Endnotes

PREFACE TO THE 2008 EDITION

1 Bob Breen, A Little Bit of Hope: Australian Force—Somalia, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1998.

2 These are: John Essex-Clark, Maverick Soldier: An Infantryman’s Story, published in 1991, and Ben O’Dowd, In Valiant Company, published in 2000.

3 Details of the actions earning battle honours, and unit citations, are available in the 1990 edition of this book, and in the regimental standing orders. 3 RAR’s US Presidential Citation from Korea is available online at www.awm.gov.au/encyclopedia/pow/korea/3rar_citation.htm.

PREFACE TO THE 1990 EDITION

1 Since this was written in 1990 the official histories of Australian involvement in the South-East Asian conflicts of the Cold War have been written.

2 Deaths on active service were as follows: Korea (1950–1953): 1 RAR 43, 2 RAR 23; 3 RAR 231; Malaya (1955–1960): 1 RAR 1; 2 RAR 15; 3 RAR 4; Malay Peninsula (1963–1966): 3 RAR 1, 4 RAR 1; Sarawak (1965–1966): 3 RAR 3, 4 RAR 5; Vietnam (1965–1971): 1 RAR 53, 2 RAR 31, 3 RAR 28, 4 RAR 23, 5 RAR 51, 6 RAR 50, 7 RAR 35, 8 RAR 18, 9 RAR 35 (total for Vietnam, 324).

CHAPTER 1

1 Under the Defence Act 1903 the government could not order troops to serve overseas unless they volunteered to do so. The changes to enlistment procedures and to the Defence Act will be mentioned in chapter 3.

2 While initially they were Australian Imperial Force (AIF) units, with the disbandment of the AIF they later became part of the Interim Army, and finally, on 14 August 1952, Australian Regular Army (ARA) units. Since the Defence Act did not permit the establishment of regular infantry, the appropriate section of the Act was repealed from 1 January 1950. Austin, ‘The Australian Army—A Brief History’, AHQ file A274–2–50 (1952).

3 For further examination of the background to the formation of BCOF see Singh, Official History, pp. 14–18; Horner, High Command, pp. 419–25; and Banwell, ‘The British Commonwealth Occupation Force’, pp. 1–17.

4 Stanley, ‘British Commonwealth Occupation Force’, in Australian Encyclopaedia Vol. II, 1958, p. 133. Other units are listed in Murphy, ‘History of the Post-War Army’, AWM: MS 848, p. 24.

5 MacLean, ‘The Development of the Australian Army 1945–50’.

6 Long, The Final Campaigns, pp. 555, 581.

7 Murphy, ‘History of the Post-War Army’, pp. 16–17.

8 Military Board Proceedings 1945, item 140/45, Shipping Requirements.

9 Horner, High Command, p. 420; Long, The Final Campaigns, p. 607; Long, The Six Years War, p. 474.

10 Long, The Final Campaigns, pp. 550–1.

11 Ibid.; also Defence Committee Minute no. 357/1945. Military Board Agendum, no. 453/1945 and no. 5/1946.

12 HQ 34 Bde war diary, 3 October 1945.

13 HQ 34 Bde, 65, 66 & 67 Bn war diaries.

14 65 Bn war diary. Two of the first members of the battalion on 11 October were Lt D.S. Thomson and Pte Frank Deane; Deane was to retire from the ARA on 12 December 1975 in the rank of staff sergeant. He is believed to have had the longest period of continuous service in the RAR. (Interview with Brig D.S. Thomson, 11 May 1988 and CARO.)

15 66 Bn war diary.

16 67 Bn war diary.

17 HQ 34 Bde war diary.

18 34 Infantry Bde Training Instruction no. 1, 10 November 1945.

19 Singh, Official History, p. 32.

20 Ibid., pp. 15–18; HQ 34 Bde war diary.

21 Interviews with Col C.H.A. East (13 May 1987) and Brig W.J. Morrow (22 May 1987); 65 Bn war diary.

22 HQ 34 Bde Administration Instruction no. 4—Medical Service, 25 November 1945; HQ 34 Bde Routine Orders 15/45.

23 HQ 34 Bde Routine Order 13/45; RMO 65 Bn report, November 1945, 265 Bn war dairy; HQ 34 Bde war diary, 15 November 1945.

24 Signal: Advanced HQ AMF, AG 5306, 9 November 1945; CO 67 Bn report, November 1945, 65 Bn war diary; Comd 34 Bde, addressing HQ 34 Bde and attached personnel, 25 November 1945, HQ 34 Bde, war diary.

25 HQ 34 Bde war diary—October and November 1945; GRO 292/45; see coloured plate, Bean, Official History of Australia in the War 1914–1918, Vol. III, Appendix ‘Colour Patches’ and p. 51n. These battalions never saw active service, being disbanded to provide reinforcements for the Australian Corps.

26 65, 66 & 67 Bn war diaries, November/December 1945.

27 66 Bn war diary, 29 November 1945, and Thomson interview, 11 May 1988.

28 HQ 34 Bde war diary; Murphy, ‘History of the Post-War Army’, pp. 22–6; Long, The Final Campaigns.

29 66 Bn war diary.

30 67 Bn war diary.

31 HQ 34 Bde war diary.

32 Courier-Mail, Brisbane, 12–13 December 1945.

33 65 & 67 Bn war diaries.

34 65, 66 & 67 Bn war diaries.

35 HQ 34 Bde war diary.

36 66 Bn war diary.

37 HQ 34 Bde war diary; 65 Bn war diary.

38 HQ 34 Bde war diary.

39 Ibid.

40 Ibid.

41 HQ 34 Bde, 65, 66 & 67 Bn war diaries.

42 66 & 67 Bn war diaries.

43 HQ 34 Bde war diary.

44 East interview, 13 May 1978; Thomson interview, 11 May 1988. Article by Wally Mills in Duty First, Winter 1987; 66 Bn war diary.

45 HQ 34 Bde war diary.

46 Courier-Mail, Brisbane, 15 January 1946; 65, 66 & 67 Bn war diaries— while some tropical diseases receive some mention, VD incidence receives none; in any case the opportunity for infection was virtually non-existent on Morotai.

47 Horner, High Command, p. 429.

48 Comd 34 Infantry Bde, letter to all ranks 13 January 1946, 66 Bn war diary.

49 HQ 34 Bde war diary; 67 Bn war diary.

50 Ibid.

51 65, 66 & 67 Bn war diaries.

52 Ibid. & HQ 34 Bde war diary.

53 66 Bn war diary, Appendix ‘Q’, Summary of Events—66 Bn Advance Party.

CHAPTER 2

1 For discussion of the last days of the war in Japan, see Hoyt, Japan’s War, pp. 397–412.

2 For a description of the preparations for the defence of the mainland by the Japanese see Manchester, American Caesar, p. 436. On 15 August 1945, Emperor Hirohito ordered an end to all hostilities, ordering his people to accept the surrender ‘by enduring the unendurable and suffering what is insufferable’. Hoyt, Japan’s War, pp. 437–8. To the vast majority of Japanese the Imperial Rescript was obeyed without question, as a sacred duty. Weapons were collected through local Japanese authorities and offensive posters removed by the time the US Occupation Forces began arriving.

3 Clune, Ashes of Hiroshima, p. 80.

4 66 Bn war diary, February 1946. Notes of discussions between Maj J.B. Godwin and Maj Gen D.S. Baldwin at Townsville, 27 October 1984, p. 1; see also 65 Bn war diary, 13 February 1946; and The Sun, Melbourne, 14 February 1946.

5 R.J. Gilmore, ‘Japan: BCOF’, p. 344; Col E.J. Mulholland to author, 20 July 1988; 66 Bn war diary, March 1946; WO W.J. Coffman to author, 9 July 1987.

6 Singh, Official History, pp. 18–21.

7 Hopkins, ‘History of the Australian Occupation in Japan, 1946–50’, p. 105; WO1 W. Mills to author, 2 August 1988; see also articles by Massey Stanley in The Sun, Melbourne, on 4, 27, 28 March 1946. The conditions and life for the BCOF is described by Dorothy Drain in a series of articles published from February to June 1946, in the Australian Women’s Weekly, see particularly vol. 13, no. 48.

8 For accounts of Robertson as Commander-in-Chief, BCOF, see Hopkins, ‘Lieutenant General Sir Horace Robertson’, in Horner (ed.), The Commanders, pp. 290–3; and Grey, ‘General Sir Horace Robertson, BCOF and the Korean War, 1950–1951’. The command and control arrangements are discussed in Singh, Official History, pp. 35–41, and Banwell, ‘The British Commonwealth Occupation Force’, pp. 18–25.

9 Joint Chiefs of Staff Australia no. 276, minute no. 255/1946, quoted in Singh, Official History, p. 36.

10 O’Neill, ‘History of the Royal Australian Regiment, 1945–1950’, p. 80.

11 34th Australian Infantry Brigade Occupation Instruction no. 3, 20 April 1946.

12 65th Battalion Occupation Instruction no. 1, 25 April 1946.

13 Singh, Official History, p. 110.

14 Godwin and Baldwin, ‘Notes’, p. 3.

15 Lt Col T.E. Archer to author, 28 July 1988.

16 Col C.H.A. East to author, 27 June 1988.

17 Godwin and Baldwin, ‘Notes’, p. 2.

18 65th Bn Training Policy, 10 October 1946; I.B. Ferguson to author, 29 July 1988 and E.J. Mulholland to author, 21 July 1988; for another view on the behaviour and activities of the Australians, see H. McDonald, ‘Australia’s occupation forces—best we forget’, Sydney Morning Herald, 27 April 1984.

19 The 34th Australian Infantry Brigade Training Instruction no. 1, 26 November 1946 set out policy and principles to govern training from 1 December 1946 to 30 November 1947. On 15 July 1946, the Governor-General of Australia, the Duke of Gloucester, presented a cup to the Australian Army, which was to be awarded annually for competition between infantry battalions of the PMF. The competition was first conducted in 1947 between the three battalions of 34th Brigade in Japan, and included battalion drill, fighting efficiency and live firing range practices.

20 Clifton, Time of Fallen Blossoms, pp. 206–44.

21 Shelton to author, 15 July 1988. In July 1947, the barracks at Hiro were renamed Morshead Barracks in honour of Lt Gen Sir Leslie Morshead, the original commander of the 9th Australian Division, from which units the 66th Battalion was formed.

22 See O’Neill, ‘History of the Royal Australian Regiment’, pp. 82–4 and Hopkins, ‘History of the Australian Occupation’, p. 107. The ‘medical crisis’ in BCOF and the suggestion of a ‘semi-official red light district’ are also discussed by John, Uneasy Lies the Head that Wears a Crown, pp. 25–6.

23 The irony of this selection was not lost on the Japanese. It was also not popular with Headquarters 34th Brigade. Shelton to author, 15 July 1988.

24 Hopkins, ‘History of the Australian Occupation’, pp. 111–12.

25 Col I.B. Ferguson to author, 29 July 1988.

26 In September the battalion was deployed with: Bn HQ, A Coy (–1 Pl) and HQ Coy at Kaitaichi; 8 Pl A Coy at Kake; B Coy (–1 Pl) at Miyoshi; 12 Pl B Coy at Ninohsima; C Coy (–1 Pl) at Ujina, 13 Pl C Coy at Shobara; D Coy (–1 Pl) at Eta Jima; and 17 Pl D Coy at Kure.

27 East to author, 27 June 1988.

CHAPTER 3

1 See Millar ‘Australian Defence, 1945–1965’, pp. 251–64; O’Neill, Korean War 1950–53, vol. 1, pp. 21–32; Murphy, ‘History of the Post-War Army’, pp. 2–53; Maclean, ‘The Development of the Australian Army 1945–1950: A Study in Policy and Capabilities’, pp. 5–76. For discussion of the continuity in foreign policy after the 1949 elections see Eggins, ‘The 1949 Election and Australian Foreign Policy’, pp. 62–8.

2 See the statement and broadcast by the Prime Minister, Mr Menzies, Sydney Morning Herald, 4 and 21 September 1950.

3 Maclean, ‘The Development of the Australian Army’, pp. 25–8; O’Neill, Korean War, vol. 1, p. 25.

4 Although the term ‘Interim Army’ was used as early as February 1946, it was not formally approved by the Military Board until May 1946. In October 1946, the Governor-General, by Executive Minute, approved that all members of the AMF serving on full-time duty were deemed members of the ‘Interim Army’. The Interim Army did not cease to exist until three months after the ending of the ‘Time of War’, which was at midnight on 14 August 1952. At that time those members seconded to the Interim Army were henceforth members of the ARA. See Murphy, ‘History of the Post-War Army’, pp. 30–1.

5 Minutes of the Military Board (Agendum Number 141/1947 dated 29 September 1947). NAA: MP 742/1, 240/1/2785.

6 CPD, vol. 205, p. 1300.

7 Murphy, ‘History of the Post-War Army’, pp. 46–9.

8 O’Neill, Korean War, vol. 1, pp. 31–3; and Maclean, ‘The Development of the Australian Army’, p. 76.

9 Headquarters 34th Australian Infantry Brigade (letter) AG 3656, dated 30 June 1948; and Headquarters 34th Australian Infantry Brigade (letter) AG 5740, 21 September 1948. SD (Infantry) Minute, Inf 264, 6 August 1948.

10 VCGS Minute, VCGS 841/48, 18 October 1948; Headquarters 34th Australian Infantry Brigade GS 659, 25 October 1948; and Army Headquarters memo 30251 (240/1/2990), 25 November 1948; Army Headquarters memo 31753 (240/1/2990), 10 March 1949.

11 Lt O.J. O’Brien, ‘The History of the 66th Australian Infantry Battalion and 2nd Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment’, September 1960, AWM: AWM 113, 11/2/1; Archer to author, 28 July 1988.

