Sturmgeschutz

In 1943, tank production in Germany was, for numerous reasons, forced to diversify. Production of the outdated PzKpfw III had almost ended by January 1943 (only a few vehicles were due for delivery in the summer), and it was replaced by the PzKpfw IV Ausf H armed with the long-barrelled 7.5cm KwK L/48; the same gun as mounted in the Sturmgeschütz Ausf F and able to defeat any contemporary enemy tank. At the same time, prototypes of the new PzKpfw V Panther medium tank were undergoing trials, and these should soon be in production, and were intended to replace the PzKpfw IV.

This transition to the PzKpfw IV proved to be difficult as those companies manufacturing the PzKpfw III could not easily be changed over to the PzKpfw IV production. To ensure a steady supply of tanks, Sturmgeschütz planners decided to streamline production in an attempt to improve efficiency:

Mühlenbau und Industrie AG (MIAG) was ordered to begin production of the StuG in March 1943.

Henschel, having designed and developed the PzKpfw VI Tiger heavy tank, was to concentrate on manufacturing the type.

Maschinenfabrik-Niedersachsen-Hannover (MNH) were to begin production of the PzKpfw V Panther in February 1943.

Unfortunately such sweeping changes required time. Consequently, tank production could not be increased quickly enough to fulfill the demands of the Panzertruppe. It proved to be impossible to replace the enormous losses on the Eastern Front at the same time to provide tanks for re-establishments and new formations.

German industrial output, particularly in the armaments sector, was being severely affected by strategic bombing by the RAF (night) and the USAF (day). The campaign to destroy industrial capacity was also intended to have a demoralizing effect on the German population, many of whom worked in the factories.

The Sturmgeschütz IV entered production in early 1944, after the Alkett factory had been destroyed by an Allied bombing raid which halted production. Basically the Sturmgeschütz IV was built by adapting the superstructure of the Sturmgeschütz III and fitting it on a PzKpfw IV hull, but with a small armoured extension for the driver due to the longer fighting compartment in the PzKpfw IV. (Historyfacts)

Due to the lack of specialized crane trucks, a 2-ton capacity Behelfskran (auxiliary crane) was designed. The simple device could be used to replace the engine or gun. However, the standard production Behelfskran was mounted on top of the vehicle, making it impossible to lift the gun. (Historyfacts)

A Sturmgeschütz IV with a Zimmerit coating identifies it as being from a mid-1944 production batch. The vehicle is fitted with the versatile Rundumfeuer-Maschinengewehr (all-round fire machine gun). Two Flammenvernichter (flame suppressor) pipes have been fitted in place of the standard exhaust. (Historyfacts)

The effect of the bombing on German industry must not be overestimated. From September 1940 to August 1943, the raids were carried out without any regularity (or accuracy) and in general output was not affected. However, when the bombing changed to day and night attacks and increased in frequency during September 1943, the effect on industry became noticeable, but the Germans proved able to increase the monthly tank production figures. As the destruction continued it began to affect vital parts of the German economy, such as steel and petro-chemical production supply became more difficult as significant parts of the railway network was destroyed.

It must be remembered that the Sturmgeschütz was at that time an important, if not vital, part of the German war machine due mainly to the type’s undisputed combat success on the Eastern Front. On the other hand, assault guns formed a large part of the German armoured force’s inventory; the number would continue to increase.

In February 1943, Krupp-Grusonwerk, one of the main contractors for the production of the PzKpfw IV, presented plans to mount a slightly modified superstructure from a StuG Ausf A on the chassis of the PzKpfw IV. The reason for their decision is unknown, and is made even more puzzling with the knowledge that the development of an improved Sturmgeschütz had already begun at Vogtländische Maschinenfabrik AG (VOMAG), leading to the leichte Panzerjäger (PzJg) IV.

Tank engines had a limited service life and had to be exchanged on a regular basis. Engineers from a workshop company have assembled an auxiliary crane to lift the Maybach engine from a damaged Sturmgeschütz. (Anderson)

In September 1943, the Alkett factory was seriously damaged in an Allied bombing raid which resulted in a considerable drop in output of the Sturmgeschütz, at a time when every single tank was needed. Due to the situation the original plan to use the BW-chassis (BW was the in-plant designation for the PzKpfw IV) for the Sturmgeschütz was resurrected.

