “Character,” in The Cambridge Companion to Narrative, ed. David Herman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 66–79 (71).
183. Margolin, “Individuals in Narrative Worlds,” 844.
184. Margolin, “Character,” 72.
185. Margolin, “Character,” 68.
186. Margolin, “Individuals in Narrative Worlds,” 847.
187. Eco, Role of the Reader, 230; Hamon, “Pour un statut,” 121; Margolin, “Individuals in Narrative Worlds,” 847.
188. Margolin, “Individuals in Narrative Worlds,” 849.
189. Margolin, “Individuals in Narrative Worlds,” 850–51.
190. Margolin, “Individuals in Narrative Worlds,” 851.
191. Margolin, “Character,” 72.
192. Following Saul Kripke, Margolin calls proper names “rigid designators, that is, they pick out the same individual at all times and in all worlds in which he exists, irrespective of any property or properties he may possess, acquire, or lose.” Uri Margolin, “Naming and Believing: Practices of the Proper Name in Narrative Fiction,” Narrative 10, no. 2 (2002): 107–27 (109).
193. Margolin, “Individuals in Narrative Worlds,” 854.
194. Margolin, “Individuals in Narrative Worlds,” 856.
195. Margolin, “Individuals in Narrative Worlds,” 856.
196. Ivan Turgenev, “Asya,” in First Love, and Other Stories, trans. with introduction and notes by Richard Freeborn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 100–143 (114).
197. “The actual world is the world from which I speak and in which I am immersed, while the nonfactual possible worlds are those at which I am looking from the outside.” Ryan, Narrative as Virtual Reality, 101.
198. Ryan, Narrative as Virtual Reality, 103–5.
199. Salman Rushdie, Haroun and the Sea of Stories (London: Granta Books, 1990), 21.
200. D. Herman, Story Logic, 4.
201. D. Herman, Story Logic, 5.
202. The journal Storyworlds emerged in 2009 and is published by the University of Nebraska Press.
203. D. Herman, Story Logic, 5.
204. D. Herman, Story Logic, 19; David Herman, Basic Elements of Narrative (Malden MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 107.
205. In Basic Elements of Narrative, David Herman briefly considers Nelson Goodman’s proposal about “ways of worldmaking” (composition and decomposition, weighting, ordering, deletion and supplementation, deformation), only to decide that as a “broad, generic account of worldmaking procedures” (111), it is not specific enough for narrative analysis. See Nelson Goodman, Ways of Worldmaking (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1978).
206. Paul Werth, Text Worlds: Representing Conceptual Space in Discourse (London: Longman, 1999).
207. Catherine Emmott, Narrative Comprehension: A Discourse Perspective (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 121.
208. D. Herman, Story Logic, 6–9.
209. D. Herman, Story Logic, 14.
210. For an early proposal, see Marie-Laure Ryan, “Fiction, Non-Factuals, and the Principle of Minimal Departure,” Poetics 9, no. 4 (1980): 403–22.
211. Regarding deictic shift theory, Herman relies on, for example, David A. Zubin and Lynn E. Hewitt, “The Deictic Center: A Theory of Deixis in Narrative,” in Deixis in Narrative: A Cognitive Science Perspective, ed. Judith F. Duchan, Gail A. Bruder, and Lynn E. Hewitt (Hillsdale NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1995), 129–55.
212. D. Herman, Basic Elements of Narrative, 112. As Herman acknowledges, the metaphor of transportation is also central to Richard Gerrig’s path-breaking study, Experiencing Narrative Worlds (1993).
213. See Barbara Landau and Ray Jackendoff, “‘What’ and ‘Where’ in Spatial Language and Spatial Cognition,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16, no. 2 (1993): 217–65.
214. Dennerlein, Narratologie des Raumes, 60 (our translation).
215. Dennerlein, Narratologie des Raumes, 71 (our translation).
216. Dennerlein points to Fotis Jannidis, Figur und Person: Beitrag zu einer historischen Narratologie (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2004), 31, but the notion already appears in Eco, Role of the Reader.
217. Dennerlein traces the notion of the model back to Philip Johnson-Laird, Mental Models: Towards a Cognitive Science of Language, Inference, and Consciousness (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1983), and its use in the study of the processing of narrative to Bower and Morrow, “Mental Models in Narrative Comprehension.”
218. We will return to these aspects (static space and dynamic actions) when we discuss frames and scripts in the section on cognitive narratology.
219. Boundaries such as walls and doors play an important part in the reader’s construction of Wasco’s “City.” We will return to their ideological relevance in our discussion of feminist, cultural, and postmodern narratologies.
220. Roman Jakobson, “Linguistics and Poetics,” in Selected Writings III: Poetry of Grammar and Grammar of Poetry, ed. Stephen Rudy (New York: Mouton, 1981), 15–51.
221. Ross Chambers, Story and Situation: Narrative Seduction and the Power of Fiction (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), 146.
222. James Phelan and Peter J. Rabinowitz, “Narrative as Rhetoric,” in Narrative Theory: Core Concepts and Critical Debates, by David Herman, James Phelan, Peter J. Rabinowitz, Brian Richardson, and Robyn Warhol, (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2012), 3–8 (3).
223. Phelan and Rabinowitz, “Narrative as Rhetoric,” 5.
224. James Phelan, Narrative as Rhetoric: Technique, Audiences, Ethics, Ideology (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1996), 217.
225. Peter J. Rabinowitz, Before Reading: Narrative Conventions and the Politics of Interpretation (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1998), 21.
226. James Phelan and Peter J. Rabinowitz, discussion under “Authors, Narrators, Narration,” in D. Herman et al., Narrative Theory, 31.
227. Phelan and Rabinowitz, discussion under “Authors, Narrators, Narration,” in D. Herman et al., Narrative Theory, 35.
228. “These rules govern operations or activities that, from the author’s perspective, it is appropriate for the reader to perform when transforming texts—and indeed, that it is even necessary for the reader to perform if he or she is to end up with the expected meaning. And they are, from the other end, what readers implicitly call upon when they argue for or against a particular paraphrase of a text. The rules, in other words, serve as a kind of assumed contract between author and reader—they specify the grounds on which the intended reading should take place.” Rabinowitz, Before Reading, 43.
229. Phelan, Narrative as Rhetoric, 29.
230. Phelan, Narrative as Rhetoric, 218.
231. Phelan, Narrative as Rhetoric, 219.
232. Phelan, Narrative as Rhetoric, 219.
233. “One way to determine the characteristics of the narrative audience is to ask: ‘What sort of reader would I have to pretend to be—what would I have to know and believe—if I wanted to take this world of fiction as real?’” Rabinowitz, Before Reading, 96.