12 O’Brien, ‘The History of the 66th Battalion etc.’, pp. 1–2; Shelton to author, 15 July 1988.

13 Additional recruit training companies were later established within the battalions, the 3rd at Ingleburn and the 4th at Puckapunyal. With the expansion of recruit training during the Korean War, the recruit training companies were disbanded and their responsibilities were transferred to the 1st Recruit Training Battalion, re-established at Kapooka in October 1951. NAA: MP 927, A96/3/2 and A240/1/2; and Lt Col C.D. Kayler-Thompson to author, September 1987.

14 Shelton to author, 15 July 1988, and Lt Col E.J. O’Sullivan to author, 14 June 1988.

15 Col A.V. Preece, to author, 23 July 1988.

16 For a full account see Lt Col M.F. Brogan,‘The Employment of the Royal Australian Engineers in Operation Excavate’, The Royal Engineers Journal (1949), pp. 73–83. O’Neill, ‘History of the Royal Australian Regiment 1945– 1950’, pp. 92, 97.

17 Postwar policy towards Japan is discussed in Rosencrance, Australian Diplomacy and Japan 1945–1951; Greenwood, Approaches to Asia: Australian Post-war Policies and Attitudes, pp. 187–90; and W. Levi, Australia’s Outlook on Asia, pp. 125–48. The attitude of the government and the fear of a resurgent Japan is also reflected in the statement by Evatt, Australia in World Affairs, pp. 40–148.

18 NAA: MP 1049, 1869–2–53; and MP 729/8, 37/431/83. The Council of Defence consisted of those ministers most concerned with defence, the three Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary, Department of Defence. Its functions were to consider and advise the Prime Minister or the Minister for Defence on defence policy or organisation.

19 Stanley, ‘British Commonwealth Occupation Force’, p. 131.

20 Ferguson was ‘a man who perhaps is to be identified with the character of his battalion more than any other . . .’ O’Neill, ‘History of the Royal Australian Regiment’, p. 67. He was an original member of the battalion and one of the few who served throughout the occupation of Japan and then went to Korea. He had acted as commanding officer on a number of occasions and served through five changes of commanding officer until he himself came to the appointment at a time of great difficulty in Korea in November 1950 following the death of Lt Col Green.

21 The fourteen RMC graduates who arrived in March were Lieutenants F.P. Scott, J.M. Church, A. Argent, D. Mannett, C.M. Townsend, R.F. Morison, A. McCann, C.S. Walsh, N.R. Charlesworth, P.H. Bennett, G. Hollings, D.M. Butler, E.O. Larson and W.F. Urquhart. On 1 January 1949, the battalion strength was 22 officers, eight warrant officers, 115 NCOs and 264 other ranks. By 3 December 1949 the strength had risen to 27 officers, six warrant officers, 88 NCOs and 408 other ranks. 3 RAR War Diary, December 1949 and May 1950, AWM: AWM 85.

22 There was no Support Company in the battalion. Experienced mortarmen and medium machine-gun crew were scattered within the battalion. Signals experience was almost non-existent. Lt Col A. Argent, ‘A Battalion Prepares for War’, pp. 17–18.

23 Much of the following account of 3 RAR activities from July to September 1950 is based on Argent, ‘A Battalion Prepares for War’, pp. 17–22.

24 Ibid., p. 19.

25 Ibid., p. 19.

26 Robertson to Chiefs of Staff, 17 July 1950, NAA: A5954, Box 1661, file 2.

27 O’Neill, Korean War 1950–53, vol. 2, pp. 11–16.

28 It was apparent that the deficiencies of 3 RAR could not be made up by drawing officers and men from the other two battalions of the RAR. Many men from these battalions did transfer to 3 RAR but it was necessary to conduct a special recruiting campaign. The Special Force, known as RASR(K) or K Force were enlisted into the Interim Army. These men were flown to Japan beginning on 28 August. To bring the battalion up to strength, reinforcements as well as replacements for those unfit for active service had to be found. By 21 November, the one thousand special enlistments had been made. Murphy, ‘History of the Post-War Army’, p. 49, 55, 56.

29 Argent, ‘A Battalion Prepares for War’, p. 22.

30 For Green’s career see: Green, The Name’s Still Charlie.

31 Argent, ‘A Battalion Prepares for War’, p. 22.

CHAPTER 4

1 Frequent reference is made to the war diaries of the RAR battalions, and to the brigade diaries. The RAR diaries are located at AWM 85, Australian War Memorial, Canberra; the brigade diaries are at WO281, The National Archives [TNA(UK)], Kew, England. For discussion of the Commonwealth military role in the Korean War see Barclay, First Commonwealth Division; and Grey, The Commonwealth Armies and the Korean War; O’Neill, Combat Operations pp. 3–289, is a detailed treatment of Australian ground combat in Korea.

2 27th Brigade war diary, 30 September 1950, TNA(UK): W0281/709.

3 3 RAR war diary, 12 October 1950.

4 3 RAR war diary, 17 October 1950; 27th Brigade situation report, 16–18 October 1950, NAA: MP729/8, 36/431/54; O’Neill, Combat Operations, pp. 32–3.

5 27th Brigade situation report, 21 October 1950, 23 October 1950.

6 3 RAR war diary, 22 October 1950; Coad ‘The Land Campaign in Korea’, p. 7.

7 Letter, Col D.M. Butler to Maj Gen. B.A. Coad, 20 October 1971, Coad Collection, IWM; Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, p. 660; Letter, Coad to Butler, 1 December 1971, ibid.

8 3 RAR war diary, 25 October 1950; ‘Summary of Operations’ 29 August 1950 to 4 February 1951, AWM: AWM 114, 665/6/1.

9 3 RAR war diary, 29 October 1950; O’Neill, Combat Operations, pp. 48–9.

10 Interview, Ferguson; letter, Coad to Butler, 1 December 1971.

11 3 RAR war diary, 5 November 1950.

12 O’Neill, Combat Operations, pp. 63–4; Coad, ‘Report on Operations’, pp. 19–20; 1st Battalion, the Middlesex Regiment war diary, 30 November 1950, Ministry of Defence, London.

13 3 RAR war diary, 5 December 1950.

14 Letter, Coad to Butler, 1 December 1971.

15 3 RAR war diary, 12 February 1951.

16 Argent, ‘Armoured Operations in Korea. Task Force “Crombez” at Chipyong-ni’, pp. 5–6.

17 3 RAR war diary, 17 January 1951.

18 3 RAR war diary, 16 April 1951.

19 3 RAR war diary, 14 April 1951.

20 16th Field Regiment war diary, 23 April 1951, DAK series 1, New Zealand Archives; Shipster (ed.), The Die-Hards in Korea, pp. 64–7.

21 27th Brigade war diary, 23 April 1951, TNA(UK): WO281/710.

22 Report, Major D.F. Laughlin, OC B Company, 3 RAR, AWM: AWM 114 665/7/1.

23 O’Neill’s account of Kapyong is to be preferred over all others. O’Neill, Combat Operations, pp. 131–60. See also O’Dowd’s account in O’Dowd, In Valiant Company.

24 Report Maj Jack Gerke, OC HQ Company, 3 RAR; Report, Maj B. S. O’Dowd, OC A Company, 3 RAR, AWM: AWM 114, 665/7/1.

25 English, A Perspective on Infantry, pp. 222–3; for a short overview of the People’s Liberation Army’s involvement in Korea, Segal, Defending China, esp. pp. 99–105.

26 3 RAR war diary, 23 May, 26 July, 11 August, 30 September 1951.

27 O’Neill, Combat Operations, pp. 176–80, 181–201.

28 ‘Report on operation by 3 RAR—COMMANDO I and II’, AWM: AWM 114 665/7/25.

29 Ibid.; see also Keys, ‘Operation Commando’, pp. l6–33.

30 3 RAR war diary, 10, 14 & 19 October 1951.

31 3 RAR war diary, 20 October 1951.

32 Interview, the late Brig M. Austin, Canberra, 27 February 1984.

33 For details of all major and a number of minor operations in this period O’Neill, Combat Operations, pp. 243–82.

34 1 RAR war diary, 11 December 1952.

35 3 RAR war diary, 25 January 1953.

36 Interview, Austin, 27 February 1984.

37 2 RAR war diary, 15–16 and 19–20 July 1953.

38 O’Neill, Combat Operations, p. 272; 2 RAR war diary, 24–25 July, 25–26 July, 27 July 1953.

39 O’Neill, Combat Operations, p. 289.

CHAPTER 5

1 Edwards, ‘The Australian Commitment to the Malayan Emergency, 1948– 1950’.

2 O’Neill, Korean War, vol. 1, pp. 287, 345.

3 Statement by the Prime Minister, House of Representatives, Canberra, 20 April 1955.

4 Cabinet Submission no. 395, 8 June 1955; notes of discussion with Chiefs of Staff, 15 June 1955, NAA: A4906/XMI, vol. 16; Cabinet Submission no. 511; Cabinet Minute no. 585, 17 August 1955, NAA: A4906/XMI, vol. 20.

5 Clutterbuck, The Long War, p. viii; Miller, Jungle War in Malaya, p. 51. Clutterbuck puts the estimate closer to 50,000, p. viii.

6 There was ‘a tendency to make the insurgent enemy in Malaya bigger than life size and thus a more worthy opponent’. Coates, ‘An Operational Analysis of the Emergency in Malaya 1948–1954’, p. vi: ‘concentrations of up to 400 were infrequent, there were occasions when the guerillas mustered up to 150 men for attacks on rubber estates’. Short, The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948–1960, p. 10.

7 Clutterbuck, The Long War, p. 187.

8 Short, The Communist Insurrection, p. 180; Miller, Jungle War, p. 19; Clutter-buck, The Long War, p. 80.

9 Temper’s appointment was Director of Operations, a novel if not unique title. Clutterbuck, The Long War, p. 80.

10 J.F. White, the commanding officer of 3 RAR in Malaya, commented that ‘for the most part aborigines were “pro” security forces and a great help to our forces except when CTs were near. We concentrated on befriending and helping them in Perak.’ White to author, 22 April 1988.

11 The next two battalions to serve in Malaya, 3 RAR and 1 RAR, had only three rifle companies fully manned, while the fourth company (D Company) had only officers and NCOs and acted as a training company and as a reserve of individuals. Chinn, ‘Malaya Commitment’, Duty First—The Magazine of the Royal Australian Regiment Association (Winter 1986), p. 50.

12 A.W. Campbell, another platoon commander, pointed out that ‘the carbine provided a lightweight but nonetheless effective alternative for the rifle or Owen Gun’. Campbell to author, 13 April 1988.

13 Colin Bannister ‘An inch of Bravery: 3 RAR in the Malayan Emergency’ Australian War Memorial History Conference, 6–10 July 1987, unpublished paper, p. 10, later published under the same title by the Directorate of Army Public Affairs, Canberra, 1994. Eventually, ‘Singlies’ had a holiday camp where ‘marriedies’ came only by invitation, and where servants looked after the ‘stand down soldiers’ every need. This was an attempt to break down the difference between singlies at a loose end and marriedies’ comforts in Penang. It also provided a means whereby the incidence of VD was lessened.

14 Navigation was a continual problem requiring great trust in compass and pacing. Problems associated with navigating in thick jungle were not assisted by areas on some maps showing no detail at all, with the printed explanation that the area was obscured by clouds when air photos were taken. P.R. Phillips, platoon commander 3 RAR 1957/58, to author 10 March 1988.

15 Short states that ‘the average time that a soldier spent on patrol before seeing a contact was estimated at thousands of hours’ and in ambush ‘on average 300 hours before contact and not before he had been in the ambush position for twenty four hours’. Short, The Communist Insurrection, p. 481.

16 Bannister, ‘An Inch of Bravery’, p. 8; White to author, 22 April 1988. An example of a prolonged ambush was one conducted by B Company in late 1957 on the approach to Jalong New Village, on the edge of the Sungei Siput town. The ambush was mounted on 60 consecutive nights with each platoon doing spells of ten nights each. No kills were achieved but access to the village was severely restricted. O.M. Carroll, platoon commander 3 RAR, to author, 2 March 1988.

17 Bannister, ‘An Inch of Bravery’, p. 8.

18 Unless otherwise specified, information relating to operational activity and the chronology is taken from the commander’s diaries for 2 RAR (October 1955 to October 1957), 3 RAR (October 1957–October 1959 and 1 RAR (October 1959–August 1960), AWM: AWM 95 Australian Army Malaya/ Borneo.

19 These included such everlasting truths as ‘I only point my weapon at people when I am prepared to kill them’, ‘I check my weapon when I take it up’ and ‘I check my weapon when I put it down’.

20 For this action Campbell was awarded the Military Cross, Falk and Pennant were awarded the Military Medal, and Rodgers and Fritz were mentioned in despatches.

21 The Central Army Records Office records that fifteen members of 2 RAR died from all causes in the two years the battalion was in Malaya with seven of them being killed in action. One of the fifteen died of sickness after returning to Australia.

22 Other corps sometimes attached their officers to battalions of the regiment for experience; 3 RAR had Capt Barry Hockney (RA Sigs) as the signal officer, and Bob Cowley (RA Sigs), Guy Boileau and John Rowe (Intelligence) as platoon commanders.

23 Indirect fire support was a common feature of operations in Malaya with each daily situation report listing the number of rounds fired by guns and the mortars as harassing fire. Two hundred to 400 rounds was not an uncommon nightly total. No occasion of close fire support is recorded. Artillery units also provided foot patrols.

24 R.S. Garland, OC B Company, had suggested that horse-mounted patrols be organised to patrol the rubber but claims Brigade Headquarters rejected the idea, suspecting that the Australians were trying to raise a polo team, Garland to author, 13 April 1988. Brown was mentioned in despatches for this action.

25 Bannister, ‘An Inch of Bravery’, p. 9. Garland had been awarded the Military Cross while serving with the 2/3 Independent Company in 1943, and a bar to the Military Cross in 1945 while serving with 2 NGIB. His experience of operating as a guerilla behind the Japanese lines ‘gave me an ability to think like a guerilla’. Garland to author, 13 April 1988. For this action Hanley was awarded the Military Medal. As a WO with the AATV, Hanley was killed in 1967.

