8 A Nine-Battalion Regiment Australia, Malaysia and Singapore, 1965–73
John Healy
From 1965 to 1973 the Royal Australian Regiment was faced with its biggest challenge. At the end of 1964 one battalion was on duty with the BCFESR in Malaysia while the other three were training in Australia. Six months later, however, one battalion was on operations in Borneo while another was at war in Vietnam. By mid-1966 one battalion was still in Borneo and two other battalions were on operations in Vietnam. And by December 1967 three battalions were in Vietnam and another was in Malaysia. Three battalions remained on operations in Vietnam until November 1970 and the final battalion was not withdrawn until early 1972. The last battalion in the Malaysia–Singapore region returned in 1973.
This substantial commitment to overseas service could be maintained only by a major expansion of the regiment: by September 1965, it had reached seven battalions; by July 1966, eight; and by November 1967, nine. This chapter describes the raising of the new battalions, their training and preparation for war, the integration of national service and regular soldiers, and their peacetime duties in Australia, Malaysia and Singapore.
The expansion of the regiment in 1965 was the result of the deteriorating strategic situation in South-East Asia. For several years the government had hesitated to react boldly, but the pressures finally came together at the end of 1964. While Vietnam was of concern during 1963 and 1964, the government’s attention was directed more towards the threat from Indonesia. As related in the previous chapter, by September 1964 Malaysia and Indonesia were close to war, presenting Australian defence planners with a dangerous situation. They were concerned that Indonesian troops might infiltrate across the border into the Australian territory of Papua New Guinea, and consequently the Australian government faced the possibility of simultaneously deploying troops to three areas, Vietnam, Borneo and New Guinea.
On 10 November 1964, the Australian Prime Minister, Sir Robert Menzies, made a major defence statement in the House of Representatives, aimed squarely at meeting the perceived threat from Indonesia. He announced the controversial decision to introduce selective national service from mid-1965, to increase the regular army from 22,750 to 37,500 men, and to expand the CMF. The pentropic division, with only two regular battalions, was to be replaced by a lighter, air portable division consisting of nine regular battalions. The Pacific Islands Regiment was to be expanded with a second battalion to be raised early in 1965. The SAS Regiment was to be doubled from two to four squadrons. In addition, new weapons and equipment were to be purchased for the army. Both the navy and the air force were to be increased in size and provided with new equipment over the following three years.1 While perhaps a future deployment to Vietnam was a consideration, the expansion was directed primarily towards Indonesia. In his speech, Menzies stated: ‘It is clear that Indonesia is carrying on an active and entirely unjustified armed aggression against Malaysia.’ As the Sydney Morning Herald of 11 November commented, the ‘basic message to the nation of the Prime Minister’s historic defence review last night was that there was a “real risk of war” with Indonesia’.
Within a month, the Australian government was dealing with requests for aid from both Britain for support in Borneo, and the United States for support in Vietnam. On 4 December William Bundy, the US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, advised the Australian ambassador in Washington that the US was considering sending ground forces to South Vietnam ‘together with such ground forces as Australia and New Zealand might be able to provide’, and Bundy suggested a contribution of 200 extra combat advisers.2 Ten days later President Johnson suggested that Australia provide 200 extra advisers and various naval craft. The Department of Defence stated that seventeen advisers could be sent to bring the number to 100 but that the ships could not be provided. On the other hand, the Chiefs of Staff advised the government that if required, an infantry battalion could be made available for operations in Vietnam. When Menzies replied to Johnson on 18 December he said that Australia could not supply the numbers of advisers and ships requested, but indicated that Australia was willing to send military representatives to discuss the positioning of US, Australian and New Zealand troops in South Vietnam.3 While these matters were being considered, in January 1965 the government approved the sending of 3 RAR and a SAS squadron to Borneo. The proposed commitment to Vietnam was discussed in Honolulu by senior US, Australian and New Zealand officers between 30 March and 1 April, and on 5 April the Australian Defence Committee agreed that a battalion should be offered. On 7 April the Cabinet accepted this recommendation.4 Meanwhile, on 1 March 1965 Lieutenant Colonel Ivan ‘Lou’ Brumfield, the executive officer of the pentropic 1 RAR, had been appointed commanding officer and was ordered to reorganise the battalion on the tropical warfare establishment. In great secrecy, on 25 February 1965 he had been told that 1 RAR might be deployed to South-East Asia in a few months. As the 1 RAR historian recorded, Brumfield ‘had to reorganise the battalion, write new Standing Operating Procedures, train his men in the new procedures and prepare them for war, without telling them that war was probably only a few weeks away’.5 Finally, on 29 April the Prime Minister announced in Parliament that Australia would ‘provide an infantry battalion for service in South Vietnam’.6 The decision aroused intense political controversy, but to the soldiers of the all-regular 1 RAR, who had been preparing for operations for almost two months, it was a straightforward if challenging task. Lieutenant Colonel Brumfield recalled:
In my view the battalion did not think much about the politics of their deployment to Vietnam. They were professional soldiers and accepted the commitment to Vietnam as another job against the Asian Communist. Most of us had been in Malaya during the Emergency. Vietnam did not appear to be very different at the time, except the situation was worse and the Americans not the British were involved . . . I suppose in the final analysis we looked forward to the sheer adventure, challenge and competition of the whole thing. That was the feeling in April 1965.7
If Brumfield and his men saw their deployment in terms of duty, they could be in no doubt that they would be facing a demanding year. On 27 May 1965, B Company and elements of Support and Administration Companies of 1 RAR embarked in HMAS Sydney for the voyage to Vietnam. The remainder of the battalion flew to Saigon during the first week of June 1965.
On 1 March 1965, 5 RAR was raised at Holsworthy from the soldiers that were surplus to the establishment of the newly organised 1 RAR. Major John Warr, the senior administrative staff officer of the larger pentropic 1 RAR, organised the splitting of the battalion, and he administered command of 5 RAR until the new commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Peter Oxley, arrived from Vietnam, where he had been the army attaché in Saigon. It was Oxley whose exhortations to perform like tigers gave the battalion a rallying cry in its early difficulties and an enduring nickname, the Tiger Battalion. In September Oxley was promoted to command the newly formed 3rd Training Battalion, and Warr succeeded to the command.