234. Phelan, Narrative as Rhetoric, 93.
235. Phelan and Rabinowitz, discussion under “Character” and under “Reception and Reader” in D. Herman et al., Narrative Theory, 111–66, 139–43, respectively.
236. James Phelan, Reading People, Reading Plots: Character, Progression, and the Interpretation of Narrative (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 5.
237. Phelan and Rabinowitz, discussion under “Authors, Narrators, Narration,” in D. Herman et al., Narrative Theory, 34.
238. James Phelan, Living to Tell about It: A Rhetoric and Ethics of Character Narration (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 2005), 31–97.
239. Phelan, Narrative as Rhetoric, 43–58.
240. Phelan and Rabinowitz, discussion under “Time, Plot, Progression,” in D. Herman et al., Narrative Theory, 58.
241. James Phelan, Experiencing Fiction: Judgments, Progressions, and the Rhetorical Theory of Narrative (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2007), 16–21.
242. Phelan, Experiencing Fiction, 7.
243. Dorrit Cohn, The Distinction of Fiction (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 118.
244. Cohn, Distinction of Fiction, 125.
245. For a short overview, see Simona Zetterberg Gjerlevsen, “Fictionality,” in The Living Handbook of Narratology, ed. Peter Hühn, Jan Christoph Meister, John Pier, and Wolf Schmid, http://www.lhn.uni-hamburg.de/article/fictionality.
246. Hamburger, Logic of Literature, 82–83.
247. No wonder Ann Banfield often refers to Hamburger in her landmark study on free indirect speech, Unspeakable Sentences.
248. Jean-Marie Schaeffer, Why Fiction?, trans. Dorrit Cohn (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2010; originally published in French, 1999).
249. Richard Walsh, The Rhetoric of Fictionality: Narrative Theory and the Idea of Fiction (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2007), 15.
250. This is a major difference between rhetorical and possible world theories. Whereas the latter maintains boundaries and separate worlds and starts from the principle of minimal departure, the former starts from the principle of relevance and proposes fluid boundaries plus overlapping discourse. See the discussion of these differences in Walsh, Rhetoric of Fictionality, 16–20.
251. Walsh, Rhetoric of Fictionality, 36.
252. All quotations from Henrik Skov Nielsen, James Phelan, and Richard Walsh, “Ten Theses about Fictionality,” Narrative 23, no. 1 (2015): 61–73 (62). The same issue of Narrative contains Paul Dawson’s critical reaction, “Ten Theses against Fictionality” (74–100), as well as “Fictionality as Rhetoric: A Response to Paul Dawson,” the reply by Nielsen, Phelan, and Walsh (101–11).
253. James Phelan, “Fictionality,” a/b: Auto/Biography Studies 32, no. 2 (2017): 235–38 (235).
254. Walsh, Rhetoric of Fictionality, 36.
255. Walsh, Rhetoric of Fictionality, 23–29.
256. Walsh, Rhetoric of Fictionality, 130.
257. Stefan Iversen and Henrik Skov Nielsen, “The Politics of Fictionality in Documentary Form: The Act of Killing and The Ambassador,” European Journal of English Studies 20, no. 3 (2016): 249–62 (251).
258. Iversen and Nielsen offer this footnote: “Fictionality = intentionally signaled invention in communication.” Iversen and Nielsen, “Politics of Fictionality,” 260.
259. Nielsen, Phelan, and Walsh, “Ten Theses about Fictionality,” 68–9.
260. See Hans Robert Jauss, Toward an Aesthetic of Reception, trans. Timothy Bahti (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), which contains the path-breaking essay “Literary History as a Challenge to Literary Theory” (originally delivered as a lecture in 1967); Iser, Implied Reader; and Wolfgang Iser, The Act of Reading: A Theory of Aesthetic Response (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978).
261. Iser here joins Roman Ingarden, who said that a text contains “places of indeterminacy” (Unbestimmtheitsstellen) because a description can never match reality in terms of completion and concreteness. A described table cannot be looked at from all sides; a described event is never seen immediately. As a result, many things remain unclear and unspecified in the text. The reader always sees only aspects of the whole. See Roman Ingarden, The Literary Work of Art, trans. George G. Grabowicz (Evanston IL: Northwestern University Press, 1973; originally published in German, 1931).
262. Rimmon-Kenan, Narrative Fiction, 117–29.
263. “The very concept of narrative has been broadened, partly under the influence of constructivist theories in the social sciences, to designate a manner of perceiving, organizing, constructing meaning, a mode of cognition different from—but in no way inferior to—logical or discursive thinking.” Rimmon-Kenan, Narrative Fiction, 2nd ed., 146.
264. See Elrud Ibsch, “The Cognitive Turn in Narratology,” Poetics Today 11, no. 2 (1990): 411–18. Interesting overviews of the various approaches and concerns can be found in David Herman, “Cognitive Narratology,” in Handbook of Narratology, ed. Hühn et al., 46–64; and his “Narrative Theory and the Sciences of the Mind,” Literature Compass 10, no. 5 (2013): 421–36. Useful collections include David Herman, ed., Narrative Theory and the Cognitive Sciences (Stanford CA: CSLI Publications, 2003); and Lars Bernaerts, Marco Caracciolo, Luc Herman, and Bart Vervaeck, eds., Stories and Minds (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2013). While there is a good deal of enthusiasm within the discipline of narratology for the judicious application of insights from the cognitive sciences, there have also been radical critiques, including Marie-Laure Ryan, “Narratology and Cognitive Science: A Problematic Relation,” Style 44, no. 4 (2010): 469–95; and Meir Sternberg, “Universals of Narrative and Their Cognitivist Fortunes (I),” Poetics Today 24, no. 2 (2003): 297–395; followed by “Universals of Narrative and Their Cognitivist Fortunes (II),” Poetics Today 24, no. 3 (2003): 517–638.
265. Gerrig considers such a reading as a trip carrying the reader to another world on the wings of a narrative script. Upon his or her return, the reader would always be more or less changed. See Gerrig, Experiencing Narrative Worlds. Victor Nell considers reading a form of play absorbing the reader so completely that he or she goes through “cognitive changes.” See Victor Nell, Lost in a Book: The Psychology of Reading for Pleasure (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 8.