26 O.M. Carroll to author, 2 March 1988.

27 ‘A brief history of the Third Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment’, unpublished Ap An Phu, South Vietnam, 4 May 1971. Paragraph 28 of this history credits the battalion with fourteen CT kills. A check of the commander’s diary reveals ten.

28 Wallace Brown, ‘219 Queenslanders for Malaya’, Courier-Mail, 18 September 1959.

29 One technique of establishing a company patrol base was that the CO would choose an area from the map, foot patrols would confirm its suitability, marker balloons would show it exact position to aircraft, explosive would be dropped in, up to ten days could be required to construct landing and dropping zones, reserves of rations and ammunition would be established, and patrols would fan out into the surrounding jungle. W.J. Morrow to author, 20 May 1988.

30 W.J. Morrow describes the period in Malaya as having all the ramifications of war (resources, incentive for thoroughness in training and discipline, opportunity for small unit leadership etc.) ‘without the nasty bits’, that is high casualties rates. Morrow to author, 20 May 1988.

31 Short, The Communist Insurrection, pp. 493–4.

32 Miller, Jungle War, p. 17.

33 Contacts are used here to describe incidents where terrorists were actually encountered, as distinct from the far more numerous occasions when signs of enemy presence, such as camps or tracks, was found. The figures are from the commander’s diaries. The statistics exclude contacts, kills and accidental deaths after the official end of the Emergency. A total of twenty members of the regiment lost their lives in Malaya before the official end of the Emergency.

CHAPTER 6

1 Director of Staff Duties to Eastern Command, 28 April 1952, NAA: MP927, A96/3/2.

2 Annual Report, Airborne Platoon, Royal Australian Regiment, 26 June 1953, NAA: MP927, 240/2/27.

3 Department of Defence, ‘Key Elements in the Triennial Reviews of Strategic Guidance since 1945’, April 1986.

4 ‘The Infantry Brigade Group’, Statement by Minister for the Army, 4 September 1957, NAA: A6059, 41/441/28; Murphy, ‘History of the Post-War Army’, p. 28.

5 Supplement no. 3 to Military Board Agendum 43/1956, NAA: A6059, 41.441/18; AMF Military Board: One Brigade Group, 1 April 1957, NAA: A6069, 41/441/176.

6 Shields, Conscription in Australia, p. 70; and Cubis, A History of ‘A’ Battery.

7 Maj Gen D. Vincent to author, 5 August 1987. ‘The Reorganisation of the Australian Military Forces, 59/60–61/62’ General Staff Instruction no. 1, 22 December 1959, p. 1, NAA: A6059, 41/441/69; ‘Composition of the Australian Defence Forces; Report by the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee to the Minister of Defence’, June 1959, AWM: AWM 121, 28/A/2.

8 ‘Composition of the Army’, part II, 8 April 1959, AWM: AWM 121, 47/1.

9 Col Lynch, DMO, ‘Notes on Some of the Events Preceding the Development of the Pentropic Division’, 19 June 1961, AWM: AWM 121, 13/c/4.

10 Millar, Australia’s Defence, pp. 40, 128; Millar, ‘Australian Defence, 1945– 1965’ in Greenwood and Harper, Australia in World Affairs, 1961–1965, p. 277; Sydney Morning Herald, 13 October 1959; ‘The Defence Scheme’, The Bulletin, April 1960.

11 Gen Sir Arthur MacDonald to author, 7 April 1987; Vincent to author, 5 August 1987; Maj Gen P. Falkland to author, 16 April 1987.

12 CPD, vol. H of R, 25, pp. 3185–88; Anon, ‘The Pentropic Division’.

13 Maj Gen C.M.I. Pearson to author, 28 March 1987.

14 Anon, ‘The Pentropic Division’; Brogan, ‘Comparative Firepower’.

15 Maj Gen A.L. Morrison to author, 28 April 1987; Pearson and Morrison, ‘The Pentropic Division—Another Point of View’.

16 The pentropic platoon commander commanded four sections only by voice or hand signals. Morrison to author, 28 April 1987.

17 Pearson to author, 28 March 1987.

18 Morrow to author, 31 March 1987; Pearson to author, 28 March 1987. However, in an article commissioned by the CGS, Morrow and Pearson wrote that they were ‘quite convinced that the increase in staff now allows the commanding officer far more time than in the past to visit his sub units’. Pearson and Morrow, ‘The Pentropic Division’.

19 Morrison to author, 28 April 1987.

20 ‘Comparison of Pentropic with Tropical Battalion’, NAA: A6059, 441/441/168.

21 Horner, SAS: Phantoms of the Jungle.

22 ‘List of Existing CMF Units of Regimental and Battalion Status Showing Major Changes Resulting From the 1960 Reorganization’, 4 March 1960, NAA: A6059, 41/441/69.

23 MacDonald to author, 7 April 1987; Maj Gen P.A. Cullen to author, 14 April 1987.

24 Anon., ‘Inside Story on Army–Marine Manpower Decisions’.

25 Military Board A240/1/71, 28 June 1961, NAA: A6059, 41/441/152; MacDonald to author, 7 April 1987.

26 MacDonald to author, 7 April 1987.

27 Lt Col B.J. Caligari to editor, 13 September 1989.

28 Morrow to author, 31 March 1987.

29 Anon., ‘Equipment for the Pentropic Division’; ‘Exercise Nutcracker’ Outline of the Pentropic Division Organization, NAA: A6059, 65/441/172; Morrison to author, 28 April 1987.

30 Morrow to author, 31 March 1987; MacDonald to author, 7 April 1987.

31 Vincent to author, 5 August 1987; ‘Review of the Pentropic Division’ and ‘Review of the Field Force Organization’, NAA: A2653, 604/R6/7.

32 Falkland to author, 16 April 1987; Vincent to author, 5 August 1987; ‘Minister Tells House Reasons for Officers’ Dismissals’, Sydney Morning Herald.

33 ‘Review of the Pentropic Division’, Annex A to Military Board Submission no. 123/1964, NAA: A2653, 604/R6/7.

34 Ibid.

35 Vincent to author, 5 August 1987; Lt Gen Wilton ‘Composition of the Australian Defence Forces; Progress Report on Achievements of Approved Objectives as at 31 December 1964’, NAA: A121, 28/B/1; Military Board Minute, 11 December 1964, NAA: A2653, 604/R6/7.

36 The Andersen Report, 23 November 1964, NAA: A2653, 604/R6/7.

37 Military Board Minute, 11 December 1964, NAA: A2653, 604/R6/7; MacDonald to author, 7 April 1987; Falkland to author, 16 April 1987.

38 AWM: AWM 121, 9/A/28; Millar, ‘Australian Defence, 1945–1965’, p. 290.

39 Andersen Report, NAA: A2653, 604/R6/7.

40 Stretton, Soldier in a Storm, pp. 177–80.

CHAPTER 7

1 Notes for Minister of Defence August 1957, AWM: AWM121, 31/A/1; Endnotes 465 Directive to Commander AAF FARELF, 15 December 1960, AWM: AWM 121, 413/A/1.

2 Wilkinson, ‘The First Twenty Years’; 1 RAR war diary.

3 Initially the barracks were known as Fort George, but on 24 May 1961 the name was changed to Terendak Camp.

4 HQ AAF FARELF war diary; Fletcher, ‘Peacetime Soldiering in Malaya’; Stretton, Soldier in a Storm, pp. 149–50.

5 Lt Col J.T.D. Stewart (DAQMG, HQ 17th Div) to author, 12 December 1987; Chap J. Doust (4 RAR) to author, 2 February 1987; Brig P.W. Beale to author, 27 February 1987; Col R.G. Curtis to author, 2 March 1987; Maj Gen B.A. McDonald to author, 7 November 1986.

6 Stretton, Soldier in a Storm, p. 170. The 3 RAR war diary for 28 May 1964 notes that the CO had sought an interview with the Commander 28th Brigade to discuss the VD problem.

7 Stretton, Soldier in a Storm, p. 174. For a description of life at Terendak from one wife’s point of view see, Thomson, ‘The Colonel’s Lady’.

8 Stretton, Soldier in a Storm, pp. 161–2; Directive to CO 2 RAR, 19 July 1962, AWM: AWM 121, 207/B/1.

9 Cpl K. Bryant was awarded the British Empire Medal for this incident.

10 For a detailed description of the border operations in August 1962 see Stretton, ‘On Active Service in Malaya, 1962’.

11 2 RAR Training Directive 1/63, 1 January 1963, 2 RAR war diary.

12 Leary had taken over from Maj Eric Smith as battalion second-in-command at the end of 1962. It was usual for seconds-in-command in Malaya to overlap from one battalion to the next, thus ensuring that the administration of each new battalion ran smoothly when it arrived in Malaya.

13 2 RAR war diary; AAF FARELF war diary. For a discussion of Malaya’s sensitivity to SEATO exercises see Hawkins, The Defence of Malaysia and Singapore, pp. 19–20. For the background to the SEATO exercise see Pemberton, All The Way, pp. 186–7.

14 AWM: AWM121, 210/A/3; JPC Agendum no 149/63, 24 October 1963, AWM: AWM 121, 211/A/2. For the Anglo–Malayan Agreement and Australia’s commitment see Hawkins, The Defence of Malaysia, pp. 16, 24; and Chin Kin Wah, The Defence of Malaysia and Singapore.

15 DCGS to DMO&P, 18 December 1959; Townley to Cramer, 22 January 1960, AWM: AWM121, 207/A/2 Pt. II.

16 Pemberton, All The Way, p. 190.

17 Beale to author, 27 February 1987; King to author, 6 March 1987.

18 Defence Committee Minute, 3/1964, 23 January 1964, AWM: AWM 121, 211/A/3; 3 RAR war diary.

19 Cables, Australian High Commissioner, Kuala Lumpur to Department of External Affairs, 6, 15 April 1964, AWM: AWM 121, 211/A/3.

20 Dickens, SAS: The Jungle Frontier, p. 119; Douglas-Home to Menzies, 10 April 1964, Defence Committee Minute 29/1964, 30 April 1964, Statement by Minister of Defence in House of Representatives, 16 April 1964, AWM: AWM 121, 211/A/4.

21 3 RAR war diary; Commander AAF FARELF Monthly Liaison Letters 9/64, 11/64, 12 October, 23 December 1964, HQ AAF FARELF war diary.

22 McDonald to author, 7 November 1987; 3 RAR war diary; Commander FARELF Liaison letters 9/64, 11/64, 12 October, 23 December 1964; HQ AAF FARELF war diary.

23 Hawkins, The Defence of Malaysia, p. 24.

24 The golden rules are quoted in Pocock, Fighting General, p. 197.

25 Mackie, Konfrontasi, p. 263; Wilson to McEwen, 15 January 1965; McEwen to Wilson, 19 January 1965; Senator Paltridge (in Kuala Lumpur) to McEwen, 21 January 1965; External Affairs to High Commission Wellington, London, Kuala Lumpur, Singapore and Australian Embassy, Washington, 29 January 1965, AWM: AWM 121, 211/A/6.

26 Pocock, Fighting General, p. 199.

27 Millman, ‘Sarawak and Confrontation’.

28 Lt Gen Sir George Lea to author, 3 April 1987; McDonald to author, 7 November 1987; Stewart to author, 12 December 1986.

29 Smith, East of Kathmandu, p. 137.

30 3 RAR war diary.

31 3 RAR war diary; Smith, East of Kathmandu, pp. 138–40; Beale to author, 27 February 1987; James and Sheil-Small, The Undeclared War, pp. 121–2.

32 ‘FARELF. Lessons Learnt from Borneo Operations’, Records of BCFESR, AWM: AWM 125.

33 A Battalion Commander ‘Reflections on Borneo’, p. 15; Lyon, ‘Borneo Reflections’.

34 Dickens, Jungle Frontier, pp. 154–5.

35 3 RAR war diary; King to author, 6 March 1987; Operation Report, no. 3, Joint 3 RAR/3 Fed Engr Sqn Mine Clearing Sweep, 1 April 1965.

36 James and Shiel-Small, The Undeclared War, pp. 157–8; Pocock, Fighting General, pp. 214–15.

37 The 1st/2nd Goorkas had conducted a successful raid across the border in eastern Sarawak in late January 1965. James and Shiel-Small, A Pride of Gurkhas, pp. 180–6. An ‘undeniable’ operation was an attack on an enemy camp or base, as distinct from ‘deniable’ operations, which included ambushes and which could be blamed on poor navigation.

38 Dickens, Jungle Frontier, pp. 157–8.

39 Lea to author, 3 April 1987.

40 Information on cross-border operations is held in a declassified file entitled ‘3 RAR Daily Operations Log Sarawak 1965’, AWM: AWM125.

41 Beale to author, 27 February 1987.

42 3 RAR Daily Operational Log. The action is also described in James and Shiel-Small, The Undeclared War, pp. 161–2. Beale was awarded the Military Cross and Jackson the Military Medal for this action.

43 Lyon, ‘Borneo Reflections’, p. 109.

44 The Indonesians went along with this fiction because it gave the impression to their own public that their forces were operating inside Sarawak.

45 3 RAR Daily Log; McDonald to author, 7 November 1987. Byers was awarded the Military Cross for this action.

46 A Company conducted seven patrols of which five were reconnaissance and two ambushes, resulting in one contact. B Company had eight patrols (three reconnaissance, five ambush or fighting, one contact). C Company, twelve patrols (four reconnaissance, eight ambush, two contacts). D Company, three patrols (all ambush, no contacts).

47 Smith, ‘There was more to it than that’, p. 37.

48 Commander AAF FARELF Monthly Liaison Letter 7/65 August 1965, HQ AAF FARELF war diary.

49 James and Shiel-Small, A Pride of Gurkhas, pp. 197–200; James and Shiel-Small, The Undeclared War, pp. 174–180; Pocock, Fighting General, p. 215.