At this time, the Alkett facility at Berlin-Borsigwalde is unable to continue production of Sturmgeschütz on the ZW chassis [ZW – PzKpfw III]. At the instigation of MunMin [Reichminister Speer], the ZW-Sturmgeschütz will be built on a BW chassis as an interim solution.

It must be mentioned that a BW-Panzerjäger with 7.5cm KwK L/48 will soon be produced by VOMAG in large numbers.

In the next days both BW-Panzerjäger (VOMAG and Daimler-Benz) will be displayed in the Führerhauptquatier [Hitler’s headquarters].

This letter underlines the absolute necessity of using all available production sites to produce tanks. In late 1943, the new le PzJg IV had completed development trials, and instead of concentrating production on this type a further vehicle, the StuG IV, was also ordered into production. Realizing the situation, Krupp referred their StuG IV as a Panzerjäger. It is obvious that Hitler was fully aware of this as the development was the subject of a presentation to him on 6 December 1943:

The Führer appreciates the suggestion of using elements of the StuG III superstructure for a similar solution based on the PzKpfw IV. This proposal gives the chance of supplying these vehicles to the tank battalions, and standardizing the spare parts situation.

This Sturmgeschütz, without armament, has been fitted with a dozer blade and was possibly used to clear roads of debris left after Allied bombing raids. Front line use of the un-armed vehicle seems to be highly unlikely. Also the extra weight of the blade and clearing operations could overload the mechanically vulnerable drivetrain. (NARA)

In this context it is interesting to note that Hitler agreed with proponents of the Sturmgeschütz.

Reports from the front passed to the Führer underline the extraordinary merits of the Sturmgeschütz, which have proven their superiority to the PzKpfw IV, in many cases under equal combat conditions. Therefore all efforts must be made to set up the conversion of PzKpfw IV production, without affecting overall output, even if the new Panzerjäger IV proved its combat ability.

Two Sturmgeschütz IVs and one Sturmgeschütz III loaded for rail transport. The first two vehicles are Befehls-Sturmgeschütz (command tanks); note both have an additional Sternantenne ‘d’ (star antenna ‘d’) for the extra radio equipment. (Anderson)

The crew of this Sturmgeschütz IV has painted eyes and nostrils on the Saukopf (pig’s head) mantlet, and also reinforced the front of the superstructure with a thick layer of concrete and sections of track. The vehicle is fitted with wider Ostketten (east tracks). (Anderson)

These lines proved the immense value of Sturmgeschütz on the Eastern Front. However, the proposed successor was intended to replace the PzKpfw IV in production entirely. While the General der Artillerie certainly would have agreed, Guderian as Generalinspekteur der Panzertruppe heavily opposed the plan, demanding continuation of the production of the PzKpfw IV. The argument continued for nearly a year, without being resolved. In June 1944, during a conference with the Führer, Guderian again presented his opinion:

1)Within a tank regiment the experiences gathered from all available troops confirms that the tank with a rotatable turret is clearly preferred to the assault gun. No contrary message is known.

2)All previous types of enemy tanks and assault guns can be effectively combated with our present armour-piercing weapons, including the 7.5cm KwK L/48.

3)A conversion of PzKpfw IV production to Sturmgeschütz would imply that all future replacements for PzKpfw IV battalions would consist of Sturmgeschütz. This would result in having two types of tanks with entirely different principles of deployment within the PzKpfw IV battalions. The Generalinspekteur suggests the continuation of PzKpfw IV production, which at this time is hardly sufficient to balance the losses by units in the field, until the Panther output is also sufficient to provide a second battalion in a regiment with the Panther. The final aim must be to raise Panther production to 900 units a month. Furthermore, we suggest provision of the le PzJg IV by mounting the 7.5cm KwK 42 L/70 beginning in August, and to mount all PzJg III/IV Einheitsfahrgestell [universal chassis] with the 7.5cm PaK 42 L/70 beginning in November.

As for the question of transferring all PzKpfw IV production to Sturmgeschütz, the Führer has decided according the proposals made by Generaloberst Guderian and Herr Saur as follows:

Production of the PzKpfw IV will continue with 300 units per month, plus Flakpanzer, until further notice. All tanks exceeding this number will be immediately used for the trials of the 7.5cm KwK 42 L/70 in turretless vehicles.