266. Sanford and Emmott, Mind, Brain and Narrative, 6.
267. Sanford and Emmott, Mind, Brain and Narrative, 20.
268. Sanford and Emmott, Mind, Brain and Narrative, 6–7.
269. “The crucial step in this analysis is to distinguish text features from text effects. [ . . . ] We use the term text feature to refer to anything that can be objectively identified in the text [ . . . ]. In contrast, text effects refer to events in the mind of the reader.” Peter Dixon and Marisa Bortolussi, “Prolegomena for a Science of Psychonarratology,” in New Perspectives on Narrative Perspective, ed. Willie van Peer and Seymour Chatman (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001), 275–87 (277).
270. D. Herman, “Cognitive Narratology,” 46.
271. D. Herman, “Cognitive Narratology,” 46.
272. Ralf Schneider, “Toward a Cognitive Theory of Literary Character: The Dynamics of Mental-Model Construction,” Style 35, no. 4 (2001): 607–40; Ralf Schneider, “The Cognitive Theory of Character Reception: An Updated Proposal,” Anglistik 24, no. 2 (2013): 117–34.
273. For a more general but equally interesting model of character construction, see Jonathan Culpeper, “A Cognitive Stylistic Approach to Characterization,” in Cognitive Stylistics: Language and Cognition in Text Analysis, ed. Elena Semino and Jonathan Culpeper, 251–77 (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2002). This essay was followed up by Jonathan Culpeper, “Reflections on a Cognitive Stylistic Approach to Characterization,” in Cognitive Poetics: Goals, Gains, and Gaps, ed. Geert Brône and Jeroen Vandaele (Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 2009), 125–60.
274. See also Suzanne Keen, Empathy and the Novel (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), for an elaborate account of the relationships between novel reading, empathy, and altruism.
275. See especially Marvin Minsky, “A Framework for Representing Knowledge,” in Frame Conceptions and Text Understanding, ed. Dieter Menzing (New York: De Gruyter, 1979), 1–25.
276. Manfred Jahn, “Frames, Preferences, and the Reading of Third-Person Narratives: Towards a Cognitive Narratology,” Poetics Today 18, no. 4 (1997): 441–68.
277. Nünning, “‘But why will you say that I am mad?’”
278. Jahn is following the thinking of Mieke Bal, “Notes on Narrative Embedding,” Poetics Today 2, no. 2 (1981): 41–59.
279. Jahn uses Franz Stanzel’s reflector concept, but what he says about it allows us to equate it with the internal focalizer.
280. For his discussion of this process, Jahn starts from an article by Menakhem Perry, “Literary Dynamics: How the Order of a Text Creates Its Meanings,” Poetics Today 1, nos. 1–2 (1979): 35–64, 311–61, and from the already mentioned book by Sternberg, Expositional Modes and Temporal Ordering in Fiction.
281. See Seymour Chatman’s chapter about description in Coming to Terms, 22–37. Chatman discusses “The room was dark” on page 30.
282. Flaubert, Madame Bovary, 52.
283. See Fludernik, Fictions of Language, 72ff.
284. David Herman, “Scripts, Sequences, and Stories: Elements of a Postclassical Narratology,” PMLA 112, no. 5 (1997): 1046–59.
285. For this definition, Herman uses Dennis Mercadal, A Dictionary of Artificial Intelligence (New York: Van Nostrand, 1990).
286. D. Herman, “Scripts, Sequences, and Stories,” 1051.
287. See also Prince, Dictionary of Narratology; and especially the essay by Rachel Giora and Yeshayahu Shen, “Degrees of Narrativity and Strategies of Semantic Reduction,” Poetics 22, no. 6 (1994): 447–58.
288. D. Herman, “Scripts, Sequences, and Stories,” 1054.
289. R. Schneider, “Cognitive Theory of Character Reception,” 118.
290. R. Schneider, “Cognitive Theory of Character Reception,” 121.
291. R. Schneider, “Cognitive Theory of Character Reception,” 123.
292. R. Schneider, “Toward a Cognitive Theory of Literary Character,” 624.
293. R. Schneider, “Cognitive Theory of Character Reception,” 125.
294. Alan Palmer, Fictional Minds (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2004), 176.
295. Alan Palmer, Social Minds in the Novel (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2010), 10.
296. Palmer, Social Minds in the Novel, 9.
297. Palmer, Social Minds in the Novel, 39.
298. William James quoted in Palmer, Social Minds in the Novel, 30.
299. Palmer, Social Minds in the Novel, 32.
300. Palmer, Social Minds in the Novel, 41.
301. Palmer, Social Minds in the Novel, 26.
302. Fritz Heider, The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations (New York: Wiley, 1958).
303. Harold H. Kelley, “Attribution Theory in Social Psychology,” in Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, ed. David Levine (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1967), 129–238.
304. Palmer, Social Minds in the Novel, 20. Palmer also discusses the terms “folk psychology” and “intersubjectivity,” which are used to indicate the same ability. For excellent discussions of the latter, see Jordan Zlatev, Timothy P. Racine, Chris Sinha, and Esa Itkonen, eds., The Shared Mind: Perspectives on Intersubjectivity (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2008). For more on folk psychology and a strong argument against theory of mind, see Daniel Hutto, Folk Psychological Narrative: The Sociocultural Basis of Understanding Reasons (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2008). Palmer solves the matter by holding on to the term “theory of mind” as a general “label for our ability to understand others” (Social Minds in the Novel, 24).
305. Palmer, Fictional Minds, 212–14.
306. Alan Palmer, “Attribution Theory,” in Contemporary Stylistics, ed. Marina Lambrou and Peter Stockwell (London: Continuum, 2007), 81–92 (85).
307. Lisa Zunshine, Why We Read Fiction: Theory of Mind and the Novel (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2012), 4.
308. Zunshine, Why We Read Fiction, 18.
309. Zunshine, Why We Read Fiction, 32.
310. Keen, Empathy and the Novel, xi.
311. Keen, Empathy and the Novel, 5.
312. Keen, Empathy and the Novel, 4.
313. Keen, Empathy and the Novel, 92.
314. Keen, Empathy and the Novel, 93.
315. Keen, Empathy and the Novel, 123.
316. Keen, Empathy and the Novel, 142.
317. Richard Menary, “Introduction to the Special Issue on 4E Cognition,” Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9, no. 4 (2010): 459–63 (459).
318. For an elaborate introduction to the post-Cartesian view, see Mark Rowlands, The New Science of the Mind: From Extended Mind to Embodied Phenomenology (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2010).