50 McDonald to author, 7 November 1986; Beale to author, 27 November 1987.

51 Cable, Australian High Commission, Singapore to External Affairs, 10 April 1966; Defence Committee, 12 May 1966, AWM: AWM 121, 211/A/7; cable, External Affairs to Australian High Commission, Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, London, 20 May 1966, AWM: AWM 121, 211/A/3, Pt 3.

52 Later some of the companies were redeployed.

53 Cable Aust. Defence London to Defence Canberra, 26 May 1966, AWM: AWM 121, 207/A/3, Pt. 3; 4 RAR war diary. Similarly 3 RAR had been prevented from involvement in a cordon and search operation.

54 For a description of these Claret operations see Avery, Our Secret War, ch. 12.

55 Smith, East of Kathmandu, p. 152; Cable HQ AAF FARELF to AHQ, 16 June 1966, AWM: AWM 121, 207/A/3, Pt 3; HQ AAF FARELF war diary.

56 4 RAR war diary; Curtis to author, 2 March 1987. He was awarded the Military Cross for this action.

57 2 SAS Sqn war diary; Commander AAF FARELF Monthly Liaison Letter 6/66, 12 July 1966; HQ AAF FARELF war diary; Brig I.J.C. Hearn to author, 24 March 1987.

58 Lea to author, 3 April 1987; Curtis to author, 2 March 1987; 4 RAR war diary.

59 See D.I. MacLeod, ‘Confrontation 1963–1966: A Study of British Foreign and Defence Policy Crisis Decision-making and Management’, MPhil thesis, St Anthony’s College, Oxford University, 1985.

CHAPTER 8

1 Statement by Sir Robert Menzies, Parliamentary Debates, 10 November 1964.

2 Sexton, War For the Asking, p. 57.

3 Sexton, War For the Asking, pp. 63–4; R.G. Neale ‘Australia’s Military Commitment to Vietnam’, a paper prepared by the Department of Foreign Affairs and tabled in the House of Representatives on 13 May 1975, p. 12.

4 Defence Committee Minute no. 15, 1965, quoted in Harry Rayner, ‘Air Chief Marshal Sir Frederick Scherger’, in Horner, The Commanders, p. 312.

5 Breen, First to Fight, p. 13.

6 Crowley, Modern Australia in Documents, vol. 2, pp. 479–84.

7 Brig I.R.W. Brumfield to Lt Col R. Breen, 19 May 1977.

8 Diary of N.R. Clark, p. 27.

9 ‘The Australian Army—Report of the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence’, AGPS, Canberra, 1974, Table A.

10 Over half of the force in Vietnam was on individual relief.

11 Lecture by Col R.H. Fullford, Director of Manning, to CGS Exercise 1971.

12 Maj Gen D.M. Butler to editor, 12 November 1989.

13 Brig C.N. Kahn to editor, 26 October 1989.

14 Army Headquarters Instruction—Carriage of Small Arms Ammunition on Field Firing Exercises, 4 June 1968.

15 Brig C.N. Kahn to editor, 26 October 1989.

16 O’Neill, Vietnam Task, pp. 21–2.

17 Richardson, ‘Australian Strategic and Defence Policies’, p. 243.

18 Stretton, Soldier in a Storm, p. 191.

19 Richardson, ‘Australian Strategic and Defence Policies’, p. 246.

20 O’Neill, ‘Defence Policy’, p. 18.

21 Witnessed by the author.

22 One officer was Lt John Wheeler, a young 1969 Duntroon graduate. He was killed in action on 2 March 1971. All sentences were later quashed by the Commander, Central Command.

23 Butler to author, 12 November 1989.

24 Review by Brig F.W. Speed, ‘Nothing Over Us’, Defence Force Journal, May– June 1988.

CHAPTER 9

1 According to McNeill and Ekins, On the Offensive, p. 3, the beginning of the Second Indo-China War is generally dated from May 1959 when the 15th Plenum of the Central Committee of the Vietnamese Communist Party in Hanoi authorised the escalation of the insurgency in South Vietnam through the application of revolutionary violence.

2 McNeill and Ekins, On the Offensive, p. 4.

3 Lewy, America in Vietnam, pp. 39–40, 48; Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, p. 137. For an Australian perspective on the situation in Vietnam and the lead-up to the commitment of troops, see McNeill, To Long Tan, chapter 3.

4 Pemberton, All the Way, pp. 286–7.

5 McNeill offers that 1 RAR ‘was the unit at the most advanced state of operational readiness on the mainland and received first priority in manpower, equipment and training resources . . . [moreover, that] 1 RAR had reached a high state of proficiency in counterinsurgency training’, Ian McNeill, To Long Tan, p. 73. Breen assesses that 1 RAR was a newly reorganised, poorly equipped and collectively undertrained unit that was a ‘patrol-focused’ group of infantrymen, trained for low-level counterinsurgency operations; ill-prepared for the combined arms, semi-conventional warfare that lay ahead. Breen, ‘Problems of an Expeditionary Force’; Breen, First to Fight, pp. 14–16, 76–7; also Australian Army, Contingency Planning paper, ‘Lessons Learnt from Operation Hardihood: The Deployment of the First Australian Task Force to South Vietnam in 1966’, Annex B, undated, p. 4. This paper appears to be an annex to a parent document that focused on logistics aspects of the deployment of 1 ATF. Probably written in 1971 for a CGS Exercise as part of a presentatio by Maj Gen G.F.T. Richardson CBE, Quartermaster General, ‘Logistics Aspects of Operation Hardihood’, AWM 101, item [10]. Copy held by author, quoted in McNeill, To Long Tan, p. 203. See also David Horner (ed.), Duty First, 1st ed., pp. 132–47 for information on reorganisation.

6 Breen, First to Fight, pp. 78–9.

7 Ibid., p. 16.

8 Breen, ‘Problems of an Expeditionary Force’.

9 For a detailed description of 1 RAR’s first tour, see Breen, First to Fight and McNeill, To Long Tan, pp. 69–174.

10 Maj Gen E.W. Williamson to author, 29 April 1986.

11 173rd Airborne Brigade (Separate), ‘Debrief on Operation 17/65 (6–9 July)’, 173rd Airborne Brigade (Separate), daily journal.

12 Maj Gen E.W. Williamson to author, 29 April 1986.

13 A.H.D. McAulay, letter to his wife, 13 October 1965.

14 173rd Airborne Brigade (Separate), ‘Critique of the Iron Triangle Operation’, 25 October 1965.

15 E.W. Williamson, Combat Commander’s Note no. 85, 14 November 1965.

16 McNeill, To Long Tan, p. 149.

17 LCpl R.H. Parker and Pte P.R. Gillson were killed and their bodies were unable to be recovered. The official account of this engagement is contained in McNeill, To Long Tan, pp. 140–50.

18 Sgt Fawcett was awarded a Military Medal for his efforts. In 2006, a group of 1 RAR veterans visited Vietnam to locate the burial site of their two fallen comrades. Though unsuccessful on that visit, a subsequent search was successful and the remains of Parker and Gillson were returned to Australia in June 2007.

19 The official account of this operation is contained in McNeill, To Long Tan, pp. 151–61.

20 Larsen and Collins, Allied Participation in Vietnam, p. 93.

21 The official account of this operation is contained in McNeill, To Long Tan, pp. 162–9.

22 McWilliams, Vietnam—A Pictorial History of the Sixth Battalion The Royal Australian Regiment 1966–1967, p. 10.

23 Brig J. Essex-Clark to author, 23 December 1984.

24 Col A.V. Preece and Brig J. Essex-Clark to author, 23 December 1984.

25 A.H.D. McAulay to wife, 24 February 1966.

26 ‘Canister’, ‘flechette’ and ‘splintex’ were names given to artillery and tank rounds that, after firing, burst into high velocity projections of thousands of small metal darts and fragments designed to shred human beings.

27 1 RAR war diary, 24 February 1966.

28 McNeill and Ekins, On the Offensive, p. 26.

29 See McNeill and Ekins, On the Offensive, chapter 2 for a comprehensive description of Phuoc Tuy province.

30 The army had to raise HQ 1 Australian Task Force (1 ATF), HQ 1st Australian Force—Vietnam (HQ 1 AFV) and Australian Logistics Support Force (ALSF) from scratch.

31 Staff calculated in February 1966 that a ‘balanced’ task force would require 4100 troops. McNeill, To Long Tan, p. 188. However, McNeill points out that the army produced a task force organisation without ‘detailed reconnaissance’, ‘consultation with the Americans’ or ‘wider consultation’ within the army, p. 191.

32 Australian Army, Contingency Planning paper, p. 7. For a description of this period see McNeill, To Long Tan, pp. 184 and 191.

33 G. Dexter to author, 10 May 1986.

34 1 RAR War Diary, 9 April 1966.

35 The official history’s conclusions and summary related to 1 RAR’s first tour is contained in McNeill, To Long Tan, pp. 171–4.

36 For a detailed analysis and description of Phuoc Tuy province, see McNeill, To Long Tan, chapter 10; the account of the planning, preparation and occupation of the Australian bases in the Phuoc Tuy province is contained in McNeill, To Long Tan, chapter 11.

37 O’Neill, Vietnam Task, and Burstall, Vietnam: The Australian Dilemma, for differing views. Also McNeill, To Long Tan, p. 199; McNeill and Ekins, On the Offensive, pp. 63–6, for opinions of senior Australian, American and communist Vietnamese officers.

38 McNeill, To Long Tan, p. 198.

39 Ibid., p. 274.

40 Ibid., p. 224.

41 Ibid., pp. 244–9, and for the village of Long Phuoc, pp. 252–5. In May 1966, the 173rd Brigade cleared the Nui Dat area for the Australian task force. The Americans lost 23 killed and 160 wounded in several ambushes and from antipersonnel mines. O’Neill, Vietnam Task, p. 33.

42 Terry Burstall makes a compelling case that the resettlement of local Vietnamese caused sufficient resentment to conclude that there would not have been much reliable information flowing to Australian intelligence sections on locations and movements of Viet Cong force elements. Burstall, Vietnam: The Australian Dilemma, pp. 78–81.

43 McNeill, To Long Tan, p. 231. For further information on the inadequacies of Australian logistics planning and support, see McNeill and Ekins, On the Offensive, pp. 62–5.

44 R.J. O’Neill, ‘Australian Military Problems in Vietnam’, Australian Outlook, April 1969, p. 51.

45 Lex McAulay, The Battle of Long Tan, Hutchinson, Melbourne, 1986, p. 9.

46 Williams, Vietnam, p. 26. The official account of this engagement is in McNeill, To Long Tan, pp. 276–84.

47 McNeill, To Long Tan, pp. 276–81.

48 Ibid., pp. 288–9.

49 McNeill opined that ‘The fight had now been taken right to the enemy, bringing closer the time when he would be forced to react.’ Ibid., p. 284.

50 O’Neill, Vietnam Task, p 83.

51 Ibid., p. 83.

52 Ibid., pp. 250 and 298. Also a quote from a soldier’s diary, p. 299.

53 See McNeill’s analysis of the conditions just before the battle of Long Tan, in ‘The situation in mid-August’, pp. 300–02.

54 Ibid., pp. 310–1.

55 Ibid., p. 310.

56 Ibid., pp. 305 and 311.

57 Ibid., pp. 348–9.

58 Ibid., pp. 328–9.

59 Ibid., p. 342.

60 Williams, Vietnam, p. 32.

61 O’Neill, Vietnam Task, p. 85.

62 Ibid., p. 93.

63 Civic action was a name given to activities that focused on humanitarian care. While combat troops provided security and South Vietnamese authorities screened inhabitants, looking for Viet Cong personnel and sympathisers, Australian medical personnel would conduct a clinic and others would distribute food and domestic items, such as cooking utensils, pots and pans.

64 Williams, Vietnam, p. 47.

65 Ibid., p. 47.

66 For a discussion and review of the first six months of the operations of the Australian Task Force see McNeill, To Long Tan, chapter 18.

67 O’Neill, Vietnam Task, pp. 181–91.

68 McNeill and Ekins, On the Offensive, pp. 72–3.

69 O’Neill, Vietnam Task, p. 190.

70 1 ATF Operation Balaclava, Operation Instruction, 30 December 1967.

71 O’Neill, Vietnam Task, p. 200.

72 McNeill and Ekins, On the Offensive, pp. 71–2.

73 Ibid., pp. 76–80 and p. 89.

74 Williams, Vietnam, p. 57.

75 O’Neill, Vietnam Task, p. 211.

76 A full account of Operation Bribie is contained in McNeill and Ekins, On the Offensive, pp. 91–115.

77 Williams, Vietnam, pp. 62–3. There is also another account in Mollison, Long Tan and Beyond.

78 McNeill and Ekins, On the Offensive, pp. 114–15.

79 Ibid., p. 115.

80 Ibid., p. 116.

81 Ibid., p. 121.

82 A full account of this operation, named Renmark, is contained in McNeill and Ekins, On the Offensive, pp. 118–123.

83 Ibid., p. 120.

84 Ibid., p. 126. See McNeill and Ekins, On the Offensive, pp. 245–250.

85 See McNeill and Ekins, On the Offensive, pp. 169–84, for a description of the completion of the barrier minefield, and its tragic legacy. For a detailed account, see Lockhart, The Minefield, 2005.

86 Williams, Vietnam, p. 40.

87 O’Neill, Vietnam Task, p. 248.

88 Frost, Australia’s War in Vietnam, pp. 94–100. Also see McNeill and Ekins, On the Offensive, chapter 14.

89 McNeill and Ekins, On the Offensive, p. 159.

90 Ibid.

91 For an account of Australian special forces in the Second Vietnam see Horner, Phantoms of the Jungle.

92 Ibid., pp. 160–1. For 7 RAR in Vietnam see O’Brien, Conscripts and Regulars.

93 Ibid.

94 Ibid., p. 162.

95 Sydney Morning Herald, 12 July 1967.

96 McNeill and Ekins, On the Offensive, pp. 203–9.

97 Brig N.R. Charlesworth to author, 13 September 1989.

98 The ‘Long Green’ was an area marked in a light shade of green representing a lightly inhabited area of jungle vegetation and agricultural land.