In the period after the loss of Stalingrad, the demand for Sturmgeschütz continued to increase. Proven to be able to defeat the Soviet T-34 and KV tanks, plans were now made to equip the infantry divisions with an assault gun element, ultimately strengthening the divisional PzJgAbt. The discussion continued until it was decided the prime task for Sturmgeschütz within infantry divisions would primarily be as a tank destroyer, and not in the original role as an assault offensive weapon.

A standard production Sturmgeschütz IV finished with a manufacturer-applied coat of Zimmerit. Although the unit cannot be identified, the Romanian soldier standing at the right suggests that it was part of Heeresgruppe Süd (Army Group South). (Anderson)

A Sturmgeschütz IV has a full set of undamaged Seitenschürzen (side skirts), despite having been in action on the front line. The crew is wearing the standard grey artillery-style tank uniforms and their badges suggest that they are in a Waffen-SS unit. (Anderson)

A Sturmgeschütz IV from a Luftwaffe infantry unit has had the 80mm frontal armour reinforced by welded-on thick armour plates. Extra armour has also been added to the front of the positions for the driver and radio operator. (Anderson)

The crew of this Sturmgeschütz IV from an unidentified unit has attempted to improve the armour protection on their vehicle. A short length of Ostketten (east tracks) has been welded to the front of the driver’s position and covered with a thick metal plate. Parts of he superstructure has been rounded off with a smooth coating of concrete. (Anderson)

In October 1943, several meetings were held at the Organisationsabteilung (OrgAbt) and a decision was made to equip the majority of infantry divisions with assault guns, as follows:

2)Experience would show that the Sturmgeschütz proved to be able to effectively fight enemy tanks

3)The service Panzerjäger (tank destroyer), which started with the 3.7cm PaK, evolved into using the Sturmgeschütz.

It is impossible to realize both alternatives (5a and 5b) at the same time. With the present Sturmgeschütz situation only one alternative is practicable. An increase in StuG production to fulfill the needs of both Heerestruppen units and those of the infantry divisions and also to maintain them… is impossible. To realize the above would require the production of 13,150 Sturmgeschütz within a 15 month period; a monthly production of 875 units.

A Sturmgeschütz carries a grenadier unit to its next assignment. Mobility was a continuous problem for supporting infantry units, as sufficient numbers of Schützenpanzerwagen (armoured half-track carriers) were not always available. Assault guns crews greatly appreciated the infantry as they provided effective protection during an advance. (Anderson)

A damaged Sturmgeschütz IV being recovered by a schwere Zugkraftwagen (s ZgKw) 18t (SdKfz 9): The markings on the halftrack indicate that it is from Panzer-Bergekompanie (tank recovery company) 4. To the left a Bergepanzer (recovery tank) III. (Anderson)

The OrgAbt was completely aware of the desperate production situation. In mid-1943, the Waffenamt (ordnance bureau) reported monthly delivery figures of 167 Sturmgeschütz and Sturmhaubitze (StuH – assault howitzer); just 20 per cent of the figure indicated under item 5). It was hoped that monthly production would peak at some 500 vehicles by December 1944.

The realities are clearly detailed in a report on the production of tanks and Sturmgeschütz, published by the OrgAbt in December 1944. The related table Panzer und Sturmgeschütz Auslieferung (Delivery of Tanks and Assault Guns) compared the total annual production figures for 1941 to 1943, and the monthly numbers for 1944 (January to November), plus the planned number for December and for 1945.

From late 1943, the term Sturmgeschütz was not only applied to the earlier SdKfz 142 (another official designation for the StuG III), but also for later vehicles; the StuG IV, Sturmpanzer (assault tank), le PzJg IV, Pz IV/70, PzJg 38(t) also the Jagdpanther and Jagdtiger. Indeed, production figures for Sturmgeschütz/Panzerjäger clearly exceeded those for tanks.

The combined yearly tank and Sturmgeschütz production figures for 1941 to 1943, the monthly production figures 1944, and the proposed production for December 1944 to March 1945.