319. Peter Garratt, “Introduction: The Cognitive Humanities: Whether and Whither?,” in The Cognitive Humanities: Embodied Mind in Literature and Culture, ed. Peter Garratt (London: Palgrave Macmillan: 2016), 1–15 (7).
320. See, for instance, Philip W. Fink, Patrick S. Foo, and William H. Warren, “Catching Fly Balls in Virtual Reality: A Critical Test of the Outfielder Problem,” Journal of Vision 9, no. 13 (2009): 1–8.
321. For a wide-ranging discussion on the embodied mind, see Shaun Gallagher, How the Body Shapes the Mind (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005).
322. Garratt, “Introduction,” 7.
323. For the complete version of this example, see Andy Clark and David Chalmers, “The Extended Mind,” Analysis 58, no. 1 (1998): 7–19.
324. Daniel D. Hutto and Patrick McGivern, “How Embodied Is Cognition?,” https://www.academia.edu/9614435/How_Embodied_Is_Cognition.
325. Karin Kukkonen and Marco Caracciolo, “Introduction: What Is the ‘Second Generation’?,” Style 48, no. 3 (2014): 261–74 (261).
326. Fludernik, Towards a “Natural” Narratology.
327. David Herman, Storytelling and the Sciences of the Mind (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2013). This book is singled out because it draws heavily on enactivist philosophy to analyze the reader’s engagement with narrative.
328. The authors refer to Arthur M. Glenberg and Vittorio Gallese, “Action-Based Language: A Theory of Language Acquisition, Comprehension and Production,” Cortex 48, no. 7 (2012): 905–22.
329. Kukkonen and Caracciolo, “Introduction,” 265.
330. George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980).
331. Kukkonen and Caracciolo, “Introduction,” 265.
332. Kukkonen and Caracciolo, “Introduction,” 265.
333. Lawrence Barsalou, “Simulation, Situated Conceptualization, and Prediction,” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 364 (2009): 1281–89.
334. Kukkonen and Caracciolo, “Introduction,” 268.
335. Marco Caracciolo, The Experientiality of Narrative: An Enactivist Approach (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2014), 4.
336. Caracciolo, Experientiality of Narrative, 49. Caracciolo’s main bone of contention with Fludernik’s treatment of experientiality in Towards a “Natural” Narratology has to do with her apparent construction of it “as a property of narrative rather than as something that ‘happens’ in the text-reader interaction” (47).
337. Caracciolo, Experientiality of Narrative, 110.
338. Caracciolo, Experientiality of Narrative, 4.
339. Caracciolo, Experientiality of Narrative, 128.
340. Caracciolo, Experientiality of Narrative, 70.
341. Caracciolo, Experientiality of Narrative, 70.
342. For various applications of the theory, see Ralf Schneider and Markus Hartner, eds., Blending and the Study of Narrative: Approaches and Applications (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2012).
343. For more information on the concept of “mental space,” see Todd Oakley and Anders Hougaard, eds., Mental Spaces in Discourse and Interaction (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2008). Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner, in their book The Way We Think: Conceptual Blending and the Mind’s Hidden Complexities (New York: Basic Books, 2002), define it as a “small conceptual [packet] constructed as we think and talk, for purposes of local understanding and action” (40).
344. María-Ángeles Martínez, Storyworld Possible Selves (Berlin: De Gruyter Mouton, 2018), 9.
345. Fauconnier and Turner, Way We Think, 44.
346. Martínez, Storyworld Possible Selves, 19–20.
347. For self-schemas, see Hazel R. Markus, “Self-Schemata and Processing Information about the Self,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 35, no. 2 (1977): 63–78. For possible selves, see Hazel R. Markus and Paula Nurius, “Possible Selves,” American Psychologist 41, no. 9 (1986): 954–69.
348. See also María-Ángeles Martínez, “Storyworld Possible Selves and the Phenomenon of Narrative Immersion: Testing a New Theoretical Construct,” Narrative 22, no. 1 (2014): 110–31 (esp. 113–15).
349. See Luc Herman and Bart Vervaeck, “Ideology,” in Cambridge Companion to Narrative, ed. D. Herman, 217–30; and L. Herman and Vervaeck, “Ideology and Narrative Fiction.”
350. See David Hawkes, Ideology (London: Routledge, 1996), for an excellent overview of the various definitions of ideology.
351. Barthes, S/Z, 18–20.
352. Philippe Hamon, Texte et idéologie: Valeurs, hiérarchies et évaluations dans l’œuvre littéraire (Paris: PUF, 1984).
353. Hamon, Texte et idéologie, 20.
354. More generally, Hamon speaks of four crucial domains in which the text’s ideological effect takes shape: the character’s gaze, language, work, and ethics. Hamon, Texte et idéologie, 105–217.
355. Liesbeth Korthals Altes, Le salut par la fiction? Sens, valeurs et narrativité dans “Le Roi des Aulnes” de Michel Tournier (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1992).
356. Vincent Jouve, Poétique des valeurs (Paris: PUF, 2001).
357. Jouve, Poétique des valeurs, 143–48.
358. See, for example, Bakhtin, Dialogic Imagination, and also his Problems of Dostoyevsky’s Poetics, ed. and trans. Caryl Emerson (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984). The Russian original of the latter was published in 1929.
359. Boris Uspensky, A Poetics of Composition: The Structure of the Artistic Text and Typology of a Compositional Form, trans. Susan Wittig and Valentina Zavarin (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), 8–11. The Russian original was published in 1970. The translators used a manuscript revised by the author.
360. Uspensky, Poetics of Composition, 17, 57, 81.
361. Phelan and Rabinowitz, “Narrative as Rhetoric,” 7.
362. See Rabinowitz, Before Reading, 42–46, for a summary of the four rules.
363. Rabinowitz, Before Reading, 84–85.
364. Rabinowitz, Before Reading, 86.
365. Rabinowitz, Before Reading, 89.
366. Rabinowitz, Before Reading, 91.
367. Quoted in Liesbeth Korthals Altes, Ethos and Narrative Interpretation: The Negotiation of Values in Fiction (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2014), 3.
368. Korthals Altes, Ethos and Narrative Interpretation, 3–4.
369. Meizoz quoted in Korthals Altes, Ethos and Narrative Interpretation, 53.
370. Korthals Altes, Ethos and Narrative Interpretation, 122.
371. Korthals Altes, Ethos and Narrative Interpretation, 111.
372. Korthals Altes, Ethos and Narrative Interpretation, 249.
373. See Wasco, “Mike’s Webisodes 11: Wasco’s stripexperimenten” (interview by Michael Minneboo), http://www.michaelminneboo.nl/2010/03/mikes-webisodes-11-wascos-stripexperimenten.