99 McNeill and Ekins, On the Offensive, p. 211.

100 Ibid.

101 Ibid., p. 215.

102 7 RAR, After Action Report for Operation Ballarat, 30 September 1967.

103 Capt N.J. Clark, ‘Extracts from Diary’ [compiled after return to Australia], 25 May 1967, p. 104, copy in AWM: AWM 257, D/5/2.

104 Ibid., p. 109.

105 See McNeill and Ekins, On the Offensive, pp. 210–15 for an account of this engagement.

106 Ibid., p. 215.

107 Ibid., chapter 8,

108 Ibid., p. 235.

109 W. Fogarty to author, 8 August 1989. Fogarty discovered the figures during research for a history of 7 RAR’s tour on Vietnam in 1967–68.

110 See McNeill and Ekins, On the Offensive, p. 258–62 for a description of Operation Santa Fe.

111 Newman (ed.), The Anzac Battalion, p. 57.

112 Horner, Australian Higher Command in the Vietnam War, p. 30.

113 McNeill and Ekins, On the Offensive, p. 6

CHAPTER 10

1 McNeill and Ekins, On the Offensive, p. 287.

2 Karnow, Vietnam: A History, p. 536; Dougan and Weiss et al., The Vietnam Experience, pp. 8–9.

3 McNeill and Ekins, On the Offensive, p. 287.

4 Dougan, The Vietnam Experience, p. 8.

5 McNeill and Ekins, On the Offensive, p. 289 and p. 299.

6 Ibid., pp. 12–14. The Viet Cong 5th Division simultaneously attacked Allied Headquarters near Saigon, the ARVN Corps Headquarters at Bien Hoa and the US Field Force Headquarters at Long Binh. At the same time, the NVA 7th Division attacked the US 1st Infantry Division Headquarters and the ARVN 5th Division Headquarters, and the Viet Cong 9th Division attacked the US 25th Infantry Division Headquarters at Cu Chi.

7 Dougan, The Vietnam Experience, p. 8. McNeill and Ekins, On the Offensive, p. 289.

8 Horner, Australian Higher Command, p. 32.

9 By this time, the task force comprised 2 RAR, 3 RAR and 7 RAR, with 2 RAR having two RNZIR companies under command. McNeill and Ekins, On the Offensive, pp. 289–90.

10 The area of operations, named Columbus, was a largely uninhabited area situated to the east of Long Binh and was roughly rectangular in shape, bisected by the Bien Hoa–Long Khanh provincial boundary, measuring 26 km from east to west and 17 km from north to south, consisting mostly of jungle in the west and grassland in the east. McNeill and Ekins, On the Offensive, p. 294.

11 Ibid., pp. 292–4.

12 Ibid., pp. 295–6.

13 See ibid., pp. 305–6 for a description of these actions.

14 See Stuart (ed.), 3 RAR in South Vietnam 1967–1968, 1968.

15 See McNeill and Ekins, On the Offensive, p. 309.

16 Ibid., p. 301.

17 Ibid., p. 319.

18 Stuart, 3 RAR in South Vietnam 1967–1968, p. 22.

19 See McNeill and Ekins, On the Offensive, pp. 321–30.

20 Ibid., p. 322.

21 Ibid., p. 331. For a detailed account of 7 RAR’s first tour of Vietnam see O’Brien, Conscripts and Regulars.

22 For details of 2 RAR’s operations see Newman (ed.), The Anzac Battalion.

23 McNeill and Ekins, On the Offensive, pp. 332–41.

24 Ibid., p. 338.

25 Ibid., pp. 340–1.

26 N. Sheehan et al., The Pentagon Papers, pp. 596–7.

27 Dougan, The Vietnam Experience, p. 145.

28 McNeill and Ekins, On the Offensive, pp. 348–9.

29 Ibid., pp. 350–1.

30 Ibid., pp. 356–63.

31 Ibid., pp. 364–6.

32 Ibid., p. 364.

33 The Australian official history account of what became known as the Battle of Coral/Balmoral can be found in McNeill and Ekins, On the Offensive, pp. 363–72. There is a more detailed account in McAulay, The Battle of Coral.

34 McNeill and Ekins, On the Offensive, p. 368–9.

35 Ibid., p. 371.

36 The Australian official history account of the second attack on FSB Coral can be found at McNeill and Ekins, On the Offensive, pp. 375.

37 Ibid., p. 377.

38 McAulay, The Battle of Coral, p. 176.

39 Ibid., p. 209.

40 For some interesting observations on this decision see McNeill and Ekins, On the Offensive, pp. 378–80.

41 Ibid., p. 382.

42 For a description of this infantry/armour battle against enemy located in bunkers, see McNeill and Ekins, On the Offensive, pp. 386–9.

43 McAulay, The Battle of Coral, p. 252.

44 McNeill and Ekins, On the Offensive, pp. 392–5.

45 Ibid., p. 396.

46 Ibid, p. 398.

47 Dougan, The Vietnam Experience, pp. 145–6.

48 McNeill and Ekins, On the Offensive, p. 400.

49 Dougan, The Vietnam Experience, pp. 148–9.

50 McNeill and Ekins, On the Offensive, p. 411.

51 Frost, Australia’s War in Vietnam, pp. 35–6.

52 Hopkins, Australian Armour, p. 263.

53 These and other details of 4 RAR’s operations are largely taken from Webb (ed.), Mission in Vietnam.

54 Dougan, The Vietnam Experience, p. 152.

55 Hopkins, Australian Armour, p. 261–2.

56 Dougan, The Vietnam Experience, pp. 151–2.

57 Horner, Australian Higher Command, p. 37.

58 7 RAR, Combat Operation After Action Report, Operation Santa Fe, 31 December 1967.

59 J.R. Webb, Mission in Vietnam, p. 20.

60 Stuart, 3 RAR in Vietnam, p. 51.

61 Dougan, The Vietnam Experience, p. 184.

62 Webb, Mission in Vietnam, p. 26.

63 Battle (ed.), The Year of the Tigers, p. 33.

64 Welch (comp.), A History of The Sixth Battalion, p. 99.

65 Details of events during the battle of Binh Ba are drawn mainly from: Battle, The Year of the Tigers; Carleton, transcript of interview with Brig Kahn and Lt Col Blake on the ‘Nationwide’ program, 1 July 1980; Castles, ‘The True Story of the Battle of Binh Ba’; Frost, Australia’s War in Vietnam; Hopkins, Australian Armour; Perriman, ‘The Battle of Binh Ba’; Rowe et al., Vietnam: The Australian Experience and Welch, A History of The Sixth Battalion.

CHAPTER 11

1 Clunies-Ross (ed.), The Grey Eight in Vietnam, p. 114.

2 Frost, Australia’s War in Vietnam, p. 54.

3 Letter, Hay to Daly, 16 April 1969, AWM: AAGV, DO Letters.

4 Horner, Australian Higher Command, p. 41.

5 Battle, The Year of the Tigers, p. 68.

6 Horner, Australian Higher Command, pp. 42–3.

7 Lt Col P.L. Belt to author, March 1988.

8 Frost, Australia’s War in Vietnam, pp. 144–6.

9 Roberts (ed.), The Anzac Battalion, p. 51.

10 For an account of the battalion’s tour see Taylor, Last Out.

11 Sayce and O’Neill (eds), The Fighting Fourth.

12 McKay, In Good Company.

13 For a vivid account of this battle see McKay, In Good Company. McKay and Taylor were awarded the Military Cross for this and earlier actions.

14 Account by Lt Col J.H. Taylor, AM, MC, May 1988.

CHAPTER 12

1 When this chapter was written much of the archival material that relates to this period had not yet been released. For their part, the battalions took little interest in preserving a historical record. Their priorities in such a turbulent and hectic time understandably lay elsewhere. Those who held some key positions during the period made a substantial contribution to the chapter. Their personal reminiscences were used so often that citing every occasion would have made the notes unmanageable. Accordingly, the author wishes to acknowledge the following who gave generously of their time in Canberra and Sydney on the dates shown: Maj Gen M.P. Blake, AO, MC, 1 September 1988; Maj Gen A. Clunies-Ross, AO, MBE, 24 August 1988; Col P.J. Cosgrove, AM, MC, 25 July and 16 August 1988; Brig R.M. Earle, 2 February 1989: Brig J. Essex-Clark, 11 October 1988; Lt Col B.P. Green, AM, 23 August 1988; Col P. N. Greenhalgh, AM, 30 August and 21 September 1988; Maj Gen R.A. Grey, AO, DSO, 25 November 1988; Brig A.W. Hammett, AM, 26 and 30 September 1988; Col J.B. Healy, 30 August 1988; Maj Gen B.W. Howard, AM, MC, 22 September 1988; Maj A.B. Keech, 23 August 1988; Brig E.F. Pfitzner, 24 November 1988; Maj Gen P.R. Phillips, AO, MC, 5 September 1988; Col A.V. Preece, DSO, MVO, 3 November 1988; WO1 C.H. Swinbourn, 29 August 1988; Mr P.N.D. White, MC, MP, 1 September 1988; Lt Col G.D. Williams, 29 August 1988. (Ranks are those held at the time of writing of the first edition of Duty First, or on retirement.)

2 Hon L.H. Barnard, MP, ‘Australian Defence Policy’, 30 May 1973, Defence Library Canberra (hereafter DLC), item no. 00588.

3 Ibid.

4 D. Armstrong, ‘The Army Without National Service’, The Australian, 15 December 1972, p. 11.

5 Lt Col J. Essex-Clark, ‘Talk to Bn, 8 December 72’, notes from CO’s diaries and notebooks (hereafter referred to as Essex-Clark Papers).

6 Col E.J. O’Donnell to author, 14 September 1988.

7 ‘Australian Defence’, Maj Gen S.C. Graham, COPS minute 320/72 and attachments, 9 August 1972 (sent to author by Maj Gen R.A. Grey).

8 Graham, COPs Minute; Armstrong ‘The Army Without National Service’, p. 11; Barnard, Statement Defence, 28 December 1972, DLC: PR D/72, item no. 00511 DLC.

9 ‘Report of the Australian Army Organisation and Manpower Committee’, part 1, 30 March 1973, DLC: item no. CP–53386, pp. 2.12, 3.12 (hereafter Farrands-Hassett).

10 Ibid., pp. 44–5, 126–7; Barnard, 30 May 1973.

11 Preece to author, 17 August 1989.

12 ‘Regimental Aspects of the Reduction of the RAR from 9 to 6 Bns by Linking’, Regimental Memorandum 8/73, 25 June 1973, Inf 571–4–2, Directorate of Infantry. This instruction was published largely verbatim as ‘Reduction in the Size of the Royal Australian Regiment’, Australian Infantry 19:3 (Sep– October 1973), pp. 34–6. The placing of funds in trust subsequently became a contentious issue because it deprived the linked battalions of the substantial interest these funds earned. It still does.

13 McDougall, ‘Exercise “Jack Horner”’, p. 43; Essex-Clark ‘Talk to Bn’, 3 September 1973, Essex-Clark Papers.

14 Essex-Clark to Clunies-Ross, 4 October 1973, Essex-Clark Papers; Greenhalgh to author, 14 August 1989.

15 Australian Army, 15:23 (13 December 1973), p. 7.

16 Essex-Clark to Daly, October 1973, Essex-Clark Papers; Maj A.B. Keech, for example, spent eight years as a WO2.

17 Barnard, ‘Australian Defence: Mr Barnard’s Budget Speech to Parliament’, 22 August 1973, Australian Foreign Affairs Record 44:8 (August 1973), pp. 540–1.

18 Barnard, ‘Australian Defence Policy—The Government View’, address to the Australian Staff College, Queenscliff, 24 April 1975, pp. 3–6, DLC: uncatalogued; see also Australian Defence (White Paper), AGPS, Canberra, 1976, chapters 2 to 3, p. 10; D.J. Killen MP (Minister for Defence), ‘Defence Review’, 22 September 1977 and ‘Defence Review’, 24 October 1978, DLC: items nos 00236, 00240; M. Booker, ‘What the Defence White Paper Left Out’, Pacific Defence Reporter 3:8 (February 1977), pp. 6–7.

19 J. Stackhouse, ‘Australia’s Faltering Defences—2’, Australian Financial Review, 19 September 1973, p. 2; Barnard, ‘Australian Defence Policy—The Government View’, pp. 2, 7; Killen, ‘Defence Review’, 1977, p. 1, and 1978, p. 1; Australia’s Defence, p. 58.

20 D. Armstrong, ‘Barnard aims at the fat’, The Australian, 29 August 1973, p. 15; Lt Gen F.G. Hassett, ‘Management of the Australian Army in 1975, address to the Joint Services Staff College, 17 July 1975, Office of the Chief of General Staff (OCGS); Killen, ‘Defence Review’, 1978, p. 18; Defence Force Development Committee Paper ‘Army Manpower’, 25 June 1976, OCGS.

21 Barnard ‘Australian Defence’, 9 April 1974, Australian Foreign Affairs Record 45:4 (April 1974), p. 277; Warner, ‘The Army in Decline—2’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 19 September 1973, p. 6.

22 Synnot, ‘The Changing Challenge For Our Defence Forces’, Pacific Defence Reporter 2:9 (March 1976), p. 13; Farrands-Hassett, p. 28.

23 O ‘Neill, ‘If the North appears remote, its defence problems are not’, Australian Financial Review, 29 July 1976, p. 4; Cranston, ‘Defence of the North’, The Canberra Times, 9 July 1974, p. 2; McNicoll ‘Defence In the Doldrums—2’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 30 September 1975, p. 7.