The report does underline the fact that the distribution of tasks between Sturmgeschütz and Jagdpanzer/Panzerjäger over the years 1943/44 was diminishing. For German forces, the war had changed: an assault led by massed tank formations was a thing of the past. Due to the desperate situation on all battlefronts, especially in the east, all armoured forces had to be utilized for the defence of infantry divisions against emerging masses of enemy tanks.

Although the accumulated numbers in the table do not allow a specified view of the ‘original’ Sturmgeschütz (Ausf G, 7.5cm StuK 40 L/43 [SdKfz 142/1], including 10.5cm StuH 42 L/28.3 [SdKfz 142/2]) production, it becomes apparent that the table was compiled by other sources.

Production of StuG, PzKpfw IV and Panther

	SdKfz 142/1	SdKfz 142/2	StuG IV	PzKpfw IV	Panther
1943	3,011	204	–	2,938	1,768
1944	3,840	903	1,006	3,125	3,777
1945	863	192	105	365	439

The table clearly shows the numerical importance of the ‘original’ Sturmgeschütz.

A Sturmgeschütz IV in service with Heeresgruppe Nord (Army Group North) has been immobilized and abandoned in an unknown town during winter 1944. (Anderson)

With adoption of new organizational structures for the Infanterie-Divisionen (InfDiv – infantry divisions), the Jäger-Divisionen (JgDiv – light infantry divisions) and Gebirgsjäger-Divisionen (GebJgDiv – light-infantry mountain divisions), finally an armoured component [Sturmgeschütz] was introduced.

At the beginning of the war, initial ideas saw the integration of an entire StuGAbt per division. However, this was not feasible, and instead the formation of smaller StuG detachments was discussed. The new October 1942 ‘Infanterie-Division neuer Art’ (infantry division; new style) had, among other changes, a reformed PzJgAbt. This battalion-size subunit had one Panzerjäger-Kompanie (PzJgKp – tank destroyer company) with 12 schwere Panzerabwehrkanone (s PaK – heavy anti-tank guns), equipped with either the 7.5cm PaK 50, 7.5cm PaK 98/38 or 7.62cm PaK 36(r), and one FlaK company as well as one PzJgKp with 14 s PaK (Sfl) with 7.5cm self-propelled guns. Alternatively, the new structure authorized an establishment with Sturmgeschütz, depending on availability.

The basis for establishing a StuG or PzJgKp in a PzJgAbt mot Zug (motorized platoon) was organizational table KStN 1159 Ausf B dated 20 June 1943, [see Chapter 3]. In contrast to this earlier version (now referred to as Ausf A), a unit would be equipped with 14 Sturmgeschütz, and a full establishment of support elements including workshop and recovery services. This was deemed necessary, since the infantry divisions did not have the facilities to maintain heavy equipment.

A Sturmgeschütz IV, from PzJgKp 1021, about to be loaded on a Marinefährprahm (MRP – sea-going lighter) at Gotenhafen (Gdynia), during the evacuation of German forces from Poland in early 1945. The StuG is fitted with swivelling-type Seitenschürzen (side skirts) a modification introduced by the manufacturer. (Anderson)

A tank destroyer subunit, still in company strength was now organized according the new KStN 1149 (StuG Abt [10 or 14 StuG in PzJgAbt]) dated 1 February 1944. At least on paper the company had been raised to battalion strength – the reason for this is not known – despite actually remaining a company. For 1944-style division, this organizational structure allowed an establishment of 10 or 14 Sturmgeschütz. At this time a unit could be equipped with Sturmgeschütz, the leichte Panzerjäger (le PzJg – light tank hunter/destroyer) IV or the le PzJg 38(t) Hetzer – [Baiter].

As noted in a table published in January 1944 by the GenStbdH, the majority of those InfDiv, PzJgDiv and GebrigDiv issued with Sturmgeschütz (34 divisions) would ideally have 14 assault guns in their inventory.

Apparently this authorized strength was reduced in the second half of 1944 to ten Sturmgeschütz, made possible by KStN 1149.

However, there was criticism. In October 1943, the OrgAbt gave a hint of a special problem with the planned large-scale introduction of independent StuGKp for infantry units:

1)Armoured vehicles need many specialists and special tools to be maintained, both of which are in short supply. So far the battalion is the smallest unit to have a workshop element.