374. Wayne Booth, The Company We Keep: An Ethics of Fiction (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 175.
375. Booth, Company We Keep, 176.
376. Booth, Company We Keep, 178.
377. Booth, Company We Keep, 179–201.
378. Adam Zachary Newton, Narrative Ethics (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), 22.
379. Newton, Narrative Ethics, 22.
380. Newton, Narrative Ethics, 21.
381. Newton, Narrative Ethics, 47–50.
382. Roger D. Sell, Adam Borch, and Inna Lindgren, eds., The Ethics of Literary Communication: Genuineness, Directness, Indirectness (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2013), 3.
383. Sell, Borch, and Lindgren, Ethics of Literary Communication, 4.
384. Roger D. Sell, “Herbert’s Considerateness: A Communicational Assessment,” in Ethics of Literary Communication, ed. Sell et al., 21–28 (23).
385. J. Hillis Miller, The Ethics of Reading: Kant, de Man, Eliot, Trollope, James, and Benjamin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), 20.
386. J. Miller, Ethics of Reading, 120.
387. “But if Kant cannot tell you exactly what the law is, where it is, or where it comes from, he can nevertheless tell you to what it is analogous [ . . . ]. [T]he law as such [ . . . ] is displaced by metaphor or some other form of analogy.” J. Miller, Ethics of Reading, 20.
388. J. Miller, Ethics of Reading, 23.
389. J. Miller, Ethics of Reading, 38–39.
390. Hanna Meretoja, The Ethics of Storytelling: Narrative Hermeneutics, History, and the Possible (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 28.
391. Meretoja, Ethics of Storytelling, 89–90.
392. Jakob Lothe, “Authority, Reliability, and the Challenge of Reading: The Narrative Ethics of Jonathan Littell’s The Kindly Ones,” in Narrative Ethics, ed. Jakob Lothe and Jeremy Hawthorn, 103–18 (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2013). Lothe and Hawthorn’s edited volume is representative of the great variety of approaches found in studies of narrative ethics. Martha Nussbaum’s idealizing humanism, the Chicago school of Wayne Booth, the poststructuralist view on ethics in terms of the ungraspable and undecidable, the political approaches of postcolonial and gender studies—all of these have left traces in Narrative Ethics. The similarities are equally telling. All of the essays plead for a confrontation of literature with real-world concerns, and they study narrative ethics from a communicative perspective, that is, the sender-message-receiver frame. For a more extensive review, see Luc Herman and Bart Vervaeck, dual review of The Ethics of Literary Communication: Genuineness, Directness, Indirectness, ed. Roger Sell, Adam Borch, and Inna Lindgren, and Narrative Ethics, ed. Jakob Lothe and Jeremy Hawthorn, Partial Answers 13, no. 1 (2015): 186–91.
393. Sanford and Emmott, Mind, Brain and Narrative, 233–65.
394. Booth, Company We Keep, 75. In this connection J. Hillis Miller speaks of “baseless positing” in Ethics of Reading, 55. The reader’s value judgment does not rest on a foundation made up of the text’s narrative procedures; it is a judgment that creates its own grounding. Ross Chambers too says that the authority of a narrative strategy does not reach any further than the readiness of the reader to recognize that authority; see Chambers, Story and Situation, 213–14. There is no direct connection between a specific narrative strategy and a specific ethical stance. This derives not only from the reader but also from the text itself. A specific strategy works only via the detour of the whole text of which it is a part. James Phelan says that “the relation between ideology and a particular element of narrative technique is always mediated by the relation of that element to the rest of the narrative.” Phelan, Reading People, 145.
395. See Booth, Company We Keep, 169–200.
396. Chambers, Story and Situation, 50–72.
397. Newton, Narrative Ethics, 58.
398. James Phelan and Mary Patricia Martin, “The Lessons of ‘Weymouth’: Homodiegesis, Unreliability, Ethics and The Remains of the Day,” in Narratologies, ed. D. Herman, 88–109. The term “ethical positioning” is mentioned for the first time on page 88 and elucidated on pages 100–104. Phelan also discusses the unreliable narrator in his Narrative as Rhetoric, 105–18.
399. “The more general conclusion, then, is that homodiegesis allows the lack of full coherence between the roles of character and of narrator when that lack both serves the larger purpose of the narrative and when it is registered only after the incoherence operates.” Phelan and Martin, “Lessons of ‘Weymouth,’” 93.
400. “Because the homodiegesis blocks our access to conclusive signals from [Kazuo] Ishiguro and so transfers the responsibility for disambiguating the scene to the flesh-and-blood reader, the deciding factor in how we carry out that responsibility is our individual ethical beliefs as they interact with our understanding of [the first-person narrator] as a particular character in a particular situation.” Phelan and Martin, “Lessons of ‘Weymouth,’” 103.
401. Monika Fludernik, “Fiction vs. Non-Fiction: Narratological Differentiations,” in Erzählen und Erzähltheorie im 20. Jahrhundert: Festschrift für Wilhelm Füger, ed. Jörg Helbig (Heidelberg: Carl Winter Universitätsverlag, 2001), 85–103. Fludernik writes, “Only in fictional narrative do we have true cases of unreliability. It is only in fiction that we assume that the narrator’s contradictions have an ulterior purpose, that of alerting us to the author’s intentions. Since we cannot check out the author’s intentions, this thesis will remain an assumption on the part of the reader” (100).
402. Susan S. Lanser, “Toward a Feminist Narratology,” Style 20, no. 3 (1986): 341–63 (341).
403. Lanser, “Toward a Feminist Narratology,” 342–43.
404. Susan Sniader Lanser, Fictions of Authority: Women Writers and Narrative Voice (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1992), 23.
405. Robyn Warhol, “Guilty Cravings: What Feminist Narratology Can Do for Cultural Studies,” in Narratologies, ed. D. Herman, 341–55 (342); Kathy Mezei, ed., Ambiguous Discourse: Feminist Narratology and British Women Writers (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 4–5.
406. Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste, trans. Richard Nice (London: Routledge, 1984), 101–14.
407. For a more detailed treatment of the development of feminist narratology, see Ruth Page, Literary and Linguistic Approaches to Feminist Narratology (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 2–16; and Susan S. Lanser, “Gender and Narrative,” in Handbook of Narratology, ed. Hühn et al., 206–18.