24 Cranston, ‘Matching forces to strategic needs’, The Canberra Times, 10 August 1973, p. 2.

25 ‘Field Force Command Training Directive For The Period Ending 30 June 1978’, 18 December 1975, HQ Field Force Command (now Land Command) Sydney, file 810/K4/31; O’Donnell to author, 14 September 1988.

26 ‘Exercise Dusty Hike—Exercise Report’, 14 November 1974, R850–1–36, 1 RAR Notes.

27 Ibid.

28 ‘Resume of Activities of 3 RAR During 1975’, Kapyong Kronicle 1:13 (Christmas 1975); Capt D. Fraser to author, 30 September 1988, 5/7 RAR R44–1–1. (Capt Fraser sent the author much valuable material on 5/7 RAR. This material is referred to hereafter as 5/7 RAR Notes.)

29 ‘Exercise “Dark Moon”, 16–26 September 1973; General Instruction’, 10 August 1973, HQ First Task Force, Holsworthy, R841–73–2.

30 Swifte, ‘Kangaroo 1’, Pacific Defence Reporter (August 1974), p. 11; ‘Major Combined Exercise for 1976’, Chiefs of Staff Committee Minute 80/1975 (Agenda Item 54/75), 20 September 1975, OCGS.

31 Essex-Clark, ‘Notes for Talk to 9 RAR’, January & May 1972, Essex-Clark Papers.

32 Essex-Clark (when SO1 Ops DINF) to Company Commanders’ Course, July 1974, p. 3, Essex-Clark Papers.

33 See, for example, letters from Lt Cols K. Newman and H.J. Coates and Col P. Scott, Australian Infantry 18:3 (Sep–October 1972), & 19:2 (May– June 1973); ‘Report On The Trial Conversion of a Mechanized Infantry Battalion’, Directorate of Infantry, Army Office A 342/2/71, 14 November 1975 (hereafter ‘Trial Report’).

34 Lt Col M.P. Black, MC, ‘Presentation to NZCGS Operational Study Period 28 April 1978 & 2 May 1978. The Australian Mechanized Infantry Trial’, undated (sent to author by Maj Gen Blake); ‘Trial Report’, pp. 2–4.

35 ‘Trial Report’, pp. 2–5.

36 Blake, Presentation.

37 Ibid.; O’Donnell to author, 14 September 1988; ‘Trial Report’, p. 3.

38 O’Donnell to author, 14 September 1988; 5/7 RAR Notes.

39 Regimental Standing Orders for the Royal Australian Regiment, 1983, p. 6F–4.

40 Kapyong Kronicle, 1:13.

41 See Pedersen, ‘Darwin—A Platoon Commander’s Experience’, Australian Army Journal, pp. 39–46.

42 O’Donnell to author, 14 September 1978; Hon W. Morrison, MP (Minister for Defence), ‘The Challenge of Peace’ in Pacific Defence Reporter 2:2 (August 1975), p. 7.

43 Capt J.D. Liddy to author, 25 October 1988 (hereafter referred to as 6 RAR Notes); Regimental Standing Orders, p. 6F–3, annex L to chapter 6.

44 O’Donnell to author, 14 September 1988.

45 Regimental Memoranda 13/73, ‘Sub-Unit Flags’, 27 November 1973 and 9/73; ‘Regimental Competitions’, 28 September 1973, Directorate of Infantry, File 571–4–2.

46 Regimental Standing Orders, chapter 2; 1 RAR Notes.

47 6 RAR Notes; Essex-Clark ‘Talk to Officers’, 18 May 1972, Essex-Clark Papers.

48 ‘Rotation of Rifle Company at Air Base Butterworth’, Chiefs of Staff Committee Minute 51/1973 (Agendum no. 38/1973), 8 August 1973, OCGS.

49 C Coy 5/7 RAR ‘Report On Tour Of Duty; Butterworth March–June ’74’, 2 July 1974, HQ Field Force Command, File 722-K11–12.

50 See end of tour reports for 3 RAR companies in 1977; B Coy, March–May; C Coy, June–August; A Coy, September–November, HQ Field Force Command, File 722-K11–12.

51 1, 5/7, 6 RAR Notes; Kapyong Kronicle (December 1977–January 1978).

CHAPTER 13

1 The description of the operation is based on: Matthew Gubb, ‘The Australian Military Response to the Fiji coup—an Assessment’, SDSC, November 1988; HQ ADF draft of ‘An Outline History of the Involvement of the ADF in the Fiji Crisis of May 1987’; Maj G.J. Stone to Lt Col M.G. Smith, 23 November 1987; Commander’s Diary, Maj G.J. Stone, Operation Morrisdance; 1 RAR Post Deployment Report, Operation Morrisdance, 29 July 1987.

2 Col A.S. D’Hagé, MC to author, 1 September 1989.

3 CGS Address to Army Staff College, 1980.

4 CGSAC Minute, 37/1979, 25 June 1979.

5 CGS to CDFS and Secretary, 17 September 1979, NAA: A6835, box 4.

6 For Beale’s experiences then see Beale, Operation Orders.

7 Brig E.F. Pfitzner to author, 20 October 1989.

8 Infantry Information Letters 1/80, 1/81; Brig P.W. Beale to author, 20 July 1989; Col J.R. Brett to author, 14 September 1989.

9 CGS Directives nos 3/1980 and 4/1980, 5 May 1980.

10 Col P.S. O’Sullivan to author, 3 August 1989.

11 Lt Col B.J. Caligari to author, 13 September 1989.

12 Col P.J. Cosgrove to author, 20 July 1989; Wolfe, ‘K83: An Exercise with a Difference’.

13 2/4 RAR Commander’s Diary; Lt Col M.G. Smith to author, 4 October 1989.

14 3 RAR to HQ 1 TF, 18 November 1980; HQ 1 TF to 3 RAR, 10 December 1980, D Inf file, A342–26–67.

15 CGS Directive, 11/1983, 30 September 1983.

16 Implementation Plan—Mechanised Capability for the ADF, 15 December 1982; signal 1 Brigade to HQ 1st Division, 17 June 1983, D Inf file A342/2/884.

17 Col P.L. McGuiness to author, 2 August 1989.

18 Col J.R. James to author, 27 September 1989.

19 Infantry Information Letter, 1/86; Lt Col R.J. Margetts to author, 3 October 1989.

20 See Horner, SAS: Phantoms of the Jungle.

21 Col A.I.J.M. Mattay to author, 14 August 1989.

22 Army newspaper, 9 April 1987.

23 1 TF to 3 RAR, 2 February 1981, D Inf file 342–26–67.

24 CGS to COPS, 18 December 1981, D Inf file A342–2–868.

25 Brig J.M. Connolly to author, 26 September 1989. See also 3 RAR Training Directive of 23 February 1982.

26 3 RAR had only a limited number of air hours available, but the CO of No. 36 Squadron RAAF, Wg Cdr Doug Chipman, was happy to use his own allocation of hours as he needed to exercise his own squadron in dropping techniques. Gp Capt D.C. Chipman to author, 7 August 1989.

27 Signal, 1 Division to 1 Brigade, 6 Brigade, 29 June 1983, D Inf File, A342–2–868. The CGS’s directive to the GOC Field Force Command to develop a parachute capability (CGS Directive 10/1983) was issued on 30 September 1983.

28 Kapyong Kronicle, 1983.

29 CGSAC Minute 32/86, 4 July 1986.

30 3 RAR Development and Training Directive 1987, 28 January 1987; 3 RAR Operation Instruction 1/87, 30 November 1987.

31 Lt Col P.J. Abigail to author, 10 August 1989.

32 Lt Col S.V.L. Willis to author, 27 September 1989.

33 CGS Directive No 3/1980, 5 May 1980.

34 In the eight years from 1981 to 1989 it was won in succession by 2/4, 6, 8/9, 6, 6, 1, 1, 3 and 8/9 RAR.

35 2/4 RAR won the Bicentennial Military Skills Competition in December 1988.

CHAPTER 14

1 Palazzo, The Australian Army, p. 336.

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid., p. 337.

4 The report also advocated continuing support to UN peacekeeping operations. De Somer, The Capacity of the Australian Army to Conduct and Sustain Land Force Operations, p. 68; Kuring, Redcoats to Cams, p. 411.

5 Restructuring the Australian Army, pp. iii and 3.

6 Australia’s Strategic Policy 1997, p. 41.

7 Grey, The Australian Army, p. 253.

8 Kuring, Redcoats to Cams, p. 403.

9 Coates and Smith, Review of the Ready Reserve Scheme, p. 4.

10 A total of 5220 ARA positions were lost with 2209 of these coming from Land Command. The review recommended restructuring the army around ten brigades and 21 infantry battalions with emphasis placed on independent brigade operations. With such an emphasis the role of the three divisional headquarters was irrevocably changed. Headquarters 1st Division transitioned to a Deployable Joint Force Headquarters, Headquarters 2nd Division was retained but with a skeleton staff focusing on administrative, training and doctrinal matters for the brigades not in the 1st Division, while Headquarters 3rd Division was disbanded on its 75th birthday. Palazzo, The Australian Army, pp. 348–9, and Kuring, Redcoats to Cams, p. 403.

11 1999 The Army in Profile, p. 10.

12 Palazzo, The Australian Army, p. 359.

13 1999 The Army in Profile, p. 10; and Liston, ‘Phoenix’, p. 35.

14 Grey, Australian Army, p. 255.

15 Kuring, Redcoats to Cams, p. 406.

16 For a full account of Operation Solace see Breen, A Little Bit of Hope, p. 263.

17 Attachments included a squadron (minus) of APCs from 3/4th Cavalry Regiment, an engineer troop, an intelligence cell, a logistics element, and a civil–military liaison detachment consisting of the battery commander’s party and forward observer teams from 1 RAR’s direct support artillery unit, 107th Battery, 4th Field Regiment. The total size of the force that left Australia was 937 all ranks. Once in place a US Marine radio reconnaissance team, counterintelligence and psy-ops cells were also attached. The battalion was inexperienced and initially ill-prepared to make use of these US attachments with, for example, neither the intelligence officer nor the commanding officer ever having worked with a counterintelligence team before. D.J. Hurley, ‘In the Service of Peace’ (transcript of interview conducted by J. Simpson), in Pratten and Harper (eds), Still the Same, p. 244; and Grey, A Military History of Australia, p. 263.

18 Grey, Australian Army, p. 247.

19 Grey, A Military History of Australia, p. 263.

20 McBean, ‘Taking Comfort from Solace’, p. 16.

21 Given the operation was unfolding just after a posting cycle, some angst initially arose over who was to deploy and who was not, especially as manpower restrictions meant that some battalion personnel were to be left behind in order to accommodate specialist attachments. In a few cases those who were familiar with the unit were given priority over their replacements. In general, however, soldiers who had already effected their removal from Townsville continued on their way while those still in the area remained and deployed with the unit. Hurley, ‘In the Service of Peace’, p. 229; Grey, Australian Army, p. 247; and Babington, ‘Operation Solace—A Perspective’, p. 35.

22 McBean, ‘Taking Comfort from Solace’, p. 18.

23 Hurley, ‘In the Service of Peace’, p. 230.

24 Babington, ‘Operation Solace—A Perspective’, p. 35.

25 Odgers, 100 Years of Australians at War, p. 380.

26 Grey, Australian Army, p. 246.

27 Campbell, ‘Operation Solace’, p. 5.

28 Ibid., p. 5.

29 Ibid.

30 Hurley, ‘In the Service of Peace’, p. 240.

31 Babington, ‘Operation Solace—A Perspective’, p. 41.

32 Ibid.; Babington’s ironic reference is, of course, to the line from the film Apocalypse Now when the character of Colonel Kilgore states that napalm in the morning smells like victory.

33 Hurley, ‘In the Service of Peace’, p. 235.

34 Babington, ‘Operation Solace—A Perspective’, p. 36.

35 Hurley, ‘Operation Solace’, p. 30.

36 Initially Support Company provided the QRF for the rifle companies but later in the deployment it was used as a fifth sub-unit. Hurley, ‘In the Service of Peace’, p. 233.

37 Ibid., p. 246.

38 Campbell, ‘Operation Solace’, p. 5.

39 Kuring, Redcoats to Cams, p. 407.

40 Hurley, ‘In the Service of Peace’, p. 234.

41 Babington, ‘Operation Solace—A Perspective’, p. 39.

42 Ibid.

43 Ibid.

44 Ibid., p. 40.

45 Hurley, ‘In the Service of Peace’, pp. 235–6.

46 Ibid.

47 Babington, ‘Operation Solace—A Perspective’, p. 40.

48 Hurley, ‘In the Service of Peace’, p. 236.

49 Campbell, ‘Operation Solace’, p. 7.

50 Babington, ‘Operation Solace—A Perspective’, p. 39; and Hurley, ‘In the Service of Peace’, p. 238.

51 Kuring, Redcoats to Cams, p. 410.

52 Babington, ‘Operation Solace—A Perspective’, p. 36.

53 Hurley, ‘In the Service of Peace’, p. 250.

54 Ibid., p. 237.

55 McTavish, ‘Rifle Platoon Command Experience—Operation Solace’, p. 12.

56 McBean, ‘Taking Comfort from Solace’, p. 18.

57 D Company, 6 RAR was made the fourth rifle company of 2/4 RAR on ODF duties until the return of 1 RAR. 6 RAR Annual Magazine 1993, p. 17.

58 Hurley, ‘Operation Solace’, p. 30.

59 Ibid., pp. 29–30.

60 Hurley, ‘In the Service of Peace’, pp. 233–4.

61 This facility, known as Line Creek Junction, contains 37 buildings including shops, a hotel, a railway station, council chambers, homes and an underground sewage system. Kuring, Redcoats to Cams, p. 418.

62 Ibid., p. 238.

63 McTavish, ‘Rifle Platoon Command Experience—Operation Solace’, p. 13.

64 Ibid.

65 Hurley, ‘Operation Solace’, p. 33.

66 UNTAC was to help ‘provide a peaceful and stable atmosphere by assisting the disengagement and demobilisation of each of the military factions’. There were about 400,000 armed men in the country at the time. Bastian, ‘Khmer Nation Awaits Peace’, p. 29.