Many of the original soldiers of 5 RAR had been left out of 1 RAR as they were medically unfit, below nineteen years of age or had compassionate circumstances. But later in the year 300 regular and national service soldiers joined the battalion, and when on 5 November the Minister for the Army, Dr Jim Forbes, inspected the battalion’s inauguration parade, 250 national servicemen from the first intake were on parade.
In January 1966, the battalion was warned for operations in Vietnam, and training was stepped up. As early as July 1965, one month after 1 RAR arrived in Vietnam, Lieutenant General Wilton, Chief of the General Staff, had realised that 1 RAR was facing a difficult problem as a single battalion in Vietnam, and had begun planning to build up the force to task force size, but he had also realised that it would be some time before further battalions could be raised and trained.
It was not until 8 March 1966 that the Prime Minister, Harold Holt, announced that Australia’s commitment was to be trebled and that an Australian task force of two battalions was to be deployed to Vietnam. The 1st Australian Task Force, comprising 5 RAR and 6 RAR, was to go to Phuoc Tuy province, south-east of Saigon.
By the time of this announcement, 5 RAR was preparing for its first exercise as a battalion in the Gospers area of New South Wales, and this was followed by a 1st Task Force exercise, controlled by Brigadier D. Vincent. He declared that the battalion was fit for operations, and the main body flew off to Vietnam on 12 May 1966.
While 1 RAR was splitting to form two new battalions, 2 RAR at Enoggera in Brisbane was undergoing a similar transformation, although a few months behind the Sydney battalion. On 1 June 1965, Lieutenant Colonel Arthur Rofe assumed command of 2 RAR, and five days later 6 RAR was formed, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Colin Townsend.
From 2 RAR the new battalion received two rifle companies and some specialists plus a fine nucleus of officers and NCOs. Some of the soldiers had years of service, were qualified for promotion and provided a highly trained core for the new unit.
These experienced soldiers were spread throughout the battalion and many became NCOs. By the time a batch of over 250 national servicemen began to arrive in September 1965, they found a well-ordered professional organisation ready to guide them from recruits into trained members of an infantry unit. A little later six national service officers arrived to take command of new platoons. The older regulars greeted them with some scepticism, but all later proved their mettle and were retained in the battalion. When the battalion returned from Christmas leave in January 1966 it learned that it was to be deployed to Vietnam in May. The tempo of training increased with three weeks at the Jungle Training Centre and an exercise at the Shoalwater Bay Training Area. Company groups began to fly to Saigon on 31 May 1966.
On 1 September 1965, 7 RAR was raised at Puckapunyal, in central Victoria, the first battalion to serve there since 2 RAR left for Korea in March 1953. The first commanding officer was Lieutenant Colonel Eric Smith, who had served as a major with 2 RAR on border operations in 1962. The battalion cadre was mainly from 3 RAR, just back from Malaysia, and many of the new soldiers came from the second national service intake of 1965. After an intensive period of individual, company and battalion training, the unit was ready for war by June 1966. At this time the battalion provided 100 reinforcements for units in Vietnam, and a fresh training cycle began. During the winter of 1966 companies phased through the Jungle Training Centre, and in September–October the battalion took part in Exercise Barra Winga, Australia’s largest peacetime exercise to that time, at Shoalwater Bay.
By the time 7 RAR departed for Vietnam in HMAS Sydney in April 1967 to relieve 5 RAR, it had developed a distinctive character forged in the isolation of Puckapunyal, and a distinctive mascot, the pig, which had been adopted by the soldiers after their commanding officer had angrily compared their social behaviour to the habits of this rotund farmyard animal. Captain Neville ‘Nobby’ Clark wrote at the time: ‘We were the Pigs of 7 RAR—muddy, dirty but good humoured . . . had not the CO called the soldiers’ mess at Pucka[punyal] “a pigsty fit only for pigs”? And had not a pig been released at the next social function of the Battalion resplendent in the insignia of a Lieutenant Colonel?’8 Much of 7 RAR’s distinctiveness came from the high numbers of national servicemen within its ranks. This situation not only brought the average age of the battalion down to 22 years but also resulted in many platoons and sections being led by newly commissioned and newly promoted national servicemen.
In April 1967, 7 RAR arrived in Vietnam, one month before 2 RAR, which relieved 6 RAR. After losing many of its members to 6 RAR in 1965, 2 RAR had been rebuilt to full strength and had gone through the normal training cycle for operations. In January 1967, it had received a new commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Noel ‘Chick’ Charlesworth.
Left to right: Lieutenant Colonel L.R. Greville, commanding officer of 4 RAR, Lieutenant Colonel N.R. Charlesworth, commanding officer of 2 RAR, Colonel D.A. Thomson, Director of Infantry and a former commanding officer of 4 RAR, and Lieutenant Colonel E.H. Smith, commanding officer of 7 RAR, photographed in Vietnam towards the end of 1967. Greville was on a reconnaissance as 4 RAR was to arrive in Vietnam in June 1968 (photo: N. Charlesworth).
Each of 5 RAR, 6 RAR and 7 RAR had relied heavily on personnel from the original battalions of the regiment—from 1 RAR, 2 RAR and 3 RAR respectively.
It was the officers, NCOs and senior soldiers of the old battalions who enabled the new battalions to absorb quickly their intakes of national service and regular soldiers, and to prepare them for war. But after this rapid expansion the regiment needed a period of consolidation in which young officers and NCOs learned their craft, and soldiers gained the necessary experience to justify promotion to corporal or lance corporal. The next battalion to be formed, 8 RAR, was therefore not raised until 18 July 1966, at Enoggera, and 150 former members of 1 RAR, which had just returned from Vietnam, were among the foundation members.