408. Lanser says first, “Because literary form has a far more uncertain relation to social history than does representational content, even a fully materialist poetics would be hard-pressed to establish definitive correspondences between social ideology and narrative form. I have nonetheless considered it fruitful to venture speculations about causal relationships that others may be able to establish or refute.” Lanser, Fictions of Authority, 23. Slightly later Lanser’s reader witnesses such a causal speculation when she reproaches Ian Watt’s traditional treatment of the novel for being blind to “causal relationships between gender and genre” (37).
409. “For the feminist narratologists working a decade ago [in the late 1980s], gender is a category that preexists the text, an entity, that shapes the text’s production and reception.” Warhol, “Guilty Cravings,” 347.
410. Sally Robinson, Engendering the Subject: Gender and Self-Representation in Contemporary Women’s Fiction (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991), 4.
411. See, for instance, Judith Butler, Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of “Sex” (New York: Routledge, 1993); and Butler, Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative (New York: Routledge, 1997).
412. Lanser, Fictions of Authority, 5.
413. Kimberlé Crenshaw, “Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics,” University of Chicago Legal Forum 1989, article 8: 139–67. Available at http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclf/vol1989/iss1/8.
414. Susan S. Lanser, “Toward (a Queerer and) More (Feminist) Narratology,” in Narrative Theory Unbound: Queer and Feminist Interventions, ed. Robyn Warhol and Susan S. Lanser (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2015), 23–42 (26).
415. Lanser, “Toward (a Queerer and) More (Feminist) Narratology,” 27.
416. For instance, Page, Literary and Linguistic Approaches, 144–72.
417. See, for instance, Alison Booth, “Screenshots in the Longue Durée: Feminist Narratology, Digital Humanities, and Collective Biographies of Women,” in Narrative Theory Unbound, ed. Warhol and Lanser, 169–93. Interestingly, the collective biography and collective narration are often associated with feminine narrative, as we will see when discussing “gender and narration.”
418. Lanser, “Toward (a Queerer and) More (Feminist) Narratology,” 29.
419. Robyn Warhol and Susan S. Lanser, eds., Narrative Theory Unbound: Queer and Feminist Interventions (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2015), 9–10.
420. Warhol and Lanser, Narrative Theory Unbound, 2.
421. Robyn Warhol, “A Feminist Approach to Narrative,” in Narrative Theory, ed. D. Herman, 9–13 (9).
422. See, for instance, Annemarie Jagose, Queer Theory: An Introduction (New York: New York University Press, 1996); and Michael Warner, ed., Fear of a Queer Planet: Queer Politics and Social Theory (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993).
423. Jane Pilcher and Imelda Whelehan, 50 Key Concepts in Gender Studies (London: SAGE, 2004), 129. The Butler text they refer to is Judith Butler, “Critically Queer,” in Playing with Fire: Queer Politics, Queer Theories, ed. Shane Phelan (New York: Routledge, 1997), 19–30.
424. Diane Richardson, Janice McLaughlin, and Mark E. Casey, eds., Intersections between Feminist and Queer Theory (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); Julie L. Nagoshi, Craig T. Nagoshi, and Stephan/ie Brzuzy, eds., Gender and Sexual Identity: Transcending Feminist and Queer Theory (New York: Springer, 2014); Mimi Marinucci, Feminism Is Queer: The Intimate Connection between Queer and Feminist Theory (New York: Zed Books, 2010).
425. Page, Literary and Linguistic Approaches, 45–72.
426. Lanser, “Toward (a Queerer and) More (Feminist) Narratology,” 39.
427. Ruth E. Page, “Feminist Narratology? Literary and Linguistic Perspectives on Gender and Narrativity,” Language and Literature 12, no. 1 (2003): 43–56. A revised version of this article appeared as “The Question of Gender and Form,” which is chapter 2 in Page, Literary and Linguistic Approaches, 20–44.
428. Page, “Feminist Narratology?,” 53.
429. See Warhol, “Guilty Cravings,” 342.
430. Nancy K. Miller, Subject to Change: Reading Feminist Writing (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 4–5.
431. Teresa de Lauretis, ed., Feminist Studies/Critical Studies (London: Macmillan, 1986), 9.
432. Mária Minich Brewer, “A Loosening of Tongues: From Narrative Economy to Women Writing,” Modern Language Notes 99, no. 5 (1984): 1141–61.
433. See Lanser, “Toward a Feminist Narratology,” 353–4.
434. For example, Lanser, Fictions of Authority, 8, 35.
435. See, for instance, Wendy Moffat, “The Narrative Case for Queer Biography,” in Narrative Theory Unbound, ed. Warhol and Lanser, 210–26.
436. Sandra M. Gilbert and Susan Gubar, The Madwoman in the Attic: The Woman Writer and the Nineteenth-Century Literary Imagination (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), iii. From the late 1980s to mid-1990s Gilbert and Gubar produced a three-part sequel, No Man’s Land, in which they discussed twentieth-century women writers against the same background of the “battle of the sexes.” See Sandra M. Gilbert and Susan Gubar, No Man’s Land: The War of the Words (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988); No Man’s Land: The Place of the Woman Writer in the Twentieth Century; Sexchanges (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991); and No Man’s Land: The Place of the Woman Writer in the Twentieth Century; Letters from the Front (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994).
437. Gilbert and Gubar, Madwoman in the Attic, 49–52.
438. Gilbert and Gubar, Madwoman in the Attic, 73.
439. Gilbert and Gubar, Madwoman in the Attic, 78. Nancy Miller rejects this direct connection between character and author: “I hope it is understood that I am not suggesting we read a heroine as her author’s double.” N. Miller, Subject to Change, 39.
440. Warhol, discussion under “Authors, Narrators, Narration,” in D. Herman et al., Narrative Theory, 39.
441. Nancy Miller therefore resists Roland Barthes’s famous view about the death of the author. See Nancy Miller, “Changing the Subject: Authorship, Writing, and the Reader,” in Feminist Studies/Critical Studies, ed. De Lauretis, 102–20 (esp. 104–7).
442. Lanser, “Toward a Feminist Narratology,” 343–44.
443. Lanser, “Toward (a Queerer and) More (Feminist) Narratology,” 37–38.
444. Tania Modleski, “Feminism and the Power of Interpretation: Some Critical Readings,” in Feminist Studies/Critical Studies, ed. De Lauretis, 121–38 (esp. 128–29). Modleski refers to Luce Irigaray, This Sex Which Is Not One, trans. Catherine Porter with Carolyn Burke (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1985).