67 The Tiger Journal, 1991, p. 4.

68 Ibid., 1993, p. 61.

69 To this end the platoon deployed with two MAG 58 general purpose machine-guns with tripods and night vision equipment in addition to their normal platoon equipment. Kuring, Redcoats to Cams, p. 410.

70 Odgers, 100 Years of Australians at War, p. 382.

71 Kuring, Redcoats to Cams, p. 411.

72 The Tiger Journal, 1997, p. 92.

73 Kuring, Redcoats to Cams, p. 412.

74 Quoted in Odgers, 100 Years of Australians at War, p. 383.

75 Palazzo, The Australian Army, pp. 346–51; and Defence Report 1990–91, p. 65.

76 The ODF was renamed the Ready Deployment Force (RDF) in 1992.

77 Green, ‘Spearhead of the Army’, p. 7.

78 Kapyong Kronicle, 1991, p. 39.

79 Ibid., 1994, pp. 4, 13.

80 Gilby, ‘Airborne’, p. 112.

81 Near deployments like Operation Vista, involving the evacuation of Australians from Phnom Penh in Cambodia in 1997, convinced the new commanding officer of 3 RAR, Lt Col R.M. Boyd, that ‘the battalion’s operational readiness was tested and proven . . . the speed at which events unfolded, validated the Battalion’s readiness requirement and capability’ while at the same time acknowledging ‘the frustration that many of you have expressed to me this year, concerning our continuing lack of operational exposure’. Kapyong Kronicle, 1996, p. 10, and 1997, p. 4.

82 The Tiger Journal, 1991, p. 26.

83 Females were even introduced into BHQ and Admin Company to help relieve manning difficulties in 6 RAR in 1990. They left the unit in 1991. 6 RAR Annual Magazine, 1990, pp. 3–4 and 8.

84 8/9 RAR had been plagued with personnel shortfalls since 1980 when the introduction of the ODF stripped it of over 250 soldiers.

85 8/9 RAR Association Homepage, www.89rar.asn.au.

86 Review of the Ready Reserve Scheme, p. 6.

87 Ibid., p. 25.

88 Drayton, ‘Maintaining the Ready Reserve’, p. 23; and Review of the Ready Reserve Scheme, pp. viii, 51–2.

89 With the introduction of the RRes, 6th Brigade was set to expand from 2900 members (2000 ARA and 900 General Reserve (GRes)) to 3700 (700 ARA and 3000 RRes), Review of the Ready Reserve Scheme, pp. 4–5 and 45.

90 Former ARA or GRes members had a part-time commitment of five years rather than the one year full-time and four years’ part-time service demanded of new recruits. A third category of RRes soldier was also established in late 1994 for ‘specialists’ whereby a member served for two years full-time followed by four years’ part-time service. Review of the Ready Reserve Scheme, p. viii.

91 Grey, Australian Army, p. 249.

92 Review of the Ready Reserve Scheme, p. 44.

93 6 RAR Annual Magazine, 1991, p. 3.

94 Review of the Ready Reserve Scheme, p. 37.

95 The success in attracting new recruits to RRes service was not, however, replicated in ex-serving ARA members or GRes soldiers. With uncertainty over what training requirements were necessary in order to effect a transfer both categories showed general unwillingness to commit to RRes obligations. Grey, Australian Army, p. 250; and Review of the Ready Reserve Scheme, p. 35.

96 Grey, Australian Army, p. 251.

97 Review of the Ready Reserve Scheme, p. 33.

98 Wastage rates were always low in comparison with general enlistees (1.8 per cent as compared to 4.7 per cent for ARA recruits from 1992 to 1994). Ready Reserve officer training began in 1994 with 30 recruited in 1993–94 and 31 in the following year. RRes officer training was similar to that given to national service officers during the Vietnam era and consisted of four weeks at Kapooka and twenty weeks at the Royal Military College, Duntroon. Review of the Ready Reserve Scheme, pp. 32–7; and C.H. Burton (et al.), ‘Ready Reserve Training at the 1st Recruit Training Battalion, Kapooka, 1992’, p. 28.

99 6 RAR Annual Magazine, 1992, p. 2.

100 During the operation of the RRes scheme the Army Reserve was renamed the ‘General Reserve’. The name reverted to its original form following the demise of the RRes. Review of the Ready Reserve Scheme, pp. v and 23.

101 McBean, ‘Ready Shield’, p. 16.

102 Review of the Ready Reserve Scheme, pp. 91–2.

103 6 RAR Annual Magazine, 1994, p. 2 and 1995, p. 3.

104 The Defence of Australia: Defence White Paper, 1987, p. x.

105 Ibid., p. 53.

106 In specifying the requirements of the ‘motorisation vehicle’ the army explained the ‘priority is mobility on roads’ as ‘it is not intended to be a fighting vehicle or to drive across country and assault the enemy position. It is intended to give the occupants protection against harassing fire or ambush’. Anon., ‘Move Faster and Win’, p. 15.

107 Kuring, Redcoats to Cams, pp. 414–5.

108 Phase Two of Project Bushranger, the tender process for the ‘real’ infantry motorisation vehicle, was also under way. The selection and production of the final Bushranger vehicle, however, proved to be more difficult than anticipated. It was not until March 1999 that the ADI Bushmaster was finally chosen. Phase Three, the production of these vehicles, fared no better with the first Bushranger ceremonially accepted by the Chief of Army in August 2003. Ibid.; and Anon., ‘Move Faster and Win’, p. 15.

109 6 RAR Annual Magazine, 1992, p.2

110 Anon., ‘Move Faster and Win’, p. 14.

111 Anon., ‘Move Faster and Win’, p. 15.

112 Ibid., p. 18.

113 Frewen, ‘Motorisation, Enhanced Mobility for the Infantry’, p. 29.

114 Allen and Caldwell (eds), Red Phoenix, p. 22.

115 Kuring, Redcoats to Cams, p. 411.

116 Ibid., pp. xi–xii and 32.

117 Palazzo, The Australian Army, p. 338.

118 The Tiger Journal, 1997, p. 82.

119 Ibid., 1998, p. 80.

120 Grey, Australian Army, p. 252.

121 Ibid.

122 Ibid.

123 Such Task Forces bore a close resemblance to past pentropic battle group experiments. Restructuring the Australian Army, p. 3.

124 Ibid., p. 4.

125 Ibid., p. iv; and Palazzo, The Australian Army, pp. 364–5.

126 The two RRes units affected were 6 RAR and 49 RQR (which was combined with the GRes 25 RQR to become 25/49 RQR). In addition, two GRes units, 5/6 RVR in Victoria and 16 RWAR in Western Australia, were allocated a limited number of ARA infantrymen to become integrated units.

127 Kuring, Redcoats to Cams, p. 420.

128 8/9 RAR Association Homepage, www.89rar.asn.au.

129 Department of Defence, 1999 The Army in Profile, p. 15.

130 5/7 RAR Little History Book.

131 In addition, Admin Company was renamed Logistics Company and from January 1998 was merged with Technical Support Company to form a Combat Support Company. The Tiger Journal, 1997, pp. 17 and 52.

132 Ibid., 1998, p. 2.

133 Anon, ‘The A21 Motorised Infantry Battalion’, pp. 19–23, and 6 RAR Annual Magazine, 1998–99, p. 24. The LAV–25s used for the trial were some of the USMC supplied vehicles left over from the RAAC trials in the 1990s, and not the ASLAV–25s eventually introduced into full service.

134 The battalion’s Admin Company was also transformed into a Combat Service Support Company with Technical Support Platoon renamed Equipment Support Platoon. 6 RAR Annual Magazine, 1998–99, p. 33.

135 Anon, ‘The A21 Motorised Infantry Battalion’, pp. 19–23.

136 6 RAR Annual Magazine, 1998–99, p. 3.

137 Ibid.

138 Kuring, Redcoats to Cams, pp. 422–3.

139 Palazzo, The Australian Army, p. 360.

140 Restructuring the Australian Army, p. 103.

141 Allen and Caldwell, Red Phoenix, p. 93.

142 Collins, Strike Swiftly, p. 243.

143 Ibid.

144 Along with these key postings a number of intelligence and signals corps personnel were sent to 4 RAR to support its new role. Larger than standard Technical Support and Quartermasters Platoons were also added. Underwood and de Heer, ‘Name Change to 4 RAR’, The Fourth Battalion of the Royal Australian Regiment (4 RAR); and Anon., ‘The Regiment Today’, p. 46.

145 All commando candidates were required to complete commando basic training, the basic parachute course, a commando amphibious operators course and a special forces military roping course. From 1998 a commando selection course of ten days was added to assess candidate suitability. Upon completion of this initial training soldiers attended courses in special forces ‘close quarter battle’, ‘first aid’, ‘signals’ and ‘demolitions’. Allen and Caldwell, Red Phoenix, p. xii.

146 Ibid.; and Logue, ‘Commando’, p. 11.

147 Logue, ‘Commando’, p. 13.

148 Hurley, ‘In the Service of Peace’, p. 239.

149 Ibid.

150 Kuring, Redcoats to Cams, pp. 407, 423.

151 Hurley, ‘In the Service of Peace’, pp. 244–5.

152 Kuring, Redcoats to Cams, pp. 418–19.

153 The system was not without its drawbacks, however, with ‘bullets’ sometimes reflected by blades of grass or flimsy barriers certainly not sufficient to deflect a real projectile. Nonetheless, IWESS remained a useful training aid. Kapyong Kronicle, 1993, p. 20.

154 Both the F88 and F89 fired new NATO SS109 5.56 mm ammunition which had superseded the previous 7.62 mm standard. The SS109 round was selected as the 7.62 mm replacement because it had better accuracy and penetrating power than any other contender, including the old round. Williamson, ‘Weapon of the Future’, p. 49.

155 Kuring, Redcoats to Cams, p. 399.

156 Lt J.A. McTavish, a platoon commander during Operation Solace, reflected that ‘one of the most poignant lessons was the effectiveness of the SS109 round which, although small, is effective and will kill’. Of course individuals and sections could also carry, and therefore apply to an enemy in contact, far more 5.56 mm than 7.62 mm ammunition. McTavish, ‘Rifle Platoon Command Experience—Operation Solace’, p. 14.

157 It was noteworthy, however, that in the face of modern doctrine, likely battlefields, potential adversaries and advances in military technology in the 1990s, the tactical relevance of area defence and deliberate attacks against a ‘dug in’ enemy had declined sharply.

158 Although DFSW platoons could operate in either capacity they could not do so simultaneously. Vehicle-mounted 106 mm recoilless rifles were withdrawn from all units but 5/7 RAR, which neither required, nor possessed, a sustained fire machine-gun capability. Kuring, Redcoats to Cams, p. 439.

159 This loss represented a serious decline in anti-armoured capability for the unit. 5/7 RAR was left with its 66 mm, 84 mm and 106 mm anti-armoured systems, all of which were becoming obsolete in a decade of significant technological advances in armoured and anti-armour capability.

160 An M203 attachment for the F88 and a range of ‘bullet catching’ and rocket-propelled alternatives were trialled but not acquired. As an unsatisfactory interim measure riflemen were issued with the Vietnam era M79 grenade launchers to carry in addition to their personal weapons.

161 Logue, ‘Wundurra Future Warrior’, pp. 45–6.

162 The Australian designed and built F1 high explosive hand grenade also replaced the venerable M26 hand grenade from late 1999. Kuring, Redcoats to Cams, p. 428.

163 Ibid., p. 414.

164 Kapyong Kronicle, 1992, p. 33.

165 Hurley, ‘In the Service of Peace’, p. 227.

166 Despite the fact that soldiers were briefed to drink large amounts of water to replace fluid lost by perspiration, over 100 were evacuated for heat stress. P. Greville, ‘K92 Pointer to Future but Anchored in Past’, Duty First 1:3 (June 1992), p. 7.

167 From 1995 the high-level Kangaroo exercises were replaced by the Crocodile series. The first of these, Crocodile 99, was conducted on a relatively small scale at Shoalwater Bay in Queensland in September–November 1999 with Australian participation truncated by the deployment of units to East Timor. The exercise featured an amphibious landing by US Marines opposed by 6 RAR and other units of the integrated ARA/Reserve 7th Task Force from Enoggera. Kuring, Redcoats to Cams, p. 395; and Warwick, ‘K95’, p. 17.

168 The Tiger Journal, 1998, p. 13.

169 Kapyong Kronicle, 1998, p. 54.

170 Logue, ‘Phoenix 98’, p. 13.

171 Anon., ‘Swift Eagle’, pp. 30–7.

172 G. McBean, ‘Ready Shield’, pp. 12–14.

173 The Tiger Journal, 1994, p. 6.

174 Ibid., 1993, p. 6.

175 Ibid., 1994, p. 6.

176 Green, ‘Spearhead of the Army’, p. 8.

177 Hurley, ‘In the Service of Peace’, p. 227.

178 Hurley, ‘Operation Solace’, p. 29.

179 Ibid., 1998, p. 53.

180 Ibid., p. 4.

181 Anon., ‘The Regiment Today’, p. 46.

182 6 RAR Annual Magazine, 1990, p. 4.

183 Ibid.

184 8/9 RAR Association Homepage, www.89rar.asn.au.

185 6 RAR Annual Magazine, 1995, p. 54.

186 Ibid., 1998–99, p. 2

CHAPTER 15

1 Breen, Mission Accomplished, pp. 1–14; Stockings (ed.), Paratroopers as Peacekeepers; and Jordan, ‘3 RAR Timor 1999’, pp. 27–32.