The first commanding officer of 8 RAR was Lieutenant Colonel John ‘Jol’ Langtry. On 8 August 1966, the battalion conducted its inauguration parade with a strength of 370 members; but in the following month further regular and national service soldiers marched in. In January 1967, the battalion was warned that it was to relieve 4 RAR in Malaysia, and between 24 August and 6 November 1967 the battalion moved from Brisbane to Malaysia by sea and air.
It was a longstanding military maxim that each battalion overseas needed to be supported by at least one other battalion at home. But as the Vietnam War continued, it became obvious that each battalion would have to be supported by two at home. With post-tour leave, and the national service training cycle, it would be difficult to expect a battalion to be ready for action within one year of its return from Vietnam. Even with this requirement, however, in mid-1967 the regiment could adequately cope with the commitment. The two battalions in Vietnam, 5 and 6 RAR, had just been replaced by 2 and 7 RAR, and in October 1967 8 RAR replaced 4 RAR at Terendak. This left 1 RAR and 3 RAR available to replace 2 RAR and 7 RAR in a year’s time, thus allowing 5 RAR and 6 RAR two years to prepare for their next operational tours.
This acceptable arrangement, however, was put under strain in October 1967, when the government decided to increase the strength of the task force in Vietnam by adding to it another battalion, a tank squadron, further helicopters and other specialist units, thus bringing the total Australian contribution to 8000 men. With three battalions in Vietnam and another in Malaysia, there would be just four others available in Australia. It was necessary to form another battalion, and on 13 November 19679 RAR was raised at Keswick Barracks, Adelaide. On that day the battalion consisted of the commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Alan ‘Alby’ Morrison, MBE, six other officers and three other ranks. A week later it moved to Woodside to take over the barracks recently vacated by 3 RAR, which had left for Vietnam.
Although the other new battalions had been formed from a nucleus of personnel from an existing battalion, it was not possible to do so in the case of 9 RAR. Since 3 RAR had deployed to Vietnam as an additional battalion for 1 ATF, not as a relieving battalion, there was no returning battalion from which 9 RAR could expect help. In its raising 9 RAR was given a full complement of officers and warrant officers, 80 per cent of its sergeants and 40 per cent of its corporals, posted in from all parts of the army, but the rank structure had to be completed from within the battalion’s resources. Furthermore, the battalion was to be ready to move to Vietnam to relieve 3 RAR within twelve months. In April 1968, 9 RAR reached full strength. On 9 November 1968, the main body of 9 RAR left Adelaide in HMAS Sydney for Vietnam, and thus celebrated its first birthday at sea on the way to war.
The successful expansion of the regiment to nine battalions was a testimony to the training and professionalism of the long-serving regulars, who had honed their skills during the period of peacetime training in the early 1960s, and in the 28th Brigade in Malaysia. The raising of a new battalion was an exciting challenge for all, with the main focus on the need to prepare for operations with the aim of matching the expertise of the older battalions. Slowly the battalion identity was established with the allocation of distinctive lanyards, the presentation of new colours, the raising of a battalion band, the selection of a battalion march, and sometimes the adoption of a battalion mascot. These regimental trappings were minor in comparison with the effort of training an inexperienced battalion for war.
The expansion of the regiment took place within a massive expansion of the regular army from a strength of 25,300 in June 1965 to 44,500 in 1970.9 All arms and services expanded to meet their new roles in Vietnam. New training battalions were raised: the 2nd Recruit Training Battalion at Puckapunyal and the 3rd Training Battalion at Singleton. Army and corps schools were expanded to meet the training demands imposed on them. The growth of the AATTV placed a further training load on the Jungle Training Centre (JTC) at Canungra and drained the army of its most valuable commodity: experienced middle-level warrant officers and NCOs. On 4 January 1966, authority was given for the demonstration platoon at JTC, then on rotation from Brisbane-based units, to become a separate entity. On 19 March 1968, the demonstration platoon became HQ 1st Division Defence Company, and on 15 June 1971, it was designated the 10th Independent Rifle Company, RAR.
Other army commitments were growing at the same time. The national service scheme allowed potential conscripts to volunteer for service in the CMF in lieu of possible conscription. Consequently the CMF expanded from 27,500 in June 1964 to a peak of 35,800 in 1968, increasing the work loads of regular cadres. On the other hand, the CMF was a small but valuable source of volunteers for full-time duty, particularly middle-rank officers.
The PIR also expanded during this period from a strength of 800 in June 1964 to 2500 in 1969. In February 1965, 2 PIR was raised. This was a further heavy commitment for the infantry corps and although it provided an overseas posting for families the nature of service in PIR entailed much family separation.
The regiment now entered a period of rotation with three battalions in Vietnam, one in Malaysia and the other five in Australia, all moving on one- or two-year cycles. Units often could not return to their ‘home’ city after a Vietnam tour because other units had of necessity occupied their barracks, and it was difficult for units to maintain permanent ties with local communities despite open days, participation in civic events, granting of ‘Freedom of the City’ and the like. Families were unable to establish permanent homes.
The army’s expansion involved a huge construction program. Most army camps in Australia consisted of temporary Second World War-era wooden, fibro or corrugated-iron huts. They had continued to serve the army through the 1950s’ national service scheme of three months’ full-time training, with minor refurbishment and enormous maintenance costs. The regular battalions of that era, when not in Korea or Malaysia, served at Holsworthy and Ingleburn outside Sydney, and Enoggera in the suburbs of Brisbane. The Infantry Centre was at Ingleburn and later at Singleton; and the Jungle Training Centre was re-established in 1954 on the site of the Second World War camp at Canungra. The raising of new battalions brought Woodside in South Australia and, for a time, Puckapunyal back into use as battalion camps.
Other new barracks came into use with task force areas each containing accommodation for two battalions opening at Townsville, Enoggera and Holsworthy.