Conclusion: Since independent companies will also require workshop elements, there will never be a sufficient number.

2)PzJgAbt (independent at army troop level) and StuGAbt will in future be issued with all types of Sturmgeschütz (StuG and Jagdpanzer). The tasks given to these services are identical: however the training will be conducted by two different services, and therefore cannot be consistent.

Conclusion: Panzerjäger and Sturmgeschütz units must belong to one service with standardized training.

All StuG and Panzerjäger within tank units must be part of the Panzertruppe. All StuG and Panzerjäger outside tank units must be attached to the artillery. Thus the Panzerjägertruppe should be transferred to the artillery and be trained accordingly.

Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung (in PzJgAbt) Ausf A (10 StuG) or Ausf B (14 StuG)

Table of organization according to KStN 1149, dated 1 February 1944.

An unusually marked Sturmgeschütz III; it has been painted with an oversize Balkenkreuz and a large letter ‘G’. The latter possibly indicates that the vehicle is being used for training in an Ersatzabteilung (Ers-Abt – replacement battalion). (Anderson)

Although this line of thought was understandable, the OrgAbt would not be able to enforce these ideas due to opposition by Guderian. Not surprisingly, the service would remain the responsibility of the Panzertruppe. However, the document had an appendix, which reveals vitally important facts:

A total of 200 StuGKp will require 200 crane vehicles and 200 recovery tractors (SdKfz 9). A force of 65 StuGAbt will require only 65 crane vehicles and 65 SdKfz 9.

This will result in an additional demand for 135 crane vehicles and 135 SdKfz 9.

A Sturmgeschütz III Ausf G, which has been painted white for winter operations, receives maintenance ready for operation in the spring of 1944. Engineers from the workshop company have removed the early type of Winterketten (winter tracks) and have placed them on the engine deck, ready to fit standard tracks. The vehicle carries no markings other than a Balkenkreuze and a letter ‘D’ in black. (Anderson)

These few lines once again give proof of the inability of the German armaments industry to fulfill the demands of the military. Indeed heavy tractors and crane vehicles were not being built in sufficient numbers and OrgAbt faced a continuous shortage of some 270 vehicles.

Furthermore, OrgAbt saw the planned provision of infantry units with small numbers of Sturmgeschütz/Jagdpanzer as critical due to a number of reasons. Early campaigns were successful because the Panzertruppe could assemble massed tank forces in order to achieve a breakthrough. Although the Panzer divisions had lost this operative power by late 1943, the fundamental idea behind it remained valid. Due to a shortage of resources, an equal distribution of Sturmgeschütz among a great number of infantry divisions could result in a fragmented commitment. OrgAbt began to think that a concentrated commitment using StuG or PzJgAbt (with 31 Sturmgeschütz) would have a greater impact against Soviet armour than would be possible by attaching ten or 14 StuGs to each infantry division.

However, it must be considered that OrgAbt preferred to continue with earlier, proven offensive tactics against enemy armoured forces. This was even at a time when the overwhelming numerical superiority of the Red Army made the establishment of new spearhead units impossible.

A Sturmgeschütz Ausf G from a late production batch lies abandoned in the main street of a battle-damaged town. The vehicle has a travel rest for the gun and there is a cast deflector on commander’s cupola. (Anderson)

Beginning in 1943, Sturmgeschütz were delivered to infantry divisions to establish an effective defence against the Soviets, rather than launch an offensive operation: the times had changed.

By January 1944, a total of 34 PzJgKp had been established. The units received the designation of their mother unit. For example, StuGs of the PzJgKp attached to 1.InfDiv received the number 1001, and those issued 344.InfDiv were numbered 1344. However, there were many exceptions.

The table clearly indicates the situation in February 1944. At that time the large majority of StuGAbt intended for infantry, Panzerjäger and Gebrigsjäger divisions were in the process of being formed. At that time the table shows a shortfall of 366 Sturmgeschütz: Note the very low number authorized for the Luftwaffe field divisions which had been transferred on the authority of GenStbdH a few months earlier. The new target allotted only four Sturmgeschütz to an entire division.