2 For a more detailed account, see Stockings (ed.), Paratroopers as Peacekeepers; and Breen, Mission Accomplished.

3 Ferndale (ed.), Operation Lorosae, p. 7.

4 Ferndale (ed.), Operation Lorosae, p. 8; and Lt Col Jim Ryan to author, 12 May 2006.

5 Cited in Breen, Mission Accomplished, p. 57.

6 Ibid., p. 63.

7 Horner, SAS: Phantoms of War, pp. 506–8; and McPhedran, The Amazing SAS, pp. 94–6.

8 Stockings (ed.), Paratroopers as Peacekeepers, p. 36.

9 Ibid., pp. 62–4.

10 Brig S. Gould to author, 12 May 2006.

11 Londey, ‘UN Blue: 5/7 RAR in East Timor’, p. 19.

12 Brig S. Gould to author, 12 May 2006.

13 Londey, ‘UN Blue: 5/7 RAR in East Timor’; and Brig S. Gould to author, 12 May 2006.

14 Breen, Mission Accomplished, pp. 90–1.

15 Londey, ‘UN Blue’, pp. 14 and 20; and Breen, ‘Humanitarian Assistance, Nation Building and Border Operations’, pp. 3–9.

16 Cross, ‘5/7 Mech on the Border’, p. 11; and Brig S. Gould to author, 12 May 2006.

17 Breen, ‘Humanitarian Assistance, Nation Building and Border Operations’, chapter 1, p. 5 and chapter 1, p. 9.

18 Ibid., pp. 5–10.

19 Thies, ‘6th Battalion The Royal Australian Regiment’, p. 25; Breen, ‘Humanitarian Assistance, Nation Building and Border Operations’; John McCaffery to author, 12 May 2006; and Good (ed.), Back to the Border, pp. 10–11.

20 Breen, ‘Humanitarian Assistance’, Preface.

21 Ferndale (ed.), Operation Lorosae; Hoyer, ‘1 RAR in 2001’, pp. 20–2; Caligari, ‘One RAR Operation Tanager’, pp. 65–71; Breen, ‘Humanitarian Assistance’, chapter 11, p. 1 and chapter 11, p. 7; and Good (ed.), Back to the Border, p. 11.

22 Breen, ‘Humanitarian Assistance’, pp. 12–3.

23 Ferndale (ed.), Operation Lorosae, pp. 149–50.

24 Ferndale (ed.), Operation Lorosae, pp. 65 and 150; and Hoyer, ‘1 RAR in 2001’, pp. 20–2.

25 Brig J. Caligari to author, May 2006.

26 Ferndale (ed.), Operation Lorosae, pp. 60–1.

27 Campbell (ed.), 4 RAR BN GP in East Timor, pp. 11–24; and Cunningham and Collins, ‘Operation Tanager: 4 RAR Battalion Group in East Timor’, pp. 72–7.

28 Ibid.

29 Ibid.

30 ‘Foreword’ in Campbell (ed.), 4 RAR BN GP in East Timor, p. 1.

31 Campbell, ‘Foreword’ in Good (ed.), Back to the Border, p. v.

32 Cited in Good (ed.), Back to the Border, p. 48.

33 Good (ed.), Back to the Border, pp. 124–41.

34 Anon., ‘Old Faithful’, p. 38.

35 The term is a reference to the film Ground Hog Day in which the main character, played by Bill Murray, is condemned to relive the same day over and over again.

36 See, for instance, Ferndale (ed.), Operation Lorosae, chapters 4 and 5.

37 Anon., ‘AUSBATT VII—Timor TCL Ops’, pp. 62–4; and Kook, ‘First Reserve Deployment Overseas Since WWII’, p. 33. Army reservists had also served in significant numbers in previous rotations, most notably with the first 6 RAR battalion group rotation in 2000.

38 Brownlie, ‘5th/7th Battalion Engineer Group’, pp. 12–14.

39 Anon., ‘AUSBATT VII—Timor TCL Ops’, pp. 62–4; and Good (ed.), Back to the Border, p. 211.

40 Col S. Smith to author, 31 May 2006.

41 Lt Col Richard H. Marson, DSO, ED, was the first CO of 1 RAR.

42 Capt Peter Badcoe, VC, was a previous BC of 107 Field Battery, 4 Field Regiment in 1965.

43 Gen Peter J. Cosgrove, AC, MC, was the CO of 1 RAR from 1983 to 1985.

44 Lt Alexander ‘Sandy’ MacGregor, MC, commanded the engineer troop supporting 1 RAR in South Vietnam in 1966.

45 See Timor Blue: AUSBATT VIII; Smith, ‘From the Commanding Officer’s Desk’, p. 34; Farrell, ‘AUSBATT VIII/IX 1 RAR/6 RAR on the East Timor TCL’, pp. 62–4; and Col S. Smith to author, 31 May 2006.

46 Col S. Smith to author, 31 May 2006.

47 Anon., ‘AUSBATT IX/WESTBATT End of the ANZAC Era in Independent East Timor’, pp. 52–4; Leech ‘There ’til the End in the Former East Timor’, p. 37; and Leech, ‘East Timor Operation Citadel Draws to a Close’, pp. 32–6.

48 These included an APC troop from the 2nd/14th Light Horse Regiment (QMI), an S–70 Blackhawk troop from the 5th Aviation Regiment, an engineering troop from the 2nd Combat Engineer Regiment, a Civil Military Cooperation Team provided by the 1st Field Regiment and a fully equipped surgical team from the 2nd Health Support Battalion. See Capt Gwilym Leech, ‘East Timor Operation Citadel Draws to a close’, Australian Infantry Magazine, pp. 32–6.

49 Ibid.

50 www.defence.gov.au/opastute/defauLthtm, 31 May 2006.

51 www.defence.gov.au/opastute/defauLthtm, 31 May 2006; and Lt Col J. 51 www.defence.gov.au/opastute/defauLthtm, 31 May 2006; and Lt Col J. Frewen to author, 30 May 2006.Frewen to author, 30 May 2006.

52 Lt Col A. Gallaway and Brig J. Caligari to author, May 2006.

53 Frewen, ‘Restoring Peace to the Solomon Islands’, p. 37.

54 Ibid.

55 Frewen, ‘2 RAR Update’, p. 37; and Hawke and Krik, ‘Operation Anode: Here They Come’, pp. 24–7.

56 Lt Col J. Frewen to author, 12 May 2006.

57 Richard Ponzio, cited in Fullilove, ‘RAMSI and State Building in Solomon Islands’, pp. 31–2.

58 Fullilove, ‘RAMSI and State Building in Solomon Islands’, p. 34.

59 Warner cited in Fullilove, ‘RAMSI and State Building in Solomon Islands’, p. 34.

60 Frewen, ‘Restoring Peace to the Solomon Islands’, p. 37

61 Fullilove, ‘RAMSI and State Building in Solomon Islands’, p. 34.

62 Frewen, ‘Restoring Peace to the Solomon Islands’, p. 40

63 Ibid., pp. 38–41.

64 Ibid., p. 41; and ‘Op Anode RAMSI ADF Downsize due to mission success’, Australian and NZ Defender 46 (Winter 2004), pp. 38–9.

65 Field, ‘Our Elite Battalions Report’, pp. 14–16; Anon., ‘Solomon Island’, pp. 13–16; and Anon., ‘Ready Company Group Deploys to the Solomon Islands’, pp. 10–11.

66 Field, ‘Our Elite Battalions Report’, pp. 14–16.

67 Findlay, ‘3 RAR’, p. 19; and Anon.,‘Para Dies in Solomon Is’, p. 23.

68 Capt Al Green, ‘Quick to respond to crisis’, Army: The Soldiers’ Newspaper, 4 May 2006, p. 2.

69 Ibid.

70 Lt Simone Heyer, ‘Peace Restored: Calm returns after riots in Solomons’, Army: The Soldiers’ Newspaper, 4 May 2006, p. 3.

71 Cited in Collins, Strike Swiftly, pp. 243–4.

72 Anon., ‘4 RAR Command’, Australian Infantry Magazine (October 2002), pp. 36–7; and Davies, ‘Commando Capability’, p. 15.

73 Anon., ‘4th Battalion (Commando) Royal Australian Regiment On Operations in Iraq’, pp. 28–30; and Anon., ‘4 RAR (CDO)’, p. 61.

74 Birtles, ‘The Australian Security Detachment in Baghdad’, pp. 45–6.

75 Maj K. Fegan to author, May 2006.

76 Anon., ‘JTF 633: Iraq Ops’, pp. 28–9.

77 Shovell, ‘Attacks on Iraq Security Detachment: Four Incidents in as Many Weeks’, p. 4.

78 Anon., ‘Bahghdad: Blood and Bombs’, pp. 32–5.

79 Norris, ‘Security Detachment Iraq—The Infantry Contribution’, p. 22.

80 ‘Sorrow and loss: Pte Jake Kovoco our first fatality in Iraq’, Army: The Soldiers’ Newspaper, 4 May, 2006, p. 5.

81 Hodge, ‘5th/7th Battalion Post Deployment Report—Iraq’, p. 10; Farrell, ‘Task Force Eagle’, pp. 28–38; and Anon., ‘Al Muthanna’, pp. 28–37.

82 Hodge, ‘5th/7th Battalion Post Deployment Report—Iraq’, p. 12; and Anon., ‘Al Muthanna’, pp. 28–37.

83 Ibid., p. 14.

84 Lt Col R. Noble to author, May 2006.

85 Ibid.

86 Anon., ‘Samawah AMTG River City Ops’, p. 18.

87 Short, ‘Tiger Battalion Deploys to Iraq’, pp. 6–9.

88 Jenkins, ‘Skylark king on Iraqi ops’, Army: The Soldiers’ Newspaper, 4 May, 2006, p. 12.

89 Short, ‘Tiger Battalion Deploys to Iraq’, pp. 6–9.

90 http://www.defence.gov.au/opcatalyst/images/gallery/20060929a/index.htm downloaded 20 January 2007.

91 http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/NelsonMinTpl.cfm?CurrentId=597791  http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/NelsonMinTpl.cfm?CurrentId=5977 MIN 127/06 of 4 September 2006 downloaded 20 January 2007; ‘Attack on Australian Soldiers in Southern Iraq, Friday, 29 September 2006’, 9.58 am, Press Release.

92 Department of Defence Media Mail List, CPA 263/06 Thursday, 28 September 2006.

93 Max Blenkin, ‘Diggers to stay in Iraq well into 2007’, 23 November 2006, 7.18 pm, article from AAP.

94 www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,20867,20742104–1702,00.html ‘More Australian troops fly to Iraq’, 11 November 2006.

95 Anon., ‘Australian Special Forces Withdraw from Afghanistan’, p. 44.

96 Anon., ‘SOTG Afghanistan’, pp. 28–37.

97 Author’s discussion with Lt Col M. Smethurst, November 2006.

98 Maj Gen Hindmarsh cited in ‘Kicking the Taliban where it hurts’, 25 Oct 2006, theage.com.au.

99 Ibid.

100 ‘Kicking the Taliban where it hurts’, 25 Oct 2006, theage.com.au

101 www.defence.gov.au/media/download/2006/Sep/20060901.cfm, 1 September 2006 Defence Minister Visits Reconstruction Task Force, downloaded on 21 January 2007.

102 www.minister.defence.gov.au/NelsonMinTpl.cfm?CurrentId=6102 MIN 141/ 06 dated 31 Oct 06, downloaded 20 January 2007.

103 Findlay, ‘3 RAR’, p. 19.

104 Ibid.

105 Anon., ‘5th/7th Battalion The Royal Australian Regiment’, p. 39.

106 Thies, ‘6th Battalion The Royal Australian Regiment’, p. 25.

107 Anon., ‘Aussies exercise in New Caledonia’, pp. 46–7; and Prickett, ‘3rd Battalion Royal Australian Regiment’, p. 19.

108 Psaikos, ‘2nd Battalion The Royal Australian Regiment’, p. 23.

109 Anon., ‘PCG Paras Jump into EX Arnhem 04’, p. 26.

110 Farrell, ‘Ex Crocodile 03’, pp. 8–15; and Anon., ‘Talisman Sabre 05’, pp. 8–16.

111 ‘Joint Evacuation EX Swift Eagle’, Australian and NZ Defender 48 (Summer 2004), pp. 9–15; and ‘Hawaiian Wargames RIMPAC 2004’, Australian and NZ Defender 47 (Spring 2004) pp. 8–15.

112 Anon., ‘Ex Mercury 04’, pp. 28–31.

113 Anon., ‘CTEX Mercury 05’, pp. 23–6.

114 Appleton, ‘Foreword’, p. 2.

115 Chief of Army, Lt Gen Peter Leahy, speech to the Royal United Services Institute, Hobart, 15 September 2005.

116 Ryan, ‘Hardened and Networked Army—An Army for now and the future’, pp. 10–11.

117 Chief of Army, Lt Gen Peter Leahy, speech to ADI Thales dinner, 22 March 2006.

118 Ibid.

119 Appleton, ‘Foreword’, p. 6.

120 Anon., ‘Infantry 2012: the new battalion and the rule of four LWC 2005’, p. 55.

121 Brailey, The Transformation of Special Operations Forces in Contemporary Conflict, p. 10.

122 Ibid, p. 3.

123 Maj Gen Mike Hindmarsh, ‘The Philosophy of Special Operations’, in The Australian Army Journal, 3: 3 (Summer 2006), p. 13.

124 ‘Army gets 2,600 extra troops’, theage.com.au, 24 August 2006, downloaded 28 January 2007.

CHAPTER 16

1 O’Neill, Combat Operations, p. 84.

2 Ibid., p 85.

3 Argent, ‘A Battalion Prepares for War’, pp. 19–20.

4 3 RAR war diary, August–September 1950.

5 Information concerning the enemy’s intentions and mistakes comes from Maj I. McNeill, Official History Unit, on his return from discussions with ex-VC leaders in Vietnam in 1988.

APPENDIX A

1 Information on awards on the Vietnam end of war honours list, and those for service in Somalia, Rwanda, East Timor and Afghanistan kindly provided by the Directorate of Honours and Awards, Department of Defence.