Accommodation for an infantry battalion was built at Puckapunyal but it was ultimately allocated to the 2nd Recruit Training Battalion. New barracks were built for 1 and 2 PIR, for the Special Air Service Regiment at Swanbourne in Western Australia and at the Jungle Training Centre, Canungra, except on Battle Ridge, where accommodation in tent lines was deliberately retained.
New training areas for the army were also acquired and old areas expanded, the most important acquisitions being the High Range Area at Townsville and the extensive Shoalwater Bay Training Area near Rockhampton in central Queensland.
These barracks and training areas represent a valuable long-term legacy to the army from the Vietnam era. The difficulties experienced by the army in the mid-1980s in attempting to identify areas in central New South Wales suitable for a new All-Arms School and a large manoeuvre area emphasise the value of these earlier acquisitions.
Two early manning decisions had a fundamental effect on training during the Vietnam War: the twelve-month tour and the rotation of major units. The twelvemonth duration of a posting to Vietnam allowed for an effective cycle of operational efficiency with a finite limit on the discomforts and dangers of operational service.
A Nine-Battalion Regiment 157 While helping the attitude and motivation of individuals, the twelve-month tenure imposed a problem for personnel managers. It did not fit neatly into posting cycles, geared for family stability of at least two years, and added greatly to posting turbulence. It was not even a neat twelve months; pre-embarkation training and leave before and after the tour meant that individuals were unavailable for other duty for about fifteen months. And many members did two tours in Vietnam, and some three or more. Career management by the Military Secretary’s staff, the Central Army Records Office and the Directorate of Infantry required careful balancing of the individual’s personal and family needs and career development and the demands of an army committed to a war.
The decision to rotate major units was a result of the Korean War experience when 3 RAR had been kept in-theatre by individual relief while 1 RAR and 2 RAR were rotated. Several times 3 RAR had to be taken out of action to facilitate changeovers of personnel. The army in Vietnam used individual relief for headquarters and static units but all major units rotated as units.10 Over a two to three-year period each battalion absorbed a new group of soldiers, junior NCOs and officers, trained them as individuals and sub-units, exercised as a battalion, served a tour in Vietnam and then marched out most members to discharge or new postings and started again. This was unquestionably a major factor in maintaining morale and operational efficiency and the pride of individuals in their units and sub-units can be felt to this day. The significant cost and effort in constantly training and moving units was more than justified.
The difficulty of attracting sufficient recruits to man an expanding army led the government to reintroduce conscription in 1964. The scheme that operated from 1951 to 1959 had called up all eighteen-year-olds for three months’ full-time training, after which they continued to serve in the CMF. The regular army was to a large extent a cadre for this huge training effort that saw the regular battalions reduced in strength and capability except when serving in Korea and Malaysia.
The new scheme called up twenty-year-olds who were eligible for overseas service, for two years. This allowed time for recruit and corps training and more than a year of regimental service. The army did not need and could not cope with a universal service scheme so a process of selection was required. A system of balloting birthdays was devised in the form of a lottery, with young men whose birthday was drawn out of the barrel being subject to call-up.
The system was efficient and flexible from the army’s viewpoint although many thought it was fundamentally unfair. The army retained its entry standards of medical and psychological fitness and minimum educational standards and the Department of Labour and National Service calculated the number of young men turning twenty each year who would be of acceptable standard. The number of days to be balloted was determined in order to produce the number required in each intake.
The absorption of the national servicemen into the army was affected by a number of considerations. First, it had been decided that there would be a national service intake every three months. During the planning for national service, the Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant General Wilton, had directed that national servicemen were to be posted to units in such a way that, as far as national service manning was concerned, all units were ‘to be at all times equally viable’. This direction resulted in the concept of a ‘steady state distribution of men’. It was essential that in a two-year period six intakes be represented in every unit. Once the national service scheme had been running for two years, input equalled output and a ‘steady state’ was achieved. This also applied to experienced levels of national servicemen.
Second, in February 1967 the Minister for the Army, Malcolm Fraser, directed that infantry battalions in Vietnam were not to comprise more than 50 per cent national servicemen. At that time 7 RAR was about to embark to relieve 5 RAR, and 2 RAR was in the final stage of preparation to relieve 6 RAR. Both 2 RAR and 7 RAR were considerably over 50 per cent national servicemen, and it was too late to make major transfers. Some national servicemen in 2 RAR were replaced, and more regular volunteers had to be found to bring 7 RAR to a 50–50 balance of volunteers and national servicemen. The minister’s direction also meant that more volunteers had to be found for 9 RAR when it was raised at the end of 1967.
For almost a year the army allotted just over 50 per cent of its volunteer recruits to infantry, and all of them had to be eighteen and a half years of age or older. This meant that all the operationally eligible volunteer recruits went to infantry for about a year, forcing the other corps to send high proportions of national servicemen to Vietnam, in order to conserve the numbers of regulars they needed so as to keep the time between repeat tours as long as possible.
Third, the successive increases in the force in Vietnam were announced around October–November each year and were to be implemented in the following February–May period. This caused an enormous annual peak in reliefs, which was raised higher with the following year’s added approvals. The most dramatic of these manning events was Operation Wintergrip in 1967. Wintergrip was the expansion of the two-battalion task force by the addition of theatre increments and supplements, plus the relief of 5 and 6 RAR and the field regiment. It gave rise to the famous signal despatched by the Quartermaster General to the GOCs of all commands, enjoining them to ‘get a grip on WINTERGRIP’.11 The ideal was for national servicemen after corps training to join a battalion destined for Vietnam six months prior to departure so they could do the complete training cycle and a full tour on operations before discharge. In practice this was seldom possible. Because call-ups occurred every three months about 70 national servicemen would be replaced in each battalion every three months. If they were spread throughout the battalion, as they should have been, this would have meant one man per section with some sections getting two. Some national servicemen joined their battalion shortly before it left for Vietnam and others joined battalions in Vietnam as reinforcements after in-country training with the Task Force Reinforcement Hold Unit. If necessary, they were then transferred to an incoming battalion to complete their tours, providing local knowledge and experience to their new battalion. The strain within the battalions imposed by the changeover of national servicemen was taken very much by the regulars. Considering the pace of operations, and especially the duration and constancy of operations, it ‘is no wonder’, wrote one commanding officer, that ‘my regulars were parchment thin when they came home from their second tour’.12 From January 1965 to December 1972 some 63,740 men were conscripted, and of these 15,542 saw service in Vietnam, the biggest percentage being with the regiment. Most of those who went to Vietnam genuinely wanted to go, either from a spirit of adventure or acceptance of duty or both. As far as the regular soldier was concerned, it can be fairly claimed that no soldier who strongly objected to going to Vietnam was forced to go. Units would not knowingly take a soldier likely to be a liability and he was reposted in Australia. The national serviceman had to specifically volunteer for overseas service by signing a declaration during corps training, and thus all national servicemen who served in Vietnam volunteered to do so.