In April 1944, the Panzeroffizier at the GenStbdH reported the status of reorganization in the respective Heeresgruppen (HG – army groups). At that time the vast majority were issued with StuG III or IV, and some with lePzJg IV. Heeresgruppe ‘C’ (Italy) had to rely on Italian-built Semovente (self-propelled) guns, being replaced by German vehicles as they became available. The infantry divisions noted under Heeresgruppe ‘D’ (France) were marked as being ‘bodenständig’, a hint to the fact that the majority of material was taken from ex-French stocks, thus reducing their combat value significantly. By late 1943, all Luftwaffe-Felddivisionen had been transferred to the responsibility of the army, but identified by the suffix (Lw). These units had been authorized to have a very small StuG detachment.

A column of Sturmgeschütz having been unloaded at a harbour, (possibly Gotenhafen [Gdynia]), pass through a small village in Poland. Each vehicle carries two 200ltr drums containing fuel in preparation for a long march. Note the two horizontal band-type camouflage schemes on the Seitenschürzen (side skirts). (Hoppe)

StuG-Abteilungen in Inf and LwFeldDiv

The crew of this Sturmgeschütz has decorated the Seitenschürzen (side skirts) on their vehicle with a cartoon image of the famous ‘Baron Münchausen’, a fictional character from German literature. Note the Sturmgeschütz in the background has been fitted with Panzer III-style side armour. (Anderson)

A Sturmgeschütz III fitted with the early type of Winterketten (winter tracks) crossing an area of marsh-like terrain with a truck in tow. This was standard procedure on the Eastern Front. (Anderson)

The Seitenschürzen (side skirts) on a StuG could easily be damaged or completely torn off by heavy contact with an obstacle such as a stone wall, a tree or even thick scrub. The crew of this vehicle has made a repair by welding tubing to the upper brackets and securing the skirts with thick wire. (Anderson)

Prague 1945: A StuG III fitted with PzKpfw III style Seitenschürzen (side skirts) carries no identification markings, only a Balkankreuze on the side of the superstructure. (Anderson)

A Sturmgeschütz III Ausf G without Seitenschürzen (side skirts) or any unit identification passes a well-camouflaged supply truck. The small swastika on the door of the truck possibly indicates that it is from 5.SS-PzGrenDiv Wiking (Viking). (Anderson)

A recovery team has attached Leichte Abschleppstangen (light towing bars) to the towing eyes on this Sturmgeschütz III Ausf G in preparation for it to be hauled away. The maintenance hatches over the brake/final-drive units have been opened indicating the location of the failure. (Anderson)

From late 1943 onwards, it was planned to complete the equipping of infantry units with Sturmgeschütz companies swiftly and to a set a standard. However, this process would be affected by the low number of Sturmgeschütz available, exacerbated by an overall shortage of soft-skinned vehicles and heavy half-track tractors. The ordnance office was forced to deliver what was available, including captured and foreign-built vehicles. Furthermore, the course of the war influenced the effectiveness of the infantry divisions (InfDiv) and Volks-Grenadierdivisionen (VGD); both were faced with many logistical problems.

A strength report from 246.VGD dated 1 November 1944 illustrates the problem. The unit, originally established as 246.InfDiv before the war, had been virtually annihilated during the Soviet assault on Heeresgruppe Mitte in the summer of 1944. What remained of the unit was then withdrawn to Milowitz training ground near Prague, were it was re-established as 246. VGD. It was then transferred to defend the border of the Reich near Aachen.

In August 1944, 246.VGD, had a complement of over 11,000 men and PzJgAbt 246 was attached as its tank destroyer element with 14 Sturmgeschütz and 27 towed anti-tank guns as originally authorized. The anti-aircraft company was reinforced by a Flak-combat unit with seven 8.8cm FlaK.

A late production Sturmgeschütz III Ausf G passes through a small town during the retreat from France in 1944. The crew has painted an image of the cartoon character ‘Mickey Mouse’ in front of the spare track carrier on the side of the superstructure. The vehicle is in a desperate state, two of the six road wheels are missing and the remainder have lost some of their rubber tyres. (Anderson)

Beside the PzJgAbt, 246.VGD had 36 guns in the artillery regiment and a vehicle allotment of 14 NSU Kettenkräd, 138 motorcycles, 125 cross-country cars and 28 staff cars, also 17 Maultier (Mule) half-track trucks, 60 cross-country trucks, 134 cargo trucks, three half-tracked tractors and 56 Raupenschlepper-Ost (RSO – fully-tracked carrier: east).