445. Gilbert and Gubar, Madwoman in the Attic, 16–17.
446. Modleski, “Feminism and the Power of Interpretation,” 136.
447. He defines a dual hermeneutic as “a negative hermeneutic that discloses [the texts’] complicity with patriarchal ideology, and a positive hermeneutic that recuperates the utopian moment—the authentic kernel—from which they draw a significant portion of their emotional power.” Patrocinio P. Schweickart, “Reading Ourselves: Toward a Feminist Theory of Reading,” in Speaking of Gender, ed. Elaine Showalter (New York: Routledge, 1989), 17–44 (28).
448. Schweickart, “Reading Ourselves,” 30–31. More generally, this sympathetic reading would have to enhance female integration: “Feminist readings of female texts are motivated by the need ‘to connect,’ to recuperate, or to formulate—they come to the same thing—the context, the tradition, that would link women writers to one another, to women readers and critics, and to the larger community of women” (32).
449. Schweickart, “Reading Ourselves,” 39.
450. Warhol, discussion under “Reception and the Reader,” in D. Herman et al., Narrative Theory, 146.
451. Page, Literary and Linguistic Approaches, 96.
452. Page, Literary and Linguistic Approaches, 100.
453. Page, Literary and Linguistic Approaches, 114.
454. Warhol, discussion under “Character,” in D. Herman et al., Narrative Theory, 121.
455. Nancy K. Miller, The Heroine’s Text: Readings in the French and English Novel, 1722–1782 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), x.
456. Mieke Bal, Femmes imaginaires: L’ancien testament au risque d’une narratologie critique (Paris: Nizet, 1986), 15. This book was translated in a thoroughly revised version (reducing and abridging the theoretical sections) as Lethal Love: Feminist Literary Readings of Biblical Love Stories (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987). The material on the page cited in this note did not make it into the translation.
457. Bal, Lethal Love, 111.
458. Bal, Lethal Love, 128.
459. Lanser, “Toward a Feminist Narratology,” 350.
460. Warhol, discussion under “Authors, Narrators, Narration,” in D. Herman et al., Narrative Theory, 41.
461. Lanser, Fictions of Authority, 8, 35.
462. Lanser, Fictions of Authority, 7.
463. Lanser, Fictions of Authority, 8.
464. Susan S. Lanser, “Sexing the Narrative: Propriety, Desire, and the Engendering of Narratology,” Narrative 3, no. 1 (1995): 85–94. The unreliable female heterodiegetic narrator is discussed on page 88 of that article. Lanser recapitulates this argument in “Sexing Narratology: Toward a Gendered Poetics of Narrative Voice,” in Grenzüberschreitungen: Narratologie im Kontext/Transcending Boundaries: Narratology in Context, ed. Walter Grünzweig and Andreas Solbach, 167–83 (Tübingen: Gunter Narr, 1999). Unreliability is discussed on page 178 of that publication.
465. The things that may be talked about depend not only on sex and gender but also on sexual preference. Thus it is easier to talk about heterosexual love than about homosexual love. See Lanser, “Sexing the Narrative,” 91.
466. Lanser, Fictions of Authority, 21–22.
467. Lanser, Fictions of Authority, 21.
468. Lanser, Fictions of Authority, 22.
469. Austen quoted in Warhol, discussion under “Time, Plot, Progression,” in D. Herman et al., Narrative Theory, 69.
470. Robyn Warhol, Gendered Interventions: Narrative Discourse in the Victorian Novel (New Brunswick NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1989).
471. See Luc Herman, Concepts of Realism (Columbia SC: Camden House, 1996), 19–23.
472. Warhol, Gendered Interventions, 18.
473. Robinson, Engendering the Subject, 20.
474. Susan Stanford Friedman, “Religion, Intersectionality, and Queer/Feminist Narrative Theory: The Bildungsromane of Ahdaf Soueif, Leila Aboulela, and Randa Jarrar,” in Narrative Theory Unbound, ed. Warhol and Lanser, 101–22 (102).
475. S. Friedman, “Religion,” 105–7.
476. S. Friedman, “Religion,” 108.
477. S. Friedman, “Religion,” 119.
478. Brewer relies on Annie Leclerc, who sees “the adventure story” as “a model for narrative in general.” Brewer, “Loosening of Tongues,” 1150. The language of such a story is “the discourse of male desire recounting itself through the narrative of adventure, project, enterprise, and conquest” (1151) and always “the discourse of desire as separation and mastery” (1153).
479. Lanser, “Toward a Feminist Narratology,” 357.
480. Warhol, discussion under “Time, Plot, Progression,” in D. Herman et al., Narrative Theory, 66.
481. Warhol, discussion under “Time, Plot, Progression,” in D. Herman et al., Narrative Theory, 67.
482. Page, “Feminist Narratology?,” 46.
483. Page, Literary and Linguistic Approaches, 90.
484. Lanser, “Sexing the Narrative,” 93; Lanser, “Sexing Narratology,” 180–81.
485. This essay constitutes the fifth chapter of Teresa de Lauretis, Alice Doesn’t: Feminism, Semiotics, Cinema (London: Macmillan, 1984), 103–57.
486. De Lauretis, Alice Doesn’t, 106. See also Robinson, Engendering the Subject.
487. “The Oedipus story [ . . . ] is in fact paradigmatic to all narratives.” De Lauretis, Alice Doesn’t, 112. In addition, “all narrative [ . . . ] is overlaid with what has been called an Oedipal logic” (125).
488. De Lauretis, Alice Doesn’t, 121.
489. “Double identification” is the term used in De Lauretis, Alice Doesn’t, 143.
490. De Lauretis, Alice Doesn’t, 149.
491. De Lauretis, Feminist Studies/Critical Studies, 12.
492. See for example Brewer, “A Loosening of Tongues,” 1157–9.
493. See, for example, Hélène Cixous, “The Laugh of the Medusa,” trans. Keith Cohen and Paula Cohen, Signs 1, no. 4 (1976): 875–93.
494. Rosi Braidotti, Nomadic Subjects: Embodiment and Sexual Difference in Contemporary Feminist Theory (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994). Traditional, “male” theories consider desire to be a finite focus on an object to be reached and possessed. As such, infinite, “female” desire is a perverse mixed form. See Teresa de Lauretis, The Practice of Love: Lesbian Sexuality and Perverse Desire (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994).
495. N. Miller, Subject to Change, 14. Miller also speaks of “rematerializing the relations of subjectivity, writing, and literary theory” (16).