A valuable product of the national service scheme was the young second lieutenants produced by the Officer Training Unit, raised at Scheyville, New South Wales, on 1 April 1965. The 22-week course was run on a strict pass–fail basis with few second chances. Many graduates served with distinction as platoon commanders in Vietnam and many opted to serve on as career soldiers.
From 1966 to 1967 all battalions consisted of approximately 50 per cent national servicemen. While the senior NCOs were normally regulars, one-third of the junior officers (platoon commanders) were national servicemen, one-third Portsea graduates and the remainder Duntroon graduates. Increasing numbers of national servicemen occupied the vital position of section commanders towards the second half of a battalion’s tour, especially following casualties, or as the regular corporals were siphoned off for training or other duties with South Vietnamese units. For example, in one major action fought by 5 RAR at Binh Ba in June 1969, at least five of the sections of two companies were successfully commanded by national servicemen acting as section commanders in the absence of the regulars.13 The national serviceman in the battalions proved himself to be the equal of any soldier to leave Australian shores, despite the fact that he came from a generation considered by some to be ‘long-haired dissenters’ who resented authority. Under the guidance and leadership of regular NCOs and officers the national serviceman showed outstanding loyalty to his unit, and courage and tenacity in battle. Battalions were proud that visitors found it impossible to distinguish regulars from national servicemen in the performance of their work, and it was of little importance to the soldiers themselves. They had equal pay rates and conditions of service except the regular soldier enlisted for a minimum of three years.
The influx of national servicemen was a watershed for the regiment and they notably raised the calibre, standards and the professionalism of a battalion. They were the cream of the nation’s young men, having had to pass careful medical and psychological screening, and only relatively few were accepted. Aged 21 when they joined a battalion, they brought with them a measure of experience, maturity and frequently education rarely found in recruits and, more importantly, they brought with them a questioning mind that demanded to know the reason why. This in turn put new demands on leaders, both NCOs and officers, to explain more fully than ever before why things were done the way they were. This translated into more comprehensive orders; the commander became more accountable in front of his troops and it made the troops appreciate and understand why they were being told to undertake operations.
The national servicemen made better infantry leaders of all the regulars.
Following 1 RAR’s despatch to Vietnam at short notice in 1965, a pattern of battalion development and training was evolved using lessons learned (and, as always, relearned) to provide the best possible preparation for the particular demands of Vietnam service. No two battalions followed precisely the same pattern; however, with the exception of 9 RAR, the training cycle of a battalion was generally to spend the first year on specialist courses, sub-unit training and support to other units. Usually the battalion was under strength. In the second year the battalion was brought to full strength with the arrival of successive national service intakes, and training was stepped up.
Battalions were properly required to conduct the bulk of their own training.
Their specialist instructors were sent for training to the Infantry Centre or appropriate army and corps schools. Stretcher-bearers were required to have high levels of first aid skills and were often seconded to public hospitals for training and work experience. All officers and non-commissioned officers had to be trained in mortar and artillery fire direction and control of air strikes.
Junior non-commissioned officer training was a continuous task with battalions having to produce their own to replace those posted out to fill the army’s training system. The critical rank was that of corporal: each new platoon raised required only one officer but three corporals and three lance corporals.
The army acquired a range of new weapons and munitions that had to be mastered: M16 rifles, M79 grenade launchers, XM203 rifle/grenade launchers, M72 rocket launchers, claymore mines and a variety of grenades. Safety took on a new emphasis. Rigorous peacetime safety precautions left soldiers unfamiliar with live ammunition and the early battalions suffered from a number of weapon and grenade accidents. From June 1968 every battalion and Special Air Service squadron was required to conduct field-firing exercises for each sub-unit carrying the weight and bulk of live ammunition. These exercises took the form of a three-day advance to contact ending with a field-firing phase with each man firing 100 rounds from his rifle and 1000 rounds per machine-gun.14 The CMF assisted some of the battalions in preparing for war. For example, in 1968 the commanding officer of 5 RAR, Lieutenant Colonel Kahn, spoke to a school friend, Lieutenant Colonel John Arnott, who was commanding 1/15th Royal New South Wales Lancers, which was equipped with a small number of Centurion tanks. Arnott agreed to undertake the training of 5 RAR with a troop of three Centurions. Over a period of three months CMF members gave up a week or more of civil employment to help train sub-units in infantry–tank cooperation on the Holsworthy Range. Eight months later in June 1969 at the battle of Binh Ba the same 5 RAR soldiers fought successfully in a major infantry–armour battle—thanks to the efforts of the 1/15th Royal New South Wales Lancers.15 Some battalions were able to travel to Puckapunyal for infantry–tank cooperation training with the 1st Armoured Regiment.
Helicopter drills and air mobile operations also needed to be practised for the army’s first helicopter war. Most battalions had wooden mock-ups of helicopters, and often troops deployed on exercises in Land Rovers to simulate helicopter insertions.
Battalion training at JTC, Canungra was mandatory and particularly important for battalions with no access to rainforest training areas. All battalions were required to send a cadre to Canungra in advance and they assisted the Battle Wing instructors as all members of the battalion were phased through in company groups at one-week intervals for a three-week training program.