In March 1944, the OrgAbt attempted to make a comparison between German 44.InfDiv and a typical British partly-motorized infantry division. While the German unit had a theoretical complement of 804 motor vehicles of all types; a comparable British unit had a total of 3,572. Also 44.InfDiv had more than 3,000 horses in service, while the British had none. This astonishing difference would worsen as the war progressed. When compared to the proposed structure of 44.InfDiv, the VGD had an even weaker allocation of motor vehicles.

So much for theory: For instance, the reality of 1944 forced VGD to drop the Kettenkräd, and reported that only 44 per cent of its cross-country cars were operational, while the promised number of Maultier half-tracked trucks and cross-country trucks were never delivered. The artillery regiment had to utilize captured equipment (seven 7.62cm Fk [r] and five 12.2cm le FH [r]), and the standard German material (nine 10.5cm le FH 18 and nine 15cm s FH 18).

A Bergepanzer III (recovery tank), from an unidentified unit, is fitted with the later type of Ostketten (east tracks); most units deployed to the Eastern Front were issued with these useful tracks. Additional ice grousers were mounted in the track links, whose incorporated grousers were totally worn off. (Anderson)

In November 1944, an unknown commander delivered his own personal judgement, shortly before the Ardennes offensive:

The subunits in the division were thrown into the Grosskampf (very heavy commitment) before the training could be accomplished. The immense losses were replaced by poorly trained soldiers taken from units without any combat experience. Half of the Panzerjäger complement is uneducated and also untrained. Training of drivers, especially those for the Raupenschlepper-Ost tractors, is difficult due to the shortage of fuel.

Constant fighting to hold defensive position, and the steady regroupings caused by the overall situation impedes the very necessary continuation of the training.

Although reliable and eager, many soldiers are depressed by worries about their relatives suffering the terror bombing and the loss of their Heimat (home).

The situation is made worse by our poor postal service, the Ostfreiwillige (volunteers from occupied eastern countries) are orderly and industrious, but they are not much use in combat near the front. Their commitment in the rear area is advisable.

Command in the grenadier regiments is weak, and only few trained Panzerjäger soldiers are available. The lack of footwear, tents, water, anti-tank mines, flare pistols and the following munitions: heavy mortars and 3.7cm FlaK only add to our problems. Overall mobility is poor due to the lack of cross-country vehicles: 40 per cent of all our motor vehicles are in a poor mechanical state.

This Sturmgeschütz III Ausf G has been modified beyond recognition. Additional armour plates have been attached to front of the superstructure, and the machine-gun shield has been replaced with a simple steel plate. Note that the commander’s periscope has been fitted with lens hoods. (Anderson)

A strength report published in December 1944, shows that the vehicle situation had continued to deteriorate. Of the 14 authorized Sturmgeschütz, only five had survived and two of these were in need of short-term repair. Also the number of anti-tank guns had decreased from 27 to four; and only seven of the 54 Raupenschlepper-Ost remained serviceable. Subsequently, the commander gave his unit a low combat rating (IV).

Denmark, 1944: Vehicles of Sturmgeschütz Ersatz und Ausbildung Abteilung (Ers und AusbAbt – replacement and training battalion) 400, at their base in Viborg. The unit had been transferred to Denmark in July 1943. At least four different variants are visible; an Ausf B and an Ausf D, also an Ausf F and an Ausf G. Such a very mixed allotment of short and long-barrelled StuGs was quite normal for training cadre and regular units. One of the vehicles is fitted with air filters for hot and dry conditions. (Anderson)

Troops of 8.SS-Kavalleriedivision (cavalry division) Florian Geyer wait in a Ukrainian village as a Sturmgeschütz from their PzJgAbt passes. (NARA)

5)	Alternative situation
	a)	One StuGBttr (company) in division	220 Batteries
	b)	StuG-Abt as army troops	312 Batteries
			-------------------------
			532 Batteries

a.)One StuGKp for every infantry division	= 2,000 StuG, or
b.) alternatively 65 StuGAbt	= 2,000 StuG