496. Braidotti, Nomadic Subjects, 6.
497. For a short and enlightening discussion of the link between affect theory and psychoanalysis in narratology, see Claudia Breger, “Affect and Narratology,” in The Palgrave Handbook of Affect Studies and Textual Criticism, ed. Donald R. Wehrs and Thomas Blake (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 235–57 (esp. 237–38).
498. Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Touching Feeling: Affect, Pedagogy, Performativity (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003); Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick and Adam Frank, eds., Shame and Its Sisters: A Silvan Tomkins Reader (Durham: Duke University Press, 1995); Lauren Berlant, Cruel Optimism (Durham: Duke University Press, 2011); Berlant, Desire/Love (New York: Punctum Books, 2012).
499. Patricia Ticineto Clough and Jean Halley, eds., The Affective Turn: Theorizing the Social (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007).
500. Claudia Breger summarizes the various narratological approaches influenced by affect theory and then proposes her own model, which combines aspects from those various strands. Breger, “Affect and Narratology,” 241–46.
501. Robyn Warhol, Having a Good Cry: Effeminate Feelings and Pop-Culture Forms (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2003). Sedgwick discusses the difference between paranoid and reparative readings in chapter 4 of her book Touching Feeling, 123–51.
502. In this respect we agree with Ruth Page, who says, “It would seem more convincing to argue that if narrative form has anything to do with gender, then this is more prominent when the performance of that story is closely related to gender issues.” Page, “Feminist Narratology?,” 52. More generally, her empirical research led her to conclude “that what is read does indeed bear critically upon how it is read.” Page, Literary and Linguistic Approaches, 114.
503. See Greta Olson and Sarah Copland, “Towards a Politics of Form,” European Journal of English Studies 20, no. 3 (2016): 207–21. In this essay Olson and Copland express their wish “to politicise narratological and formal analysis while retaining the form specificity that has been a feature of narratology” (207).
504. See Hanne Birk and Birgit Neumann, “Go-Between: Postkoloniale Erzähltheorie,” in Neue Ansätze in der Erzähltheorie, ed. Ansgar Nünning and Vera Nünning (Trier: WVT, 2002), 115–52.
505. Gerald Prince, “On a Postcolonial Narratology,” in A Companion to Narrative Theory, ed. Phelan and Rabinowitz, 372–81 (373).
506. Amy Elias, “Ideology and Critique,” in Teaching Narrative Theory, ed. David Herman, Brian McHale, and James Phelan (New York: Modern Language Association, 2010), 281–94 (281).
507. Elias, “Ideology and Critique,” 281.
508. Jan Alber and Monika Fludernik, eds., Postclassical Narratology: Approaches and Analyses (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2010), 3.
509. Sommer, “Merger of Classical and Postclassical,” 152–53.
510. Sue J. Kim, “Decolonizing Narrative Theory,” Journal of Narrative Theory 42, no. 3 (2012): 233–47 (233).
511. Kim, “Decolonizing Narrative Theory,” 237.
512. Olson and Copland, “Towards a Politics of Form,” 211.
513. Monika Fludernik, “Identity/Alterity,” in Cambridge Companion to Narrative, ed. D. Herman, 260–73 (260).
514. Fludernik, “Identity/Alterity,” 266. The groundbreaking contributions to postcolonial theory include Frantz Fanon, Black Skins, White Masks (London: Pluto Press, 1986; originally published in French, 1952); Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage, 1979); Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?,” in Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, ed. Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1988), 271–313; Homi K. Bhabha, The Location of Culture (London: Routledge, 1994); and Robert J. Young, Colonial Desire: Hybridity in Theory, Culture, and Race (London: Routledge, 1995).
515. Birk and Neumann, “Go-Between,” 123–34 (our translation).
516. Birk and Neumann, “Go-Between,” 125 (our translation).
517. Birk and Neumann, “Go-Between,” 130 (our translation).
518. Marion Gymnich, “Linguistics and Narratology: The Relevance of Linguistic Criteria to Postcolonial Narratology,” in Literature and Linguistics: Approaches, Models, and Applications, ed. Marion Gymnich, Ansgar Nünning, and Vera Nünning (Trier: WVT, 2002), 61–73.
519. Roy Sommer, “‘Contextualism’ Revisited: A Survey (and Defence) of Postcolonial and Intercultural Narratologies,” Journal of Literary Theory 1, no. 1 (2007): 61–79 (68–69).
520. Prince, “On a Postcolonial Narratology,” 373.
521. Prince, “On a Postcolonial Narratology,” 374.
522. Fludernik, Towards a “Natural” Narratology, 366.
523. Prince, “On a Postcolonial Narratology,” 374.
524. Prince, “On a Postcolonial Narratology,” 378.
525. Prince, “On a Postcolonial Narratology,” 375.
526. Kim, “Decolonizing Narrative Theory,” 238.
527. Kim here builds on Lanser, “Sexing the Narrative”; and on Dan Shen, “Why Contextual and Formal Narratologies Need Each Other,” Journal of Narrative Theory 35, no. 2 (2005): 141–71.
528. Sommer, “‘Contextualism’ Revisited,” 71.
529. Identity and alterity are also at the heart of other contextualist narratologies as they center on the intersection of narrative strategies and historical or ideological elements. Sommer’s own proposal for an intercultural narratology builds on a corpus of multiculturalist fiction that may feature specific kinds of conflicts that “help to produce intercultural master and counter-narratives challenging, for instance, monocultural notions of identity formation.” Sommer, “‘Contextualism’ Revisited,” 73. In a clear bid to avoid the ideological risks of “postcolonial” narratology, Ruth Gilligan calls for a “narratology of otherness” to shed light on formal devices used in “transcultural” fiction such as Zoli (2006), the Irish-born American writer Colum McCann’s novel about a Romani poet in 1930s Czechoslovakia. Gilligan, “Towards a ‘Narratology of Otherness’: Colum McCann, Ireland, and a New Transcultural Approach,” Studies in the Novel 48, no. 1 (2016): 107–25. In her effort to combine ecocriticism, narratology, and postcolonial studies, Erin James proposes an “econarratology,” in which the focus on narrative structure “opens up ecocritical discourse to a set of texts that had previously been illegible to ecocritics”; her cases in point are four postcolonial novels (from Trinidad and Nigeria) that offer nuanced and decidedly non-Western takes on the relationship of human beings with the environment. Erin James, The Storyworld Accord: Econarratology and Postcolonial Narratives (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2015), 14.