In addition to training major units, Battle Wing ran battle efficiency courses on similar lines which were mandatory for everyone posted to Vietnam, regardless of rank or corps, and advisers’ courses for potential members of the AATTV. At a time when the whole army was working to maximum capacity there were none who worked harder or more productively than the staff at Canungra.
The first battalion to phase through the course at Canungra was 5 RAR, as recalled by the battalion historian:
The first week was worse than the whole of our year in Vietnam put together, for we had to propel our reluctant bodies over rope courses, across rivers dangling from flying foxes, over an assault course and finally over a thing called a confidence course . . . In the third week we exercised as companies in the depths of the Wiangaree State Forest . . . The training at Canungra was of the greatest value. Once we had learned to cope with its jungle and torrential rains, Vietnam held little that was totally new, except of course, the Viet Cong.16
The final battalion exercise at Shoalwater Bay conducted by Headquarters 1st Division was a critical and detailed examination of every facet of a battalion’s performance. Members at any level could be judged below standard and sacked and many regarded it as more demanding in some respects than actual operations in Vietnam—a principle of training with which many would agree.
The problems of training for Vietnam are demonstrated by this photograph of troops of 7 RAR about to board a Caribou aircraft at the end of an exercise in the Gospers area of NSW in July 1969. The troops are wearing lightweight combat jackets, not having been issued with the warm liners, while frost can be seen on the ground. In the foreground is Major G.C. Skardon, officer commanding C Company, 7 RAR (photo: A. Mattay).
It is not possible to describe in detail the preparation of each battalion for operations, but after 2 RAR and 7 RAR were deployed to Vietnam in mid-1967, the rotation cycle was as follows:
• 3 RAR returned from Malaysia in September 1965 and took over the old 4 RAR lines at Woodside. Under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Jim Shelton, MC, the battalion deployed to Vietnam in December 1967 to become the third battalion in the Task Force.
• 1 RAR returned from Vietnam in June 1966 to its old barracks at Holsworthy. Under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Phillip Bennett, the battalion deployed to Vietnam for its second tour in April 1968 to relieve 7 RAR.
• 4 RAR returned from Malaysia in October 1967 and went to Enoggera, where Lieutenant Colonel Leon ‘Lee’ Greville took command in January 1968. In view of the short period between its return from Malaysia and its deployment to Vietnam in June 1968 to replace 2 RAR, Army Headquarters decided that members of the battalion would not be reposted when it returned to Australia from Malaysia, and that complete sub-unit structures would be retained. As a result, 4 RAR was unique in the number of officers, NCOs and soldiers who stayed with the battalion during its early years. Many who served in Borneo during Confrontation stayed with the battalion through its first tour in Vietnam from 1 June 1968 to 19 May 1969, and when it returned to Vietnam in May 1971 it contained 24 sergeants who were foundation members of the battalion and 50 soldiers who were beginning their third operational tour with 4 RAR. This continuity in manning gave 4 RAR a feeling of family such as occurs with the British regimental system. The closeness of the battalion dependants, fostered in Malaysia, helped them to cope with separation during the Vietnam tours.
• 9 RAR, as mentioned earlier, began its first tour in November 1968 to replace 3 RAR.
• 5 RAR returned to the new Tobruk Lines at Holsworthy from Vietnam in May 1967, and Lieutenant Colonel Colin ‘Genghis’ Kahn took command in November that year. The battalion returned to Vietnam for its second tour in February 1969 to replace 1 RAR.
• 6 RAR returned from Vietnam in June 1967 and was the first battalion to occupy the new Lavarack Barracks in Townsville. Under the command of Lieutenant Colonel David Butler, the battalion began its second tour of Vietnam in May 1969 when it relieved 4 RAR.
• 8 RAR returned from Terendak in April 1969 and went to Enoggera, where Lieutenant Colonel Keith O’Neill took command. After intensive training the battalion moved to Vietnam in November 1969 to replace 9 RAR. The short period of preparation in Australia was assisted by the formation of an Australian component of the battalion at Enoggera some months before the return of the main body from Malaysia to begin training the national service intake.
• 1 RAR returned to Holsworthy from Vietnam in February 1969. The battalion’s Australian component had already made preparations for the move to Malaysia, and in March 1 RAR took over from 8 RAR at Terendak.
• 7 RAR returned from Vietnam in April 1968 and occupied Finschhafen Lines at Holsworthy. Under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Ron Grey, the battalion returned to Vietnam for its second tour in February 1970, relieving 5 RAR.
• 2 RAR returned to Enoggera from Vietnam in June 1968, and in January the following year moved to Lavarack Barracks in Townsville. Under the command of Lieutenant Colonel John Church, the battalion returned to Vietnam for its second tour in May 1970, relieving 6 RAR.
• 3 RAR returned to Woodside from Vietnam in December 1968 and Lieutenant Colonel Peter Scott assumed command in February 1969. It was assumed that the battalion would relieve 8 RAR in November 1970, but the government reduced the commitment to two battalions and 8 RAR was not replaced. In February 1971, 3 RAR moved to Vietnam for its second tour to relieve 7 RAR. Its tour concluded in October 1971 and it returned to Woodside.
• 4 RAR returned to Enoggera from Vietnam in May 1969, and in December 1969 moved to Lavarack Barracks, Townsville to join 2 RAR as part of 3rd Task Force. Lieutenant Colonel Jim Hughes, MC, assumed command in October 1969. Like 3 RAR, 4 RAR’s deployment to Vietnam was delayed by the non-replacement of 8 RAR, and it relieved 2 RAR in Vietnam in May 1971. Except for D Company, which returned in March 1972, its tour concluded in December 1971 and it returned to Townsville.
• 6 RAR returned to Townsville from Vietnam in May 1970 and Lieutenant Colonel David Drabsch, MBE, assumed command in June 1970. In July 1971, the battalion relieved 1 RAR in Singapore.
The conclusion of the Vietnam commitment found 1 RAR, 2 RAR and 4 RAR at Townsville, 3 RAR at Woodside, 5 RAR at Holsworthy, 6 RAR in Singapore, 7 RAR at Holsworthy, 8 RAR at Enoggera and 9 RAR at Enoggera.
During six years of war seventeen officers had commanded battalions of the regiment in Vietnam. These officers all had remarkably similar backgrounds. All had graduated from Duntroon and all had seen active service in Korea. Some had served in Malaya during the Emergency or in Malaysia during Confrontation. Their average age on arrival in Vietnam was 40; the youngest, Brumfield, was 37, and the oldest, O’Neill, was 43. One had graduated from Duntroon in 1944, three in 1946, four in 1947, six in 1948, one in 1950 and two in 1951. These statistics demonstrate the extent to which the army had become a professional long-service force during the postwar period. They also show the extent to which the experiences of the previous twenty years had provided a pool of highly trained personnel that could be used if the regiment needed to expand quickly.
Despite the enormous strain placed upon the regiment, the fact that it did not suffer any administrative or tactical disaster was a tribute to the excellence of the preparation of the peacetime years and the experience of Korea and Malaya. But it is doubtful how much longer this performance could have been maintained without a serious deterioration in standards. The expansion of the regiment between 1965 and 1968 and its maintenance to the end of the Vietnam War was an outstanding achievement and one in which all members of the regiment could be proud.
While attention focused on the Australian forces in Vietnam, battalions of the regiment continued to serve as part of the BCFESR at Terendak in Malaysia. By the time 8 RAR arrived towards the end of 1967, the future of BCFESR and the 28th Commonwealth Brigade was in the melting pot. During 1966 the British government had discussed a possible withdrawal from ‘east of Suez’, but senior British ministers had indicated that Britain had ‘no intention of ratting on [its] existing commitments’.17 By July 1967, however, Britain had announced that half of the forces deployed in Malaysia and Singapore would be withdrawn by 1971, the rest by 1973 to 1976.
When President Johnson announced on 31 March 1968 that the US involvement in the Vietnam War would be wound down, it was clear that the Australian government would have to rethink its strategy in South-East Asia. Colonel Alan Stretton, who had earlier commanded 2 RAR at Terendak, headed a fact-finding mission to report on the future of the battalion group at Terendak, and he concluded that if the Australian battalion were to be ‘left in Malaysia there was a risk that it would become involved in any trouble that might break out and Australia would be faced with an open-ended commitment from which she could not withdraw’.18 If the battalion were to be withdrawn to Singapore, it would reduce the administrative burden.
On 19 November 1968, the Prime Minister, John Gorton, announced that Australia would retain its military forces in the Malaysia–Singapore region until the end of 1971, and on 3 January 1969 it was announced that the battalion would move from Terendak to Singapore. This move was confirmed on 25 February when, in a statement to Parliament, the Prime Minister presented Australia’s decision as a contribution to regional stability. Australia would retain two squadrons of Mirages, a naval ship and a battalion indefinitely. They would remain only so long as ‘actively desired’ by Malaysia and Singapore, and would not be used for the maintenance of civil law and order.19 Both Malaysia and Singapore were keen for Britain, Australia and New Zealand to retain forces in the area, and the incoming Conservative government in Britain in 1970 reversed its predecessor’s decision to withdraw and negotiated the Five Power Defence Arrangements between Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore, which included an agreement to consult in the event of an attack or threats against Malaysia or Singapore. The three external powers formed a joint force known as ANZUK. Australia took a primary role in this force and provided the first joint commander. The 28th Independent Commonwealth Infantry Brigade Group became the 28th ANZUK Brigade.
Meanwhile, in the midst of this controversy, 8 RAR under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Langtry, continued training with the 28th Brigade, commanded by Brigadier Peter Tancred. On 25 September 1968, the battalion received its Queen’s and regimental colours at a parade at Terendak, the first time a battalion of the regiment had received new colours overseas.
In late April 1969, the battalion handed over its lines to 1 RAR under the com mand of Lieutenant Colonel J.B. Trenerry. Like 8 RAR, 1 RAR conducted valu able jungle training and both battalions were a useful source of well-trained reinforcements for the battalions in Vietnam. In December 1969, 1 RAR began to move to Singapore, and the move was complete by February 1970. The battalion’s new home was the historic Selarang Barracks, where the Japanese had held Australian prisoners of war after the fall of Singapore in 1942. All training was now aimed at a major five power exercise, and 1 RAR was brought to full strength by the addition of two New Zealand companies from 1 RNZIR based in Singapore. On 16 July 1971, 6 RAR replaced 1 RAR and during 1972 moved from Selarang to Kangaw Barracks at Nee Soon.
The decision to withdraw Australian ground forces was made soon after the election of the Whitlam government in December 1972. In the light of the changing strategic situation in South-East Asia and the regional desires, particularly of the Malaysian government, for a neutral South-East Asia, it was becoming questionable whether by 1973 there was any significant external threat to be met by the ANZUK force. Both the Malaysian and Singapore armies had grown in strength, and as Professor Robert O’Neill observed, ‘it had begun to appear presumptuous to offer Australian aid to these stronger armies, particularly as they were facing no external threats’.20
The intelligence officer of 6 RAR, Captain A.S. D’Hagé, briefs the 6 RAR orders group during Exercise Swamp Fox in Johore in October 1971. Third from the left is the commanding officer of 6 RAR, Lieutenant Colonel D.A. Drabsch, and on his left is Major M.J. Harris. Both Harris and D’Hagé were later to command 6 RAR (AWM photo no. GAR/71/499/MC).
The principal unit involved was 6 RAR and the Defence Minister, Lance Barnard, briefed 6 RAR’s commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel John Healy, when he visited Singapore in February 1973. The battalion would be with drawn by the end of the following February. Soon after, 28 ANZUK Brigade broke up.
Thus began a busy year for 6 RAR. The preparations for its return to Australia seemed interminable. The belief that the Australian withdrawal precipitated the disbandment of the 28th Brigade, a formation which had been in existence since the Korean War, exacerbated 6 RAR’s natural sadness at the passing of one of the great attractions of peacetime service in the regiment. The Singapore tour was invaluable for the soldiers’ experience and morale, while the good quarters, frequent leave and generous allowances made it popular with their families as well. No battalion felt the disappointment more keenly than 2 RAR, which was preparing to relieve 6 RAR when the decision was announced. 6 RAR left Singapore in December 1973 to return to Enoggera, ending the continuous presence of Australian battalions in South-East Asia since 1955. For the first time all battalions of the regiment were back in Australia.
The long Vietnam war had a profound effect on the regular troops who, despite the national servicemen, had made up the bulk of the battalions. They worked long hours with much bush time for many years, they accepted the responsibility of early promotion and often had to learn on the job. Formal acquisition of promotion qualifications still required personal study and attendance at career courses.
Although the battalions became very skilled in techniques for operations in Vietnam, they inevitably lost the wider skills of conventional operations in terrain other than jungle. For years after the war NCOs taught and practised jungle skills such as contact and harbour drills in open country. Company and battalion defensive positions were referred to as fire support bases. There was a loss of broader soldierly skills.
In many ways the worst effects of the Vietnam commitment were on the families. Service life can be difficult in peacetime, with constant moves, poor housing and disruption to children’s education and wives’ employment. To this was added the strain of long separations, loneliness and nagging worry about a husband at war. Every wife or mother knew the fear of an army staff car stopping near her house. All this in the midst of a nation overtly at peace, generally indifferent to the war and with a minority noisily opposed and capable of making threatening calls to service wives.
Families living in married quarters found company and assistance from sympathetic neighbours and had easier contact with the welfare and support systems. Others preferred anonymity in the wider community where they could mix with extended family and friends. Often the best support came from unit wives’ clubs, area wives’ associations and ladies’ auxiliaries. These provided points of contact for wives, mothers, families and agencies; conducted a wide range of social activities, sports, cards, art, cooking and the like; facilitated fundraising drives in support of battalion civil affairs activities; arranged Christmas parties; and exchanged tapes and films of battalion and wives’ club activities.
Soldiers and families both were affected by the growing dissent and public demonstrations against the war. Most accusations against the army and individual soldiers, although unfair and hurtful, were made through ignorance rather than malice. The army was blamed for actions, such as conscription, which were the result of an elected government’s decisions.
Other events touched more deeply. Postal strikes in Australia delaying mail to and from Vietnam led to threats of a ‘punch a postie’ campaign by troops returning home. During the big moratorium demonstrations of 1970, 3 RAR managed to play its own small part. The battalion was on stand-down on Friday 8 May, the day before the rally and march in Adelaide. Many of the protesters had gathered on the steps of the South Australian Parliament House, waving Viet Cong and North Vietnamese flags and chanting their opposition to the war. Some 50 members of 3 RAR who were in town in civilian clothes decided to join other anti-moratorium demonstrators in staging their own anti-protest march. There was a lot of shouting, pushing and shoving but no major incidents. Fortunately word had got back to Woodside and all available officers and senior NCOs, plus some staff from Keswick Barracks, hastened to the scene and persuaded the soldiers to disperse.21 The battalion was confined to camp the next day, the official march proceeded without interference, some of the soldiers, and two junior officers, were summarily disciplined and the excitement subsided.22 It speaks well for the discipline of the regiment that despite the extreme provocation offered by some demonstrators there were no other such incidents in this time of national division.
Contrary to popular understanding, most battalions had ‘welcome home’ marches in their ports of disembarkation. These were well supported to the end of the war, with the vast majority expressing approval and support for the marching troops.
However, the national servicemen returning home individually at the conclusion of their service had no such welcome, and some battalions were not welcomed. For example, 6 RAR came home from its second tour by air because HMAS Sydney was in refit. The drafts arrived at night in Sydney and were met officially by a movements lance corporal. Everyone was despatched efficiently within 24 hours to home and for discharge. Many national servicemen were discharged before they realised it and the change from war to civilian life was dramatic. The commanding officer of 6 RAR, Lieutenant Colonel Butler, bitterly resented not only the lack of reception but the fact that his regulars had to pay the extra costs, above rail fares, to enable them to fly home from Sydney to Townsville. Butler later wrote: ‘No lesser man than the QMG actually yelled at me when I queried the injustice before we left South Vietnam. Indeed I feel my anger rise as I write this note after all those years.’23 The Vietnam ‘Welcome Home’ March staged in Sydney on 3 October 1987 had particular meaning for the men who returned by air, often arriving at night. It attracted an estimated 30,000 participants and a huge crowd of cheering spectators. No one who was present could forget the emotion as nine battalions of veterans, each up to 800 strong and led by their former commanding officers, marched past the Governor of New South Wales and the Prime Minister of Australia.
The regiment was ready for the task thrust upon it by the commitment to Vietnam and had established a record worthy of its distinguished forebears. It had come a long way from its early days at Morotai in 1945. It had learned about barrack life and occupation duties in Japan, it had faced the harsh reality of war in Korea, it had gained from the association with the British Army in Malaya, and it had endured the cruel penny-pinching days of the 1950s. But in the mid-1960s the regiment was ready; officers and NCOs were qualified several ranks above those held, and the battalions had achieved high levels of discipline and excellence. In 1945 Lieutenant General Sir Sydney Rowell, among others, had determined on setting up an infantry battalion organisation in which unit discipline would survive in peace and war. This organisation served Australia well in Japan, Korea and Malaya and Borneo, but in the commitment to Vietnam returned its full dividend.24 Since 1973 the regiment has never numbered more than six battalions (although 5/7 RAR unlinked in December 2006, and the re-raising of 8/9 RAR is planned for 2008). But to the thousands of veterans who served between 1965 and 1973, the nine battalions still live proudly in their memories. Before discussing the post-Vietnam reduction of the regiment, however, it is necessary to return to the operations in Vietnam, which to many veterans remain the most vivid memories of their service.